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Abstract: 
 
A Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenology of technology and vision: 
towards an existential – ontological understanding of social being. 
 
This thesis turns to Martin Heidegger to develop an interpretive framework to answer the 
question that has increasingly been thrust to the fore of 21st century society: what is the 
nature of the relationship between technology and society? And related to this central 
question is the matter of how society and social being is altered by technology and its 
modalities of vision? The basic argument that has been advanced to address this question 
revolves around the fact that in as much as we use technology as a means to serve 
practical ends, it displaces certain tasks and functions, which would otherwise be 
necessary, and thus truncates or reduces the scope of social practices in our everyday 
social routines. However, it does not simply end there as we illustrate that social practices 
encompass, to varying degrees, a different range and scope of social relationships which 
are instantiated in their wake. Considered together we found that these relations 
constitute a nexus of social connections, which we take up as the quality of sociality. The 
implications for our argument that sociabilities and sociality converge to produce an 
understanding of social being means that any technological encroachments which 
displace our social practices and social connectives alters our understanding of social 
being and thus how we understand ourselves, the world and others. We take up this 
theme of the displacement of our social being, sociality and sociabilities by considering 
two outcomes that modern technology seems to open up: equipmentality and curiosity. 
Firstly, as regards equipmentality we have noted that it connect us to our sociality and 
sociabilities and thus inures our understanding of social being, however, by contrast 
Heidegger finds in (idle) curiosity a second outcome that dooms us to the dystopian fate 
of nihilism. There is thus no fait accompli as regards modern technology’s nihilistic 
tendencies. This does not mean that we can be complacent about our future. But it does 
mean, on a positive note, that we human beings do have a responsibility to recognize 
technology’s efficacious ontological dimension for disclosing our being and the world. 
By contrast, on the negative task, our responsibility does extend to resisting modern 
technology’s nihilistic ontological wasteland, which does not admit objects, things or for 
that matter human beings, but only the flattened insubstantial being of resources as 
standing reserve for the technological system, bereft of sociality, humanity and an 
understanding of social be-ing.  
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Chapter One 
The Organization, Structure and Logic of the Thesis.  
Title: A Heideggerian Hermeneutic Phenomenology of 
Technology and Vision: Towards an Existential – Ontological 
understanding of social being. 
 
1.1 Introduction: Background and Motivation  
The initial thinking of this doctoral study drew its inspiration from the democratic 
transformation of South Africa and its ‘nation-building’ project from the vantage point of 
understanding this ‘new’ nationhood being born. In light of this I conceived of a research 
program that could distil the shape of and recuperate the emergent imagined communities 
(Anderson, 1983) of a national, continental and global scope, in public media. This was 
to be achieved through a discourse analysis of those television genres that occupied the 
largest sectors of public interest for their meaningful content for said imaginations. The 
more I pursued this the more I had the nagging feeling that I had left a prior question 
unasked and thus left somewhat adrift in this silence.  
 
There were certain silences that were left a begging: firstly, in seeking out the different 
levels of generality in the national, continental and global I had overlooked quotidian 
everyday practices, and comportment to objects that inure social being and our sociality; 
and secondly, in pursuing said thematics of media content I had overlooked the relations 
entered into vis-à-vis technological objects and their modalities of vision, and how these 
relate to social being. And finally I had overlooked a grounded concept of what it meant 
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to be this social being we call human, and Heidegger calls Dasein, and how our relations 
to other human beings, objects and ourselves are anchored existentially and ontologically.  
 
The point of theoretical interest that arose in respect to the latter silences was a matter of 
how to reconcile the social practices, perceptions and meanings that people are engaged 
in as matter of course, in their everyday lives, within a technological milieu as a way to 
consider questions of social transformation from the ground up. The strong argument of 
this thesis is that in taking as our starting point Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology 
of modern technology and perception as vision we open up a different way to think about 
the conditions of possibility that instantiates our sociality and the various sociabilities that 
are manifested and that coalesce in social being.  
 
In short we open up in Heideggerian vein an existential – ontological understanding of, 
what we prefer to call as will become increasingly evident, our social being. What we 
bring to the fore and make explicit by way of this thesis is the unraveling or 
‘deconstruction’ of the taken-for-granted in the notions embedded in “human nature”, 
being “social” and “social being”. For it is here, after all, that we encounter the meanings 
entailed in the technological shaping of social life, in a modality of being that though 
variously described comes down at bottom to an alienation or estrangement from our 
sociality, and thus our humanity as beings who are structured by care and concern for 
their collective existence.  
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1.2 Theoretical focus:  
 
To put the central questions directly:  
 
• what is the constitutive structure of our human way of social be-ing, and how is it 
related to our sociality;  
• how does this sociality translate into sociabilities, that is, our comportments and 
encounters with the world of things, that is technology, and how does this relate to 
social being? 
• what are the modalities of vision that accompany the different modes of being (ways 
to be) and encounter beings (forms) and how does this relate to our technological 
modality of being and social being?  
 
The overarching aim is: 
 
• to explore the existential – ontological constitution and meaning of social being, by 
way of a phenomenology of technology and equipmentality, and perception-vision 
and its intentional comportment, and their articulation, for understanding the social 
modalities of social be-ing, sociality and sociability instantiated in dealing and coping 
with the quotidian order of everyday life as it is or stands to be interpolated by the 
way of revealing of modern technology and its nihilism.  
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1.2.1 The problematic 
This thesis is fundamentally concerned with social being and how it is or has or 
potentially can be altered and displaced by what we have set up as the technological 
condition and the visual condition that beset us. In technology we argue, in Heideggerian 
vein, that it is not merely an instrumental modality, nor only a human activity, though it’s 
fundamental characteristics may be so understood. We take up Heidegger’s ontological 
thesis and make the argument accordingly that technology is a way of revealing being, 
the world and nature, in that which comes to be, in its modality of making and producing 
things. However, this ontological feature of technology, its disclosure of being which we 
take up specific to social being, is disrupted and blocked off by the imperative of modern 
technology. This ontological imperative which hails us as an  ‘enframing’ transforms 
being and social being into mere resources or in the form of a standing reserve, which is 
only at hand to serve technological ends. In other words that social being can be 
transformed into a modality of technological being, and thus our humanity and sociality 
evacuated from our horizon of intelligibility, is its sociological outcome. This is the 
hermeneutic dimension of our social being which is that the latter no longer comes to 
serve as the basis for understanding and giving meaning to our existence, as such. While 
technology offers both a basis to connect us to our social being in its ontology of 
revealing, it simultaneously in its modern equivalent exposes us to the gravest of dangers, 
namely, nihilism.  
 
The same holds for vision but to different effect: in that we set up its problematic as one 
in which our involvement in society comes under the visual imperative of objectification 
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and detachment from our social being, in the way philosophy, social theory and its 
naturalization in commonsense thinking, as they come to understand it. What we are 
faced with here is generally referred to as the subject – object relation in which a 
distanciation and juxtaposition is seen to be extant, and thus our social being as one of 
involvement in- the-world is disrupted in its objectification and representationalism 
taking on the spatial construct of being in the world as containment in something. We do 
not hold that this is simply a negative state of affairs, as this would imply that we reject 
science and theory tout court, which we do not, but rather what we draw attention to is 
that sociology, as the science of society, as case in point, is caught up in a paradox.  
 
This paradox takes the form in which sociological theory as indeed does all theory sets up 
a recontextualisation of its object of study within a disciplinary matrix; as such the 
objectification and detachment that comes with this theoretical sociability enables us to 
generate explanations and knowledge about the structure and properties of society, this is 
its virtue. However, in doing so from a theoretical stance we extricate ourselves from 
society and thus lose our grounding in social being as those who are embedded in-society 
and as such offers us a vantage point outside society; whereas what we seek in this thesis 
is to approach the matter of our sociality and sociabilities from the vantage point of what 
Heidegger calls being-in-the-world and being-amidst-things. In so doing we intend to 
arrive at an understanding that offers us insight into what an involvement in-society 
actually opens up, by way of its disclosure of social being and our existential constitution. 
This way of revealing social being as a sociality and a sociability that takes it point of 
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departure from our involvement in-the-world is what is meant by an existential – 
ontological understanding of social being.  
 
1.3 Theoretical Framework 
Clearly in so far as we are embedded in the imperatives of modern technology and vision, 
in terms of their ways of revealing social being as technological being, the standing 
reserve, as in the former, and one of objective detachment, the latter we need a vantage 
point that does not reinforce the latter, and as such sociological theory paradoxically in its 
objectification of social being does not offer us a way out of the conditions we seek to 
obviate. Thus we deemed it necessary to opt for an approach that offers us insight into the 
mode of intelligibility of social being that inures us in our sociality and sociability, and 
one that simultaneously returns us to the very structures that constitute the conditions of 
possibility of what it means to be social and human. In short we need to anchor sociology 
in a concept of the social as social being, and a concept of what it means to be human, as 
prior to the theoretical vantage point of our disciplinary paradigm.  To this end we found 
in Heidegger’s version of hermeneutic phenomenology the approach that grounds us 
existentially and socially, such that we were able to establish in his ‘fundamental 
ontology’ that which constitutes our social being in our human constitution. 
 
The hermeneutic phenomenology opened up an essential grounding and two paths which 
we secured as ‘Archimedean levers’ to dislodge us from the imperatives of modern 
technology, the standing reserve and the imperative of vision, the detached observer.  
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 Firstly, we established the existential – ontological grounding in an understanding of 
social being as the field of social disclosure in Heidegger’s concept of Dasein, or the 
existential complex involved in our way of being human. This is in effect the ontological 
anchorage we have brought to bear on the theoretical orientation that has become the 
exclusive domain of our disciplinary paradigm across its spectrum from the more overt 
versions of macro sociology to its micro sociological versions in Phenomenology and 
Ethnomethodology where despite all the apparent differences and protestations to the 
contrary, we have an objectification of social being as its outcome. All bearing on our 
theoretical understanding of society in its various modalities of sociality and sociability, 
but none as far as we can gather offering a concept of social being centering our 
existential involvement-in society, without decentering the latter in a cognitive centering 
of the social subject in reflexivity. In so doing, cognitive centering displaces against its 
intentions, particularly in some cases, as in Ethnomethodology with its focus on the 
quotidian, and in other cases such as Husserlian inspired Phenomenological versions of 
Sociology (Heap and Roth, 1973) and Sartrean versions of Existential Sociology 
(Ritzer,1983)  where consciousness in the latter two, and cognition in the former have 
been centered and abstracted or reified in the individual, thus losing its focus in terms of 
what it means to be in-society,  
 
Secondly, in taking up the matter of vision as perception we have shown how the latter 
extends Heidegger’s claim that in art there is contained as far as it holds onto its 
ontological dimension as a way of revealing, a vantage point with which to counter the 
imperative of modern technology and thus keep in sight and at hand technology’s way of 
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revealing, and thus its connectedness to the truth of social being and being in general. We 
show this in the capacity of perception and vision for releasing its objects to be perceived 
insofar as a hermeneutic is made manifest in the perceptual structure in terms of its 
sociability as intentional comportment and thus how entities are unveiled and uncovered 
and thus released such that they can be phenomenologically encountered, in themselves 
and their intelligibility made manifest. This we have come to understand is the distinct 
nature of vision or indeed all senses in their respective modalities and is what lays at the 
heart of art in so far as it is recuperated in the ontology of perception as vision and its 
way of revealing or connectedness to the truth of social being.  
 
And finally in technology, by taking up the hermeneutic phenomenology approach, we 
are returned to its ontological dimension, that is, a way of revealing being and social 
being, in our existential involvement-in being-amidst-equipment. In this regard we show 
how our social being is constituted through the mode of sociality instantiated in our 
comportment with and sociabilities that emerge in relation to our circumspective 
absorption with equipment and its concomitant modalities of vision. We were not only in 
a position to surface its existential structure, but also to show how the stances we take in 
our mode of contemplation as theory and curiosity are derived from our primary and 
original engagements, as involved social beings, that is being-in-the-world. That the 
modes of sociality that are manifest in presence-at-hand, that is, in the mode of vision and 
its subject – object distanciation and their sociabilities, as modes of concern are similarly 
not the primordial and original engagement with the world, and how we come to know it. 
The latter being the claims of Western Philosophy and Social Theory; but as Heidegger 
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shows and what we have reined in to our ends for anchoring a concept of social being, 
but rather that these arise as a consequence of the breakdown in the usability of 
equipment, that is social being as involvement-in-equipment  and its equipmental nexus. 
What we have shown in this breakdown is the intimate connection between the 
modalities of social being and modalities of vision and how they are inextricably linked 
in the existential – ontological constitution of being, in general, beings and equipment 
and social being in all its dimensions and thus the site of interpolation where modern 
technology and its way of revealing stands to alter and displace for its insubstantiality.  
  
Thus, in conclusion, we have shown that in our existential – ontological constitution lies 
the basis not only for understanding social being and its dimensionality in sociality and 
sociabilities, but that equally importantly it has returned us to a modality of interpreting 
our social condition from the vantage point of our involvement –in-society, as a prior task 
and corrective and ultimately as a way of grounding our theoretical and paradigmatic 
recontextualisation of the social and society. We have argued that while necessary, 
important and legitimate as these theoretical endeavors are they remain incomplete and 
adrift in the paradox that we have sociology without a grounded concept of social being. 
It is our hope that in opening up a hermeneutic phenomenological interrogative into 
technology and vision we have established something akin to an ontological grounding 
for sociology in an existential – ontological understanding of social being.  
 
We have shown both the theoretical efficacy of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology 
in his existential – ontological understanding of being by way of its demonstration in-
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analysis, rather than as a function of methodological exegesis. And similarly we have 
shown how the conceptual anchors of social being, sociality and sociability resonate 
when we ground our analysis in our primary engagement with the world as is being-
amidst-equipment in the mode of a non-thematic circumspective absorption in an 
equipmental-world. And finally, whist we accept that the validity of the conceptual 
anchors may not have emerged in their full scope and clarity given what is only a nascent 
development, and thus raise more questions than answers, we do hold, that what is of 
concern for sociology is to treat the complexity of the social such that, the totality of our 
human condition opened up by the concept of Dasein and being, may dislodge our 
conflation of what it means to be existentially involved with the one dimension of  our 
theoretical modality of being (a reductionism). In making a case for anchoring social 
being in an existential – ontological understanding, we draw attention to its logic of 
complementarity and its anteriority not its exclusivity, for then we will have an insight of 
what it means to be in-society, but as immersed in it we will not be able to set it up as 
object of theoretical and scientific knowledge.  
 
And conversely, in setting up the subject – object epistemological dualism of our visual 
predisposition, we do not have a sense of what it means for a hermeneutic that makes 
sense of our social-being-in-the-world. We, in short, have called for a turn to social 
being, in its dimensionality as sociality and sociability, and in all its modalities of being-
in-the-world alluded to, but not taken up, and those that did not enter our purview, and 
offer this thesis as a terminus ad quo not as terminus ad quem. 
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1.3.1 Conceptual anchors and disciplinary aporias, tensions, concerns 
 
Our point of departure is that in sociology and sociological theory society has been 
accepted as given and left largely unproblematised though of recent there have been 
moves a foot though to different ends from ourselves in Baumann’s “A Sociological 
Theory of Postmodernity”, cited in, Calhoun et al (2002), and Latour’s (2005) intensive 
interrogation in “Reassembling the Social” in his “Actor-Network Theory”. However, 
Heidegger has saw fit to show both the connectedness of our way of being human with 
that of society, and thus, as far as we are concerned, an understanding of social being and 
being in general. And we also argued the disconnect between social being, that is, Dasein 
and society risks in general and amounts to in the main an uncritical acceptance of social 
constructions and formations as essentialised phenomena which Heidegger contends is an 
inauthentic state of social being. However, this does not mean that in being critical of 
society’s normative structure and its constructions leads necessarily to an authentic 
modality of Dasein or a human way of being, but rather it lies in accepting society’s 
social possibilities in the understanding that these are not essentialised, that in being 
human existence precedes essence and what we are is as a result of that which we have 
taken a position on in terms of the practices we engage in and our self-interpretations 
thereof. .  
 
Since Heidegger has an ambivalent relation to society we have been guarded against 
making explicit any connection between Heidegger and a sociological project as such. 
Thus, not to do too much violence to his existential – ontological understanding of being 
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and in trying to stay as close as is theoretically possible to his project we have seen fit to 
take on the notion of ‘social being’. However, to enable a way of speaking with some 
level of specificity we broke down social being to speak to its modality of presencing a 
way of being as its sociality and the practices and functionalities and relations that come 
into being as a consequence, that is, its articulations, as sociabilities.  
 
We accept that this may be and perhaps even is a non-reflexive way of going about the 
task at hand, though recognize that in engaging a social or theoretical domain some 
concepts have of necessity to remain implicit in their conceptual workings. With this in 
mind the concepts social being, sociality and sociability serve this tacit function of a 
background conceptual framework which paradoxically assumes prominence in their 
referentiality as the connectives in binding technology and vision to the problematic and 
its possible resolution. The rationale for leaving this conceptual core largely untouched 
and thus under theorized is too avoid their foreclosure in the epistemological limits, 
definitions set so that they may surface with added meaning and complexity as a function 
of their discursive work in-the-analysis-in-situ..  
 
Thus without an extensive treatment but with some regard for how these concepts have 
been treated in Sociology we allude to Baumann (2003) who makes the point that 
sociality is preferred because it treats of society as a process. We find in Simmel, cited in, 
Ritzer, (1983) use of sociability a relation to forms of social interaction. While in Marx in 
his notion “ zoon politikon” (cited, inRitzer, 1983) he uses sociability in the way in which 
we prefer to use sociality, as an integral part of human make-up though consummated in 
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society. By contrast we prefer to tie these concepts to Heidegger’s existential structure of 
being-in-the-world and thus as social being though similarly we do not essentialise it as 
such.  Though the concept sociality and sociality differ significantly in the way we use it 
there are certain resemblances but in the main they do not take up these concepts sociality 
and sociability within the dimensionality of social being.  
 
Aside from the ambivalence Heidegger shows for society’s normative programme and its 
relation to understanding being, and thus our move to take social being as our underlying 
concept there is the equally important matter of Heidegger’s conception of the derivative 
nature of the theoretical modality of being stemming, he argues, from a breakdown or 
permanent interruption to our primary commerce with the practical domain of the 
usability of equipment, to effect that which is deemed functional and necessary for social 
being. Considered as such it is clear that it shares a kinship with Comte who saw “social 
pathology” as inuring society in the institutional responses that deal with some or other 
social crisis, and sociological theory itself and sociology as discipline emerged in such 
disruptions and transformation or breakdowns of the scale and scope of the social tumult 
of political, economic and scientific revolutions inaugurating the modern age. .  
 
However, Heidegger goes further by claiming and showing that theory and science are 
not the primary basis through which we come to know the world, each other and 
ourselves. But rather it is when the modality of readiness-to-hand and its equipmental 
nexus that is the practical domain that we are involved-in is disrupted that we shift to the 
modalities of being of theory and curiosity. Thus much like the Ethnomethodologists 
 
 
 
 
 20
have held it is in the quotidian order of everydayness that we come to know, though 
unlike Ethnomethodology which holds onto a notion of social subjects as cognitively 
centered and reflexive which they share with the phenomenology of Husserl, Heidegger 
does not share in this conception. By contrast Heidegger has moved out of the orbit of 
Husserl’s concern for consciousness and a transcendental ego for a being-in-the-world in 
which intentionality is not the primary function of a cognitively centered, consciously 
aware individual (Dreyfus, 1991; Lima, 2003). Heidegger takes the view that our primary 
engagement is with equipment, which is located in the sociability of non-thematic 
circumspective absorption in-the-world. Furthermore, in which social being and 
equipment disappear into the equipmental nexus, and our sociality as readiness-to-hand 
and our social be-ing as existential involvement in-the-world. In sum Husserl and 
Heidegger are distinguished by the formers cognitive centering for the latter’s existential 
centering. Thus it is in forging a discursive space to talk of ‘social being’ as being-in-
society that we have turned to Heidegger and taken one step backwards from sociological 
theorizing.  
 
More than this it is Heidegger’s treatment of the primary involvement in-the-world and 
its quotidian order of everydayness that has motivated us to seek a way of grounding 
sociology quite paradoxically in social being where it does not seem to dwell. Sociology 
as science and sociological theory as paradigmatic have increasingly distanciated us from 
the social so much so that we barely recognize ourselves as the preeminent and 
consummately social of beings in the disciplinary matrix. Thus, it is in the spirit of a turn 
to social being and that which gives us humans our Dasein-like character that we have 
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sought to anchor an interpretation of sociality in its modalities of sociability, the practices 
and functionalities that inure us in our social milieus. One that we hope is commensurate 
with the existential structure of care and concern for our way of being human and is 
couched in an ontological understanding of technology and vision such that we arrive at 
the disclosure of being in general and social being in particular.  
 
1.3.2 Ontology of Social Being: social being as hermeneutic  
 
Having offered a justification for not setting up definitional limits for the concepts social 
being, sociality and sociability we set out the general Heideggerian grounding for our 
understanding of social being and its equivalence with being. Though, we do argue that in 
opting for social being and given its centrality we give added specificity to the 
provenance of his concept of being. However, in the same sensibility as before we do not 
seek discursive foreclosure, but we do intend in what follows to shore up the ontological 
basis of our conception of social being in Heidegger.  
 
What we note as our terminus ad quo is that Heidegger distils from our sociality of being 
the existential structure which he deems originary, in that it sets the very ontological 
conditions of possibility of our understanding of being and social being. The 
distinguishing feature he isolates is that we do not choose the social world in which we 
find ourselves, but rather that we are so to speak thrown into the social and cultural 
worlds we find ourselves in without choice and without ‘rhyme or reason’. We thus find 
ourselves in-the-world in which we need to carve out an existence and make it our own, 
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over the entire duration of our lives, which he holds is in turn defined by how we relate to 
this temporality, which is the finitude of human existence. This notion of being thrust into 
the world is what Heidegger refers to as our “throwness” and is an important aspect of 
our human condition, which in a certain sense forces us to take some kind of stand on this 
scenario, and thus where we come to comport our own existence to what is socially 
proffered. Conjointly this ‘throwness’ and the stance we have to take on our existence 
and our self-interpretations of this, and its unfinished nature is what Heidegger calls  
Dasein to indicate its objective nature, that it is not privative and subjective, even though 
it is individuated in being-towards-self it is still publicly accessible.  
 
This existential condition of being thrown into the world is revealed to be constitutive of 
the basic existential structure, which define the very condition of possibility of our social 
being and predisposes us to an understanding of being, in general and thus to a social 
comportment that is the sociability manifest in how we deal with being-amidst-things, 
and how these relations bear on our sociality. But in order to understand the being of 
beings Heidegger (1962) argues that this can only be realized through that being for 
which its existence is an issue or concern to itself, and for which due care needs to be 
exercised. What he is saying here and explored in the thesis under the rubric of social 
being is that this understanding of what it means to exist in its most general sense, is an 
endowment of the human condition or Dasein, and as such represents the sine qua non for 
understanding the being of all beings and being in general.  
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Though most importantly what makes it social is that this understanding of being is not 
an a priori, but is acquired in the process of socialization and the inculcation of a shared 
normative order. In this sense Dasein or our human way of being is acquired early in our 
life-cycle and constitutes the fundamental condition for the understanding of being, in 
general, and as such represents an ontological threshold. And since this capacity for 
understanding being in general arises in the very condition of social existence, which is 
shared human (co)existence in particular leads us to his existential – ontological 
understanding of being, and our grounding of social being..  
 
 In considering the nature of social being from the vantage point of the ‘social subject’ 
Heidegger comes to make his existential determinations which are based on his own 
version of phenomenology, which by contrast to Husserl does not set itself up primarily 
as a self- referential transcendental subject with its consciousness, but instead refuses this 
cognitive centering and opts instead for setting the horizon of intelligibility of being as 
distilled through the process of socialization or imbibing what he call the common-sense 
views of “Das Man” that is everyone and anyone, or as we in common refrain would say 
that one has to do or say what is expected of one, if one wants to be one of them. It is in 
this sense of the socialized self as constituting the basis for an understanding and 
agreement of shared practices (a normative order) and thus an understanding of being in 
general and the being of beings that we anchor the concept social being and its sociality 
and thus have the basis of a horizon of intelligibility or social hermeneutic.  
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Though, like Heidegger we accept that this common-sense view is not necessarily 
deterministic, nor an expression of authentic social being, as that which defines a being-
towards-self, even though society is its only source. What serves as the existentialist basis 
for separating an authentic self from an inauthentic or undifferentiated self is that the 
latter two accepts our way of being human in some or other essentialist terms unlike our 
authentic selves which Heidegger holds accepts Dasein in its constitution as unsettled, 
foundationless and even homeless, the latter a relational outcome (Thaver, 2006) Where 
we lose our authenticity is that we tend in the main to throw ourselves into the 
sociabilities of various social roles in order to flee from this unsettling truth about what it 
means to be human or Dasein, and that is that we become whatever we are at whatever 
moment based on whatever our stances are at that point and the self-interpretations we 
have, but that these are neither fixed nor destined. It is this unsettling and unsettled 
condition of our social being that we flee from, and in so doing fall into what society has 
to offer insofar as it is believed that the socialities and sociabilities instantiated could not 
have been anything else but what it has come to be. Thus we have a spurious ontology 
which is fixed and essentialised rather than a genuine ontology which is open and 
multivariate.   
 
By contrast the concept of social being we work with is that which accepts the 
foundationless-ness and homelessness of our way of being human,  and thus it sees in 
being-in-the-world, being-with-others and being-amidst-things a multiplicity of 
possibilities but no essentialities that may divide us from each other, and that as those 
whose sociality is one of being-the-world-with-others-amidst-things our sociality is thus 
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consummated in that referential whole or social being as gestalt. The logic is simple, in 
our authentic selves our existential structures are such that in our temporal natures we 
show concern and care for being-in-the-world, being-amidst-things, being-with-others 
and being-towards-self, and because we are existentially unsettled, foundationless and 
homeless we are not fixed to a nation, religion, clan or anything else for that matter 
except to being, in general, and social being in particular, with its commensurate sociality 
and sociabilities. Thus our originary transcendence as being-in-the-world grounds our 
social being and sociality and our ontic transcendence or intentional comportment 
grounds our sociabilities. Taken together we have an existential – ontological grounding 
of what it means to be a social being.     
 
This is the ontological condition of social being that informs our concept and is the basis 
of our social hermeneutic and how we come to interpret and give meaning to being-in-
the-world and being-amidst-things. It is of such a nature that in our interrogatives of 
social being in relation to technology and vision we were able to uncover different ways 
of revealing being and how this positions us in the contemporary age in contradistinction 
to the ‘enframing’, which is the way of revealing of modern technology.  
 
And moreover, what the concept of social being grounded in an existential – ontological 
understanding disclosed was that our sociality and much of our sociabilities that define us 
stand to disappear into the standing reserve, to become mere resources and no more. As 
such we would be bereft of the sociality of our being, our humanity; we would have been 
substituted by a technological being, if we are not already in its destining.  Heidegger 
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calls this our gravest danger of all, and in a word it is referred to as, nihilism. This is the 
conceptual efficacy of ‘social being’ in the way it is used and developed in this doctoral 
thesis.  
1.4 Significance  
The substantive significance of this thesis is that  we have shown that in our existential – 
ontological constitution lies the basis not only for understanding social being and its 
dimensionality in sociality and sociabilities, but that equally importantly it has returned 
us to a modality of interpreting our social condition from the vantage point of our 
involvement –in-society as a prior task and corrective, and ultimately as a way of 
grounding our theoretical and paradigmatic recontextualisation of the social and society.  
 
The theoretical significance of this thesis is that while our endeavors in sociology 
(science of society) and sociological theory are fundamentally necessary, important and 
legitimate they remain incomplete and adrift in a paradox; in this sense only, that we have 
sociology without a grounded concept of social being. It is our hope that in opening up a 
hermeneutic phenomenological interrogative into technology and perception-vision we 
have established something akin to grounding for sociology in an existential – ontological 
understanding of social being.  
 
1.5 Chapter Organization and Division 
 
The chapters follow a logical sequence in relation to setting up it problematic and the 
basis upon which it is interrogated culminating in the hermeneutic upon which a 
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resolution is offered. It is as such a theoretical work with a hermeneutic framework in an 
existential – ontological understanding of social being as its theoretical grounding.  
 
Chapter one sets out the history of the topic starting as it did with a discourse analysis of 
television in South Africa in terms of its media content and its bearing on constituting 
national and continental (African) imaginations. This introduction serves as background 
and is followed up with what motivated the thesis and proceeds to delineate the 
theoretical problematic, focus, aims, theoretical framework, conceptual anchors, 
significance and its overall structure and organization.   
 
Chapter two, titled “Philosophy of Technology: the technological condition”, spells out 
the first leg of the problematic and simultaneously outlines some of the disciplinary 
problems associated with taking up technology as object of enquiry and its 
epistemological implication in philosophy, as well as its relative neglect and research bias 
in sociology. In as much as it sketches the problematic it takes up what has been 
described as the ‘technological condition’ and tracks it through the discourse of 
philosophy and social theory. The sub-themes taken up here were not intended to be 
exhaustive and have been selected for their contribution to understanding the 
technological condition. In this regard we traced it through to ancient Greek philosophy 
through Plato and Aristotle and took it into the Enlightenment period where we 
considered both its optimistic and pessimistic outlooks. This was followed by some 
noteworthy views on technology which framed the problematic in deterministic terms 
and considered Marx, Ellul, Heilbroner and closed with Borgmann’s thesis on how it 
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related to contemporary life. And finally we set the terms of the technological condition 
in terms of Heidegger’s understanding thereof as a way of setting up a segue way into his 
hermeneutic phenomenology of technology and its import for his existential – ontological 
understanding of being. 
 
 
Chapter three titled, “Heidegger’s philosophy of technology: ‘essence’ of techne and 
modern technology”, considers Heidegger’s philosophy of technology as he develops it in 
his “Question Concerning Technology”. The discussion in this chapter follows his claims 
as to the essence of techne, which is technology in its pre-modern modality and tracks 
into his hermeneutic phenomenological analysis of instrumentalism and causality. In 
doing so we establish the ontological dimension of technology which we take up in our 
existential ontological understanding of social being in relation to equipmentality as 
counterpoise in chapter seven We steer clear of making any references to the latter in 
chapter three so as to maintain a clear focus on Heidegger’s philosophy of technology. 
This we follow up in tracking into Heidegger’s analysis of modern technology and thus 
establish how he understands the nihilistic danger that it poses. We frame our discussion 
for its bearing on our conceptual anchors and thus refer to its implications and 
ramifications for social being, sociality and sociabilities. We close this chapter by 
considering the phenomena that might serve as our saving grace and thus serve as 
counterpoise, or what we have also identified as the Archimedean levers that will enable 
us to dislodge ourselves from the danger posed by the enframing of modern technology. 
Firstly, in technology as techne, that is, as a way of revealing social being; and in 
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equipmentality as a way of revealing sociality. Secondly, in art, though not in itself, but 
rather in relation to its underlying grounding in perception and vision, as ‘releasement’ or 
simply the freeing up of that which is to be perceived.  
 
Chapter four, titled “Philosophy and Vision: the visual condition as subject – object 
distanciation”, sets up the second leg of our problematic and follows the structure of 
chapter two on the technological condition. Thus we similarly spell out the problematic 
and simultaneously outline some of the disciplinary problems associated with taking up 
vision as object of enquiry and its epistemological implications in philosophy. In as much 
as we sketch the problematic of vision, we set it up as a visual condition in as much as it 
involves a subject – object distanciation and its import for the dimensionality of our 
social being. Though, here too, we consider its modality in theory and science as 
counterpoise to the essence of modern technology, in chapter seven. The discursive 
strategy, as in chapter two, though in this instance related to the visual condition tracks 
it’s problematic through to philosophy and epistemology, and its expression in ancient 
Greek thinking. Our approach in this chapter is largely informed by Levin’s Heideggerian 
understanding of vision where we follow his line of thinking; though bring it to bear on 
our primary concern for social being and its mutual determinations. We close our 
discussion on the implications of vision for our human way of being, which Heidegger 
conceptualizes as Dasein, to separate his concerns from any anthropocentric overtones or 
any other social science disciplinary construct, which in our case happens to be 
sociology. We remain mindful of his project of an existential ontological understanding 
of being and in this spirit have not attempted to sociologise his thinking, though we have 
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found in his hermeneutic approach, such an emphasis on its social dimension, that we 
have directed his concept of being in our general disciplinary direction as ontological 
grounding of  social being. This opened up as we lead into the next chapter Heidegger’s 
existential – ontological understanding of our social being as Dasein. Though for 
Heidegger, we note that Dasein is not only an ontological analysis of the existential 
structures constituting what it means to be human, but a “fundamental ontology” for the 
understanding of what it means for anything to be, that is,’ Being’, in general. 
 
Chapter five titled “Existential – Ontological understanding of social being: Dasein as 
horizon of intelligibility of be-ing” sets the basic terms in which our conception of social 
being is anchored. The issue of how we encounter and constitute the world and thus 
Dasein (human existence as be-ing) is spelt out and the ontological conditionality of our 
way of existing as human is established as the social horizon of intelligibility of being, in 
general. Moreover, we anchor the concept of social being in the existential complex of 
Dasein and its different modalities which, given its social embedding tends to speak to 
our conceptual anchors of social being, sociality and sociability, so much so, that to assert 
it at every turn seemed more of an exercise in tautology, than explication. We draw the 
relationship between Dasein and vision fairly tightly though also bring closer the question 
of technology, equipment, things and objects. The themes we take inter alia deal with 
modalities of vision and their relation to social being, fundamental ontology, our mode of 
dwelling and its sociality and sociabilities and the mode of gathering of things and its 
ontological dimension, that is, as way of revealing being and the social. We firm the 
existential – ontological grounding of social being in Heidegger’s concept Dasein as a 
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way to establish the clearing for taking up in the ensuing two chapters the matter of what 
holds as potential counterpoise to modern technology’s essence, viz., the intentional 
comportment of perception, and equipment and how this relates to the interpolation of 
social being.  
 
 
Chapter six, is titled “Hermeneutic Phenomenology of Perception: perceptual intentional 
comportment as counterpoise”, we contextualize Heidegger’s phenomenology in relation 
to perception by showing that he is firstly, embedded in a hermeneutic which is grounded 
in the social as its ‘first surface of emergence’ (Foucault, 1971). And secondly that his 
understanding of intentionality does not center a cognitive subject, but rather grounds it 
in the intentional comportment that arises in the intersection of perception and Dasein. 
What we develop in this chapter is the hermeneutic, as horizon of intelligibility of social 
being, at work in unveiling be-ing and a phenomenology that simultaneously describes 
the essence of perceivedness, as an uncovering such that entities may be released to be 
encountered in themselves. This intentional comportment is in turn linked with Dasein’s 
constitution such that an existential – ontological understanding emerges of Dasein as a 
field of disclosure or clearing, in which entities are perceived in themselves. It is this 
capacity of the intentional comportment for releasing entities to be perceived in 
themselves that we identify the potential for counterpoise, and thus make the claim that in 
as much as this faculty is in place modern technology’s reduction of everything into 
resources, or the standing army, can be counteracted, in so far as objects, things and 
equipment will still be perceived as such rather than the former. Thus, in setting out the 
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perceptual structure and its essence in this chapter we offer up the first of two 
counterpoises, which we have identified as such, and its relation to our social being and 
its redeeming sociability in our intentional comportment and its existential – ontological 
grounding in social being.  
 
Chapter seven, is titled “Being-amidst-things: equipmentality as counterpoise”, we bring 
the thesis to a close and take up Heidegger’s analysis of equipment and its different 
modalities of being. We bring home our thesis that in equipment and its modality of 
being of ‘readiness-to-hand’, is encompassed our social be-ing in its dimensionality of 
sociality and sociability with an existential ontological grounding that suggests itself as 
our strongest counterpoise to the modality of revealing of modern technology, which 
threatens us with nihilism. In fact in equipment though we nuance the argument to 
consider its limitations as well, we are persuaded by its concentration of sociality in its 
equipmental nexus and equipmental whole such that our sociabilities, that is, our 
comportment with being-amidst-things coalesces, and thus grounds our social being. In 
this regard we conclude that equipmentality is on balance indeed an Archimedean lever, 
which we can use to dislodge the technological monolith, and thus release social being 
and our humanity from its nihilistic fate, if indeed, history is to prove Heidegger correct.  
 
In addition to equipment as counterpoise in terms of its way of revealing of sociality we 
also take up the implications of theoretical thinking and science, but only if existentially 
and hermeneutically anchored in-society, for their potential to also serve as counterpoise 
in so far as these are able to constitute objects in their fullness and substantial being, and 
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thus counteract their reduction in being treated as resources or as ‘standing reserve’. And 
finally, in the modality of curiosity we show that when the equipmental mode of being is 
not recontextualised as in theory, but releases Dasein to a state of affairs where it 
abandons itself to the world in idle talk and idle seeing, then we are offered up to modern 
technology’s way of revealing as standing reserve and we become no more than 
resources to used and disposed in the pursuit of novelty for novelty sake. However, the 
strong argument holds out the hope that from within technology in its modality as in 
equipmentality we have a way of revealing that is our existential ontological 
understanding of social being which would ultimately counteract modern technology’s 
nihilistic interpolation of social being.   
 
 
Chapter eight is our conclusion where we draw our argument to a close and offer some 
general comments on what we have established by way of our interrogatives of 
technology and perception-vision by way of their potential as counterpoise in the 
interpolation of being by modern technology such that our social being and with it our 
humanity stands in grave danger of being substituted by a technological modality of 
being. The state of affairs of this scenario is that we are left bereft of our humanity and 
social being, but as we have argued in relation to our perceptual intentional comportment, 
and equipmentality that this is not necessarily a fait accompli.  
 
Moreover, in considering the fate of our humanity and in taking up Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic phenomenology, we have been alerted as to the existential displacement in 
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our modalities of theorizing and that at bottom we have taken for granted an 
understanding of social being, sociality and sociabilities. That in the main in sociology 
we have made reference to these dimension of sociality by proxy in our discourse on 
macro-sociology in structure, processes, relations and association, and in the form of 
micro-sociology we have engaged our sociabilities by proxy in social action and rule 
governed behavior in conversational rules, cognition and reflexivities, dramaturgies and 
all manner of inter-subjectivities and the like. To be sure these have all enlightened us 
theoretically in one way or another, though we claim at the expense of paradoxically 
distancing us from our existential – ontological grounding in social being. 
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Chapter Two 
Philosophy of Technology: the technological condition 
The rationale of this thesis as stated is that we seek to arrive at a grounding and 
understanding of what it means to be human, that is, a social being, in the light of our 
capacity of sociality and its translation into the various sociabilities which we come to 
have in coping with our quotidian lives. This latter concern is what is contained without 
saying too much about it at this point in the existential – ontological understanding of 
social being. What is of concern in this chapter is the terminus ad quo if the latter 
understanding is our terminus ad quem. To this end we set up in this chapter by way of 
our social problematic what has come to known in general as the “technological 
condition” (Scharff et al, 2003) that we find ourselves amidst of and that we bemoan as 
we encounter ourselves so transformed, each other so distanced, the world so transformed 
and everything rendered equivalent as “resources” (Dreyfus, 1991), a “standing reserve” 
as Heidegger (1977) conceives of it.  
 
It is the sense of the transformations alluded to, in the preceding, which we have 
conceived of as the aporia of speaking to the changes that we are experiencing, since, as 
it stands, we have no philosophical or theoretical grounding in a concept of our social 
being in sociology that we may be able to make meaningful claims as to the nature and 
extent of perceived changes in our human –social condition. We speak by proxy of such 
changes through our references to and objects of study necessary as they are in social 
relations, associations, structures, institutions, processes and the like but what of our 
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social being, our sociality as existential – ontological capacity. It is towards the latter by 
way of an initial clearing firstly of the conceptual baggage suffusing our understanding of 
technology that we attend to immediately as part of the theoretical corrective of 
redressing the silence about social being and its modality of sociality and sociability that 
we are directly and indirectly concerned with in this thesis, in general and this chapter, in 
particular. 
2.1 Philosophy of Technology:’ technology as philosophical problem’  
 
In order to arrive at an existential – ontological understanding of social being we need to 
clear the ground so that the philosophy of technology that we have selected, viz. 
Heidegger’s can emerge with some clarity. To this end we sketch a range of philosophers 
and theorists who have engaged and contributed variously, though not always explicitly, 
to a philosophy of technology as distinct sub-discipline, in general; and in particular for 
their contributions towards filling out the arguments that make up our encounter in the 
contemporary age of what has been described as a ‘technological condition’.  
 
The objective of this thesis is to provide by way of an analysis of the philosophy of 
technology an understanding of the conditions of possibility and impossibility portentous 
of our technological and social admixtures that tend to the former and the latter to 
varying degrees. In this regard the theoretical tasks that flow from the way the thesis has 
set up its problematic requires an exegesis of Heidegger’s (1977), also cited in Scharff 
and Dusek (2003), essay on the “Question concerning Technology”. The significance of 
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Heidegger’s text cited for this thesis rests simply in the fact that he is similarly concerned 
with what technology is rather than what it does and how we shape it. 
 
 Our starting point in this thesis is that the existence of technology is first and foremost 
not to be found in the technological object and thus should not be conflated as such. What 
should emerge is that as far as the thesis is concerned is that the dimensionality of 
technology and its philosophical discourse are fundamental to any understanding of its 
sociology as ‘technological condition’. Thus, any analysis that tends to offer up 
technology as background, that is, as canvas similarly renders mute the mutually 
transformative relationship it shares with the social. One ends up either with an 
exaggerated sense of human agency by way of sociologisms, or anthropologisms, or a 
view of technology as autonomous with human beings merely ‘technobots’. Neither of 
which is sufficient to the task of providing insight into what Heidegger contends is the 
real point of understanding technology and that is, the relationship between technology 
and society.  
 
With respect to the latter we will see how Heidegger (1977) espouses an ontological 
thesis with respect to the essence of technology. For him technology is an ontological 
modality of being in so far as it ‘discloses’ the nature of the world and its structure as 
worldliness when one engages in the usability of equipment and its equipmental nexus. In 
other words the way of knowing the world is not epistemological that is there is no ‘royal 
road’ to knowledge of the world, but rather it is in the domain of practices and social 
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practices in particular that  the conditions of possibility of  disclosing the nature of the 
social as world, being and beings or things are surfaced..  
 
However, before proceeding to Heidegger’s philosophy of technology we need to 
constitute the general technological problematic. To this end we will open up discussion 
on Scharff and Dusek’s (2003) notion of the “technological condition” as it is taken up in 
the emergent sub-discipline of “Philosophy of technology” as a means to contextualize 
Heidegger’s position and our own point of departure which takes up the latter in the 
direction of social being and its grounding in being-in-the-world which we in turn take up 
as a foundational sociality though we hasten to add that neither its content nor its 
practices or sociabilities are of a universalistic construct. Only that in order to be social or 
sociable presupposes a capacity and this is its homologous nature though how it if filled 
out is relative to the social formation and its normative order.  
2.1.1 Disciplinary limitations 
 
The philosophy of technology as a dedicated field of specialization has only of late come 
to the foreground in philosophical discourse. As such, this seeming recalcitrant 
emergence of a philosophy of technology strikes one intuitively as quite paradoxical 
given the centrality that technology occupies in contemporary social life. What this 
signals with respect to the emergence of philosophy of technology is that it occupies, in 
so far as it does, a contentious place in philosophy. From Mitcham and MacKay’s (1983) 
introduction to an anthology of essays somewhat guardedly titled “Philosophy and 
Technology” perhaps in reference to the emergent nature of a ‘philosophy of technology’ 
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one gets a sense of their position on the disciplinary limitations philosophy imposes on 
understanding technology. Their argument (Mitcham & Mackay, 1983: 30) is that  
 
… the philosophical problems of technology make it necessary to relate 
epistemology, anthropology and sociology in ways not usually found in 
philosophy. There is more than just a collection of philosophical problems 
centering on technology: there is a need for a comprehensive philosophy of 
technology.   
 
The philosophical problems they allude to specifically relate to their contention that an 
adequate definition of technology is conditional upon three approaches which 
respectively, as stated above are epistemological, anthropological and sociological. (Ibid, 
1983). 
 
 First, technology has been analyzed as an epistemological problem. 
 Second, technology has been considered in relation to the nature of man. 
 Third, Technology has been taken to be the defining characteristic of thought and  
action in modern society. 
 
The significance of what appears as the disciplinary limitations associated with 
philosophy holds similarly for the disciplinary concerns of sociology. In this regard the 
theoretical challenge that is taken up is to ground one’s thinking on technology in a 
philosophical understanding of technology which is mindful of its problematic status and 
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most importantly, its complexity as reality sui generis. By contrast the sociology of 
technology in its incipient stages is defined by the ‘social constructivist approach’ which 
has faced some stringent criticism from the likes of Langdon Winner (2003) for what he 
calls its anti-realism. Though Elam’s (20003) response sees in Winner a rabid anti-
constructivism which he claims overlooks the liberal position of  deliberately avoiding 
making any value judgments as to the veracity of scientific claims in relation to 
technology. For our own purposes it would appear as if the social construction of 
technology approach is both epistemologically vague in its tendency to over-relativise 
both the processes science and technology.  
 
Pinch and Bijker (2003) argue for an integration of sociology of science and sociology of 
technology in the development of the social construction of technology rather than for 
their separation and as such could potentially contribute to a comprehensive 
understanding of the techno-science complex. However, its resistance to a realist 
epistemology of science and technology weakens its approach which coupled with a 
fixation on the artifact amounts to navel gazing at sociabilities without being anchored in 
a sociality and social being. We are more inclined to a Heideggerian approach which 
does not seek the essence of technology in the artifact, but in its relation to being and 
society. By contrast the social construction of technology considers the wider social 
milieu but only insofar as it articulates with the artifact in terms of how it is shaped and 
what meanings are attributed to it. Useful in itself but it falls well short of informing an 
understanding of social being trained as it is the opposite direction of the social process 
embedded in the technological artifact, its ontology is directed away from social being 
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and thus is not about to say much about our sociality and our sociability except by way of 
what goes into the artifact.  
 
In relation to a Heideggerian sensibility what it offers might be a way to think about the 
technological process as scientific and social gathering made manifest in the outcome of 
the technological artifact but its isomorphic direction though inclined to a multiplicity of 
sources only accounts for the success or failure of the technological thing. The question 
we are asking is how technology resonates with being-in-world such that an account of 
social being with its sociability and sociabilities may emerge rather than remain at the 
surface of the ‘fate and fortunes’ of a technological artifact the domain it seems of 
sociology of technology in the delimited modality of constructivism.   
 
Thus, in as much as it is held that technology encompasses more than can be contained in 
strict disciplinary boundaries it calls for one to expand one’s horizon of intelligibility. To 
this end we enjoin Mitcham and Mackey’s (1983) attempts to take in a broader analytical 
sweep of technology to effect a philosophical orientation that extends beyond 
epistemology to anthropological and sociological approaches.  The theoretical task which 
this thesis sets itself is similarly placed though the disciplinary terminus ad quem is to 
contribute to sociology an existential – ontological understanding of social being that is 
anchored conceptually in a philosophical understanding of technology. That this 
sociological orientation is grounded in Heidegger’s (1977) “Question concerning 
Technology” and his “Being and Time” (1962, 1996) will become apparent as we 
proceed to develop an understanding of technology that is amenable to an understanding 
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of social being and its modalities. However, before we address Heidegger proper some 
ground needs to be cleared with respect to the epistemological status of technology. 
Through this it is expected that the ensuing analysis of Heidegger’s philosophy of 
technology (2003) would have a point of reference against which the interpretation 
offered in this thesis may be assessed. In other words that one is not taking too much 
liberty and interpretive license, so to speak.  
 
The matter of technology has thrown up, and continues to, all manner of problems across 
the empirical – theoretical divide. Here we need only refer to the voluminous scholarship 
on environmental degradation and exhaustion of natural resources to denote problems of 
a substantive nature. Though one is mindful of these pressing empirical problems it is not 
the primary concern of this chapter or the thesis and we merely point to some of the 
scholarship dealing the relation between the environment, ecology and technology 
(White, 1972; Simon, 1972; Merchant, 2003; Naess, 2003; Devall, 2003).What we are 
particularly concerned with are second-order questions about what technology is, what is 
its relation to epistemology, what is its relation to being and how do we live in and with 
technology. And in this regard, that is, as philosophical problem technology’s standing is 
somewhat ambivalent as McDermott (2003) captures with some sting in holding that 
“technology: [is] the opiate of the intellectuals”.  
 
The debate, then, as to the epistemological status of technology cast broadly asks whether 
it is a distinct form of knowledge, or whether it is a debased form subsumed under 
applied science or practical skills. In so far as it is relevant, it is a matter of 
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epistemological significance, in that its very existence as a field of knowledge is at stake 
either as philosophy of technology or as philosophy of science. Within this 
epistemological debate, Mitcham and Mackey (1972) pinpoint the different points of 
view of Feibleman (1983) and Skolimowski (1983) who argue that technology does have 
an epistemic claim to make, as philosophy of technology, while Bunge (1983) takes the 
view that it is applied science, and as such falls within the purview of a philosophy of 
science.  
Moreover, Mitcham and Mackey (1983) make the point that Heidegger contends that 
technology is neither applied science, nor an instrumentality predicated on effectiveness, 
nor for that matter a modus operandi as such. Instead they argue that Heidegger posits in 
its stead, as far as the interpretations of Jonas (1983) and Hood (1983) are concerned, the 
view that technology discloses the world and as such can initially be taken within 
epistemology since knowledge is produced as object of disclosure. Even though this 
disclosure takes place at the level of social practices and not a theoretical engagement.  
 
Heidegger (1962, 1996) takes the view that technology engages us ontologically since it 
discloses the conditions of possibility of the world and being. And since this disclosure is 
a function of an engagement in the world that is through social practices it is taken to be 
an “interactive epistemology” (Mitcham and Mackey, 1972). Though, Heidegger has no 
truck with technology as of the order of epistemology: for him the disclosure reveals the 
very condition of possibility of existence, that is, it is ontological with technological 
objects merely ontical in structure, in that they refer to entities of one kind or another.  
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Thus, as far as  can be gleaned, what is at stake are not machines running amok even 
though this remote possibility does exist, but something much more fundamental, which 
is that our sense of the world , the meanings we make are mediated by a technological 
sensibility, a framework, perhaps even a “device paradigm” (Borgmann, 1984).     
 
In addressing technology as a philosophical problem it is necessary to draw a distinction 
between what counts as such a problem and what lies outside its ambit. What attention is 
drawn to may be distinguished from the kinds of problems that ensue from social, 
economic and political concerns arising out of technological activity. Even though as 
Mitcham and Mackey (1983) point out philosophical questions underlie said substantive 
concerns in as much as they are based in a true understanding of technology. But strictly 
speaking these latter concerns are not of a philosophical order since the latter focuses on 
what are referred to as “second-order questions”. They (Ibid’ 1983) argue that the 
fundamental distinction between technological and philosophical problems hinge on the 
difference between empirical information (the former) and reason and understanding (the 
latter).     
 
2.1.2 Technology and epistemology  
 
The problem that arises with respect to the epistemological concerns raised by technology 
involves its status as a form of knowledge. In this regard there is no consensus on what 
the epistemological status of technology should be with respect to whether it constitutes a 
distinct form of knowledge, and if so, what might that be. On the one hand, the argument 
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is made by Jarvie (1983) that technology does enjoy an epistemological status in so far as 
it is a form of practical knowledge, which when expanded to include an anthropological 
dimension absorbs all forms of knowledge in its fold. This holds from the vantage point 
of an anthropological approach, he argues, since all knowledge ultimately is about 
humankind coming to terms with the world. Though, in this regard Mitcham and Mackay 
(1983) note that what is yet to obtain is an epistemological definition of technological 
/practical knowledge. Nevertheless, what is evident is that at the level of a philosophical 
approach technology’s epistemological status is undecided, though, at an anthropological 
level of analysis it takes on a generalized form as practical knowledge, as does all forms 
of knowledge. A reduction ad absurdum!   
 
On the other hand the conventional argument is made that since technology does not 
pursue the truth as such, but is directed at effectiveness, it does not warrant an 
epistemological status within philosophy. Jarvie (1972), however, is not content with the 
epistemic evacuation of technology and puts forward instead the view that technology 
does embrace the truth in so far as it speaks to the truth of its effectiveness in the world. 
To be sure technology in its epistemic wake stops well short of providing explanations 
and as such is not to be conflated with scientific knowledge. But neither, argues Jarvie 
(1983) can technology be subsumed under applied science and as such fall within the 
rubric of a philosophy of science since it involves additionally the level of practice in and 
of itself. In effect he is making an argument for a distinct modality in a philosophy of 
technology as differentiated from a philosophy of science. It is this move towards 
consolidating a study of technology sui generis that is being singled out as a way to enter 
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the philosophical discourse and in so doing enable one to put a perspective on Heidegger 
(1977, 1962) when we engage him later.  
 
The epistemological questions at hand then are what form does knowledge take in the 
realm of technology, and how does it relate to the structure of knowledge. In addressing 
the former question, Jarvie (1972: 54-61) draws on Ryle’s view of the distinction 
between “knowing that” and “knowing how”, to make an argument for the 
epistemological status of technology. What emerges is that whereas the philosophical 
convention is one of the epistemological privileging of the theoretical modality of 
knowledge entailed in “knowing that” its antithesis, that is, practical knowledge and with 
it technology is discounted as a form of knowledge.  Jarvie (1983) challenges this 
conventional understanding of technology as bereft of knowledge by arguing that 
“knowing how” is also a form of knowledge. That as a form of knowledge, technology 
too is shaped by an epistemological imperative, that is, it is oriented to the truth, but only 
in so far as it relates to effectiveness rather than disclosure of the world.  
 
In other words technology does not offer explanations of the nature and facts of the world 
that is the truth of the world but rather in Jarvie’s (1983) estimation it does entail 
knowledge or the truth of what works in the world. What makes the modality of 
knowledge associated with technology distinct for Jarvie (1983) is that whereas scientific 
knowledge is of a general i.e. theoretical form the former is environmentally-specific. 
Thus, what we have is an epistemic distinction between local and universal forms of 
knowledge which is analogous to the nomothetic and ideographic divide. Jarvie (1983) 
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makes us aware that beyond the divide between theoretical and practical knowledge is 
their mutual inclusiveness. All told with differences aside the net effect of Jarvie’s (1983) 
analysis is that technology does entail a particular form of knowledge, and at worst since 
“knowing that” and “knowing how” are interrelated it ipso facto is a part of the structure 
of knowledge.   
 
Whilst one may be sympathetic to the project of providing an epistemological grounding 
of technology one should similarly be aware that there may be no ‘royal road’ to the 
truth; whether it is disclosure of nature and the social, or disclosure of effectiveness. The 
point is that technology’s truth is not of the order of an epistemology, but rather an 
ontology in as much as it discloses something in the order of the nature of our being and 
the world. In other words that in engaging the world through social practices as mediated 
by technology or things, the nature of the world is disclosed.  
 
Thus, it is not an epistemological relation that informs the essence of technology with 
respect to its capacity to disclose the nature and structure of the world, being and the 
social. This is the crux of Heidegger’s (2003) ontological approach to the essence of 
technology; viz. that it serves to disclose the structure of the world and the nature of 
being. However, of epistemological note he argues that it is only when we engage the 
world through social practices involving relations with technology that one encounters 
the truths of nature, sociality and being, rather than exclusively through its form as 
knowledge. In other words we are thrust into a world amidst things technological and it is 
precisely this pervasive quality particularly in the 21st century to varying degrees across 
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the globe that informs the nature of the sensibility of our social being. It is this 
‘technological condition’ of being amidst things technological that constitutes the real 
danger: one which stands to imperil our relationship to ourselves and the world. In short 
in Heideggerean vein the threat is to our very social being and humanity. But what is at 
stake here that has been isolated for theoretical scrutiny is what this nature and structure 
of social being is that is being threatened and how does it sit in our sociological state 
described as ‘technological condition’. The theoretical task here as identified is in 
uncovering the very essence of technology in general and modern technology in 
particular and thus the first step is a hermeneutic phenomenology. Put differently we need 
to uncover our understanding or interpretation of technology that is in place albeit it a 
vague and dim realization and related to this we need to let technology emerge in its 
reality sui generis.  
 
The theoretical task at hand in a nutshell is then: how do we approach the question as to 
what it is that might have been altered, modified and transformed in the modalities of 
social existence in a technological milieu. And with this in mind what kind of theoretical 
sensibility is able to yield an understanding that simultaneously addresses its discursive 
foreclosure in Sociology, in general, and sociological theory, in particular. With respect 
to the first question the short answer is through a concept of social being though 
developed as an ‘existential – ontological’ understanding of social being. About which 
much more later, however, with respect to the matter as to how one is to anchor such an 
understanding it is marked by a Heideggerean framework which combines his particular 
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take of a combination of hermeneutics and phenomenology as applied firstly to 
technology and secondly to vision.  
2.2 The technological condition 
 
To varying degrees the aforementioned has constituted and addressed a given state of 
technological affairs confronting society.  In referring to the latter state of affairs a 
“technological condition” is being signaled one that amounts to a conditioning of our 
sociality and sociabilities in short our social being. Although the sociological theme is 
particular to this thesis, Scharff and Dusek’s (2003) philosophy of technology takes up 
the theme of the “technological condition” to effect the latter and not the former. 
However, in the wake of pursing a philosophy of technology they take up amongst others, 
themes which include a historical account of different conceptions of technology, which 
for our purposes is marshaled to elaborate the social philosophical import of the notion of 
a “technological condition”.  
 
2.2.1 Technological condition and Ancient Greek Doctrine 
 
Reaching far back to the ancient Greek doctrine of Plato and Aristotle, Scharff and Dusek 
(2003: 5) point out that despite their differences they shared: 
  
“hierarchical conceptions of knowledge that make philosophical or scientific 
understanding of the universal and essential superior.”           
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From the above what emerges is that technology which is neither philosophical nor 
scientific as such does not inhabit in said Greek thinking the universe of superior 
knowledge, but is instead delimited to the province of practical techniques. In our 
contemporary understanding of modern technology the relationship between science and 
technology is not as clear-cut as it seems in ancient Greece but fraught with contestation 
as already alluded and about which more when we take up the matter of technology and 
epistemology. However, the import of this hierarchy points to the epistemic shape in as 
much as it reflects on a ‘technological condition’. Thus, one might say that in so far as 
technology is a form of practical knowledge its status was of a lower and subordinate 
order. This much is evident in the relative neglect and late arrival of technology to 
philosophy and for that matter sociology. However, as to how the ancient Greeks viewed 
the relationship between technology and society Scharff and Dusek (2003: 5) put it thus: 
 
…ancient Greeks did not think of technological change and economic production 
in the modern terms of efficiency and progress. Practical techniques were judged 
as analogous to and as facilitating for our own purposes the cosmic and natural 
processes about which the human spirit above all seeks knowledge and with 
which we are in any case involved. 
 
What is noteworthy above is that the idea of technological change or how the relationship 
between technology and society is viewed in ancient Greek doctrine has an ontological 
dimension to it, such that one is able to differentiate between the latter and a modern 
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Western modality. The distinction between the aforementioned is reducible to an 
ontological thesis on the one hand,and an instrumental one on the other hand. Considered 
in the light of a ‘technological condition’ what emerges is the diminution of the concept 
of technology such that its ontological dimension is effaced in the face of its re-
specification in the modern context of rationalization (Weber) as means, i.e., 
instrumentalism. Paradoxically, Western thought seized upon the hierarchical conception 
of knowledge of ancient Greek doctrine, though abandons the ontological dimension of 
their view of technology, and thus loses out on its ontological depth.  
 
With respect to tracking into Heidegger’s ontology of modern technology this excursus is 
intended to map out the discursive force of a modality of being, which continues to veil 
our sociality with the technological condition, and its predisposition towards 
instrumentality. What this chapter and the ensuing one on technology seek to offer up is a 
hermeneutic phenomenology of technology without reference to social actors and their 
predilections, but rather the conditions of possibility for those technological predilections 
and how they are related to a particular constitution of social being..  
 
In other words, what we argue is that what makes it even possible to think of philosophy 
and sociology of technology, in general, for that very matter, is the very idea of its 
ontological grounding. The technological condition made manifest here is that in 
removing the ontological dimension of technology, we conceptually remove a 
fundamental social understanding that is responsible for inuring us in our social worlds. 
And furthermore is responsible for semantically anchoring us in our worlds. It is this 
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ontological sense of technology which we seek to thread through the thesis and to argue 
that in effect it is redoubled in a hermeneutic phenomenological analysis of vision, that is, 
it ontology, where both bear on revealing and disclosing the sociality of being. But, 
equally so, modern technology as will become evident, in the exegesis of Heidegger’s 
concept thereof, taken up later, is also the site of the obfuscation of social being and its 
sociality.  
 
2.2.2 Technological condition, Enlightenment Optimism and Romantic Pessimism 
 
The dialectic of ‘disclosure and obfuscation’ of technology taken up above is met with a 
symmetry in modern philosophy though taken up as ‘emancipation and oppression’. On 
the one hand we are referred by Scharff and Dusek (2003: 5-6) to the technological 
utopianism and enlightenment optimism of Bacon (“knowledge is power”), Comte 
(“order and progress”) and Saint Simon (“society as a vast factory”). Taken together their 
ideas converged on the understanding that science and technology would usher in 
progress and peace. Moreover that the agents and custodians of this progress and peace 
were to be scientists and technologists in Comte’s thinking the new priesthood an 
emergent technocracy.  
 
By contrast Scharff and Dusek (2003: 6) refer us to the romantic critique of Rousseau 
who counter poses the enlightenment optimism of Comte’s “scientific progress leading to 
world peace and happiness” with a view that it will instead lead to “decline and 
decadence”. These contrasting perspectives of Comte and Rousseau considered in the 
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light of a technological condition captures one or the other pole of the debate which 
divides along the lines of utopians vis-à-vis dystopians. Their limitation is that neither 
considers the technological condition as a unity of the duality of emancipation and 
alienation. That is they do not consider the co-simultaneity and mutually constitutive 
nature of the dialectic of technology and society. And since they, Comte and Rousseau, 
are locked in an isomorphic understanding of the relationship between technology and 
society they both end up in a deterministic frame, though their respective outcomes as 
noted are different. Their understanding can be seen to converge on the idea that 
technology is a means, that is, it is about instrumentalism, though they differ on the ends 
that would be realized and on the extent to which such means are to be taken up given its 
effect on traditional social being. In effect this divide represents the bifurcation of the 
dialectic to the positive and negative dimensions of technology destined never to meet 
and as such always presenting a partial picture. Thus, in as much as one may speak of a 
technological condition one is referred to the Enlightenment optimism and Romantic 
pessimism as discursive foreclosures in as much as they are presented as mutually 
exclusive poles of social being involved in the ‘technological condition’.  
 
2.2.3 The Technological condition, Marx and technological determinism 
 
Considered, however, from such a perspective that allows of the unity of the opposites of 
the technological condition is Marx’s understanding of the relationship between 
technology and society. Scharff and Dusek (2003: 6) point out that “Marx  is optimistic 
concerning the development of science and technology as well as about their benefiting 
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humanity in the long run even though he “ridiculed … Comtean conceptions of scientific 
and technological progress”. Equally so they (Ibid: 6) contend that Marx:  
 
shares the pessimism of Rousseau and the romantics concerning the oppression 
and alienation produced by science and technology … in the present and short 
run”.  
 
If the relationship between technology and society is a case of being ‘good and evil’ is 
there a point at which one may speak “beyond good and evil”. For Marx that terminus ad 
quem is Communism though whether we arrive at that through the development of the 
productive forces a technological determinism, or whether we arrive at that through class 
struggle that is a social determinism are the different directions that contemporary 
Marxism has taken.  
 
With respect to Marxist variants favoring a technological determinist interpretation of 
social change Scharff and Dusek (2003: 6) show that in both the “Poverty of Philosophy” 
and in his highly influential “Preface to a Contribution to a Critique of Political 
Economy” there is sufficient basis in Marx to support this position. For instance they 
contend that the former text of Marx to be taken lightly “contains his famous quip, “…  
 
the hand-mill gives you society with the feudal lord; and the steam-mill society 
with the industrial capitalist  
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This clearly resonates with a technological determinist theme. Similarly in the latter text 
it is argued that Marx “identifies the base of society with the technological forces and 
social power relations of production, thus making technology central in his system of 
thought. By contrast to this technological determinist theme Scharff and Dusek (2003:7) 
refer us to the social determinist thematic which they argue takes it cue from Marx’s 
claim in Capital where it is held that “class structure and class struggle control what sort 
of technology is developed”. Notwithstanding, Scharff and Dusek’s (2003) account of the 
technological and social deterministic offshoots of Marx there is also interpretive room to 
consider the dialectical import of such claims. In as much as they (Scharff and Dusek) 
disclose the bifurcation prevalent in Marxian thinking they do not similarly focus on the 
kind of thinking that shows that a mutual embeddedness is also evident. In other words in 
reversing the relationship between society and technology in what is referred to above as 
a so-called quip one may also infer that Marx makes explicit the dialectical nature of said 
relationship. That even though the comment may appear to be said in jest it nevertheless 
points to an understanding of the relationship between technology and society as 
mutually constitutive.  
 
The question as to where Marx places weightage with respect to the debate as to whether 
“technology determines social relations or whether social power determines technological 
developments” is for Scharff and Dusek (2003: 7) a case of the latter. The technological 
condition in this regard is tantamount to seeing the relationship between technology and 
society as the mediation of the generalization and normalization of the vested interests of 
a dominant class. In other words as Williams (1974) argues that technology is socially 
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shaped and as such offers a ‘symptomatic’ read of the social interests which predisposes 
it in very definite ways. There is no disagreement with this level of analysis in as much as 
it shows the intersection between technology and society and its structural import, 
however, what is missing is that there does not appear to be an engagement with what 
technology is but only how it is appropriated and used. It comes across as an argument 
post fortiori with no mind to technology a priori. Notwithstanding, the allusion to 
dialectics, it is our contention that the dialectic of technology and society is strong on 
analyses of the intra societal dimension and on said relationship though weak on an intra 
technological analysis.  
 
In other words, Marx accepts technology as fundamental, that is, as part of the material 
base of society, and moreover, he sees it as foundational in the dialectic of social change 
(contradictions between the forces and relations of production), though he does not open 
up technology, sui generis, to a dialectical analysis in itself. What is being contended is 
that the determinism both social and technological referred to above within Marxian vein 
arises as a result of the lack of an analysis of technology proper. It is arguably this gap 
that is responsible for destabilizing the discourse on the relationship between technology 
and society thus rendering problematic how we understand this latter relationship and 
thus its import in the constitution of social being.     
2.2.4 Technological condition: Ellul, Autonomy and technological determinism 
Seen in the light of a non-Marxian framework, technological determinism takes the form 
of an argument which stresses the ‘autonomy of technology’ as against its social 
determination. In this regard Scharff and Dusek (2003) refer us to Heilbroner (1967) and 
 
 
 
 
 57
Ellul (1980) and their variations on the theme of technological determinism and the 
emergent ‘technological condition. What the former (Ibid:2003) point out is that for Ellul 
the technological condition emerges as a kind of blindness when it comes to seeing and 
accepting that technology itself is self-propelling, that is autonomous. The logic of Ellul’s 
(1980) position as argued by Scharff and Dusek (2003: 383) is that in contrast to the 
“idea that technology is in fact just the collection of instrumental means” is the reality 
claim that “how “the technological phenomenon” (sic) actually functions demonstrates 
that all of the human activities we “grandly assume are independent from and thus 
empowered to direct and control technology are in fact bound up with and beholden to 
it.” In short what is being suggested is that society is shaped by the imperatives of 
technology rather than its inverse. Thus what obtains from the framework of Ellul 
according to Scharff and Dusek (2003: 383) with respect to technological determinacy is 
that:  
 
Science, the political order, economics our (vastly overestimated) mental powers- 
all of these are repeatedly put in the service of “the technological demand” (sic) 
for more invention, more development, more control -…    
 
It is not only that technology issues forth the imperatives of “more invention, more 
development, more control” but most importantly that it does so within the specificity of 
a technological modality. The form of this latter technological modality or demand which 
is captured by Ellul as the demands of “technique” is analogous Scharff and Dusek 
(2003: 383) contend to Weber’s conception of the “rationalization of social practice”. 
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What is pointed out is that both Ellul and Weber converge in as much as they identify an 
increasing tendency in the development of “technique” and “rationalization” towards a 
state in which reason is transformed into “something entirely instrumental and means 
oriented, and we thereby cease to think about the question of the ultimate ends of our 
practices” (Scharff and Dusek, 2003: 383). Notwithstanding, the latter it should be noted 
that their sociological orientations are entirely different in as much as where Ellul gives 
credence to technology as ‘purposive’ Weber moves in the opposite direction of the 
social actor as purposive. Moreover, where the ultimate social outcome of “technique’s” 
or technology’s hegemony leads to something of a ‘homo technologicus’ for Ellul, while  
rationalization,  on the other hand, for Weber leads to a ‘homo bureaucraticus’. To these 
theoretical outcomes both dystopian we are offered a corrective in Weber’s cultural 
relativism and a fait accompli in Ellul’s technological autonomy.     
 
   
If, this is putatively the reality of the “technological phenomenon”, as Scharff and Dusek 
(2003) understand Ellul, then the question that begs is, what is it that accounts for this 
blind spot so identified and reproduced, in the imperatives of the technological society 
and modernization. In this regard the following factors are identified by Scharff and 
Dusek (2003:383) as key to how Ellul understands the reasons behind the pervasive 
social blindness as to the ‘true’ nature of the autonomy of technology.  
 
For one thing, it is characteristic of those who claim possession of the ability to 
control the direction of technological development to overestimate their skills. 
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Scientists and engineers display embarrassing naïveté and shallowness in dealing 
with the social impact of technology. Politicians are driven by ideological 
assumptions rather than knowledge in their efforts to direct or regulate technical 
practices. And ordinary citizens and consumers are seriously uninformed about 
both the technical practices and social realities that dominate everyday lives. 
Moreover the technological system itself entrances us all … it comes to be 
admired as the primary “creative force” (sic) in our lives and its values displace 
traditional morality.    
 
The assumption most noteworthy for an understanding of the relationship between 
technology and society is that as argued above there is the suggestion that there is a 
disjuncture to be found between the imperatives of technology and those across a 
spectrum of different social modalities. And that should we yield to the imperatives and 
rationale of technology, rather than superimpose factors extraneous to its development 
and its social sweep, then, we would be able to avoid the many disasters that accompany 
the political manipulation, hubris and ignorance surrounding technological practices. This 
amounts to reversing the conventional wisdom that ‘the state commands and technology 
obeys’ for an imperative that hails that ‘technology should command and the state obey’.  
 
There is without a doubt the empirical reality, though gradations notwithstanding, that 
our social lives and social realities proliferate with technology in general (artifacts, 
systems, processes etc.) and that these are mediated to different effect across a range of 
institutions. However, to suggest that the dialectic between technology and society will 
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be consummated in a technological state of affairs at the complete erasure of our 
humanity and sociality that is the end of his and her story (history) and its substitution in 
the story of techne (techno-story) seems way too fatalistic perhaps even eschatological. 
But to suggest, however, that living in a world that is increasingly becoming 
technologised and is reaching a critical mass that is surely reacting back on us, as we no 
longer do things in the same way as before, nor do we think about things as we did once 
before the generalization of technology in electronics, and that its time to put this 
contemporary relationship between technology and society into perspective, is quite 
another matter. In other words we need to be mindful that technology’s relation to society 
is proportional and not absolute and that we are not compelled by an ineluctable 
technological force to an end over which we have no choice, but rather that this type of 
thinking is nothing else but the symptom of an instrumental thinking that has separated, 
as noted above with respect to Weber, the means from its social ends. It bifurcates our 
social being such that our sociality is separated from our sociabilities.    
 
The question that begs and that is seized upon in this thesis is how we go about 
establishing or exploring not the “technological condition” as such, but the ‘sociological 
condition’ of living in a technological world. What is however held as the point of 
departure is that an understanding of the ‘sociological condition’ of contemporary life is 
fundamentally predicated on the nature of the relationship between technology and 
society and vice versa. Thus, we identify in the above sentiment that “ordinary citizens 
and consumers are seriously uninformed …” a qualified agreement in that one accepts 
that whilst they may be uninformed this does not mean that they do not generate their 
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own meanings through the quotidian practices and social realities engaged in. What is 
being argued here and taken up with gravitas later is that in focusing on “ordinary” 
peoples practices and concerns in their interaction with technology we may be in a 
position to give shape to their emergent social imaginaries or social being. That is in how 
different modalities of social being are gathered in the intersection of what Borgmann 
(1984) calls “focal concerns”, “focal practices” and technological forms in daily life. In 
other words, methodologically we might be in a position to consider the hermeneutic 
framework in which the conditions of possibility and impossibility of what is doable and 
sayable may emerge, in situ. That place where such a convergence is seen to take place is 
arguably around the intersection of technology and vision which we have tracked into 
Heidegger’s existential – ontological understanding of being-in as a way of connecting 
with social being. The latter is not Borgmann’s concern and as such we take our point of 
departure from him but remain mindful of his concern for the quotidian order of being, 
which we discuss later, in its everydayness at the level of his understanding of 
Heidegger’s notion of gathering. It is this gathering of being which we take seriously in 
our concern with technology and vision and thus focus on the disclosure of modalities of 
social being as it is uncovered in our circumspective dealings with the world.  
2.2.5 Technological condition: Heilbroner and ‘Soft Determinism’ 
However, where Ellul does not appear to equivocate with respect to his deterministic 
understanding of the relation between technology and society Heilbroner (2003: 401, in 
Scharff and Dusek) by contrast does and opts for a thesis based on “what William James 
calls “soft determinism” (sic) with regard to the influence of the machine on social 
relations.” Establishing Marx as reference point Heilbroner (ibid: 398-399) sets out to 
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establish whether one might be able to “explain technological determinism historically as 
well as explain history by technological determination”. With respect to the argument for 
a historical explanation of technological determinism Heilbroner (2003: 398) invokes 
Marx’s quote on “the hand mill gives you society with the feudal lord; the steam-mill …” 
to ask a question, which momentarily sidesteps the obvious suggestion of correspondence 
between technology and society, but that directly addresses the technological sequence 
implied. The sequence put forward by Heilbroner (Ibid: 399) takes this form: 
… the steam-mill follows the hand-mill not by chance but because it is the next 
“stage” (sic) in a technical conquest of nature that follows one and only one grand 
avenue of advance.”  …one cannot move to the age of the hydroelectric plant 
before one has mastered the steam-mill, nor to the nuclear power age until one has 
lived through that of electricity.   
Paraphrasing Marx, Heilbroner (2003: 399) puts the question thus to open up the 
possibility of a history of productive technology (‘techno-story’ perhaps a ‘tech-no-
story’): 
 
Can we then explain the “laws of motion” (sic) of technology itself? Or to put the 
question less grandly, can we explain why technology evolves in the sequence 
that it does?   
 
 The ‘softness’ of Heilbroner’s (Ibid: 399) technological determinism surfaces in his 
mindful rendition of the counterfactuals that need to be accounted for such as the 
variegated nature of societies vis-à-vis the development of productive technology, the 
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social pressures exercised on the course of development of technology and the distinction 
between discovery and technological application. However, these attend to the second of 
his questions which deal with how technology relates to the social order, though one 
notes paradoxically an obdurate turn in his account of the evidence he marshals in 
support of a view of a determinate technological sequence. Thus, notwithstanding the 
differences in how societies relate to productive technology Heilbroner (ibid: 399) still 
contends that it does not discount the view that for those societies that do pursue it there 
exists a “determinate sequence”. The evidence for this sequence Heilbroner (Ibid: 399) 
finds in the specificity of the process of discovery and innovations immanent in the 
development of productive technology.  
 
What Heilbroner (ibid: 399) finds in his historical purview of discovery and innovation in 
regard to the development of productive technology is that it is characterized by “the 
simultaneity of invention, the absence of technological leaps and the predictability of 
technology”. Without entering into the specifics of each, as they are sufficiently 
suggestive, what firms up in Heilbroner’s argument is that all three are bound up, and 
given definition and form, by the process implicated in the development of productive 
technology. Thus, with respect to the “simultaneity of invention” what is evident is that 
“discovery takes place along a well defined frontier of knowledge rather than in a grab-
bag fashion”; that secondly “most advances …appear essentially incremental, 
evolutionary and finally that prediction admits to technology following “a developmental 
sequence rather than arriving in a more chancy fashion’ (Ibid: 399).        
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The softness, that is, the proportional role attributed to technological determinism by 
Heilbroner (Ibid: 400) is made manifest in the way he accounts for the “structured” (sic) 
history of technological sequencing. What becomes evident in his argument is that he 
does not restrict  the “laws of motion” of technological development to only its internal 
dynamic since this would not be able to account for the obvious variegated nature of its 
spread across different societies. Nor, does he decenter the internal dynamic of 
technological progress, but rather he sets up the sociological context as constraints 
operating on and shaping technological development. In doing so he is able to support the 
idea of a “determinate sequence” but at the cost of producing a parallel line of 
determination. For not only is it argued that the process of technological discovery, 
invention and innovation marks a determinate course, but that this level of determination 
is socially circumscribed. In the words of Heilbroner (Ibid: 400) there are “order-
bestowing social constraints on the development of technology such as “the gradual 
expansion of knowledge”, “… the stock of capital”, “the material competence of an age”, 
“technological congruence”,  all of which set a limit on what is achievable and thus 
allows for a level of predictability and thus determinacy. To paraphrase Marx similarly it 
would appear from Heilbroner that technology does develop in and of itself, but not in the 
circumstances of its own choosing. It does so on the basis of a logic of articulation or 
‘congruence’ between the technological and the social.  
 
In sum, then, for Heilbroner it is not a theoretical reach to argue for a history of 
technological determinism that follows the sequential order of productive technology, as 
long as it is tied to a congruent sociological complex comprising in the main scientific 
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knowledge, technical expertise and a division of labour. What this does mean is that even 
though the sociological complex is seen to act on technology it nevertheless implies an 
autonomous process which accommodates itself to society whilst issuing forth its 
internally generated imperatives in relation to labor and the organization of work. Thus, 
asks Heilbroner (Ibid: 401) can one then take Marx at “face value” and argue that “the 
steam-mill does in fact give us society with the industrial complex” and furthermore that 
“the technological infrastructure is responsible for some of the sociological features of 
society.” To these questions Heilbroner does not give an unequivocal response and thus: 
 
Certainly the class characteristics of a particular society are strongly implied in its 
functional organization. Yet it would seem wise to be cautious before relating 
political effects exclusive to functional economic causes.  
 
Considered in the light of the erstwhile Soviet Union with its constellation of socialist 
states Heilbroner (Ibid: 401) suggests that technology is ambivalent as to whether the 
economic context is capitalist (industrial capitalist) or socialist (industrial manager), 
though what is beyond doubt is that it will bequeath the “technician and the bureaucrat”.  
In other words what is being said here is that the scope of determinism associated with 
technology does not necessarily hold when it comes to the level of broad based social 
effects, but is limited more to the immediate technological sweep, which is, that it is more 
proximate and parochial with long term ramifications and indirect effects. It is in this 
sense that the effects of technology are reined in that one sees the shape of what is called 
a ‘soft determinism’ or a weaker effect than that suggested by an outright technological 
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determinism. Hence to wit Heilbroner (Ibid: 402) muses that “ we cannot say whether the 
computer age will give us the latter day capitalist or commissar, but it seems beyond 
question that it will give us the technician and the bureaucrat.” Thus emerges technology 
and society in a relationship of mutual determination in which the imperatives of 
technology issue forth the technician and bureaucrat, while the sociological imperative 
recasts the latter as post-industrial capitalist or post-industrial administrator. If the matter 
of the dialectic of technology and society is settled for Heilbroner as that of mutual 
determination then what is it that might account for the persistence of technological 
determinism in contemporary thinking and thus so express a particular manifestation of 
the ‘technological condition’, so to speak.   
 
What is argued is that the “rise of capitalism provided a major stimulus for the 
development of a technology of production”, in so far as the “emergence of the market 
system” based on the “principle of private property”, provided the institutional basis 
capable of “systematically guiding the inventive and innovative abilities of society”, 
geared as it is towards its social reproduction. However, what the market system also puts 
into play, notes Heilbroner (Ibid: 403), with direct import for technological determinism, 
particularly in so far as it relates to the notion of the ‘autonomy of technology’ was a 
“laissez-faire ideology”.  
 
The argument advanced is that since it was market forces that governed the adoption of 
technology in the economy and that this selfsame market force is ruled by an “invisible 
hand”, meant that technology too was taken up in this notion of a “diffuse “force” (sic) 
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bearing on social and political life” (Ibid: 403). In addition to capitalism and the market 
system, Heilbroner (Ibid: 403) makes us aware that science too “gave a new impetus to 
technology”. What is striking about the relation of science to technology, a matter taken 
up variously in this chapter but of particular epistemological note here is that it is 
embedded in modern technology. Thus, it seems that as far as technology involves 
knowledge in its internal operations it could be argued that the social reaches into 
technology at its very heart. This surely undercuts the extent to which one might hold that 
technology enjoys some form of autonomy from society such that one may speak of its 
relation to the latter. It would appear that such a division maintaining ‘blue water’ 
between technology and society is not entirely sustainable. And furthermore, when we 
consider how science tends to be reified from society one notes an additional impetus 
behind the pervasiveness of technological determinism even though it can be easily 
discounted.  
 
At bottom what is implicit perhaps even explicit in Heilbroner argument is that the 
relationship between (productive) technology and society i.e. a market-driven society 
manifests an institutional lag, a ‘technological lag’. And that it is precisely within the 
space created by this “lag” that a ground is cleared for technological determinism to take 
root and to flourish. The form of this lag or disjuncture in which technological 
determinism insinuates itself has a sociological shape to it in Heilbroner’s (Ibid: 403) 
dialectical formulation of the problematic: 
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Technological determinism is thus peculiarly a problem of a certain historical 
epoch - …-in which the forces of technical change have been unleashed, but when 
the agencies for its control or guidance of technologically are rudimentary.” 
 
In this thinking technological determinism amounts to a sociological problem in as much 
as society is deemed to have absconded from taking up the responsibility of 
circumscribing technology within the grasp of its social being. Thus, the technological 
condition as understood herein is a reinforcement of the mysterium that surrounds 
technology, in as much as it is deemed to be running amok, or certainly beyond the 
behest of social control. Heilbroner as far as can be gleaned from his argument addresses 
the relationship between technology and society as two domains in mutual engagement 
with each other, though what is unclear is the nature of their mutual implication in each 
other. What is being noted here is that there is no conception of the way in which 
technology as reality in itself imbricates human affairs through its imperatives reaching 
into modalities of being and sociality.  
 
To Heilbroner’s credit he does make it explicit that these existential questions are not 
addressed in his ‘soft deterministic’ argument, as to the level at which machines do make 
‘history’. However, in as much as Heilbroner’s argument holds for this thesis it is 
delimited to his historico-sociological explanation of the pervasiveness and insistence of 
technological determinism. Together with his account of the mutual determination of 
technology and society Heilbroner does raise the discourse on the nature of technological 
determinism by pointing to its relative and proportional influence. However where we are 
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left somewhat adrift is in accounting for the existential dimension in the relationship 
between technology and society. 
   
 The second question that Heilbroner (Ibid: 400) attests to is that concerned with Marx’s 
proposition that suggests that “a given technology imposes certain social and political 
characteristics upon society.” In this regard Heilbroner (Ibid: 401) holds that this is true 
particularly when we consider that which is directly implicated in the production process 
such as “the composition of the labour force” and “the hierarchical organization of 
work”. In both instances he points out that technology necessitates particular responses in 
order for it to function: the labour required in relation to different productive technologies 
may be skilled, semi-skilled, unskilled or a particular combination depending on whether 
one is dealing with a hand-mill, steam-mill etc.; while the organization of work required 
by different technologies involve different orders of supervision and coordination (Ibid: 
401).    
 
 
Thus, in both instances of technological development that is either when internally driven 
or externally acted upon by society there are to be found two levels of determination 
imputing structure and determinacy in respect of the sequential development of 
productive technology. The implications of this view on the predictability of 
technological change is that it emerges as a function of the internal dynamic of 
technology, i.e. its laws of motion’ on the one hand, and that of an external dynamic or 
sociological constraints, on the other hand. In effect one ends up with a bifurcation of the 
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technological and the sociological which Heilbroner (Ibid: 400) reconciles with his 
notion of “technological congruence”.  
 
“In acquiring new productive forces men change their mode of production, and in 
changing their mode of production they change their way of living-they change all 
their social relations.”    
 
The levels of determination that issue forth from Marx’s dialectical understanding of the 
relationship between technology and society is not of the type that suggests a direct 
relationship between productive forces and social relations. Rather that the level of 
determination that is seen to have direct consequences for social change is mediated at 
the level of the mode of production. This level of determination at the instance of the 
mode of production is in turn an expression of the unity of the dialectic manifest in the 
relations that unfold between the productive forces and the social relations of production. 
It is then when the contradictions and tensions are resolved one way or another between 
the latter and former that social changes of a general nature are instantiated. 
 
   
However, the recessive nature of class struggle in the contemporary period seems to 
suggest its containment or domestication in the institutionalization of relations between 
labour and capital (e.g. collective bargaining) and as such signals some kind of 
displacement of this erstwhile central site of social struggle for surely there is a daily 
struggle. The question that then arises is what those forms of social struggles and 
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contestations might be that are now fore grounded though not centralized in the day-to-
day social lives of people contemporaneously. In this regard this thesis on technology is 
leading to making a case for such decentering of the Marxian site of primary conflict 
from the ‘factory-floor’ so to speak to the engagement of the technological and social in 
peoples’ daily practices. In other words one is not privileging any domain of social 
activity as in say work but rather shifting the unit of analysis to what Borgmann (1983) 
refers to as “focal concerns” and “focal practices” of people in relation to their 
technological milieus. But, as to what distinguishes this shift, it is characterized by an 
existentialist analytical frame that brings people’s concerns, practices and objects 
together on the basis of an experiential grounding. The question that arises in this regard 
is not what effect technology has on society but rather in what sort of ways technology is 
manifest as social practices that is in turning inwards to how we experience living in a 
technological world. Thus, before we attend to the central and foundational question of 
Heidegger and its import for this thesis, we consider, by way of setting the philosophical 
context, for the latter, Scharff and Dusek (2003: 487) on how technology is taken up in an 
“experiential perspective” in order to “understand the cultural transformation technology 
brings.”  
2.2.6 Borgmann and the technological condition 
 
In as much as Borgmann (1984) conceptualizes a problematic associated with technology 
he is seen to take up a position, as argued by Scharff and Dusek (2003: 249), “between 
technological determinists like Ellul and instrumentalists who view technology merely as 
a means to freely chosen ends, …” They (Ibid:249) furthermore contend that Borgmann 
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(1984) is in agreement with Heidegger (1977, cited in Scharff et al , 2003) in so far as the 
former similarly recognizes the inherent “danger of modern technology”, but not without 
some modification to the latter. What this ‘danger of technology’ amounts to in 
Borgmann’s (1984) thinking is taken up and respecified as that constituting a 
“technological condition” ala Scharff and Dusek (2003) though given a different slant in 
this thesis.  
 
Taking up the notion of the ‘technological condition’ in Borgmann’s diagnosis of 
“advanced technological way of life” two salient but related issues are apparent. Firstly, 
he (Borgmann, 1983: 3) points out that: 
 
The problems that beset technological societies are thought to be extrinsic to 
technology: they stem, supposedly, from political indecision, social injustice and 
environment constraints. I consider this a serious misreading of our situation. I 
propose to show that there is a characteristic and constraining pattern to the entire 
fabric of our lives. … This pattern is visible first and most of all in the countless 
inconspicuous objects and procedures of daily life in a technological society.    
 
In setting up the problematic, above as such, Borgmann (1984) addresses the “serious 
misreading” of the putative ‘technological condition’ as a matter bearing directly on the 
manner in which technology is understood, and moreover in its relationship to society. 
Taken at face-value technology is understood as somehow neutral and thus all problems 
ensuing are considered to be external; much like a tool is considered such that what begs 
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is the common-sense understanding, that a poor ‘workman’ (sic) always blames his tools 
when a job goes awry. And indeed in so far as a human hand is deemed culpable it is 
valid, however, beyond this instrumental understanding the point of relevance that 
Borgmann (1984) is drawing our attention to is that taken together, technology involves a 
substantive dimension which is made manifest in a “constraining pattern” and one that 
affects the “entire fabric of our lives” or we prefer, our social being. Thus, in so far as 
one may speak of a ‘technological condition’ or state of affairs as such it is in 
Borgmann’s (1984:3) estimation that there is much more than that which may be 
associated with ‘real politick’, moral imperatives and ecological sensitivities and which 
involves: 
…the dominant way in which we in the modern era have been taking up with the 
world; and that characteristic approach to reality I call (modern) technology  
 
However, what Borgmann (1984: 3-4) means by “been taking up” with modern 
technology not only refers to a definitive pattern, but also in Heideggerean vein devolves 
to a fatalism which threatens our very being and sociality. With respect to the definitive 
pattern (ibid: 3) it is discernible in as much as: 
Technology becomes most concrete and evident in (technological) devices, in 
objects such as television sets, central heating plants, automobiles and the like. 
Devices therefore represent clear and accessible cases of the pattern or paradigm 
of modern technology.     
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The fatalism alluded to above on the other hand that emerges with the advent of modern 
technology with eschatological undertones becomes palpable in so far as it is a theoretical 
function of Borgmann’s “description of the device paradigm” and thus (ibid: 4):  
This description reveals a fatally debilitating tendency in the present rule of 
technology. But that aspect of its rule can be made intelligible only if we turn 
explicitly to those forces in our lives that are endangered by the rule of the device 
paradigm. 
 
What Borgmann brings within the purview of his analysis of modern technology captures 
what are at the heart of the ‘technological condition’, both as debilitating tendencies of 
the “device paradigm”, and that which stands at the threshold of his idea of how this 
tendency may be reformed. Before centering these two pillars of Borgmann’s analysis a 
brief by him on what these forces are (ibid: 4): 
 
I use “focal things and practices” (sic) as approximate terms for those forces. … 
A focal practice is one that can centre and illuminate our lives. 
 
With this in place the question as to what the “device paradigm” is and what “focal 
concerns” are with respect to a Borgmann’s (1984) philosophy of technology becomes 
our concern, as the issue of its place in thinking the “technological condition” has been 
contextualized. The issue then is how technological devices as such threaten to imperil 
our elation to the nature of social being, i.e. our sociality and sociabilities. How is it 
possible that we are taken up with technology such that it is deemed to alter our sense of 
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being, sociality and the world we dwell in, in our everyday life? This latter question is 
what we seek to unravel in Borgmann’s (1984) conception of the device paradigm 
immediately below to illustrate how he understands the technological condition.  
 
2.2.6.1 Borgmann’s Device Paradigm as Enframing  
 
The argument that Borgmann (1984) develops with respect to how we are taken up with 
technology as contemporary condition hinges on his thesis that there is a distinctive 
pattern in the way in which it is implemented. This implementation of modern technology 
in society in its turn devolves to Borgmann’s (1984: 41) stated ‘promise of technology’ 
which involves “by way of the domination of nature” humanity’s liberation from “misery 
and toil’. In palpable terms Borgmann links the implementation of the promise of 
technology, that is “liberty and enrichment” to that of “availability” (ibid).  In other 
words what seems to emerge in that it is through technology making things available that 
it insinuates itself and gives definition to our social being.  But how is it possible that 
availability as technologically mediated comes to impose a pattern that somehow 
threatens us by disburdening us from what is commonly described as the drudgery of 
chores. The answer to this question is at the core of Borgmann’s (1984) philosophy of 
technology and involves as its initial task a theoretical clearing in which the notion of 
‘availability’ is set into relief in the distinction drawn between “things and devices”. 
What obtains in Borgmann’s (1984: 41-42) analysis of a ‘thing’ is that it involves a 
context which comprises a “physical engagement” and a “social engagement” which is 
inextricably linked and which collectively constitutes it’s (the thing’s) world. Moreover, 
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Borgmann contends that a “thing” in as much as it calls “forth a manifold engagement [it] 
necessarily provides more than one commodity” (ibid: 41) or use. This concept of the 
‘thing’ that Borgmann is working with becomes a lot clearer when reference is made to 
the example he cites to illustrate his argument (ibid: 41-42).  
 
Thus a stove used to furnish more than mere warmth. It was a focus, a hearth, a 
place that gathered the work and leisure of a family and gave the house a centre. 
Its coldness marked the morning and the spreading of its warmth the beginning of 
the day. It assigned to the different family members tasks that defined their place 
in the household. The mother built the fire, the children kept the firebox filled, 
and the father cut the firewood. It provided for the entire family a regular and 
bodily engagement with the rhythm of the seasons that was woven together of the 
threat of cold and the solace of warmth, the smell of wood smoke, the exertion of 
sawing and of carrying, the teaching of skills, and the fidelity of daily tasks. … 
Physical engagement is not simply physical contact but the experience of the 
world through the manifold sensibility of the body. 
 
In the above we see the manifold connections and imbrications of physical engagement 
and its social ordering and structuring of everyday life in a pre-modern technological 
setting. What follows are the implications of these self-same activities though extended to 
the realm of skill entailed in work and how it bears on social engagement beyond the 
domain of the household. Taking up the idea of the sensibility of the body above 
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Borgmann inures its link to the experience of the world and makes the sociological point 
thus (ibid):  
 
That sensibility is sharpened and strengthened in skill. Skill is intensive and 
refined world engagement. Skill, in turn, is bound up with social engagement. It 
molds the person and gives the person character. Limitations of skill confine any 
one person’s primary engagement with the world to a small area. … Work again 
is only one example of the social context that sustains and comes to be focused in 
a thing. If we broaden our focus to include other practices, we can see similar 
social contexts in entertainment, meals, in the celebration of the great events of 
birth, marriage, and death. And in these wider horizons of social engagement we 
can see how the cultural and natural dimensions of the world open up.   
 
What can be discerned in both the nature of physical engagements and social 
engagements is that in both cases one sees at work a complex engagement in which 
things disclose an intersection between being, sociality and the world that is congealed in 
the context of things. The point at hand in the juxtaposition of things and devices devolve 
in the main for Borgmann (1984) to the displacement or absorption of the embodied and 
social contexts of things by the machinery of devices. It is thus in the context of things 
that an understanding of that technological pattern to which Borgmann (1984) alludes can 
emerge with any clarity at all and thus be put into perspective. It is also within this logic 
of the device paradigm that the very idea of a technological condition that besets 
humanity contemporaneously is ultimately to receive it’s intelligibility as horizon of 
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social being. The question at hand is then what is it that distinguishes a device from a 
thing. Borgmann (198442-43) answers thus: 
 
A device such as a central heating plant procures mere warmth and disburdens us 
of all other elements. These are taken over by the machinery of the device. The 
machinery makes no demands on our skill, strength, or attention, and it is less 
demanding the less it makes its presence felt. In the progress of technology, the 
machinery of a device has therefore a tendency to become concealed or to shrink 
technology. Of all the physical properties of a device, those alone are crucial and 
prominent which constitute the commodity the device procures. Informally 
speaking, the commodity of a device is, “what a device is there for.” … The 
emphasis lies in the commodious way in which devices make goods and services 
available.  
   
The basic thrust of Borgmann’s analysis is that modern technology in so far as it 
constitutes a pattern sets in motion a process of physical and social diminution of human 
involvement in their social reproduction. What we are witness to is that in place of the 
manifold engagements opened up by an involvement with things in a traditional modality 
of being, there is a steady emaciation of our physical and social being to the point at 
which an ontological substitution, or rupture is made manifest in our subordination to the 
machinery of the devices that procure human satisfactions. In this technological 
procurement of human satisfactions our engagement both physically and socially 
withdraws into the background of the machinery of the device, only to emerge in an 
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emaciated and diminished form as consumers of technologically supplied ends. Thus it is 
not only that the machinery of the device is seen to shrink but most importantly the 
context that makes up the ‘things’ world and hence our place in it and the horizon of 
intelligibility it offers us as social grounding. In other words life loses the richness of its 
meaning; it becomes increasingly less meaningful and thus contracts the nature of social 
being.    
 
The issue at hand in this technological patterning of life is that there is a distinction 
between the machinery of the device and what it procures or what it is used for that 
Borgmann isolates for treatment as symptomatic of modern technology and its 
conditionality. Moreover, he identifies in this distinction of the general divide between 
means and ends that which approximates respectively to the machinery and the 
commodity of the device. It is this divide as fault-line cutting across pre-modern and 
modern technology that appears reconstituted as ontological threshold of  the latter that 
needs to opened up for discussion. However, the withdrawal of the means into the 
machinery of technology and with it the concomitant physical and social engagement 
underscores Borgmann’s contention that the technological condition contemporaneously 
as said pattern is not recognized and identified as such.  
 
To redress this elision of the technological pattern Borgmann (1984: 48-49) specifies the 
means-end divide spatially as the “background” (machinery-means) and “foreground” 
(commodity/function-ends) of the device paradigm. The question thus begs what is it that 
distinguishes modern technology from its precursor in traditional society, in so far as it 
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has a bearing on the distinction between means and ends. Borgmann (1984: 43) analysis 
below discloses that the means-end distinction or more accurately its separation is in fact 
symptomatic of modern technology and is indeed a threshold separating the latter from a 
pre-modern technological modality and as such signals the modality of modern 
technological being.  
 
The distinction in the device between its machinery and its function is a general 
instance of the means-end distinction. In agreement with the general distinction, 
the machinery or the means is subservient to and validated by the function or the 
end. The technological distinction of means and ends differs from the general 
notion in two respects. … In the general case, it is very questionable how clearly 
and radically means and ends can be distinguished without doing violence to the 
phenomena. In the case of the technological device, however, the device can be 
changed radically without threat to the identity or familiarity of the function of the 
device. … This concomitance of radical variability of means and relative stability 
of ends is the first distinguishing feature. The second, closely tied to the first, is 
the concealment and unfamiliarity of the means and the simultaneous prominence 
and availability of the ends. 
  
This argument as to, what we may call, the ontological violence inherent in separating 
means and ends from phenomena ,outside modern technology, or the device paradigm is 
closely tied up with the inseparability of the context of a ‘things’ world from the thing 
itself, as far as its manifold engagements hold. And since we have already developed this 
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position at length it need not detain us any further, however, with regard to the modern 
technological rupture implicated in the conditions of possibility of the reification of 
means from ends and vice versa some illustration is necessary. With respect to the former 
Borgmann (1984: 43) draws our attention to the history in the variability of the means, 
that is, the machinery, employed in the powering of a wrist-watch to make his point. The 
fact that it was initially powered by mechanical means and displayed time with pointers 
or hands and replaced by electrical means displaying time digitally did not in the slightest 
alter its function or ends as such (ibid). Thus, through this example and countless others 
that could be cited one witnesses the reification of the means from its ends, and 
concomitantly, in this shift in technological modality, the effacement of its context, as the 
former (means) increasingly withdraws from view, whilst the latter (ends) profligates. 
This adumbration of means in the ensuing technological pattern and illumination of ends 
carries with it a social cost of some magnitude. Borgmann (1984: 44) contends that this 
cost is one of social anonymity and proceeds thus:  
 
The concealment of the machinery and the disburdening character of the device 
go hand in hand. … A commodity is truly available when it can be enjoyed as a 
mere end, unencumbered by means. … The device provides social 
disburdenment, i.e., anonymity. …The starkness of social anonymity in the 
technological universe can be gauged only against a picture of the social relations 
in a world of things. Such a picture will show that social anonymity shades off 
into one of nature, culture and history. Here it pays to show … how nature and 
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culture were interwoven and how this texture was rent by the advance of 
technology and overtaken by anonymity.  
 
What is particularly significant about Borgmann’s analysis of the technological pattern in 
which the machinery of the device so to speak covers up the means through which its 
function is procured or produced is that it brings to the fore a kind of ‘blind-faith’ in the 
manner in which we are taken up with modern technology or the device paradigm. This 
theme will be expanded when we take up the matter of vision and visuality (see chapter 
4). What is pertinent in this instance is that technology instantiates a way of seeing that 
relates to the experiential visibility of the function of technology, and a way of not seeing 
that is related to the experiential invisibility of the means of technology, its blind-spot. 
All told Borgmann’s position bears testimony to the makings of a ‘technological 
condition’ in so far as it reaches into social being and its sociabilities, in how it alters and 
erodes social practices and functionalities, and in how it contracts the social context 
within the technological all contributing to a technological modality of being.  
 
2.2.7 Technological condition and Heidegger 
Heidegger ‘s description of the state of affairs confronting us to varying degrees, as social 
formations, also seems to disclose itself in what has been called the makings of a 
“technological condition”. This technological condition or rather its formative shape is 
traced by Scharff and Dusek (2003: 3-5) to the distinction between “practical-technical 
(artistic) understanding” and “scientific-philosophical understanding which ensued in 
ancient Greek thinking starting with Socrates through Plato to Aristotle. Considered 
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summarily, beyond the acknowledged differences between them there is general 
agreement noted in their epistemological privileging of philosophy-science over the 
practical-technical and artistic (Scharff & Dusek, 2003). What is pertinent in as much as 
it relates to the technological condition alluded to is that said epistemological 
disprivileging which was bequeathed to Western thinking by ancient Greek doctrine 
damned philosophical enquiry into technology to the margins and until relatively recently 
to a relative discursive silence. In effect the consideration of the epistemic shape of the 
technological condition disclosed in its stead the makings of a philosophical condition 
which so to speak testifies to the quietude on matters concerning what technology is and 
worse its misconception as “neutral” that is without essence. Thus two objectives were 
realized when technology was taken up as object of knowledge by Heidegger, in 
particular (1977): firstly technology was realized as object of knowledge philosophically 
and secondly technology was treated as reality sui generis.    
 
 
What we shall be focusing on from this point forth  is Heidegger’s (2003) philosophical 
understanding of  what is entailed in the  view that implicit in modern technology and in 
technology in general is the makings of a ‘technological condition’ which imperils what 
we may call the ‘human condition’ our humanity or social being. He is of the general 
dystopian view that the social relations that ensue between technology and society bears 
testimony to a problematic relationship in so far as it bears directly on the essence of our 
social being, our humanity. What is at stake from a sociological point of view is that the 
technological condition is that which intepellates the very nature of our sociality. In other 
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words we are hailed in such a particular way that it alters our “predisposition” to the 
world, which is our sociality: and considered further, in the light of Pierre Bourdieu’s 
(1980) framework of social practice one is dealing with the schemas of one’s habitus, our 
ways of thinking and doing what we prefer to refer to as our sociabilities.  The question 
that begs is thus how the putative technological condition relates in toto to our social 
being. In this regard Heidegger (2003: 252)) argues that: 
 
“[e]verywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we 
passionately affirm or deny it.”   
 
If anything at all we could say this of existence in the 21st century that it is that we are 
thrust in the midst of a techno-social world from which there is no escape. This seems 
self evident though, the sociological import of Heidegger’s notion of “unfree and 
chained” speak to a relationship of complexity in which technology and society are 
inextricably bound up with and in each other. Considered as such, this relationship of 
being mutually bound up characterizes the techno-social complex of modern technology, 
which in turn informs social being and which in its turn is proximate in ways of 
questioning and thinking about not only technology, as case in point, but the nature of the 
world and being and their mutual embeddedness. Though clearly this pervasive 
discursive influence of the ‘conventional’ or ‘correct view’ which Heidegger (2003) 
argues is always partial because it fixates on some aspect of the object of knowledge or 
discourse in question  and as such  it relates to all manner of conceptualization and 
theorization. And it is precisely because of this very reason that we should remain 
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mindful that attempts to think through the essence of technology are rendered 
problematic. How?  In short, as we will glean from Heidegger, but through the 
interference of a discourse imbued with the vestiges of the techno-social logic of 
instrumentalism, which we take up in the next chapter, in our discussion of Heidegger’s 
philosophy of technology.  
 
So what is at stake in unraveling the relationship between technology and society is 
firstly that it should be separated from the adumbration of a concept suited to addressing 
what we do with technology, but entirely unsuited to addressing what technology is, 
namely its essence.  And this conflation of what it does for what it is can only be avoided, 
Heidegger (2003) holds, once one has identified and mapped  what this thesis respecifies 
as the technological modality of social being or the sociality constituted in instrumental 
conceptions rendering problematic a deep theoretical engagement with the nature of 
technology, sui generis. Thus, in contradistinction this thesis does not share in analyses 
that proceed only from technology postfactum, that is, address only the social interests 
that shape it in its wake and in so doing remain at the level of sociabilities, what we can 
do by way of our practices and functionalities,, as it is held that this latter approach is 
taken up in the vector of the discursive force of what Heidegger calls “the will to master” 
technology.  
 
The real question, which is been thrown up now, is what might the ontological costs be, 
of an instrumental view, when considered, in relation to its position on the neutrality of 
technology, i.e., merely as means to an end. Considered as such Heidegger (1977) offers 
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us what we might proffer as diagnosis to remain consistent with spelling out the nature of 
the ‘technological condition’ so essentialised that we.  
 
… we are delivered over to it in the worst possible way when we regard it as     
something neutral; for this conception of it, to which today we particularly like to 
pay homage, makes us utterly blind to the essence of technology.  
 
In considering the above it is noted that Heidegger attributes, as far as can be gleaned 
from the above, an obfuscation and truncation, with respect to how we encounter 
technology when arguing on the basis of its neutrality. In being “delivered to technology 
in the worst possible way” suggests that one’s encounter with technology within the 
‘framing’ of neutrality obscures the path to a true understanding. Furthermore in reducing 
the essence of technology to that which is neutral and as such a mere means, an 
instrumentality forecloses on the possibility of confirming anything else but what is 
already presupposed. By contrast Heidegger (1977) makes it clear that the question 
concerning technology is to answer what it is and in answering what it is one arrives at 
what “ancient doctrine” (Plato, Aristotle) regarded as “the essence of a thing”. So when 
he puts the question out there to conventional wisdom, so to speak, as to what technology 
is, what obtains are in the main two predispositions (Heidegger, 2003: 252). 
 
Technology is a means to an end. … Technology is a human activity. The two 
definitions belong together. For to posit ends and to procure and utilize the means 
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to them is a human activity. … The current conception of technology, … can 
therefore be called the instrumental and anthropological definition of technology. 
 
In Heidegger we see that the essence of the conventional view of technology is 
instrumentalism. It is this viewpoint that Heidegger identifies as both a vice and virtue in 
relation to his theoretical objective of establishing the essence of technology. It is a virtue 
because it is through an analysis of the instrumental view that Heidegger is able to free up 
a discursive space to engage the ontology of technology indirectly. And it is a vice 
because the discursive force of instrumentalism stalks all attempts to think beyond an 
instrumentalist understanding of technology. And finally it is a virtue because at the 
limits of instrumentality lies the saving power of the essence of technology, namely, that 
which “grants” through its capacity for “disclosure” an alternate modality of “revealing” 
being, which leaves society “free” to establish a non-instrumental relationship with it.   
 
Thus, in short, the ‘technological condition’ amounts to the instrumentalist negation of 
being such that one ends up with an emaciated sociality and humanity. The question as to 
which way the synthesis of the technological and the sociological seems to be heading for 
Heidegger clearly settles on a dystopian view though, most importantly not as fait 
accompli. What Heidegger (2003) offers as way out of the ‘technological condition’ 
which consumes itself in an instrumentalist rationality is an understanding of technology 
that reaches beyond the discursive foreclosure of instrumentalism. And this latter 
possibility arises out of Heidegger’s critique of instrumentalism that is based on drawing 
an ontological distinction between that which is correct from that which is true. This is 
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what we will turn to next as we track Heidegger’s conception of technology and its 
implications for social being as it elates to its sociality and sociabilities. 
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Chapter Three 
 
Heidegger’s Philosophy of Technology: ‘essence’ of 
techne and modern technology 
What is taken up in this chapter now that we have somewhat cleared the conceptual 
ground is a discussion which delves into the overall structure of Heidegger’s (1977) 
philosophy of technology. We do so in the light of what Heidegger’s hermeneutic 
phenomenology unveils and thus uncovers about technology per se, in its various 
modalities and as far as it offers a particular understanding of the relationship between 
technology and society. This will mean that we intend to tease out some of the theoretical 
significances in his mode of analysis to refine our understanding of Heidegger’s concept 
of technology and in so doing to develop our conception of social being. We take up for 
consideration those areas of existential and ontological note in his estimation of the 
discursive process engaged in, to establish what he calls a “free” relationship with 
technology. In sociological, that is, Durkheimian, vein it might be spoken of as the study 
of technology sui generis, as reality in itself, as ‘social fact’. And in so far as technology 
reaches into society it involves its relationship with social being and thus our sociality 
and sociability as technological mien within a technological milieu.    
3.1 Heidegger’s discursive modality/theoretical Project in context 
Heidegger’s philosophical orientation sees him set up subtle distinctions of major 
epistemological import in his discursive pursuit to establish a clear ground, so to speak, 
of the essence of technology. And herein lays the paradox or dialectic depending on one’s  
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predisposition; in order to free him, from the all pervasive instrumental view, he has to 
explore this very instrumentality to its limits. By establishing its limits or essence he puts 
himself in a position to contemplate technology beyond the discursive reign of 
instrumentalism. In this manner he is able to distinguish between what he calls a 
“correct” understanding (instrumental and anthropological) from a “true” understanding 
(hermeneutic phenomenological--its essence). Furthermore, in Heidegger’s (2003) 
analysis of the distinction between technology and modern technology we see the same 
discursive strategy at work privileging essence as ontological condition and thus true 
understanding. 
3.1.1 Heidegger’s “Question Concerning Technology”: Mode of analysis 
Heidegger is not explicit about his mode of analysis though the cursory statements made 
reveal its orientation. His fundamental concern or object of knowledge is technology and 
his approach is baldly put as questioning and thinking about the essence of things 
technological. So his question in “The question concerning technology” (1977), also cited 
in full in (Sharff et el.: 2003) is; what is technology. He sets up the problematic of 
questioning and thinking about technology as one in which conventional wisdom both 
points to and obscures a true understanding though his starting point is that it is modestly 
correct. His strong point is that the focus on technology as means, that is, as 
instrumentality over which it is claimed that humans exercise a putative mastery 
obfuscates a true understanding of its essence. However, in order to arrive at such a true 
understanding Heidegger has to settle for pursuing a seemingly paradoxical path through 
the epistemic truncation of correct understanding which to reiterate stops short of a true 
one. The reason for invoking the guarded formulation of a seeming paradox is that 
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Heidegger seems to move between a hermeneutic phenomenology and a dialectic 
epistemology, in his analysis of technology. For in as much as he discloses the 
ontological dimension to technology as a way of revealing the truth of being and the 
world he operates within his customized hermeneutic phenomenology, but in as much as 
theorizes what appears to be a dystopian view a kind of ‘techno-pessimism’ he 
nevertheless argues, in effect, that in this very technological distemper there lies it’s 
saving power, and thus offers a dialectic.  
 
The theoretical objective of Heidegger as he makes abundantly clear is to establish a 
“free” space in which to engage the essence of technology. It is in this regard that 
Heidegger employs a hermeneutic analysis to fix the underlying conceptions that frame 
an understanding of technology, which we have made explicit in the previous chapter and 
thus offer up a theoretical clearing or “free space” to think technology. However, whereas 
the hermeneutic approach engages the interpretations that are extant it does not in and of 
itself reveal what technology is and thus he adopts a phenomenological approach, which 
he grounds in sociality (contra Husserl and Sartre see chapter one) as a way to return to 
technology sui generis, thus revealing its essence. To this end Heidegger engages in an 
analysis which, maps out the discursive range of instrumentalism in so far as it encircles, 
frames and reaches into the sociality of a being that finds itself thrust amidst technology. 
In other words by mapping out the discursive sphere of influence of an instrumental view 
he is thus able to establish a clearing in which, it becomes possible to confront 
technology outside of the conventional strictures that gather and confine its meaning.   
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Heidegger is also deeply embedded in discourse and its hermeneutic significance, as the 
means to clear the ground, for as he holds it is in language, particularly those of ancient 
Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle that he finds a discursive site in which, to 
contemplate ways of thinking and questioning technology, outside of the instrumentalist 
horizon of intelligibility. In this regard what this chapter seeks to probe is to what extent 
the theoretical reorientation of technology as horizon of intelligibility can hold as 
ontology of social being and how the latter in turn may function in relation to its 
grounding in an existential – ontological understanding. What remains is to track into 
Heidegger’s philosophy of technology so as to engage how this bears on the sociality and 
sociabilities of social being in the course of his discourse.  
 
The course of this analysis henceforth and the discussion that ensues asks the following 
questions: What is it like to be immersed in a technological world? What is the essence of 
technology? What is the essence of modern technology? What is the danger and savior of 
technology?  These questions are employed to direct us towards an understanding of 
Heidegger’s philosophy of technology and to take in his particular mode of application of 
the hermeneutic phenomenological method. And thirdly, to draw out those ontological 
aspects that tease out for our purposes that which constitutes an understanding of social 
being since this is our point of departure in as much as we take this to be the sine qua non 
for an understanding being in general as will be made evident. And finally, we intend to 
bring the preceding to bear on Heidegger’s understanding of the different modes of being 
and what we have conceptualized as its sociality, in its articulation with its related 
 
 
 
 
 93
visionary sociabilities to engage the matter of social being in a thorough going fashion 
within a techno-social complex. 
.  
The term techno-social is used to denote two dimensions of being: techno speaks to the 
technological imperative and its sociabilities, which is how we comport to the equipment, 
gizmos and gadgets. While social speaks to the imperative of sociality and its 
concomitant horizon of intelligibility and refers us to social practices that come under the 
sway of the essence of technology and thus its displacement or substitution. And finally, 
conjointly they both speak to a logic of articulation as perhaps an admixture pulling in the 
direction of the technological and thus against the imperative of social being and its 
sociabilities as existential- ontological understanding. In this regard as far as the latter is 
concerned one is directed to Heidegger’s (2003) ontological thesis of technology as the 
basis for disclosing and revealing what he considers to be a true understanding of social 
being and being in general. For it is technology which allows us to capture the essence of 
nature, the cosmos and being in as much as it involves us in a particular type of social 
engagement within our world. The fundamental shape of this technological modality and 
its ontological capacity for disclosure of social being and being in general is our primary 
concern. 
3.2 What is technology?  
The objective that Heidegger seems to have in mind when considering what appears to be 
a subtle ontological distinction between a correct and true understanding is in fact the 
drawing of a deeper distinction, namely that between the appearance of technology and 
its essence. In its most manifest guise that is ‘technology as means to an end’ Heidegger 
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(2003: 252) points out that it is “in obvious conformity with what we are envisaging 
when we talk about technology”. One could hardly say that this interpretational stance 
(hermeneutic) was not in evidence as it would contradict our commonsense experience of 
how technology is understood.  In fact, if hard pushed, one might even concede that it 
was ‘true’ that technology is in the ‘final instance’ a means to an end. So with all this 
hermeneutic weight favoring an instrumental conception why does Heidegger make the 
distinction count as much as he does? For in distinguishing between understandings he is 
able to reconcile himself to the instrumentalist; that which is commonplace and immanent 
in our sociabilities or comportments, and still hold out that whilst correct it was 
incomplete. However, by the time Heidegger (1977) draws his argument to a close he 
baldly rejects the instrumental and anthropological conceptions of technology as false. 
What we turn to now is Heidegger’s analysis of the essence of instrumentalism and set 
the epistemic potentialities and limits of this conception.  
3.2.1 Technology and Instrumentalism: A correct understanding 
We consider here what it is that an instrumental discourse seizes upon and upon what it is 
predicated. In relation to the former we can see in what sense the discourse may be 
described as seizing upon certain hermeneutic features of technology. For Heidegger 
(2003: 253) “the correct always fixes upon something pertinent in whatever is under 
consideration”. The discursive import of Heidegger’s distinction is that in describing 
some pertinent feature and setting it up as definitive of technology as case in point runs 
the risk of veiling it and most significantly establishing an ‘unfree’ relationship to it thus 
compromising its phenomenology. With respect to the former one confronts certain 
aspects of technology (instrumentality) though at the expense of covering others 
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(disclosure); the latter arises in as much as one ends up being bound by the discursive 
foreclosure bound up with its conventional hermeneutic thus reproducing 
instrumentalism. With this much at stake epistemically, Heidegger meticulously clears 
the path to understanding the essence of instrumentality. The point of departure for 
Heidegger is to pursue the true (essence of technology) by way of the correct 
(instrumental) and to this end Heidegger (2003:253) asks “What is the instrumental 
itself? The key to thinking phenomenologically about this question Heidegger (2003: 
253) points out lies in revealing what “instrumentality” and “causality” are and how this 
sits with technology. What we will come to see is that the conventional hermeneutic with 
its interpretational bent for instrumentality veils and covers up what technology is and 
that what Heidegger is heading towards is a hermeneutic that contains the seeds of our 
understanding of being. In identifying the basis upon which this hermeneutic of being 
rests we have noted its sociality and sociabilities and thus have seized upon social being 
as its essence. We have pushed quite far downstream though it is deemed necessary to 
have this understanding present in the discussion that follows on instrumentalism and 
causality.  
       
3.2.2 Instrumentalism and fourfold causality 
In Heidegger’s (2003) analysis of causality what is noteworthy is that he sets up a 
trajectory in which an understanding of the essence of causality is at its fullest in ancient 
Greek doctrine and most truncated in the Modern age. What this amounts to may be 
called an ‘existential, ontological and epistemological diminution in so far as an 
instrumentalist view of technology involves the narrowing of what it is that is knowable 
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about technology sui generis, being in general and the social way of being human.  Thus, 
the question as to the significance of entering into a discussion of causality is that it 
affords us the theoretical scope to consider, through Heidegger (2003), the threshold 
between a true understanding of technology, and one that is false albeit seemingly 
‘correct’. The point at hand is to consider causality in its totality: this accordingly 
involved an initial conception comprising four modalities; though later it was compressed 
into one, in the main. Underlying this discussion is the elaboration of Heidegger’s (2003) 
understanding of technology which he considers to be in essence a framework that 
reveals and discloses the nature of being, worldliness (sociality) and nature. It is to the 
matter at hand that is the quaternary concept of cause that we now turn.  
 
Causality, which which is collectively responsible for occasioning some thing into ‘be-
ing’ or presence that is producing things as understood in ancient Greek philosophy, 
according to Heidegger (1977: 6), implicates four different though unified modes. These 
are:  
 
(1) the causa materialis (sic), the material, the matter out of which , for example, 
a chalice is made; 
(2) the causa formalis, the form, the shape into which the material enters; 
(3) the causa finalis, the end, for example, the sacrificial rite in relation to which 
the chalice is determined as to its form and matter; 
(4) the causa efficiens, which brings about the effect that is the finished , actual 
chalice, in this instance, the silversmith.  
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The first two causes point us to the substance or material content and its form, its shape, 
the way it occupies a given space. Put differently it refers to the physicality of the object 
or thing as matter and as form. However, embedded in this object are the markers of its 
origins in so far as the form and material suggest that it had been selected and 
transformed by some means and agency which implies a sociability which is is a 
comportment, that which a given social formation cultivates in its members through 
socialization.  
 
This sociability for identifying with and relating to particular material substances like 
silver as in Heidegger’s example disappears into these modalities of causality. In other 
words in these first two modalities of matter and form causality situates the social as 
allusion. The social is recessive, that is, it comes across as tacit as an inclination, that is, 
neither explicit nor made manifest as a modality of social being. What is particularly 
important and holds significance for its truncation or diminution is that these two 
modalities from the vantage point of cause require that we confront the object only on its 
own terms as matter and as form without any recourse to its congealed sociality. .  
 
The third and fourth modality of cause on the other hand foregrounds the social and 
cultural as determinant moments in delimiting the causal complex. It is thus apparent that 
in spite of the instrumentality of the technological imaginary it is yet embedded in the 
socio-cultural dimension of social life. Of critical note one needs to ask how it is, then, 
that we speak of a technological state in which we are imprisoned, fettered, when in the 
composite sense of causality presented above the sociological content seems prominent.   
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First, as introduced, with respect to the argument made for the ontological diminution of 
causality, it is made explicit, in Heidegger’s (2003:253) view that over time cause has 
come to be represented “as that which brings something about.” And given the causal 
complex above we are referred to “causa efficiens” by Heidegger (2003:253) who states 
that despite being only one of four causes it “sets the standard for all causality.”  In 
consequence Heidegger (2003:253) bemoans the fact that it “goes so far that we no 
longer even count the causa finalis, telic finality, as causality.”  
 
And secondly in regard to the existential matter of social erasure and being fettered we 
are once again referred to the argument that the great casualty in this discursive 
disprivileging of causa finalis evacuates the sociological precisely at the time it is made 
explicit and co-determinant in the causal complex. Consequentially, this social erasure in 
the face of the instrumentalisation of the causal complex is respecified in this thesis as the 
discursive need to restore the sociological in its guise as social being to ontological 
equivalence by way of making explicit causa finalis as well as materialis and formalis  in 
accounting for the sociality of the causal complex.  
 
In fact what we are witness to in this tendency towards the reification of causa efficiens, 
that is, instrumentality and the attendant marginalization and diminution of the social is 
perhaps the imperative of technological substitution at work. This takes the form as 
Borgmann (see 2.2.6.1) makes clear in the way the means are separated from the ends 
and the social context is absorbed into the technological efficiency of taking over social 
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practices in its modality of what Heidegger’s calls ‘challenging-forth’ into presence or 
production. In other words with the proliferation of technological artifacts in our lives we 
are witness to the diminution of social practices and its concomitant sociabilities which 
previously was used in tandem with the former, however, the contemporary age modern 
technology comes to substitute for actual engagement in the world and thus reduces its 
ontological scope. 
 
To be sure Heidegger unlike the social constructivists of technology does not conflate 
technology with what happens in the outcome of the technological artifact. By contrast 
Heidegger holds that the essence of technology is not in any technological artifact but in 
its ontological capacity for disclosing being to which we will add and its sociality.  
 
What we turn our attention to now are inferences alluded to above that the four 
modalities of cause are unified to constitute a causal complex and consider whether 
considered as such it restored that which has been erased and or truncated. Put in 
Heidegger’s interrogative he asks: 
 
From whence does it come that the causal character of the four causes is so 
unifiedly determined that they belong together? 
 
For Heidegger (2003:253) “the four causes are the ways, all belonging at once to each 
other, of being responsible for something else.” He illustrates this by way of the example 
used earlier of the silver chalice to clarify the argument. In summary he delineates the 
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four causes in relation to the chalice thus. In causa materialis, the matter, namely the 
silver out of which the chalice is made is held to be “co-responsible” for the formation of 
the chalice. As a chalice, however, the causa formalis that is the form that the chalice 
takes is that to which the general concept of chalice is given. However, in so far as the 
form takes its meaning from a general concept presupposes a social and cultural 
convention at work and thus testifies in Heideggerian vein to a gathering of what we have 
attributed to social being as sociality and sociabilities which is congealed in causa 
formalis.  
 
The same would also hold for causa materialis in as much as one note the variations 
across socio-cultural formations with respect to the materials employed in say the making 
of chalices or the normative order informing the choice of materials, form and so on. 
Perhaps it may be noted that the level of definition of sociality and sociabilities differ in 
intensity in regard to the first two modalities of cause. Whether, the raw material is easily 
given or intensely worked as in mined or looted elsewhere is a measure of the 
sociabilities involved in training and being fitted for such eventualities and thus of the 
sociality embedded in such a social formation.  
 
Thus even in something seemingly material and physical as metal it is traceable at some 
level so that it manifests its origins in nature and in social contexts and thus marks its 
social being even in this modality. However, when it comes to the form of the 
technological object this need not bear any relationship whatsoever to nature and its 
forms, though it can and does, it is nevertheless arbitrary and conventional and thus 
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consummately social. The distinction though not important as such that is being made 
here is that the social dimension of being is registered in both modalities of matter and 
form; though what is also noted is that arguably the latter tends to presence the social 
more so than could be averred from the former. Thus, both the modalities of matter and 
form are not only technologically but equally so socially co-responsible in their 
respective ways for the formation of the chalice, as case in point.  
 
The third modality of cause that enters into play involves what may be called a 
sociological delimitation which involves in Heidegger’s (1977) analysis the modality 
causa finalis. It is in this modality of cause that he sees that the “chalice is circumscribed 
as sacrificial vessel” Heidegger (2003”253). Though, in seeing the chalice reach 
completion that is in its finality Heidegger is able to recuperate the discursive complexity 
of the Greek concept telos. By contrast we are alerted to its methodological truncation or 
epistemological diminution in sociological research which sees telos reduced in scope to 
goal or purpose. To explain the expanded sense of the teleological Heidegger (2003: 253) 
draws on its Greek conception, however, with the specific ‘aim’ of illustrating what is 
meant by causa finalis. 
 
The telos is responsible for what as matter and what as aspect are together co-
responsible for the sacrificial vessel. 
          
In other words telos is concerned with that which has delimited the choice of “matter” to 
silver, delimited the choice of “aspect” to its form the chalice, and that which binds and 
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circumscribes, that is conjoins both in its completion in  the “realm of consecration and 
bestowal” , the sociality of belief and its said modalities of sociability.. Clearly we are 
dealing here with much more than an aim or a purpose. This then are three of the 
modalities of cause brought together to show how they operate as a causal complex in the 
unities that ensue in their interaction and their social being which in the main is 
overlooked or given scant regard..  
 
With respect to the fourth cause, namely, causa efficiens what is made clear is that it is 
not in the silversmith per se that responsibility is attributed, as would be the case with its 
ontological privileging alluded to earlier. In this regard Heidegger (2003:253) reins in 
causa efficiens from exaggerated notions of causality and confines it to the “pondering of 
the silversmith for the “that” and the “how” of their coming into appearance and into 
play, for the production of the sacrificial vessel.”  Since the entire process of causality 
merges in the means of transformation and the production of the artifact it concentrates 
the entire modality of the social in its wake, which partially explains its reification. In this 
analysis of Heidegger we see the different modalities of cause brought into relation with 
each other and even suggest that some of these relations constitute social unities. But as 
Heidegger pointedly asks “what unites from the beginning? What is the source of their 
unity? 
 
The answer that Heidegger proffers brings the correct understanding to a close and 
signals that the epistemological threshold is in reach to engage the essence of technology. 
We now see why Heidegger sees fit to engage in an analysis of the instrumental essence 
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of technology even though he accepts that it is not a ‘true understanding’ of what 
technology is, in essence. Heidegger’s probing of the fourfold modality of cause, central 
to the instrumental conception, discloses in its causal unity the very raison d’etre of 
technology. In other words it is in, establishing what it is that unifies, the four modalities 
of, cause that Heidegger finds the path to the essence of technology. And true to his 
promise we now find ourselves at the hermeneutic limits of a ‘correct understanding’ and 
at the threshold of a ‘true understanding’. 
 
Heidegger asks, in relation to his example of the chalice, what it is for that the four 
modalities of cause are responsible. And in concrete fashion reference is made to the 
chalice as sacrificial vessel lying before us. Taken further, but what does it mean for 
something to be lying present before us? Heidegger points out that in so far as something 
is present it may manifest itself as two different modalities of being or presence as  
“laying before” (present-at-hand) us or “lying ready” (ready-to-hand) for us. This 
somewhat counterintuitive move to introduce gradations to presence or what it means to 
be holds much ontological and epistemological gravitas, in that it questions the relative 
lack of the problematisation of what we understand by something being present and 
presence itself. It may be read that Heidegger is signaling a ‘wake-up call’ from the naïve 
approach to presence as in what we may call ‘immaculate existence’, that is, he invokes a 
critique of positivism, which is also evident in Derrida’s (1976) “metaphysics of 
presence”. This certainly has the shape of waking us, as Kant did, from our 
‘anthropological sleep’ and at the risk of sounding immodest our attempt at anchoring 
‘social being’ might incipiently refer us to our ‘sociological sleep' Without saying too 
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much here it is also in this spirit of problematising presence as appearance that we take 
our cue to open up the matter of vision and perception, (see chapters four, and six), in 
terms of the modalities of social being involved in inuring us in-the-world, and enabling 
us to perceive that which is at-hand, and that which is merely present for contemplation 
or to satisfy our insatiable curiosities.   
 
What is then crucial for understanding the unification or essence of the four modalities of 
cause is that they are “responsible” for bringing “something into appearance” (Heidegger, 
2003:255). However, for Heidegger things that are brought into presence, and this is its 
profundity, are not merely there but have a particular modality of being. It is not simply 
there before us as chalice but it has a particular modality of being, which we will discuss 
later (see chapter seven) in detail, in order to grasp its significance, but which for now we 
merely want to point to, in its modalities as thing which is “ready-to-hand”, that is 
“Zuhanden” and not as “present-at-hand” that is “Vorhanden”, merely occurring as such  
(see chapter seven, Heidegger, 1962).  The point is that the chalice is ‘ready-to-hand’ as it 
is taken up in the modality of ‘causa finalis’ in order to manifest it functionality in the 
Greek ritual for the sake of our mode of being of spirituality.   
 
Most importantly it is in the unity of the four causes, that is its combined effect, as causal 
complex that we encounter the essence of technology, in that which brings-forth 
something into appearance, into presence though human efforts and thus at the 
ontological level discloses it modality of being, as such. In other words technology in 
terms of its fundamental characteristic of instrumentality points to an essence which is 
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other than what may be construed as technological. This quality that defines the 
formative essence of technology Heidegger (1977: 10) says we find in “bringing forth” 
which then brings us to the phenomenological threshold of the essence of technology. 
Thus we ask in the words of Heidegger (Ibid:11) “But how does bringing-forth happen ..?  
3.2.3 Essence of instrumental causality and the ontological threshold of technology 
In opening up the modality of ‘bringing-forth’ to scrutiny we find in Heidegger’s (1977:  
phenomenological analysis a historical demarcation which does not include modern 
technology but in Greek thought includes:  
 
Not only handcraft manufacture, not only artistic and poetical bringing into 
appearance and concrete imagery, is a bringing-forth, poiesis.  Physis also, the 
arising of something from out of itself, is a bringing-forth, poiesis. Physis is 
indeed poiesis in the highest sense. For what presences by means of physis has the 
bursting open belonging to bringing-forth, e.g. the bursting of a blossom into 
bloom, in itself. In contrast what is brought forth by the artisan, or the artist, e.g. 
the silver chalice, has the irruption belonging to bringing-forth not in itself, but in 
another, in the craftsman or artist. 
 
What we may note in the above is that not only is there a point of differentiation in 
modalities of bringing-forth, but that there is also a point of equivalence which holds 
particular significance for interest in bringing together technology and vision. Firstly, the 
bringing-forth associated with nature is of a higher order that that associated with the 
sociabilities involved in art, poetry and handcraft. The striking aspect to the equivalence 
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of the three domains of social practice is that while the bringing-forth of nature, that is, 
physis is an end in itself and thus constitutes a higher order in the ontological schema a 
similar distinction between “arts of the mind”, fine art and poetry vis-à-vis handcraft is 
not made. The latter three are collectively known in Greek thought as “techne”.  
 
Consider that in the bringing-forth of theoria, art and poetry granted that is through social 
agency and as such differentiated it holds in common with physis that what is brought-
forth is an end in itself. Certainly that is what one could understand of works of art and 
poetry as opposed to handcraft which is that its products are not ends in themselves. In 
other words as a bringing-forth in terms of the modality of efficiens or means a 
distinction between nature and the social holds ontologically, though at the level of the 
modality of causa finalis might we not say that an ontological distinction can be made 
that touches on the essence of technology. We do not wish to be pedantic or fastidious on 
this matter but it seems as it holds some significance if we foreground the matter of the 
sociality and sociabilities involved and thus social being. In this regard the distinction we 
draw attention to has a particular bearing for the comportment or sociability involved in 
theoria (to see, I.e. as understanding), and art and thus in perception (understanding) and 
vision (as mental picture) as that which offers a different vantage point to the modality of 
being as it relates to technology and its nascent development in handcraft manufacture. 
This will become apparent when we take up the technological sweep of modern 
technology and its essence in terms of how it relates to the danger and savior of being and 
social being. The point we are making here in relation to the thesis as a whole is the 
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ontological basis for including vision with technology as heuristic for probing the matter 
of social being.         
 
Putting technology, then, in terms we are seeking to consider, the modality of being, in 
that which is brought-forth, presents itself to us in a way that reveals its sociality, that is, 
that it presents its facticity as social, at the level of ontological specificity. What this 
comes down to is what it means for that which is brought-forth to be, in a relation to 
human co-presence both in its making and its use as it unfolds in its temporality and its 
historicity. Thus, what rests in this bringing-forth is but a condition of possibility, a way 
being, and not its ostensive appearance in what is manufactured or produced as such. In 
other words the set of four modalities of cause coming together as the causal complex is 
the bringing-forth of a social conditionality that makes possible the technological as 
opposed to the appearance of something in itself as natural, that is, ‘physis’. However, the 
question still begs; what is has really happened in, what we have called, the social 
conditionality and that has been brought forth in all this bringing into appearance?  
 
What seems to be at issue is that in engaging causality Heidegger’s phenomenological 
description discloses that “bringing- forth” yields the essence of technology as that 
quality which is responsible for “revealing” ontological truths about the world and being. 
This in turn is made possible since Heidegger (1977: 11) holds that every ‘bringing-forth’ 
brings something from “concealment into unconcealment”. Thus, what arises between 
‘concealment and unconcealment’ is none other than a “revealing” (Ibid: 11). Clearly the 
visual implications (see chapter 6) of the discourse employed by Heidegger is stark, 
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though the sense in which it is used refers more to the hermeneutic, which is embedded in 
our understanding of being, and that makes for unveiling and the reference to ‘seeing’ as 
understanding phenomena as they are phenomenologically uncovered that we need to 
bring to bear, in making sense of the ontological dimension involved in the disclosure of 
the being of beings. In arriving at this Heideggerean essence of technology which was 
distilled from his analysis of causality as an instrumental complex we have been enabled 
to cross the threshold into a true understanding of technology. In other words we can now 
inure an understanding of technology which involves getting to know what it truly is, that 
is, its essence and its intimate connection with vision in as much as we examined it 
closely and carefully and unpacked its imaginative perception as revelation.   
3.3 Technology: A true understanding 
What was established as we concluded above was that the essence of technology 
involved what Heidegger calls a “revealing”. What does technology have to do with 
revealing? Heidegger (1977: 12) asks. His most succinct of answers is “everything” 
though his grounded response puts his argument into sharp relief:  
 
For every bringing-forth is grounded in revealing. Bringing-forth indeed gathers 
within itself the four modes of occasioning-causality- and rules them throughout.  
Within its domain belong end and means as well as instrumentality. 
Instrumentality is considered to be the fundamental characteristic of technology. 
If we inquire step by step into what technology, represented as means, actually is, 
then we shall arrive at revealing. The possibility of all productive manufacturing 
lies in revealing. Technology is no mere means. Technology is a way of revealing.  
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If we ask quite fundamentally what is being revealed, then surely the most direct answer 
is that the four modes of causality and with it the very social conditionality of possibility 
of ‘bringing-forth’ And moreover in the actual appearance of the artifact what technology 
reveals is the modality of being of that which is brought forth and thus its mode of being 
as it relates to the particular way of being human at a given point in time, that is, the 
historically constituted sociality. When we take up Heidegger’s example of the chalice 
and ask what a true ontological understanding of technology succinctly, amounts to, this 
is what might obtain in unpacking the causal complex,  
 
• causa materialis reveals the chalice raw material, its natural properties and 
qualities and thus its social suitability and value and in this sense its sociality and 
sociability and by extension that of the social agent which  additionally, includes 
the functionality of making the silver available;  
• causa formalis, takes up this silver with the aim of producing a form, namely, the 
chalice, and thereby reveals its sociality and sociability as aesthetic;  
• causa finalis, in the context of spiritual and ritualistic purposes, the chalice reveals 
its sociality and sociability as such and thus its social context and its worldliness 
is disclosed;  
• and finally in causa efficiens, the means of its transformation is revealed and thus 
the totality of social being is visited upon this modality as the artifact is released 
into its context..  
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What this revealing, immanent in causality, turns out to be is a modality of knowing, but 
most importantly not as a site in the formation of knowledge, as epistemological, but in 
reality a way of primordially disclosing in social practice both the natural and social 
worlds. Both of which occur in the movement from “concealment” to “unconcealment”, 
or as Heidegger also refers to it from “hiddeness” to “unhiddeness”.  What the 
hermeneutic phenomenology has revealed thus far is that we have crossed over from the 
ontological and existential diminution of instrumentalism to its release into the 
complexity of a social hermeneutic which makes of technology much more than a means 
with or without ends. Instead technology is an ontological modality for disclosing social 
being, being and worldliness, in a word, reality in so far as it is a way of ‘revealing’.  
 
What we now ask is, if, this ontological dimension is indeed its province, then, how does 
technology and ontology end up being bound together, in Heidegger’s (2003:255) 
thinking, such that he is able to say that “it [technology] is the realm of revealing, i.e. , of 
truth.”   
3.3.1 “Techne and “episteme”: technology, and truth 
Heidegger (1977: 13) traces this relationship between technology and epistemology to the 
origins of the word technology, and finds that it “stems for the Greek technikon [and] 
means that which belongs to techne. He cautions that the word techne, then, carried 
different meanings that is, before it became a site in which the hierarchy between the 
sciences and the crafts was established (see 2.2.1). Firstly (Ibid): 
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Techne is the name not only for the activities and skills of craftmen but also for 
the arts of the mind and the fine arts. Techne belongs to bringing-forth, to poeisis, 
it is something poetic.  
 
Secondly, Heidegger (Ibid) identifies in Plato a second type of use: 
 
The word is linked to episteme. Both words are terms of knowing in the widest 
sense. … Such knowing provides an opening up. As an opening up it is a 
revealing.  
 
The first point of note is that the ancient Greeks as far as the concept ‘techne’ is 
concerned drew a point of equivalence between the manual and ideational.  Thus even 
though one may be dealing with two different orders (art and craft) it nevertheless 
amounted to the same essence in its bringing-forth  as a way of ‘revealing’. And it is this 
essence that renders it equivalent in this sense that it is a way of bringing-forth as 
opposed to the hierarchical relationship that is suggested between science and technology 
as epistemic formations. This distinction between bringing-forth and knowledge 
formations should be clear lest we confuse and consider what was earlier raised (see 
2.2.1) as contradictory and miss the point about its essence. What this essence is is that 
forms of activity, both manual and ideational, cause something to come into appearance 
or presence and as such reveals its way of being.  
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In Heidegger’s concept both craftwork and the arts of the mind is a bringing-forth. But 
each bringing forth in turn as terminus as quem (causa finalis) conceals its modalities of 
cause whilst the process of its production (causa efficiens) reveals the latter modality in 
the said causal complex. In so far as the technological is a mode of producing it is that 
which sets up or marshals the modalities of causation in its sweep. However, without the 
requisite knowledge entailed in the four modalities of course and their unity, the 
technological act remains mute except for the artifact and its allusions. The point being 
made epistemologically does not hinge on the content of the modalities of cause in each 
instance, but rather hinges on the very quaternary modality of causation itself. In this 
regard the discursive scope of ‘techne’ opened up by Heidegger (2003) issues forth a way 
of speaking about the essence of technology that suspends issues concerning the social or 
intellectual division of labour. In this regard we may say that the latter is arguably true at 
the level of the sociabilities involved though we would argue it does open up in the 
essence of technology as revealing a way to engage with social being and its related 
sociality. This we would say is manifest in the way something presences itself in our 
presence and how our presence as such is in turn overdetermined by the given way of 
revealing.   
 
What seems to be at stake is an understanding of all modalities of production, beyond 
‘good and evil’, something in itself (an sich, sui generis), as that which is a way of 
bringing something into presence. Furthermore, at a fundamental level, one encounters in 
technology’s instrumentality, its means, that which makes possible the appearance of 
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something, or another, but this, as noted, is not its essence merely the reductionism we 
find in our contemporary understanding of technology and its truncated hermeneutic.  
 
There is the added quality to that which makes possible some appearance, in other words, 
to the unity of the four modality of causality occasioned by “bringing-forth”. What this is, 
is simply that the bringing-forth in moving between “concealment and unconcealment” 
come to rest in its essence which is its way of “revealing”.  And it is a ‘revealing’ in as 
much as it is presupposed in the object, as case in point, which comes into appearance as 
such it is a way of being which as far as we can tell is a way of social being. This will 
become apparent when we engage the existential – ontological dimension of this thesis in 
our account of what the sociality and sociability is that comes to constitute the basis of 
what it means to human and Dasein; and thus inform our understanding and interpretation 
of being as we engage the world we are in and constituted by. It is the way of revealing 
that is embedded in technology and its critical position in Heidegger’s technological 
understanding of being that we engage this phenomenological description.  
3.3.2 Technology and revealing 
 In what specific sense does Heidegger (2003:255) means that technology is a revealing 
of the world when intuitively and experientially we encounter it as instrumentality.   
 
Whoever builds a house or ship or forges a sacrificial chalice reveals what is to be 
brought forth, according to the four modes of occasioning.   
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What is noteworthy, here, for coming to grips with Heidegger’s concept, is his repeated 
emphasis of that moment, which he considers to be critical in seizing upon when 
technology discloses its essence, as that, which is a way of knowing. The modality in 
which this way of knowing impresses itself upon the human agent, is through an 
engagement in the world, in sociabilities as social practices of all sorts such that therein 
the nature of the world stands revealed; but what makes for such revealing, which is such 
that its epistemology is too fleeting to catch. To be sure: there is something of a 
mysterium to be countenanced in the way a human imaginary is able conjure up a theory, 
works of art, poetry, technological design from its contemplation in the mind. Thus it 
seems to us that Heidegger chooses to approach the problematic of technology from the 
ontological end, that is, from what it says about the nature of the world and being as 
mutually engaged and embedded in its existential – ontological structure. Put differently 
what we may infer from Heidegger’s analysis is that the revealing he refers to is an 
ontological imperative of technology as it relates, in this instance, to the nature of the 
world and its object formations while its instrumentality may be considered its 
teleological imperative in the restricted sense of the term. The epistemological principle 
of this revealing seems to suggest a logic of integration and articulation of four modes of 
causality based on an extant technological modality (modern and or pre-modern).  
 
Heidegger, however, takes issue with the instrumental tendency predisposed as it is 
towards ontologically embellishing causa efficiens in virtue of its position to revealing by 
arguing that all four modalities are co-responsible in the causal complex. The 
technological imaginary or way of revealing configures causality and though it is a 
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human activity it is not of human making. It is rather of the order of an ontological 
imperative. How this plays itself out in technology Heidegger has this to say: 
 
This revealing gathers together in advance the aspect and matter of ship or house, 
with a view to the finished thing envisaged as completed, and from this gathering 
determine the manner of its construction. 
          
What is sought here with Heidegger’s notion of the essence of technology is a concept of 
this technological way of revealing as a modality of social being. Though, similarly, we 
intend to remain consistent with Heidegger who is mindful of obviating the attendant 
pitfalls associated with an instrumentalist reduction of causality to only that of causa 
efficiens (i.e. the means). Likewise when considered in relation to the modality of causa 
finalis the essence of social being can similarly suffer ontological diminution viz. that of 
being reduced to one modality of cause, only this time its sociabilities in causa finalis, or 
as efficiens a means to be used and disposed of as contemporary case in point. Rather, 
what we have in mind with respect to the very condition of possibility of the 
technological is its relation to social being. This ontological quality he refers to as 
“revealing” does not inhere in the technological, that is, it cannot be read off 
technological artifacts. As such it is of the essence of technology, a quality of all 
technology but a quality not to be found in anything technological, in particular.  
 
Thus, revealing as it is being developed is not passed on from technological artifact to 
human beings thus informing our social being; but rather in the particular modality of 
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technology as a complex whole, a particular way of revealing is imparted to the social 
formation, in its wake. Through our socialization and acculturation within this 
technological milieu we acquire a technological understanding of being and a 
technological mien as distinct sociality and a normative order which is a distinct set of 
sociabilities or practices and functionalities. Of course, the problem that Heidegger 
identifies in this regard is that the striking efficacy of technology as means realizing all 
manner of things useful and superfluous has overshadowed its ontological essence. The 
point, with dystopian undertones, is that in making the means available to provide weird 
and wonderful ‘gadgets and gizmos’, which shape our daily lives in perceptible and 
imperceptible ways, and which often drive us to distraction, technology simultaneously, 
in its ontological dimension impresses upon us a technologically conditioned way of 
being. This way of technological social being is tied to its particular way of revealing 
which in its modern equivalent threatens to imperil us with its nihilism displacing as it 
does our social being, and its attendant humanity for a technological being with nothing 
but a technological functionality in place, as we will uncover when we next deal with 
modern technology.  
  
Thus, in Heidegger (2003) we are able to draw a relationship between technology, 
causality, revealing and social being. Technology as a modality of revealing in this regard 
discloses itself to the shipbuilder as a gathering of the four modes of causality. Heidegger 
makes this quite explicit in the quote above where he makes reference to the quaternary 
causal complex evidenced as the aspect (or form), which refers us to causa formalis, its 
matter to causa materialis, the finished thing in terms of the socio-cultural relationship it 
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engenders as causa finalis and finally the manner of its construction which gathers all the 
modalities of cause and amounts to a causa efficiens. Thus, in his examples of ship, house 
and chalice it is clear that when considered in relation to the four modes of cause one can 
clearly account for their causality in a composite and comprehensive manner. However, 
considered from the vantage point of its instrumentality as it is considered in the main, 
the biggest casualty in this concept as far as the disciplinary concerns of this thesis are 
concerned is the diminution nay erasure of the social composition of technology. In 
displacing causa finalis that is its social framing, technology’s essence, as way of 
revealing or knowing cannot be marshaled to shed light on the true relationship between 
technology and society. Put differently seen from the vantage point of causa efficiens 
(instrumentality) what obtains is a dialectic without its opposite that is a technological 
dimension without the social and that is indeed a dystopia. Though properly conceived 
technology’s essence lies not in any one mode of cause nor in all of them conjointly but 
rather in the way of revealing or knowing that unifies or concentrates the modalities of 
cause in engagements in the world, in social practices. 
   
It should have become apparent by now that Heidegger is not fixing the essence of 
technology to the process of its production nor to the means of bringing it about. In 
precise terms the essence comes down to (Heidegger, 2003:255): 
 
Technology is a mode of revealing. Technology comes to presence in the realm 
where revealing and unconcealment takes place, where aletheiea, truth happens. 
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The essence of technology lies in the particular way in which the four modalities of 
causation are revealed in social being prior to its actualization in the thing. In this sense it 
amounts to a way of knowing through doing but most of all in being embedded in the 
social formation. The question remains what does technology as essence reveals to us. 
We may think of technology as that which is brought to bear in our quest to know 
something. In other words in addition to asking what the essence of technology is as 
means and instrumentality that is in relation to doing one also asks what is its essence sui 
generis in relation to knowing the world. With respect to the latter technology is 
predicated upon revealing the ‘ontological truth’, that is, at bottom, according to 
Heidegger (2003), about the nature of the world and being. What this amounts to is that 
technology viewed outside the purview of instrumentality and its attendant rationality is a 
way of getting to know what has become of the world and being through probing the 
relationship between technology and society as it has unfolded or unfolds in the 
relationship between social beings, their concerns and practices and the things or objects 
taken up by them and in them being taken up by things and objects. This is technology’s 
essence, a complex social reality, whereas technology considered as instrumental is 
discounted to such an extent that it approximates to a ‘reductio ad absurdum’.   
 
Thus far, what we have isolated in Heidegger’s (2003) analysis is his concept of 
technology in general with regard to the distinction between a correct understanding of 
technology and a true understanding. What has emerged is that the essence of technology 
is a “way of revealing” (aletheia) though what is fundamental to it is its instrumentality, 
or so it may seem. And as we are all too aware in sociology is that all is hardly ever as it 
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seems and thus we will track into Heidegger’s (2003) analysis of the essence of modern 
technology and its ontological distinctions. What we are moving to is a concept of 
technology in which to think, how social being brought under its sway might serve as a 
heuristic to understand the relationship between technology and society in the 21st 
century.  
 
Perhaps the question is fatally flawed in as much as the modality chosen (technology) is 
of such a nature as to confirm rather tautologically that the world is being technologised. 
Such a danger is indeed proximate in a correct understanding of technology but 
notwithstanding this pervasive danger what frees one from such an instrumentalist 
discursive shadow is that we are approaching technology from a different vantage point 
viz. its ontological dimension. Thus, we seek in the heuristic of technology something by 
way of what it might reveal about sociality and the sociabilities that arise in relation to 
being involved in-the-techno-social-complex in terms of how it increasingly comes to 
ontologically substitute the real for the virtual and the simulated, and as such comes to 
constitute as social being a technological modality of being, that is, a particular way of 
questioning, thinking, knowing and revealing. The objective herein is to tap into the 
unique position of technology poised as it is in the crossover from an analogue world to 
digitally constituted world. In other words we are put in a relationship with modern 
technology which has shifted from one involving us in discrete technological objects to 
one which involves us as part of an interconnected electronic technological world.  
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In other words the world that we have come to dwell in, in the 21st century, involves us in 
a different relationship with technology because it has undergone a fundamental shift 
from the modality of “bringing-forth” and it is this rupture or break that we now turn our 
attention to under the rubric of modern technology from Heidegger’s (1977) 
understanding in his “Question concerning technology”. Our concern is not with the 
specificities of this transformation and its technological artifacts but rather in 
hermeneutic phenomenological vein we seek the understanding that underlies the shift to 
modern technology and its modality of “bringing-forth” with its concomitant way of   
revealing and how it informs our understanding and interpretation of social being.       
3.4 The essence of Modern Technology  
What is being suggested is that while the essence of technology according to Heidegger 
lies in the ontological domain of revealing it is not homogenous for all time and space. 
Thus, what we have here is the dimension of time, historicity, and moreover different 
social modalities related to technology, and thus moreover, a sociology. And, in this 
regard, what is noteworthy is that in the ontological distinction between technology per se 
and modern technology  there are not only different modalities of revealing that are 
evidenced but moreover that these approximate to different sociological sensitivities and 
sensibilities ,or,  in the concept that is being developed in this thesis, social being. These 
modalities, Heidegger (2003) contends, in turn evidence qualitatively different types of 
relationships that ensue in relation to the particular modes of revealing classified as   
“bringing-forth” and by contrast its modern version which is a “challenging-forth”.  
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We will focus on Heidegger’s (2003) distinction between the modality of “bringing-
forth” (poiesis) which evidences a close relationship to the ontological dimension of 
technology, that is truth (aletheia) and modern technology where this access to the 
ontological domain is blurred and obfuscated by the particular way in which revealing is 
reconfigured as “enframing” which as such reshapes social being.. The discussion that 
follows, hones in on this distinction, in order to develop a clear understanding of 
Heidegger’s concept of modern technology, so that we may free up a discursive space, to 
later, think the specificity of its sociality as modern technological being and its relation to 
the sociality of  social being. 
 3.4.1 Modern Technology and revealing  
The point of distinction that is taken up here is the way in which, Heidegger posits an 
essence to technology per se, and yet maintains that modern technology has a distinctive 
essence. In approaching the question thus we intend to probe the kind of relationship 
Heidegger (2003:256) proffers with respect to modern technology and society.  
 
What is modern technology? It too is a revealing. Only when we allow our 
attention to rest on this fundamental characteristic does that which is new in 
modern technology show itself to us.  
  
For Heidegger (2003) modern technology sets upon the world or nature in a way that is 
qualitatively different from its precursor. In his use of the examples below he sets out 
what he considers to be the essence of modern technology. Of note Heidegger (2003) 
identifies the essence of modern technology to rest in a ‘way of revealing the being of the 
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actual’ or the world, but this time he introduces a distinction that typifies the modern 
condition, which he refers to as a “challenging –forth” as opposed to a “bringing-forth” 
of nature.  This concept of challenging nature or setting upon as distinct modality of 
revealing of modern technology is distinguished from “bringing-forth” in Heidegger’s 
(2003; 256) example of farming and the generation of power.  Thus: 
 
The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order appears differently 
than it did when to set in order still meant to take care of and maintain. The work 
of the peasant does not challenge the soil of the field. In sowing grain it places 
seed in the keeping of the forces of growth and watches over its increase.  
 
What Heidegger conjures up here is an organic relationship between society and nature 
that is mediated by a particular modality of technology that amounts to a “bringing-
forth”. In this modality we are presented with a view of technology that suggests that its 
essence or way of reveling is a “bringing-forth”, so to speak, of the harvest, as case in 
point. What distinguishes this relationship from its modern equivalent is that “bringing-
forth” is not predicated upon exacting from nature as it is with the former but is 
concerned with fitting in with the rhythm and pace and essence of nature premised in the 
‘care and maintenance’ of its forces, and thus, in this process, over its revealing. Here we 
find in a pre-modern technological modality of social being an attunement with nature or 
physis as that highest position in the ontological schema.  
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In the 21st century we are confronted with modern technology and a sociability which 
seizes and sets upon nature through genetic engineering and large scale commercial food 
production, as case in point. By contrast, that which is a ‘bringing-forth’ provides the 
basis for seeing the harvest as object in its own right and as such is celebrated as thing in 
itself, sui generis, the product of great care and maintenance. In other words the social 
being in attendance in pre-modern technology treats nature with integrity and dignity 
with a sociability that sets things in order for the bringing-forth of physis to take its 
course as its way of revealing being.  The issue at hand is how this “setting-upon-nature” 
attributed to the “challenging-forth” of modern technology differ according to Heidegger 
(2003: 256) from the “setting-in-order” of “bringing-forth” above. 
 
This setting-upon that challenges the energies of nature is an expediting, and in 
two ways. It expedites in that it unlocks and exposes. Yet that expediting is 
always itself directed from the beginning toward furthering something else, i.e., 
toward driving on to the maximum yield at the minimum expense.   
 
The distinction between the modality of revealing as bringing-forth from that of 
challenging forth is captured in the above in as much it surfaces the question of the 
relationship of modern technology to modern physics in regard to unlocking and 
exposing nature. And secondly, with respect to “maximum yield …” above, it addresses 
the logic or imperative of modern technology in so far as its realization sees the 
reconfiguration of nature, as storehouse, that is, a “standing reserve” in which all objects 
and forces take the form of resources that are at hand, and make up an inventory, so to 
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speak. Modern Physics sets the theoretical terms in which nature is reconfigured in such a 
way as to render it “as a calculable coherence of forces”. It is through this measurability 
that modern technology is able to set upon nature and exact its quanta demanding ever 
more to ensure that the standing reserve is “ready to hand”. This is in direct contrast to 
bringing forth which Heidegger (2003) tells us is a setting in order, in order to fall within 
the forces and natural capacity of nature.  
 
The theoretical distinction that Heidegger brings to bear is that in both cases viz. 
‘bringing-forth’ and ‘challenging-forth’ they are equivalent as ‘ways of revealing’. As 
such they stand in a historical relationship to each other the latter deriving from the 
former. However, with regard to their distinctions this emerges in the kinds of 
relationships that characterize how a given social formation is engaged in its 
technological modality. In this respect pre-modern technology is oriented to bringing-
forth objects in tune with the imperative of nature whereas modern technology is oriented 
to challenging forth nature in tune with its imperative, that is, the “standing reserve”. 
Both, as technology, are ways of revealing though what they reveal and how they relate 
to revealing differs fundamentally in as much as bringing-forth reveals a clear 
relationship albeit fleetingly, to truth i.e., in what is unlocked and exposed about being 
and social being.  
 
Modern technology by contrast not so much as reveals but confirms nature to be that 
which has already been reconfigured by modern physics/ science as that which is 
orderable and calculable. What comes to mind is the logic of paradigms ala Kuhn (1962) 
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and Heisenberg’s ontological sensibility in the act of measurement constituting the reality 
of the thing being measured. In this respect modern technology through its imperative for 
ordering and measuring consequentially obscures and obstructs a clear relationship to 
truth. The critical question, then, to which we now turn, is what it is about the essence of 
modern technology and its modality of revealing that sets up an ontological block to 
social being and an epistemological block to truth, aletheia. And this brings us to 
Heidegger’s concepts of “Enframing” and “destining” which for the purposes of this 
thesis have been respecified as imperatives of modern technology: what we may refer to 
as the ontological shaping of modern technology.  
3.4.2 Enframing and revealing: imperative one, of modern technology 
What follows is at the heart of the modality of being of modern technology and thus 
drives its type of sociality and its accompanying sociabilities, that is, its practices and 
comportments. We now turn to the meaning of this central concept of “Enframing” which 
Heidegger (2003, 258) has developed to capture the essence of modern technology and 
simultaneously establish its equivalence across different modalities of revealing.  
 
Enframing means the gathering together of the setting-upon that sets upon man, 
i.e., challenges him forth, to reveal the actual, in the mode of ordering, as standing 
reserve. Enframing means the way of revealing that holds sway in the essence of 
modern technology and that is itself nothing technological.      
 
The relationship between society and technology that Heidegger sets up here is 
something of a technological modality of being that predisposes social being towards an 
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erasure of its sociality, its nihilistic imperative. In this instance of modern technology 
“Enframing” is made manifest epistemologically in the principle of “ordering” and 
ontologically in the actual as “standing reserve”. What is at stake here as can be gleaned 
from the above is nothing of the order of the technological but rather that of a much more 
fundamental and substantial nature as said and thus involves the very essence of our 
social formations. In as much as the essence of modern technology “holds sway” does it 
mean that society stands in a relationship of over-determination? To the extent that 
society participates in modern technology it is brought under the adumbration of 
“enframing”, that is, the way of revealing the actual in its ordering, as standing reserve. 
This is the technological import of a modality that is predicated upon an “enframing” that 
is a “challenging-forth” of the ‘energies of nature’ and that threatens to substitute social 
being with technological being should we not become aware of this ontological state of 
affairs. The question that arises is what the fate of social beings and the social formation 
is in the ontology of modern technology and its way of revealing being, in general, and 
social being, in particular.  What Heidegger (1977: spells out does not bode well as the 
following suggests: 
 
Always the unconcealment of that which is goes upon a way of revealing. Always 
the destining of revealing holds complete sway over men. But that destining is 
never a fate that compels. For man becomes truly free only in so far as he belongs 
to the realm of destining and so becomes one who listens, though not one who 
simply obeys. (Heidegger, 2003: 260) 
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On the one hand we have an ontological imperative at work in “Enframing” in the 
“destining of revealing” and over which we have no control, while on the other hand we 
are not compelled as a social formation by the imperatives of technology. Are we witness 
to Heidegger drawing a distinction between an epistemological order in the essence of 
technology over which we have no control and an ontological order in which we are able 
to secure the essence of our being, as epistemic subject and not as technological subject?   
What Heidegger (2003) makes us aware of is that the essence of technology as such 
posits a particular discursive formation viz. that of ordering the standing reserve, and thus 
reduces all revealing, that is, truth to that which is measurable, calculable and orderable. 
The point of note is that Heidegger does not suggest that this ‘technological imperative’ 
is necessarily determinant of being. In participating in modern technology the strong 
point that Heidegger makes is that one needs to free up a discursive space in which one 
confronts its essence, its truth as reality , its ontology and not only its applied dimension, 
its instrumentality. Thus what is evident is that one cannot as social agents take 
ownership of the essence of technology and shape it as it is not a technological thing: but 
one may be in a position to experience it as a way of revealing, that is a modality of the 
knowable. In this regard we now ask what it is that Heidegger has to say about the 
essence of modern technology in as much as it has a bearing on what it is that holds 
“sway” in the way of revealing of modern technology. This is Heidegger’s (2003: 256) 
succinct but pointed response to the nature of “destining” which is that which holds sway: 
 
The revealing reveals to itself its own manifoldly interlocking paths, through 
regulating their course. This regulating itself is, for its part, everywhere secured. 
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Regulating and securing even become the chief characteristics of a revealing that 
challenges.  
 
What emerges in Heidegger’s thinking is that at one level one is dealing with that which 
is internal to revealing. In this regard one is referred to the previous discussion on the 
unity of the four modalities of cause as gathered within the technological imaginary of an 
“enframing” which was a “bringing-forth”. In this instance the relationship between 
Enframing and revealing is evidenced in the modality of the “bringing-forth as that which 
regulates the course and unity of the modalities of the causal complex.  And that which 
regulates in the latter modality has the character of an “enframing” which Heidegger 
describes as a “setting-in-order” of nature. By extension in the contemporary context that 
which regulates or holds sway in modern technology in as much as it involves revealing 
as a causal complex or more precisely that which is responsible for its particular type of 
causal unity has the character of a “setting-upon” of nature. With respect to the teleology 
of modern technology, that is, the question as to what it is that is being regulated or 
secured and to what ends this process is being marshaled towards one encounters the 
actual as “standing reserve”. 
 
To reiterate in general terms for its sociological significance what this enframing comes 
down to is that it is an ontology that constitutes the reality of the world as that which is 
orderable, measurable and calculable and ultimately manifest as standing reserve or 
inventory of resources. And that this fundamental relationship ensues when society 
engages modern technology in the pursuit of social life which as such does not offer any 
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choice as to whether society comes under its particular sway or not; this is a fait 
accompli, as one is within its essential sweep. But neither is it a relation of determination 
argues Heidegger (2003): in taking up modern technology the imperative rests in society 
observing its essence but in not necessarily obeying it. In other words in Enframing the 
world is revealed in a particular way as that of a “standing reserve”, a “storehouse”, an 
inventory of resources predicated on a Positivistic science of quantification. This 
epistemological model reveals nature and the world to be that which is calculable, 
measurable and orderable on the basis of its horizon of presence, which in Heidegger 
(2003) amounts to as “Enframing”. The strong point is that we need not surrender to 
“Enframing” to such a point where we become enveloped by the technological condition 
that Heidegger calls “the objectlessness of the standing reserve”. In other words it 
amounts to evacuating the social from the social being such that what remains are agents 
as “orderers of standing reserve”, as stock, as resource sans humanity. 
 
The sociological sweep of this “Enframing” in its manifestation as instrumentalism has 
been evidenced in the movement of the modality of “scientific management” (Taylorism, 
Fordism) from the domain of industrial production into the state and civil society (Post-
Fordism), as in the inner sanctum of the academy (neo-managerialism, the university and 
the epistemic project) and right into the micro domain of the private (micro-wave 
suppers, TV-dinners) access to personal information). This much is experientially borne 
out. What we seize upon here is that Heidegger is in effect making the argument that the 
essence of modern technology, “Enframing”, has the power of  a ‘command’, that is a 
‘call to action’ to address that which is ‘urgently necessary’. Moreover, that this action is 
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obligatory and preemptory in as much as it sets the terms and clears the ground for 
participation in modern technology. In a word what “Enframing” then is, is taken up in 
this thesis as that which is akin to a social imperative.  
 
What is of critical note here is the kind of relationship that Heidegger (2003) posits 
between Enframing and destining and hence to establish what it is that sets off the 
process and what role the social being plays in this technological process which up to 
now has tended to constitute its technological sociality by and large determinate if not 
determined. In order to address this epistemological matter of determinism with its 
isomorphic logic the thesis considers the relationship between society and technology as 
one informed by non-determinism but that is yet determinate. By this it is meant that the 
essence of technology as “Enframing” is a modality of determination but as Heidegger 
(2003) contends it is not a compelling force since the social agent has a choice as to how 
it admits itself into the technological realm. That is as “one who is spoken to” in the sense 
that social agency registers an awareness of the essence of technology as a way of 
revealing being and social being, rather than as one who seeks the illusion of mastery by 
reducing the technological complex discursively to its instrumentality.  
 
What Heidegger (2003) raises here is the paradox of the essence technology: on the one 
hand there is that which once in its pre-modern mode as techne (bringing-forth) granted 
us close proximity to revealing of being, that is, its truth; and on the other hand there is 
that which in modern technology as enframing (challenging-forth) blocks access to its 
way revealing or truth by delimiting us to the horizon of intelligibility of the standing 
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reserve.  And it is to this matter of the danger and the saving grace of the essence of 
modern technology to which we now turn.  
3.4.3 Destining of enframing: imperative two, of modern technology-danger and 
saving power 
What has already been established is that the essence of technology is of an ontological 
nature in that it is a way of revealing, which through its instrumental modality of 
producing things yields the causal complex that is responsible for such formations. The 
matter at hand now is how this ontology (revealing the actual) that is at the heart of 
technology as Heidegger claims (2003) bears on the relationship between technology and 
society. It seems that Heidegger is making two claims of sociological import. On the one 
hand Heidegger’s is making the claim that  in participating in modern technology or its 
precursor for that matter society comes under the sway of the essence of technology 
which is its dimension of “Enframing”. This dimension of “Enframing” or framing the 
world within a particular technological imaginary, as case in point the “mode of ordering 
the actual as standing reserve” is that which configures the world and is something over 
which we have no control. In this regard the danger that Heidegger (2003) warns us of is 
that we are caught within the ontological grip of the essence of modern technology, so to 
speak. If, this is indeed the case, then, the question that begs is what is the ‘destiny’ of a 
social formation under the sway of an enframing which is a ordering of the standing 
reserve? Heidegger (2003:261) outlines his argument thus: 
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…when destining reigns in the mode of enframing, it is the supreme danger . This 
danger attests itself in two ways. As soon as what is unconcealed no longer 
concerns man even as object, but exclusively as standing reserve, and man in the 
midst of objectlessness is nothing but the orderer of the standing reserve, then he 
comes to the brink of a precipitous fall; that is, he comes to the point where he 
himself will have to be taken as standing reserve. 
 
The character of the destining that reigns in the mode of enframing to reiterate is one 
described as a “setting-upon” nature in as much as the latter’s energies are challenged-
forth to yield to its reconfiguration as standing-reserve or storehouse. What is 
unconcealed in the enframing of modern technology takes the form of an ordering of 
nature such that its energies are  “unlocked, transformed, stored, distributed and switched 
about anew’. In short what is being described is the unmaking of the being of nature and 
the social being of the world in the making of a standing reserve where everything is 
reconfigured as resources.  
 
There is thus an ontological substitution at work which leads to an epistemological 
substitution; on the one hand with respect to the former the objects of nature are replaced 
by the stock or the resources of an objectless ‘standing reserve’, and on the other hand the 
causality of a bringing-forth into appearance, that is, the unity of the four modalities of 
cause is replaced by the causality of a challenging-forth that is the ordering, regulating 
and securing of the standing reserve. What we now have is a technological modality of 
being in place of a social modality in as much as all significances which comes with the 
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‘relationality’ or relational nexus of the social world disappears into the disposability of 
beings as that which is available in the technological inventory, the standing reserve. The 
great casualty and supreme cost for Heidegger is that being has been forgotten and the 
way of revealing as its truth is all but taken up in technological being and with it our 
sociality and humanity our care and concern for self, others and the world.  
 
Nothing escapes this fate of nihilism. The elision of objects that Heidegger (1977) refers 
to above as objectless-ness is a condition that arises as a result of the substitution of 
nature for the standing reserve. Whereas in the realms of nature one encounters a 
staggering variety of objects and energies which are brought-forth sui generis and thus 
differentiated the opposite is true for Heidegger (2003) in the realms of the standing 
reserve. In nature as storehouse, that is as standing reserve objects lose their integrity as 
such since they are no longer related to as differentiated entities with autonomy but as 
resources which are on standby ready to be taken up on demand and used accordingly in 
a complex interrelated techno-social world.  
 
The point that Heidegger (2003) seems to be making is that as stock and a resource all 
objects have equivalence and as such they stand undifferentiated, furthermore, they have 
no standing as autonomous entities but exist as a function of the standing reserve. It is 
thus in this sense that Heidegger (2003) speaks of the objectless-ness of the standing 
reserve. What is of gravest concern for Heidegger (2003) is that this destining of objects 
in the way of revealing being of enframing of modern technology threatens human beings 
with the same fate. What concerns us as the gravest danger is that in seeking to show how 
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our sociabilities are changing we remain at the ontical level in such sociological analyses, 
but in taking up the issue of social being we move the plane of analysis to the ontological 
level and ask the deeper question as to what is the reach of technology into the 
provenance of what it means to be human. To say that we have become materialistic and 
vain is good and well but to take this into our existential – ontological understanding of 
social being is quite another matter one we seek to arrive at in this thesis. .  
 
Let’s examine how Heidegger arrives at his understanding of technological being by 
considering the ontological implications of the role Heidegger assigns the social agent in 
the sociology of the standing reserve. He states above that social being within the 
enframing of modern technology is assigned the sociability of the “orderer of the 
standing reserve”. This does not mean that social being does not engage nature at all in 
terms of its objects and energies but rather that this engagement is the extension of the 
logic of the standing reserve. In other words nature is viewed in terms of how it can be 
ordered such that it resembles a storehouse, a “standing reserve”. Thus the primary 
engagement with nature does not stop even start with the unlocking of its mysteries, it 
moves from its transformation as standing reserve which is its terminus ad quo not its 
terminus ad quem. This is the radical import of Heidegger’s position on the way of 
revealing of modern technology as ‘standing reserve’.  In this regard Heidegger (2003) 
argues that society is no longer engaged directly in techne as a way of revealing the truth 
but rather that revealing devolves to ordering with the social beings sociability reduced in 
scope to the practices and functionalities entailed in being its “chief orderer”.  
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The hermeneutic import of this is that the social agent as ontological subject is denied 
access to the “primal truth” or “aletheia” contained in world-disclosure and its way of 
revealing. Thus the supreme danger that Heidegger (2003) refers us to is twofold: on the 
one hand the essence of modern technology (enframing as ordering) potentially stands to 
dehumanize society (as resources of the standing reserve); and on the other hand 
enframing stands to obfuscate if not obstruct an original ontological access to “bringing-
forth” or poiesis and thus revealing as truth or aletheia. 
 
The question that begs, since we have already established that the essence of technology 
while determinant is not compelling, is in what relationship we stand to this unfolding of 
modern technology. Heidegger has attested to the “supreme danger” that the essence of 
technology holds thus the matter at hand is what his argument is for the “saving power” 
of technology. Thus Heidegger (2003: 263): 
 
The essence of technology is in a lofty sense ambiguous. Such ambiguity points to 
the mystery of all revealing, i.e., of truth. On the one hand enframing challenges 
forth into the frenziedness of ordering that blocks every view into … revealing 
and … endangers the relation to the essence of truth. On the other hand enframing 
propriates for its part in the granting that lets man endure- as yet inexperienced 
…- that he may be the one who is needed and used for the safekeeping of the 
essence of truth. Thus the rising of the saving power appears.  
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In considering the saving power of enframing we are once again returned to the matter of 
revealing and the potentially redemptive relationship that social being can have with 
modern technology. Heidegger (2003: 263) restates this relationship to make his 
argument as to the saving power of technology.  
 
…the challenging-forth into the ordering of the actual as standing reserve remains 
a destining that starts man upon a way of revealing. As this destining the essential 
unfolding of technology gives man entry into something which, of himself, he can 
neither invent nor in any way make. For there is no such thing as a man who 
exists singly and solely on his own.   
 
There are two points of note that need to be isolated that bear light on Heidegger’s 
conception of the relationship between technology and society and the nature of the 
former. Firstly, technology is conceived of as standing separate from society and 
somewhat autonomous in as much as it constitutes an independent domain and is imbued 
with a revelatory essence which is its real raison d’etre. Secondly that this modality is not 
the preserve of the individual but is fundamentally societal in its scope and content. In 
other words the essence of technology does not act on the individual as much as it acts at 
the level of the sociological, that is, it defines a zeitgeist. Thus the saving power as its 
danger are conditions of possibility that ensue in the unfolding of enframing though 
unlike the former the latter rests not in ‘enframing’ as a way of revealing but in revealing 
as ‘poiesis’, as a ‘bringing-forth’ of the truth of being. But, how are we to avert the 
ontological hold of ‘challenging forth’ and its way of revealing the ‘enframing’ that is a 
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‘standing reserve’ so that we may have clear ontological access to the way of revealing of 
techne,  as aletheia, i.e., truth.     
 
We are offered the following caveat and corrective by Heidegger (2003: 264) as to how 
social being is able to engage the saving power of technology. 
 
Above all through our catching sight of the essential unfolding in technology; 
instead of merely gaping at the technological. So long as we represent technology 
as an instrument, we remain transfixed in the will to master it. We press on past 
the essence. When we ask how the instrumental unfolds essentially as a kind of 
causality, then we experience the essential unfolding as a destining of revealing.  
 
What emerges from the above with respect to the ‘will to mastery’ is that an instrumental 
bearing which invokes the opposite may also be said to be true or at least potentially so as 
far as it is able to see in its causal modality its way of revealing in ‘bringing-forth’. That 
is the technological assumes mastery over society and society operates at the behest of 
the “machine” is a dystopean view that has much currency contemporaneously. However, 
as Heidegger makes clear this stems from the idea that technology is an instrument and 
an instrumentality which while correct is not necessarily true since it never leaves the 
provenance of the instrumental. It is this predisposition towards the means that is, causa 
efficiens that shifts our gaze from the unfolding of causality as the unity of the four 
modalities of cause in its transcendence as a way of revealing being and social being.  
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The ontological casualty so to speak is that we are no longer in the proximity of revealing 
as the truth of being and sociality (the social world) but in the domain of the instrumental 
as the “destining of enframing” of modern technology and how it reshapes and reorients 
being and sociality. But, equally so, as Heidegger points out, we need not dwell in this 
ontological truncation or diminution if our gaze is trained on the essence of technology as 
bringing-forth. Since after all modern technology may be determinant but it is not 
deterministic in the sense that we are compelled to obey its imperatives that are its call to 
the ‘standing reserve’. In other words, as ontological subjects, that is, as disclosers of 
being and social being we can press past the “enframing which is an ordering”, and move 
onto an “enframing which is a destining of revealing”, that is,  we can establish a 
commensurability between ourselves as ontological and epistemic subjects (disclosers of 
being and truth) and not fall prey to our diminution as adjuncts of the “standing reserve”, 
just resources and no more. 
 
Technology is what it is: the point is to admit to a relationship with technology that is 
fixed on its essence which is a way of revealing; its imperatives are a destining of 
revealing and a destining which is a way of being as enframing. Thus, the essence of 
technology is akin to technology but it is nothing technological, it is in fact ontological, 
that is, it is conditionality for that which is, its being and its sociality. This is the saving 
power of technology; its essence offers us entry into its way of disclosing and knowing; it 
makes of society, certainly in one of its manifestations, ontological subjects as social 
beings and, no less. This however does not mean we have a vantage point or an 
Archimedean point from which we can engage the danger of technology since as 
 
 
 
 
 139
Heidegger holds we are in its midst and can only take a position subsequent to it. That is 
we are caught within the enframing that is an ordering and all our standards according to 
Heidegger (2003) are as such derived from this way of being, the standing reserve. We 
can confirm nothing other than the actual as mesurable, calculable and orderable.  
Thus Heidegger needs a vantage point outside the enframing that is an ordering of being, 
sociality and nature but that is yet a part of revealing to maintain the duality of 
“irresistibility” of enframing and the “restraint” of the saving power he sets up. To this 
end Heidegger takes us back to the ancient Greek concept of techne which was taken up 
in discussion earlier though this time to effect the very possibility of such a vantage point. 
It is thus to art and our visual and perceptual being that Heidegger points the way out of 
the technological mire and simultaneously into the theoretical path of this thesis in as 
much as it opens up the theme of visuality, its second leg. Given this theme of the visual 
it suffices to point out that to keep from muddying the waters of the discussion and 
development of an understanding of Heidegger’s (2003 philosophy of technology we 
have exercised restraint with respect to drawing out the relationship between revealing 
and visuality so as to take this up in its appropriate analytical space. What follows is a 
discussion on how Heidegger’s understands the discursive space that offers itself as a 
basis to engage with modern technology through the sociability of art.      
3.5 Technology, art, perception – vision: saving grace as counterpoise 
The problematic that Heidegger (2003) sets up with respect to the ‘ontological blind spot’ 
inherent in the essence of modern technology under the adumbration of its way of 
revealing of enframing and its destining in the standing reserve yields to the limitations 
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imposed on social engagement  with technology. Thus Heidegger (2003: 263) contends 
that: 
Human activity can never directly encounter this danger. Human achievement 
alone can never banish it. But human reflection can ponder the fact that all 
saving-power must be of a higher essence that what is endangered, though at the 
same time kindred to it. 
What emerges for consideration is that social engagement with technology at the level of 
its essence is a non starter since one is not dealing with something technological in 
nature. The essence of technology to reiterate takes the form of  a modality of revealing 
as such one may participate in its reproduction or one may abstain, but in enjoining it one 
come under its determinate sway i.e. ordering leads to the possibility that “everything 
will present itself only in the unconcealment of standing reserve”. If this is how order 
manifests itself (standing reserve) in modern technology then the saving power that is 
revealing as aletheia (blind spot) though premised in techne is paradoxically non-
technological or not of the order of technikon. To this end Heidegger (2003: 264) returns 
his analysis to the ancient Greek conceptual complex of techne: 
There was a time when it was not technology alone that bore the name techne. … 
There was a time when the bringing-forth of the true into the beautiful was called 
techne. …Because it was a revealing that brought-forth and made present, 
therefore belonged with poiesis. It was finally that revealing which holds 
complete sway in all the fine arts, in poetry and in everything poetical that 
obtained poiesis as its proper name.     
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Clearly Heidegger above holds the view that the essence of technology as revealing that 
is, as truth holds sway in the modality of bringing-forth of techne which has the character 
of poiesis. But since the enframing of the challenging-forth which is the essence of 
modern technology blocks access to poiesis it has to be sought elsewhere in the complex 
of that of techne; in other words in fine art and poetry. Heidegger (2003: 264) 
speculatively asks of this possibility and its alternative: 
 
Could it be that revealing lays claim to the arts most primally, so that they for 
their part may expressly foster the growth of the saving power, may awaken and 
found anew our vision of, and trust in, that which grants?  
 
If indeed the fine arts are granted this possibility Heidegger (2003: 264) offers a 
conditional response which holds “only if reflection upon art, for its part does not shut its 
eyes to the constellation of truth, … This recourse to poiesis offered as corrective in as 
much as it involves reestablishing a path to aletheiea or truth is but one possibility. Of its 
alternative Heidegger (2003: 264) says: 
: that the frenziedness of technology may entrench itself everywhere to such an 
extent that someday, throughout everything technological, the essence of 
technology may unfold essentially in the propriative event of truth 
 
In the above the dialectical import of danger and saving grace Heidegger’s argument 
bears on the transformation of quantity into quality in as much as he seems to suggest a 
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point of saturation and perhaps an ontological implosion in which enframing as standing 
reserve sheds the latter and yields to its essence as a “destining of revealing”. What this 
opens up for the thesis is that (modern) technology justifiably is a viable means to pursue 
the matter of social being because it serves as a sociological principle insofar as we see in 
it the ‘frenziedness’ with which the natural and social are continuously ordered and 
revealed as ‘standing reserve’ that is as technological being. In this transformation of 
virtually everything into the modern technological being of standing reserve or resources 
lays the very conditions of possibility of the danger of technology and indeed in 
dialectical fashion its savior which might burst open its social being in its technological 
malady. It is thus with this very condition and its possibility that we have sought to open 
up social being to an existential – ontological understanding so as to contextualize where 
we are in terms of the technologically transformed sociality and how far that is from the 
sociality that comes with our existentiality as Dasein, and or ontological and what it 
opens up in relation to social being and sociality. In approaching this question thus we 
note Heidegger’s (2003: 264) sensitivities and convergence of technology and vision 
albeit in art: 
 
… in our sheer preoccupation with technology we do not yet experience the 
essential unfolding of technology, that in our sheer aesthetic-mindedness we no 
longer guard and preserve the essential unfolding of art.    
 
What Heidegger means would be in line with his understanding that our anthropological 
and instrumental views on technology veils and covers it in such a way that we are unable 
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to let technology be and thus appropriate its being as one of disclosing and revealing 
what it means to be in-the-world, amongst-others and towards-our selves. Similarly, in art 
we become fixed by an aesthetic of some kind, and thus lose the essence of art, as 
disclosing and revealing of the truth of being and beings, as such we tend to close 
ourselves off from an understanding of perception which a phenomenological analysis 
reveals is about releasing something to be perceived. It is this ‘releasement’ that we seek 
from technology that we have seized upon in our visual beings as the ability to consider 
things in their unconcealment. But what this entails and how this comports with our being 
is the subject of a clearing of the philosophical ground of vision (chapter 4), its relation to 
Dasein and social being (chapter 5), and finally its complex perceptual structure (chapter 
six)  as it pertains to vision.  
 
We then firstly set up something of a the visual condition as analogous to the 
technological condition that is then subsequently taken existentially and which 
culminates phenomenologically in perception as a means to constitute in themselves and 
collectively an existential -.ontological understanding of what it means to be human and 
how this is in its turn tied to our sociality. The sociological passage is then from the 
technological condition to the visual condition in order to reach the human condition as 
social condition which is tied to our social being that is its sociality and  sociability 
understood existentially and ontologically, that is not taken for granted or as given. 
Moreover, it is in the dialectical unity of opposites of technology and art and its social 
being in vision suggestive in Heidegger above that we take on the latter two as heuristic 
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to probe the sociological conditionality of what we have centered in the notion of social 
being and its dimensionality of sociality and sociability.  
 
Thus, in as much as we stand in a relation of being imperiled by modern technology and 
being saved by a modality of vision of art as truth that we see fit to seize upon this visile 
dimension and thus pursue its understanding in the relation between philosophy and 
vision and later its phenomenology. For it is in the modality of vision and its relation to 
social being and its intentional comportment as Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology 
reveals that is at issue in grounding and in so doing come to terms with how our sociality 
is threatened and what kind of sociability is to be at-hand in bailing us out so to speak. 
The latter is the subject of chapter five but before this we need to set out the terrain in 
which we think about vision as a way of clearing the ground and freeing our self from the 
discursive gambit of notions such as ‘natural vision’, the ‘innocent eye’, ‘immaculate 
perception’ and ‘bare perception’ and the like. 
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Chapter Four 
Philosophy and Vision: visual condition as subject – 
object distanciation   
The previous chapter took up the challenge of articulating a position on modalities of 
being and sociality as technologically interpolated and thus situated the basis for such an 
understanding within the conceptual complex of a philosophy of technology, in general, 
and a hermeneutic phenomenology of technology, in particular. Though, in both 
instances, the objective was not to remain at the philosophical level, but to probe these 
dimensions of thinking for their social relevance, i.e., to consider the question as to how 
technology is taken up in the quotidian order of being, and thus informs and shapes a 
‘social horizon of intelligibility’, that is our social being and sociality.  Similarly, we 
intend to take up the matter of vision across a broad range of conceptions to probe its 
grounding in sociality and thus inform particular modalities of social practices as visual 
condition, or visuality as such, i.e., the way in which vision shapes and reconfigures our 
sociality and sociabilities.  
  
The structure and organization of this chapter on vision and visuality and their 
sociological import will start with some general comments on philosophy and vision and 
it’s problematic. The idea behind which is to embed the argument, from the outset, that 
vision like technology is not neutral, that is, unfettered and unencumbered, but rather that 
the social and the cultural is taken up in vision in ways that reconfigure our sociality 
reconstituting it as a distinct modality of visuality (objectification and detachment) and 
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vice versa. In taking up this theme we intend to shape our reading of the philosophers and 
social theorists who have pronounced on vision and visuality in such a way that their 
views are telling for its social import, that is, that it says something about social being 
and its dimensions albeit from the vantage point of vision and the visual. In the main we 
address the epistemological and ontological privileging of vision, its propensity for 
objectification and detachment and confront notions such as ‘immaculate perception’ and 
the ‘innocent eye’ all by way of clearing the ground much like was done in relation to 
technology. Our argument is that vision is not an unproblematic phenomenon in that it is 
not an autonomous entity producing its visual form in some neutral medium, but rather is 
ontologically grounded which gives its intelligibility, and as such opens up the theoretical 
task of constituting the implicit hermeneutic at work in vision derived from our social 
being (mode of existence-sociality), beings (human selves) and worlds (social practices, 
comportment to things-sociabilities).  
 
The object of this chapter then is to consider the different ways in which, vision and the 
visual is understood philosophically and theoretically; its implications for how being and 
the world is understood; its relation to cognition, believing and knowing; and ultimately 
at the phenomenological level in so far as we have developed an understanding of vision 
and visuality that is commensurate with our concern for different modalities of being as it 
relates to its sociality and sociabilities in vision a little later. The objective is to move 
towards considering ways of seeing that do not reproduce the imperative of modern 
technology with its lens of enframing, but rather one that conjoins us to a modality of 
vision that is connected to aletheia, an ontological vision and its concomitant modality of 
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social being premised in Dasein as a way of revealing that offers an Archimedean lever to 
dislodge ourselves from the adumbration of the standing reserve.    
 
4.1 Philosophy of vision: vision as philosophical problem 
We take up the paradox that even though vision is centered in contemporary society it is 
not considered explicitly when we consider how television as an example has been taken 
up in study. It comes somewhat as a surprise, then, that the concept of vision which 
features so prominently in television has by and large been overlooked and has not been 
given to any reflexive engagement in studies thereof. In short, it has been taken for 
granted. Or alternatively in the logic of Barthes (1973) notion of ‘ex-nomination’ it is 
precisely because vision is hegemonic that it need not be mentioned. In other words that 
it does not constitute an object of enquiry as such is in some sense a function of the 
power of the visual and it’s perceived ‘natural’ order of being. Notwithstanding, it is 
nevertheless obvious enough that television as a technological object of an electronic 
kind is consummately visual in its functioning in so far as it beams out or transmit images 
of all kinds accompanied by acoustics of all kinds. What concerns this chapter is not 
television per se but how we relate to matters concerning vision and for this reason we 
briefly take up the lack of a reflexive approach to vision in studies which take television 
as its thematic.  
 
Whereas previously, we noted the significance of technology for being we now turn our 
attention to the latter as it is constituted as such within a field of vision. By way of an 
approach to this phenomenon of vision we tease out a paradox which looms large in 
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studies on media, in general and for that matter, television in particular. What one would 
expect to find, given the expansion and foregrounding of visuality in our contemporary 
age of digital technology (television, cellular phones, cameras, internet, personal 
computers etc., etc,), is that an understanding of vision would be considered a sine qua 
non for grounding a sociology of media or television. Instead of an explicit account of 
vision one encounters a conspicuous silence which is particularly disturbing in the 
otherwise pioneering and theoretically rich work on television by someone of the stature 
of Raymond Williams (1974). We found that even though Williams (1974: 75-76) shows 
an awareness of the visual dimensions of television and some of its intrinsic qualities it is 
still bereft of a philosophy or theory of vision. In effect he offers very little except to 
show as in his technological thesis on television a ruptured dialectic featuring only its 
conventional and social shaping.  
 
However, to Williams’s credit he does signal the need to consider the visual dimensions 
of television, though here again it is not suggestive of a field of vision in which to make 
sense thereof, but rather at the level of a visibility, or what seems to this writer to be its 
visiogenic, that is its aesthetic features. Whereas Williams (1974) gives at least scant 
attention to the visual dimension sans vision, Fiske (1987) deals with the visual by proxy 
through representation and spectacle on television, though to his credit he does open up 
gendered ways of looking, though here again it is not contextualized within a theory or 
concept of vision.  Adorno (1991), on the other, hand invokes a ‘hermeneutic of 
suspicion’ in considering the “hidden messages” in television images, but without 
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contextualizing this in a field of vision or scopic or cultural regime of signification much 
less a philosophy of vision.  
 
McLuhan (1962,1964) by contrast has much to say about the visual dimension of being in 
‘light’ of the advent of the phonetic alphabet, in as much he contends that the latter 
witnessed “trading an ear for an eye”, though in this instance it is done within the logic of 
the sensorium. However, McLuhan’s (1964) error is in accepting the visual sense 
unproblematically as “cool and neutral” but he does open a different ontological 
perspective on television, which is that its mode of being is “tactile” in virtue of its 
capacity for synaesthesia, that is, of uniting the senses. Shifting the attention back to 
vision to Bourdieu (1996) ‘on television’ it is noted that his analysis is mainly concerned 
with a sociological analysis of the ‘field of cultural production’ and its articulation with 
content, as it relates to the producers and audience. There is very little reference to vision 
as such except to draw on literary critics who have pointed out that images produce a 
“reality effect”, Bourdieu (1996: 21). What is then implied in this reference to the reality 
effect of images is that there is something intrinsic to vision and the visual that allows for 
such embellishment. But without a phenomenology of vision one is left without any 
means to understand how images are indeed experienced at the visiogenic level, that is, in 
‘light’ of its modality of visibility on television, as case in point.  
 
Taken together what the aforementioned and countless others involved, in the main, in 
such research have in common are theories and analyses of television without a theory of 
how vision or the visual is experienced, and thus bereft of a concept of visuality to guide 
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and ground their thinking. We take our cue for taking up the matter of vision from such 
lacuna and from the fact that the contemporary technological age has fore grounded a 
visual modality of being, but has simultaneously pushed to the background its 
conceptualization and thus its relation to our social being.  
 
What emerges is that much like the neutral and instrumental treatment of technology we 
find a symmetrical understanding of vision which accepts the visual as given and largely 
unproblematic in and of itself, and only problematised with respect to its social and 
ideological shaping, in the forms of representation that television images bias 
conventionally and ideologically. On the positive side with some felicity for our thesis 
the aspect of the former, that is, the conventional shaping by television raises to the fore 
the technological imperatives involved in how technology articulates with and informs 
sociabilities dealing with interpretive practices that are implied in our modalities of 
vision. However, with respect to the question of neutrality there is a similar tendency as 
to how audiences and the phenomenon of viewing television are treated. What one finds 
is that either a theory of vision is overlooked or subordinated thus conflating it with the 
sociological complex of the viewer; or it over relativises the viewers interpretive 
resources and thus over subjectivises vision in an under theorized and taken for granted 
notion of vision and the visual, thus conflating it with a semiotic of signs.  
 
Against these concerns raised and those yet to emerge the move to seek philosophical 
grounding in our understanding of vision, the visual and visuality is then not only a 
corrective but a fundamental theoretical task. One that remains informed by a 
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Heideggerean sensibility also taken up by Levin’s (1988) magnum opus, “The Opening 
of Vision”. To this end a hermeneutic phenomenological opening of vision reveals the 
social practices of vision with their attendant modalities and their social import, which we 
consider in the light of its sociality and concomitant sociabilities. In particular we focus 
on the contemporary condition of technological saturation that Heidegger (2003) argues 
has produced a way of being or ontology of modern technology in which its essence 
“enframing” has closed off and blocked access to our social being thus necessitating that 
we open up alternate modalities of vision which challenge said technological modality of 
being.  
 
We take up the theoretical challenge of exploring an alternate modality that is able to 
counteract the reductionist understanding of vision as instrumentalised and rationalized, 
that is, moving beyond a ‘visual condition’ to a nuanced concept of what is entailed in the 
social complexities involved in reconfiguring our ontological relation to ‘social being and 
becoming’.  However, before we engage the latter we proceed by way of a 
contextualization of the theoretical ground as set and take up the different ways in which 
vision has been philosophized and sociologized and set up the problematic of vision. This 
we argue takes the form of a vision condition which amounts to the subject – object 
distanciation and thus the reification and objectification of our social being. The virtue, 
so to speak of the vision condition is that it contains the conditionality of our modality as 
theoretical beings but its vice is that it ruptures our existential involvement in-society.  
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4.1.1 Ancient Greek doctrine: Plato and Aristotle on ontological and epistemological 
privileging of vision  
 In ancient Greek thinking, with respect to Plato and Aristotle, sight is considered the 
noblest sense and imbued with the significance of being, both an ontological and an 
epistemological threshold. Synnott (1992:620) takes up the disciplinary challenge of the 
relative lack in taking up vision in sociology, in his “Sociology of Sight”, and much to his 
credit anchors it philosophically in “Plato (Timaeus 47; 1963: 1174-1175)”, to draw out 
the epistemic links between Greek thinking and “sight …reason, understanding, 
knowledge, wisdom and truth”.  
 
The sight in my opinion is the source of greatest benefit for us, for had we never 
seen the stars and the sun and the heaven, none of the words which we have 
spoken about the universe would ever have been uttered … And from this source 
we have derived philosophy, than which no greater good ever was or will be 
given by the gods to mortal man.  
 
In juxtaposing our being as humans to the cosmos as evident above we have the makings 
of the epistemological dualism in the subject – object juxtaposition as constructed and in 
it the incipient form of the distanciation that has come to characterize Western 
Philosophy particularly in its Cartesian form. It is our contention and the basis of our 
thesis that this is the ontological basis of the centering of a discourse in which our 
primary relationship to the world is accepted as epistemic and thereby centered while our 
existential involvement is decentered and our social being thereby attenuated.   
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In addition to the epistemological ramifications of Plato’s thinking that we have drawn 
out in relation to Synnott (1992) and made explicit there remains an ontological point to 
be made. In this regard one sees in Plato’s understanding above the setting up of a 
conditionality which raises the matter of how we come to apprehend the world through 
vision, and thus establish a relationship to the cosmos; and moreover that this ‘gift’ of 
vision by the gods discloses something of the order of being, that is, of the order of our 
nature as human beings. In further extending the analysis in the direction of the ‘nobility’ 
in which vision is held and its occularcentric dimensions is the sequential order 
suggestive in Plato above, which we see and then speak. What is certainly implicit in this 
understanding of Plato that one may infer from the above quote is that vision is 
considered to be unmediated, a neutral phenomenon through which we take in the world 
and then impart to it through discourse a measure of its intelligibility. However, this 
understanding is not unproblematic at all and has been taken variously in different 
critiques such as Jenks (1995) on the problematic of  “immaculate perception”, Mitchell 
(1986?) on the naivety of the “innocent eye”, Merleau-Ponty’s (1964),  corrective in his 
understanding that perception is open to a “horizon of an infinite number of perspectival 
views”, Levin’s (1988) phenomenology of vision in the face of the nihilism of modern 
technology and Heidegger’s (1962, 1975) hermeneutic phenomenology of  vision and his 
critique of “bare perception”.       
    
Continuing, however, with the ancient Greek theme and vision, Synnott (1992) in 
developing his “sociology of sight” finds in Aristotle too the makings of an 
epistemological privileging of sight, and thus the subject – object distanciation and 
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reification of social being. Though, in this regard, we too add, insofar as we are directed 
towards social being, the ontological significance in his analysis. Synnott (1992: 620) 
cites from “(Metaphysics 980; 1984: 1552)”: 
 
All men by nature desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in 
our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves … 
The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us know and brings to light 
many differences between things.     
 
What we seem to concur with Synnott is the discursive foreshadowing of an empiricist 
epistemology in Aristotle’s understanding of the role of the senses in the production of 
knowledge, in general, in so far as the ‘senses’ has this epistemic capacity that it “makes 
us know”.  At the ontological level two aspects are evident: firstly, Aristotle’s 
understanding of the nature of being in relation to our senses is that we are in essence 
epistemic beings in as much as we are given the “desire to know”. And secondly that our 
senses endow us with what Heidegger distinguishes as an ontological capacity, though 
most importantly, not in themselves, that is the ability to disclose the nature of the world 
and an ontical ability to distinguish things or objects in the world. Now given these 
capacities that we are imbued with by the senses and given the role played by vision both 
ontologically and epistemologically it is clear that sight is then centered. Thus as Synnott 
(1992: 620) points out:  
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“Sight is, said Aristotle, “the clearest” and “noblest” of all the senses (Dialogues; 
1984: 2412-2413). The primacy of sight therefore has an ancient classical lineage. 
 
It is this lineage in so far as it insinuates itself in the modern age and thus is implicated in 
Western philosophy that we seek to explicate, to which we now turn to embed our 
understanding of vision, epistemology and ontology. In closing, the point that needs to be 
made explicit, as it is only alluded to and quite veiled at that, is how this hegemony of 
vision of the ancient Greeks relates to the sociological condition of modernity. To this 
end it is noted that since vision establishes our place in the world, the cosmos, being, 
discourse and knowledge it is really offered as sine qua non for our very sociality and our 
sociability. In other words vision as understood by the ancient doctrine of Plato and 
Aristotle in particular is mutually constitutive.  
 
From this natural faculty of vision emerges a sociality (awareness of being-in-the-
world/cosmos) which in turn variously informs the visual as discursive visibilities 
(romantic and prosaic being-with-others) and finally firms up a visuality, that is, a 
modality in which, seeing is framed as a scopic or cultural regime of vision which as such 
is ontologically and epistemologically privileged. What is at issue heretofore is thus how 
this aspect of vision is able to transcend the threshold from the seen to the known and as 
such is deemed to feature prominently in Western philosophy and is thus implicated in 
our (post) modern condition.   
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4.1.2 Ancient Greek epistemological privileging of vision and western philosophy  
The ancient lineage of Greek thinking as described above finds its way into Western 
philosophy in virtue of a visualization of knowledge predicated on the immanent logic of 
vision. Jay (1993: 24-26) draws on Jonas (1982) to show how vision is elevated in Greek 
thought and what this ocular bias implies for Western philosophy. There are three 
epistemic implications of note as foundational in constituting the vision condition, that is, 
the subject – object distanciation, which we find in Jay’s (1993) analysis. The latter 
engages Jonas (1982) insights into the nature of sight which we in turn marshal insofar as 
it bears directly on our thesis in relation to Heidegger’s philosophy of technology and its 
visual implications for social being. The first point of note of Jonas (1982: 145, cited in, 
Jay 1993: 24} deals with the privileging of the static over the dynamic as a direct import 
of the nature of seeing and thus:  
 
…sight he contends is preeminently the sense of simultaneity, capable of 
surveying a wide visual field at one moment. …less temporal than … hearing or 
touch it thus tends to elevate the static Being over dynamic Becoming, fixed 
essences over ephemeral appearances. Greek philosophy from Parmenides 
through to Plato accordingly emphasized an unchanging and eternal presence.   
 
There are a few implications that flow from this view as taken up by Jay (1993) that is of 
pertinence for an understanding of the experiences entailed in vision and for how this in 
turn is embedded epistemically and thus reaches into our social being. What strikes one 
from the above is that vision enjoys an expansive horizon when compared to the other 
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senses as far as its capacity to cover a “wide field” is concerned. This means at one level 
that as far as this is of epistemic bearing vision is able to take in more knowledge of the 
world than the other senses. However, this fecundity accordingly comes at an 
epistemological cost in as much as vision imparts its sensory imperatives in the form of 
principles that inform the knowledge production process.  
 
Considered in light of simultaneity vision undermines the process and experiential 
orientation of knowledge which is its existential dimension and thus its sociality for its 
seeming immediacy. Thus, in effect eliding or certainly suppressing the dimension of the 
historicity of knowledge in social being so far as vision involves rendering that which 
enters its field of visibility “less temporal” and as such fully present. In reducing this 
temporal dimension of social being the ontological flux of life is exchanged for an 
ontological constancy and thus “static Being” is favored over “dynamic Becoming”.  
 
At the level of its epistemological import the principle of knowledge is then one of 
establishing “fixed essences” as of the order of the world and not its “ephemeral 
appearances”. What we might in Heideggerean vein (see 3.2.1 and 3.3) respectively refer 
to as the ontological distinction between a true understanding and a correct understanding 
in terms of how it relates to and what it discloses about social being. The net effect of 
social practices of vision which limit its expansive horizon by reducing the ontological 
scope of vision simultaneously reduces its efficacy for engaging, or being-in-the-world, 
and thus limits one’s capacity for “becoming”. And similarly social practices of vision 
that are fixated by its visiogenic are ipso facto locked into an essentialist view and as 
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such beyond the pale of temporality and historicity rendering such epistemic forms 
sociologically decontextualised and an emaciated concept of social being.  
 
Secondly, Jay (1993 :25) takes up Jonas’s (1982 : 147) understanding of the import of 
vision for the way in which the subject-object relationship is construed on the basis of 
Greek thought and for its implications for setting up objectivity as such.   
 
Jonas’s second contention is that the externality of sight allows the observer to 
avoid direct engagement with the object of his gaze. Thus, the very distinction 
between subject and object and the belief in the neutral apprehension of the latter 
by the former, a distinction so crucial for much of later thought is abetted by the 
occularcentrism of Greek thought.  
 
This property of vision, specifically its capacity for “externality” and thus its constitution 
of a subject-object dichotomy culminates in social science methodology as the position 
referred to as “epistemological dualism”. Whilst this latter ‘view’ has come under much 
criticism, and legitimately so, for it’s wholesale borrowing of a natural science 
sensibility, and for taking up the Comtean positivist project calling for the 
methodological unity of natural and social sciences, the point here, notwithstanding, is 
that this orientation arises as a result of the privileging of the function of the visual as 
epistemological condition in the constitution of knowledge. Of further epistemological 
note and consistent with the dualism attendant to the externality of vision is the 
problematic ‘view’ that this relationship is “neutral”. Thus the occularcentrism of Greek 
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thought is seen to be complicit in setting up the ‘perspective’ which abstracts vision and 
reifies it from what we will argue is otherwise a mutually constitutive process that 
receives its intelligibility from the sociality of being and not the visuality of being. Thus, 
while the sociabilities, as epistemic practices, arising in this mutually constitutive process 
is visually informed they receive their intelligibility from our existential involvement in-
society, which is our social being.  Conversely, if what we are alluding to are the 
epistemological costs of occularcentrism, then what might the gains be of such a vision-
centered ontology and epistemology. To this end Jay (1993: 25) refers us once again to 
Jonas’s (1982: 147) thinking in this regard: 
 
“The gain”, Jonas writes, “is the concept of objectivity, of the thing as it is in 
itself as distinct from the thing as it affects me, and from this distinction arise the 
whole idea of theoria and theoretical truth. Perhaps lost by this “dynamic 
neutralization”, as Jonas calls it, is a clear sense of causality, because the 
constitutive link between the subject and object is suppressed or forgotten.    
 
Whilst we agree with the contention that the concept of objectivity is indeed a major gain, 
it however is a qualified one. The point of Heideggerian significance taken up rigorously 
by Dreyfus (1991) is that this epistemological principle of objectivity and its stance of 
detachment does indeed inaugurate theory and science and as such is definitive of the 
Western epistemic formation. Though, what is also evident is that it comes with a 
reversal to the order of theory and practice, insofar as it relates to our primary and initial 
engagement with the world. We take this up later in much detail later (see 7.1.2.3 -7.1.3) 
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and as such defer to that discussion, though with regard to its occularcentric formation we 
seek to point out that we have here a logic of inverse proportionality. The greater the 
ontological force with which theory is propounded as our primary engagement with the 
world, the lesser is the practical and existential engagement and thus the greater is the 
subject – object distanciation. The ‘true’ relationship as Heidegger shows is that theory is 
derived from a breakdown in our practical involvement in-the-world and not vice versa.  
What is at stake is the decentering of our social being and with it our social hermeneutic 
which lies at the core of our ‘horizon of intelligibility’. Nevertheless, in as much as one is 
confronted by an object of knowledge in its facticity and apprehends it as such, is indeed 
of profound epistemological significance, as Jonas avers, in that it opens up the very 
condition of possibility of theory, paradigmatic thought and science. Though, we hasten 
to add that the positivistic conception of science could do with its social supplement in an 
existential science (see 7.1.2.2).  
 
On the matter of causality we have previously argued in line with Heidegger that the 
Greek concept of causality (see 1.4.2) proffered by Plato and Aristotle is of the order of a 
conceptual complexity that is marked off against the epistemological diminution 
accorded it in the sensibility of modern technology with its bias for instrumentalism and 
its reification at the expense of taking cognizance of its embedded sociality. We still 
stand by this and offer a corrective to the above by suggesting that what might be missing 
in the ancient Greek conception is a phenomenological dimension of the experiential 
since their quaternary concept of causality (see 3.2.2) seems adequate enough in the light 
of modern technology and its reductionism. However, moving in the opposite direction of 
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the latter is the final point of relevance in making explicit the occularcentrism of Greek 
thought and its implications for Western Philosophy. In this regard Jay (1993: 25-26) 
takes up Jonas’s (198; 147) themes of infinity and foresight: 
 
The Greek idea of infinity was encouraged by contemplating the vast reach of our 
ocular range. So too the pull of the eye into a distant landscape seemed to grant 
the viewer the all important “prospective capacity for foreknowledge, which was 
the premise of instrumental and adaptive behavior. Once the battle against 
Sophism, which defended rhetoric and the ear was won, Greek philosophy could 
elevate a visually defined notion of disinterested, monologic epistemic truth over 
mere opinion or doxa.   
 
The argument that was made previously in respect of a decontextualised understanding of 
essentialism, which was imparted to the ocular logic of a fixed gaze is reinforced in the a- 
temporality of “infinity”, and thus one is not able to rein in vision to its proportional role 
and is left instead with an understanding of the power of the visual as transcendental, 
even absolute. This capacity of the ocular for contemplating vast ranges does not end 
with a predisposition for infinity, but also opens up an epistemic space as indicated above 
for “foreknowledge” in as much as one is invited into the observation of an event as it 
unfolds over time and space, that is, at a distance as case in point. On the one hand it 
introduced a temporality in the causal unfolding of the sequential nature of an event its 
epistemic dimension though in reifying this property there is the cost of an ontological 
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displacement in as much as the finitude of human life is not as such computed and thus 
with it is evacuated a sense of our epistemological limits. 
 
What is of particular significance of this analysis of occularcentrism in Greek thought 
and its implications for Western thought with a Heideggerean slant is that it foreshadows 
the modality of instrumentalism. Thus, in the capacity for compressing time and space in 
the “prospective capacity of forethought” an instrumental bearing is disclosed which as 
yet is reined in by a social sensibility that treats objects as things in and of themselves, sui 
generis, and thus as “present at hand’, amenable to being studied as such open to being 
theorized. This changes under the rubric of modern technology and modern science 
where instrumentalism is given full reign ontologically in as much as objects are no 
longer autonomous but “ready-to-hand” as resources that together with being are 
consumed by “enframing” and the imperative of the “standing reserve” such that we 
stand facing the possibility of having our sociality evacuated from our being and 
substituted with a technological being. But also holds epistemologically in as much as 
forms of knowledge are reduced to the modality of the instrumental, that is, to the 
reproduction of that which is “orderable, calculable and measurable” and as such bereft 
of its social being ‘untimely ripping us from our a de-distanciated being-in-the-world and 
recontextualising us in a distanciated (from our selves, each other, things and the world) 
technological being in a technological world.  
 
And finally in Greek occularcentrism Jay and Jonas point to a state of affairs in which the 
sense of sight not only establishes its hegemony over the other senses, but that this 
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domination extends to the realm of knowledge, and the epistemic privileging of 
detachment over experiential involvement. With this occularcentrism of Greek thought in 
place the stage was set for the reign of vision as made manifest in the ocular metaphor of 
the “Enlightenment” and the makings of a ‘rational’ being couched in science over and 
above a social being couched in social existence.   
4.2 Disciplinary concerns: constituting the problematic 
The critical concern at hand with respect to the matter of vision and visuality and how it 
may relate to social being is predicated on the subject- object distanciation and how this 
has bearing on the latter and its articulation with modern technology. To reiterate, as a 
means to set the ground for how we are to understand vision and visuality in relation to 
the theoretical task set, the point that is paramount is that modern technology 
reconfigures being, sociality and sociabilities through the imperative of enframing such 
that the emergent field of vision constitutes all within its purview, as resources or a 
standing reserve.  
 
In Heideggerean vein what we ‘see’ in the enframing of modern technology presents 
itself as that which has use or  is “ready-to-hand” awaiting to be taken up and used within 
a field of utility or instrumentality as opposed to that which is “present-at-hand” and 
taken up within a field of observation for theoretical or scientific study. The latter admits 
social being into a field of theoretical vision to be seen and studied as objects or 
phenomena in themselves, sociology as case in point, in the modality of a subject – object 
distanciation. While the former admits social being to the logic of modern technology as 
standing reserve, and thus is not seen as being in its own right nor even as an object even, 
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but rather disappears from view so to speak into the standing reserve as a unit of an 
integrated technological utilitarian whole, or more directly as a function of an 
instrumental field with a specific purpose as resource in the ‘scheme of things’.  
 
What is being argued here is not that vision is considered to be some autonomous 
phenomenon, namely, that which is rendered visible nor is it but a function of sight. 
Instead at the ontological level, that is, in so far as one is thinking the very condition of 
possibility of vision and visuality one is invoking technology, in general, as a 
foundational basis informing the substrate or horizon of intelligibility (social 
hermeneutic) of what we see and how we see that which is seen. Put directly vision as a 
function of a modern technological ‘imaginary’ or technological, sans social, being. In 
particular that vision has a modality of sociality  (historically informed) tied to a spatial 
logic (distanciation) and articulated in different modalities of technology with both 
ontological (conditionality of being) and ontical implications (the realm of beings, what 
is seen).  
 
4.3 Heidegger and the problematic of vision:  
In setting out to develop an understanding of vision as part of the problematic of our 
contemporary age, that is, as function of a sociological complex and the technological 
modality thereto attached, we have started above with the ancient Greek conception of 
vision as ontologically and epistemologically privileged. Moreover, we have argued that 
this ancient lineage is imbricated in our modern age and as such sets up an ocular 
problematic as ‘vision condition’, that is subject – object distanciation. What we develop 
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in this section is Levin’s philosophy of vision predicated as it is on Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic phenomenology for a concept of vision that comports with an existential 
visionary being and which de-distanciates our social being such that we are returned to 
being-in-the-world . The objective here is not to reckon with the “metaphysical tradition” 
as such, nor to take up the question of the ontology of Being per se, but rather, to 
reconfigure the analyses of Levin such that an emergent ‘social hermeneutic’ or  
understanding or interpretation firms up as horizon of intelligibility which serves as 
connective to social ‘be-ing’. We seek not only to understand the contemporary period as 
a visual problematic, that is, as social symptomatic of detachment and distanciation but 
also as a basis upon which to think through the modality of an alternate vision capable of 
resisting and challenging the technological imperative implicit in our sociological 
condition described by Heidegger as nihilistic and imperiling our social being.  
 
If it seems that we are going over the same ground to arrive at our conception of vision 
what should be borne in mind is that it is done to different effect and from a different 
analytic. With this in mind we take up the occularcentric problematic of vision of the 
ancient Greek and modern lineage to open up discussion on Levin’s (1988) 
phenomenological understanding of vision. The problematisation of vision serves 
negatively as a basis to contradict the idea that vision is neutral, innocent and 
sociologically unencumbered and unfettered, but positively it serves as basis to 
ontologically anchor our social being..   
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The ontological and epistemological priority that Plato and Aristotle accord to vision as 
discussed previously is taken to task by Heidegger (1962, cited in Levin, 1988) in his 
critique of the ‘metaphysical tradition’ made explicit in “Being and Time”. However, 
what we find in Levin (1988: 7) despite Heidegger’s protestations to the contrary is a 
continuation of “the paradigmatic function of vision in the formulation of ontology and 
the conditions of knowledge.”  Citing Heidegger directly (1962: 187), Levin (ibid) 
presents the case thus:   
 
In giving existential significance to ‘sight’, we have merely drawn upon the 
peculiar feature of seeing, that it lets entitities which are accessible to it be 
encountered unconcealedly in themselves. Of course, every ‘sense’ does this 
within that domain of discovery which is genuinely its own. But from the 
beginning onwards the tradition of philosophy has been oriented primarily 
towards ‘seeing’ as a way of access to beings and to Being. To keep the 
connection with this tradition, we may formalize ‘sight’ and ‘seeing’ enough to 
obtain therewith a universal term for characterizing any access to entities or to 
being, as access in general.  
 
In Levin’s (ibid) analysis of the above he makes points that are similar to those 
previously raised, that is, he also makes connections to occularcentrism but he does so in 
the language of a ‘hermeneutics of suspicion’ and thus speaks of a  “complicity of vision” 
as “paradigm for knowledge” and “rationality”. By way of a qualification, we need to 
insert that in Heidegger above, we have identified a terminus ad quo that offers itself up 
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as Archimedean lever, in as much as sight at the level of its perceptual structure serves as 
corrective, as far as its intentional comportment (see chapter six) to release entities, such 
that they may be perceived, sui generis, is concerned. Thus, we take Heidegger’s 
hermeneutic phenomenology of perception in a different direction and as such we serve 
notification of this here, though it is to different effect that we take up Levin’s (1988) 
analysis in this instance. Additionally, however, he raises the matter of complicity to the 
level where vision as problematic is taken up in the tasks necessitated presently in the 
“deconstruction of metaphysics”. But it is not this reference to the critical theoretical 
injunction, though important, that is immediately relevant for our purposes, rather it is his 
point that (ibid; 8)  
 
What is in question in the deconstruction of metaphysics must be, therefore, the 
opening of vision as a ‘way of access to beings and to Being’. This question will 
be understood, here, as demanding a discourse on the nature and character of our 
normal everyday vision: the vision of das Man, of anyone-and-everyone. Such a 
discourse needs to be spelled out in the hermeneutical language of 
phenomenological psychology for experiential concreteness will call our attention 
to matters otherwise disregarded and can accordingly dispel some persistent forms 
of mystification and delusion. 
 
‘Suspending’ the theoretical and methodological import, of what Levin holds above, for 
imputing a concreteness to the problematic of vision, for the moment, what is particularly 
significant for our thesis are the social ramifications of the metaphysical “opening of 
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vision”.  If as Levin holds that the ontology of vision within the metaphysical tradition is 
such that it enables the possibility of establishing access to our way of being human, that 
is, the essence of our lived human reality or human existence, then it is in fact opening up 
a primordial or original aspect of our existence which we may take to be our ‘qualia’ for 
sociality, as such. For Levin, what we may call a ‘socialized’ vision offers a vantage 
point from which to interrogate the ontology of ‘Being’ without falling prey to the 
metaphysical propensity for reifying and abstracting the human social condition which 
we might find in what we would call a ‘sociological vision’. The latter serves to drive the 
point home that sociology offers us invaluable insight into society and it causal ‘laws’ 
emergent properties, conditions of emergence, formation, existence and transformation 
though from the vantage point of our social be-ing it does so paradoxically and 
inadvertently from the epistemic vantage point of a subject – object distanciation and thus 
severs us from our place in-society. By calling attention to a socialized vision we seek to 
make the point that an existential dimension to sociology allows for a connective between 
our social being and our theoretical understanding of that being.   
 
However, for us Levin’s interrogation of visionary being offers a way to access the 
socialized condition of vision in as much as it involves a conception of “normal everyday 
vision: the vision of “das Man, of anyone and everyone”. In as much as there is talk then 
of “normal everyday vision” what is implied is a prior process of socialization, 
acculturalisation, and thus ‘normalization’ in the notion of the vision or seeing of anyone 
and everyone, what we may call a ‘quotidian vision’. And as such one is referring to a 
‘socialized vision’ that is embedded in-society in a particular time and de-severed space, 
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and thus our ontologically anchored social being. But, moreover, there is also the added 
implication of a vision that is not of a socialized normality but a preceding stage, a 
biological one that is prior to socialization, and hence primordial.   
 
The ‘socialised’ vision when taken up in Heidegger’s distinction between ontological and 
ontical, where the former refers to the condition of possibility of social being, and the 
existential structures of being-in-the-world and being-towards-self then one sees its 
ontological dimension in Dasein as authentic being (see 5.3). Authenticity of being is a 
function of a true understanding of Dasein’s nature and it way of being human, which is 
foundationless and unsettled, and as such suggests a specific modality of existential 
vision, which is an ontological vision. By contrast a being-in-the-world or social being 
which is based on a social be-ing that amounts to ‘falling’ into an understanding of 
sociality that is essentialised in the social roles or social identities, that is, the 
sociabilities, society proffers we may call to distinguish it an ‘ontical vision’, a modality 
of the “existentiell”.  
 
We make this call as this modality of vision is based on an inauthentic or undifferentiated 
understanding of social being since it is conflated with ‘das Man’, that is, the herd 
instinct, and it is not towards Dasein or the self (in a non-egocentric sense) but towards 
whatever anyone and everyone does to be a part of them- a particular manifestation of a 
social role and a social identity as fixed and given social subjectivities (e.g. caste system, 
colonial subject, social rank, etc). Writ large it is the surrender towards a modern 
technological being bereft of both subjectivity and objectivity in a short a being towards 
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the ‘standing reserve’ and not towards the sociality of being-in-the-word-with-others-
towards-self and being amidst-things as equipment and objects not merely being-
resources. In other words the ontical is that concrete socialized anyone or everyone who 
is becoming of a particular mien and hails from a specific milieu as a matter of course 
without an authentic or true understanding of his or her existential – ontological social 
being and its open-endedness. What lies embedded in this modality of existential vision 
as ‘ontical vision’ is a deeper visionary being one that is aware of its authentic way of 
being human and that is an ‘ontological vision’. The key point is that both modalities of 
existential vision have their provenance in society though only the latter is borne of a true 
understanding of what it means to be while the former has a correct understanding that 
being is tied to existence its falls short in accepting that what society has to offer is of the 
order of an essentialised being. But most importantly in railing against the mode of 
revealing of modern technology and its imperative of the standing reserve, ‘ontical 
vision’ amounts to a surrender while ontological vision offers a vantage point to resist the 
nihilism that stalks social being.    
 
There are thus two modalities of vision that we need to grasp: one of that is tied to our 
‘primordial or original sociality’ and implied in Heidegger’s existential structures of the 
care and concern that comes with authentic Dasein’s “being-in-the-world”, “being-with-
others”, “being-amidst-things” and “being-towards-self”, an ‘ontological vision’. The 
other of a quotidian order called ‘ontical vision’ which may or may not hold as such is 
distinguished by beig bound up and foreclosed in the concrete existential conditions of 
everyday life without a thought as to the open possibilities that lay fallow in our social 
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being a truncated version of the human condition. Thus, we have two theoretical tasks 
that arise in this regard in our concern for anchoring a concept of social being: one that 
shows how modalities of seeing as part of a modern technological rationality and 
instrumentality produces a foreclosure; and two, how an ‘ontological vision’ has within it 
the possibility of resisting the technological imperative and as such offers an alternative 
to Virilio’s “vision machine” and “machinic vision” as that which stands to negate the 
essence of our humanity, that is our sociality.        
 
The problematic of our modern age, in as much as one conceptualizes it, in terms of 
vision and its socialized correlate as visuality is offered up by Levin (1988: 8) as a social 
diagnostic with the following historical and sociological imperatives.  
 
But our discourse must also bring to light the historical character of our vision: 
the hidden violence, the hidden nihilism. Therefore it must diagnose 
hermeneutically, and in an experientially familiar language, the closure-to-Being 
which underlies the historical character of our vision- its character, in particular, 
as suffering and affliction, its cultural psychopathology. Our discourse must be a 
‘speech of suffering,’ telling the truth about its social production and reproduction 
in the world of our vision.             
 
The sociological theme, as point of departure, with its ontological ramifications and  
implications, devolve, respectively, to firstly, opening up the sociality implied in the 
concept of the human nature of the social agent we assume in sociology, which is to be 
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taken up explicitly in an ontology of vision; and secondly, as diagnostic to take up the 
meaning of the socialized being of das man as that site of the repressed, in the “hidden 
violence” and “hidden nihilism”  that is involved in the technological sensibility, which 
has visited, and continues to visit its alienation and estrangement in the form of an 
instrumentalism that has blocked us from our social being and humanity. To be replaced 
it with a being, which is de-subjectified and reconfigured as ‘standing reserve’ 
(Heidegger, 1972) or as ‘resource’ (Dreyfus, 1991), thus reconstituted as technological 
being, ‘homo technologicus’. It is these dimensions of a technological modality of being 
that is denoted and connoted in vision and visuality that we have fore grounded as a way 
of confronting the technological modality of being with one that bears the hallmarks of 
our existential – ontological understanding of social being and its modalities of seeing.  
 
Most of all, the problematic of vision is brought to bear positively in as much as it is 
sought phenomenologically in the experience associated with relating to social being; and 
negatively as a response to the pervasive silence confronting vision in the study of the 
social and society in most of its guises. There is however an added dimension to this 
socialized and existential vision which is of disciplinary import. To introduce it here it is 
of the order of what we may call a ‘sociological vision’, one that is predicated on a 
critical theoretical gaze and implied obliquely in our notion of social being as existential 
– ontological interpretive framework. Though there is mush that would need to be done 
to cast off its epistemological dualism in the subject – object distanciation in the form of 
its recontextualisation in an existential science and a hermeneutic philosophy of science 
though this is beyond the scope of this thesis it is signaled as a prospective area for 
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research. The real scope of an existential – understanding of social being as far as it 
relates to vision lays in chapter six where we open up Heidegger’s hermeneutic 
phenomenology of perception and consider the notion of a perceptual release as 
counterpoise to modern technology as our point of departure from his claims as to the 
efficacy of art as alternate modality of revealing.   
 
4.3.1 Heideggerean problematic of vision and Critical Social Theory: Levin’s mode 
of analysis   
The nature of this critical interpretive framework or critical hermeneutic as Levin (1988) 
refers to it is accordingly fleshed out by way of the latter’s engagement with Heidegger’s 
deconstruction of the ‘metaphysical tradition’. We take this up as a way of opening up 
Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology to scrutiny and to contextualize his though 
where we otherwise feel that given his complexity the introduction of additional 
theoretical voices into his discourse while offering the virtue of a context nevertheless 
detracts from its explication. We therefore take this opportunity before we move to his 
phenomenology of perception. The central problem that Heidegger confronts in his 
theoretical quest to understand Being is directed as Levin (1988: 6) points out at the:  
 
struggle to release the question of Being from its metaphysical history – a history 
of reification and totalization, egocentrism and logocentrism. But we must 
understand that this struggle is never finished, never final. All we can do is 
maintain the vigilance of a critical spirit repeatedly questioning itself. 
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What is at issue here is not only that the metaphysical tradition evacuates the sociological 
and historical context, that is, the specific and concrete conditions constituting Being 
from the analysis, but that we are also caught in the paradigmatic adumbration of this 
very tradition. Thus, even though one might be able to establish a ‘clearing’ in which to 
posit the question of the ontology of Being, one is never quite beyond the pale of the 
‘woods’ (perhaps jungle is more suggestive) of metaphysics, so to speak. However, it is 
only in critical vein that we are put in a position to remain vigilant, and thus to rein in the 
discursive effects of the metaphysical tradition. To this end, in taking up the ‘opening of 
vision’ to access an understanding of Being outside of the metaphysical tradition, we are 
required to engage this critically by embedding it , as Heidegger does, in the existential 
conditions of Being, namely, one in which an abstraction and reification is traded for a 
“being-in-the-world” and a “being-with-others”.  
 
Thus, the ontological question remains, though, in this instance the meaning of Being is 
reined in by an existential framing, albeit ‘primordial’ and even paradoxically pre-
ontological. What is at work here, argues Levin (1988) is Heidegger’s ‘existential 
phenomenology’, as a specific instance of his mode of ontological analysis, and 
simultaneously his critique of the metaphysical ontological tradition and his 
deconstruction thereof.  The point simply put is that Heidegger’s critique does not leave a 
void in its wake but embeds his concept of Being both historically and socially and it in 
this sense that we have seen fit to anchor it as social being.   
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In light of this concrete and specific grounding Levin (1988: 34) is doubly mindful of 
being critical on the one hand and on the other hand of the need for  
 
A basic trust in our reflectively lived-in experience: how we experience our 
historical situation. This has to be our starting point.  
 
Here again Levin takes care not to fall prey to the metaphysical tradition associated with 
the ‘reifications’, ‘abstractions’ and ‘certainties’ that frame such an understanding of 
experience. The way to counteract such fixities in metaphysical thinking Levin (ibid) 
suggests is to remember that our experiences always come from the “standpoint and 
viewpoint of some corner” which quite clearly refers us to social being. In this regard 
Levin (ibid) refers us to Heidegger’s concept of “Befindlichkeit” translated as the 
‘situatedness’ (Langenscheidt’s, German-English Dictionary) of our experiences, and 
hence its multiplicities, that is, what we take to be its sociabilities . And flowing from this 
multiplicity of experiences Levin (1988: 34-35) makes the methodological point thus:  
 
This, the saying of our Befindlichkeit, is the task I assign to our hermeneutical 
phenomenology, whose method trains us in the discipline of critical perception: 
the meticulous, exacting discipline of attention to our life-world, to what we are 
experiencing in the course of our daily lives. It will become apparent that that the 
use we shall make of this method is a critical one- that we shall be drawing upon 
the inherently critical power of a method which teaches us to see what previously 
was not to be seen. In particular we shall give hermeneutic phenomenology a 
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diagnostic and potentially emancipatory function, using its powers of awareness 
to bring to light; through the channels of our experience, the suffering and needs 
of our time. 
 
In accepting that vision has two modalities that are predicated respectively on ontological 
and ontical dimension opens up the interpretive necessity of establishing their respective 
domains and their possible conjunctures and dysjunctures.  These two ‘visions’ surface 
both an existential (former) and socialized (latter) modalities brought into a potentially 
contradictory relationship given their distinct articulation with social being and how they 
are overdetermined by their existential – ontological understanding of Dasein or what it 
means to be human. In as much as they are in agreement they take the form of an 
ontological vision, but in as much as they are contradictory they are overdetermined by 
an ‘ontical vision’, or ‘commonsense vision ’, or better yet the vision of ‘das man’ it is 
the ‘socialized vision’ as ontical over the socialized vision as ontological.  In other words 
the awareness of two distinct modalities of vision is not necessarily apparent as such.  
 
Now given the instrumentality of the modern age and the ‘enframing’ of modern 
technology, the ‘ontological vision’ is displaced by a ‘falling into the technological 
milieu of modern technology and what passes for sociality and sociabilities is then the 
normative order of the way of revealing which is the standing reserve, a virtual sociality, 
in a word a simulacrum of the social. However, in as much as one is caught within the 
imperative of modern technology and the standing reserve it assumes the proportions of 
what Baudrillard (1994) has conceptualized as the “precession of the simulacrum”. This 
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is necessarily so in so far as the simulation of the social, that is, the standing reserve 
comes to be the real, and that which was our social be-ing now stands as the imposter at 
odds with the technological-reality. The ontical that is beings (presencing of entities) take 
precedence over being (meaning of being) the ontological, and with it our existential – 
ontological understanding of being for a technological one. Our vision no longer takes it 
intelligibility from a social hermeneutic but from technology and no more 
 
It is thus incumbent, as Levin (1988) argues, upon a hermeneutic phenomenology to 
provide the theoretical and methodological wherewithal to prize open this visionary life-
world of modern technology with its technological conditionality such that access to 
Being, that sociality which defines the essence of our humanity as ‘existence’ might be 
freed or opened to a different vision and visuality: one anchored in an existential- 
ontological understanding of social being. But it is equally incumbent as we have argued 
upon a ‘sociological vision’ with its disciplinary gaze, to complement Levin’s theoretical 
sensibilities (phenomenological psychology and a hermeneutical phenomenology) and 
Heidegger’s philosophy, to take up the question as to what has become or is becoming of 
our contemporary age with respect to the existing modalities of being and our sociality. 
However, how we are to get there Levin (1988: 17) contends would require a theoretical 
and methodological complex that engages  
 
… critical social theory in a sustained reflection on our capacity for vision, and on 
the social conditions which limit, disorganize, and predispose us to misinterpret it. 
In order to accomplish this task, however, social theory must collaborate with a 
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hermeneutically critical interpretation of the history of Being represented in the 
discourse of metaphysics, and also with a phenomenological psychology which 
will put us in touch with our historical experience and enable us to understand it 
without being misled- without being incapacitated – by prevailing ideological 
interpretation, presently circulating in our culture.  
     
With regard to that which obfuscates our understanding of vision the primary imperative 
that is held responsible for this state of affairs is informed by Heidegger’s modern 
technological “enframing” thesis (1977) and his philosophy of technology (see chapter 
three). Secondly, the collaboration suggested between “social theory” and a 
“hermeneutically critical interpretation of Being” is in line with hermeneutic approaches 
in Sociology, in particular, with the likes of Berger and Kellner (1981: 11) and their 
concept of what they call the “modern sociological perspective“. Moreover, the latter 
offer in their understanding of sociology a theoretical vision which equips the individual 
with a critical faculty with which to challenge extant dogma and to subvert their 
ideological assumptions and as such goes some way to address the psychological 
dimension without psychologising the social and thus losing grip on the modern 
sociological perspective (ibid)..    
 
At the heart of the modern sociological perspective is the perception of the 
autonomous and frequently covert dynamics of human collective entities. … It 
follows that to be able to perceive ‘society’ at all there must be a certain 
debunking angle of vision. It follows further that sociology was a way of seeing 
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the world as soon as it found its object of enquiry, and all later elaborations of this 
peculiar vision are a sort of unpacking of what was already implied in that first act 
of perception. 
 
The convergence between Levin above and Berger and Kellner is that they are all critical 
of the way in which social existence presents itself in terms of its appearance. In fact 
what is being suggested is that social reality or social being (existence) is, so to speak, 
muddied on the surface, which as such should be debunked by a sociological vision, 
which is able to penetrate the surface reality so as to uncover its “covert dynamics”. 
Levin on the other hand suggests that in order to penetrate the manifest social 
obfuscations requires a critical interpretive framework or hermeneutic.  
 
There is however an important distinction that needs to be made in respect of the way I 
have used socialized  vision as opposed to Levin’s analysis of Heidegger in relation to the 
conception of the vision of “anyone-and- everyone (das man), or put slightly differently, 
the ‘commonsense’ ‘viewpoint’. To distinguish between these visions it should be noted 
that reference is made to socialized vision to demarcate its basis in ‘Das man’ from a 
sociological vision which is more akin to the vision associated with critical hermeneutics 
and its penetrative theoretical gaze. What we might see if such a conception proves viable 
is that such a sociological vision would move our ‘ontical vision’ beyond the 
obfuscations of socialized vision to one that sets up the conditions of possibility of a true 
rather than a correct understanding of the sociological conditionality of our contemporary 
age predicated as it is on modern technology. However, there is more that one might 
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expect from the critical modality that is to be embedded in a ‘sociological vision’ and 
which does bring an added dimension to Levin’s critical hermeneutics as made evident in 
Berger and Kellner (1981: 12).      
 
In this debunking quality of sociology lies its intrinsically subversive character. 
Any collective order is always legitimated by official definitions, and the 
demonstration that only the latter tell only a part of the story or, worse, serve to 
obfuscate what really goes on, is intrinsically subversive of ‘good order’. In other 
words, sociology begins to ‘subvert’ from the first moment that it applies to social 
reality its peculiar way of seeing. It is very important to emphasize that this is so 
regardless of whether a particular sociologist intends to subvert.   
 
The point of engaging in research to paraphrase what Marx famously made apparent was 
not only to interpret the world, but to change it and in this sensibility the critical 
dimension in sociology amounts to ‘being’ subversive. If, as Heidegger believes and 
Levin has echoed that modernity with its technological imperative for enframing and 
reducing everything to the way of revealing of a standing reserve leads to nihilism, that 
is, the evacuation or erasure of our humanity, our sociality, then, the theoretical 
imperative of sociology is to make this condition apparent in its sociabilities; and the 
social imperative is to offer an alternative socialized vision of ‘das man’ in an existential 
– ontological understanding of social being; and its political imperative is to challenge an 
order that legitimizes and entrenches the technological distemper of instrumentality and 
neutrality, that is, a technocracy. To this end we enjoin Levin as he takes up the 
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theoretical and methodological complex of the ‘opening of vision’ though we will do so 
with the aim of centering sociality in a way that adds disciplinary rigor to our theoretical 
quest for an existential – ontological understanding of social being as diagnostic, critique 
and subversion of the sociological condition of our contemporary age as an instance of 
the mutually constitutive nature of technology and visuality in the imaginary of what we 
may call the time of the hegemony of the visiogenic (the simulacrum) and the evacuation 
of our humanity.  
4.4 Defining an ontology of vision: being and society 
The critical concerns that we focus on here take into account the different modalities of 
vision that we have spoken to in various ways to make specific points about visionary 
being without necessarily offering an interpretation or our understanding of these terms. 
Here we take up the matter of vision explicitly and attempt to flesh out what its structure 
and nature is, as taken up by Levin (1988) especially for its Heideggerean framing 
towards an understanding of how it relates to our technological modality of being as a 
way of clearing some of the ground for a hermeneutic phenomenology of perception 
later. Much of our discussion above has demarcated variously three types of vision, two 
of which was used to disciplinary ends in as much as it involved its ramifications for a 
sociological way of seeing, that is, a theoretical vision; and in so far as it was implicated 
in the socialized vision of ‘das man’, that is a common sense vision. However, we also 
referred to ontological vision that is tied to an existential understanding of our being as 
Dasein (see)–and that this is linked to the modality of being as authentic. What we hold is 
that this ontological vision is ultimately the only legitimate basis from which to proceed 
to a theoretical vision, as sociological vision, for without which the starting point, if 
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located in an ontical vision, or ‘socialized vision as end in itself, rests on a spurious 
premise. This inauthentic understanding of being invariably leads down the road to 
confirming that which otherwise should have been debunked. Thus ontological vision is 
the existential grounding, which serve as the connective for our sociological theorizing 
since it is anchored in social being. And even though the former (theory) leads us into the 
social detachment of a subject – object distanciation, if however we are to be anchored in 
the latter (social being) we would do so with one ‘eye’ firmly in-society. If we consider it 
in this sense that it is stereoscopic vision that gives us dept-perception we would have an 
ontological eye (existential seeing) and a sociological eye (theoretical seeing). But in a 
manner of speaking, we would not seek a theoretical eye and a sociological eye which is 
one and the same, and thus entirely removed from society, sociality and social being. In 
formulaic fashion sociology plus sociological theory gives us a double dose of theory, we 
are twice removed from our social being, but existential ontological understanding of 
being and sociology/sociological theory might give us an existential sociology which 
amounts to being-in rather than being beyond.   
 
What we develop now is a discussion and analysis of the different modalities of vision 
from an ontological and phenomenological point of view though always mindful of its 
ramifications and implications for both a sociological vision and a socialized vision. The 
argument is roughly that an ontological vision that is not tied to a true understanding of 
social being as authentic self, and being-towards self becomes subsumed by the ontical 
vision of a socialization that is towards the other as one of ‘them’, that is,  ‘anyone and 
everyone’. This latter socialized vision is in turn conditioned by an ‘enframed’ which is 
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the way of revealing of the standing reserve a technological vision. These latter two 
‘visions’ may be disclosed by a phenomenological sociological vision which has 
disciplinary overtones but is not necessarily limited to it in the formal sense, but rather 
captures those who may have a developed as per Levin a critical hermeneutic with which 
to look at the social world in a way which discloses its underlying structure and being and 
is most importantly able to link it to the ‘question of social being’.  
 
What is argued is that the disclosure of our visionary being is not as Heidegger argues a 
function of our theoretical being (present-at-hand vision), but rather of our existential 
conditionality (circumspect vision) oriented to care through the structures of ‘being-in”, 
“being-with, “being-amidst” and “being-towards”. This offers to Heidegger’s existential 
understanding the corrective that our being is not as the metaphysical ontological 
tradition would have it, that we are all at some level philosophers (epistemic beings) but 
rather that in our embodied social being and existential – ontological understanding of 
this being we might more appropriately be ‘sociologists’ (homo sociologicus), in the 
hermeneutic phenomenological sense, though decidedly not in the positivistic modality as 
this serves merely to confirm our ‘enframing’.  However, most importantly it may be so 
but only in the derivative sense as flowing from our existential social being-in-the-world 
and our practical engagement in the world and its ontological vision which when ruptured 
surfaces that capacity for theory and thus our sociological vision as such kicks in. is  
 
4.4.1 Primordial vision, socialized vision and being 
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The need for a phenomenology and hermeneutic of ‘primordial’ understood as earlier and 
original vision arises from the import of Heidegger’s technological thesis that ‘being’, 
that is, all organic and inorganic forms of existence, including of course human beings, 
are caught within the imperative of ‘enframing’, that is, the reconfiguration of all that 
exists (beings) as ‘standing reserve’, stock’ or resources, in sum a utilitarian or functional 
value. If this is indeed the case, that we have consequentially, over time, become 
estranged and even alienated from ‘Being”, (that which constitutes or grounds existence, 
in general), and ‘beings’, (that is, different forms of existence), then the primordial 
question that arises is what is the nature of this rudimentary or earlier formed ontological 
capacity which has been transformed. And most importantly, for our purpose, in tandem 
with Levin’s reading, in this instance, of Heidegger’s (1962) “Being and Time”, though 
to different ends, we ask how primordiality relates to our visionary being as such. To this 
end Levin (1988: 9) is most efficacious in the way he sets up the relationship between 
being and vision thus: 
 
‘The essence of thinking’ according to Heidegger, ‘is the understanding of Being 
in the possibilities of its development.…’ Vision is a capacity of our being. As 
such vision is a process of development. There is no reason to suppose that this 
development does not, or could not continue- for a lifetime. If, in our adulthood, 
vision is ruled over by an ego-logical subject, what could vision become when it 
is committed to overcoming this rule? Since we are visionary beings, this question 
is addressed to us, questioning our being.           
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What emerges above is in fact a case of primordial analysis in so far as Levin ties 
Heidegger’s notion of thinking and our visionary capacity to the onset of our 
developmental trajectory. The problematic, as Levin constructs it, is that, if, we assume 
that vision is indeed subject to a developmental process, but that it is intercepted in our 
adulthood and ‘overruled by a rational mindedness, then, the matter of its primordial 
nature becomes an issue for contemplation, where the content of this ‘ego-logical’ 
deviation in visionary being is one characterized by nihilism, as previously stated, and 
thus symptomatic of the contemporary sociological condition.  
 
However, this is not a fait accompli, as our capacity for thinking, which is tied to our 
being, and hence its concomitant possibilities of development, suggests that we do have 
alternatives to that which is extant, in that which is inherent in our primordial visionary 
being, and that which is yet to disclose itself, an ontological dimension. In other words, 
we are not ineluctably tied to the displacement of our sociality and as such our humanity 
by the modality of modern technological being, in so far as it ‘destines’ us to a 
reconfiguration as ‘standing reserve or resource, fit only in that we are offered up to be 
‘ready-at-hand’ or used as required. What this alternative is though, involves how it 
relates to the primordiality of vision, which is yet to be articulated. In the interim 
however, as a lead up to the latter eventuality, we need to give an account of the ontical 
constitution of our being, which involves the immediacy of our socialized and 
acculturated selves, in a word, what might be called our, ‘sociality’ that is our capacity to 
comport to the world, things and others. Exactly how we do differs according to the 
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cultural sociabilities that emerge to inure our social being in-our-contexts of 
involvements and thus make sense of being, in general. 
 
The question of a primordial vision is, then, also grounded socially, albeit seemingly 
paradoxical: consider that Heidegger’s concept of “das Ma”, that is, the socialized and 
normalized social subject who is a product of his or her cultural milieu and thus rendered 
sociable, is argued herein to be a superimposition on the ‘sociality-of-being’ which 
inheres in a particular predisposition, as such. And furthermore, that this level of 
superimposition, or sedimentation is met with another form of social mediation, in the 
technological modality which is operant as the imperative of ‘enframing’, and thus 
responsible for further blocking off access to the primordiality of, what we argue is, the 
‘sociality-of-being’, in as much as it relates to the primordiality of the existential 
structures of “being-in-the-world” and “being-with-others”.  
 
In seeking to establish the primordiality of our visionary being, it is both for Heidegger 
and Levin and indeed for our thesis a matter of establishing the basis of  a corrective, 
which may be able to ‘open’ up vision such that we may be able to free ourselves from 
the restricted horizon of a socialized and technologised vision estranging us from an 
authentic relation to being, for a ontological horizon that puts us back in touch with the 
existentiality of  our sociality which as stated is tied existentially to our  ‘being-in-the-
world and ‘being-with-others’. More directly, it offers us a hermeneutic with which to 
understand modalities of vision in contemporary society such as television, for example, 
in such a way that it reconnects us to our existential or embodied sociality with its 
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concomitant vision and predisposition; that in short amounts to a de-technologisation of 
vision and redress of the instrumentalisation and rationalization of vision as such.  
 
The questions that beg are, whether this concept of ontological or primordial vision -as 
having developed earliest in the socialization process where an agreement of shared 
practices, a normative order was reached in socialization and which serves as basis of an 
understanding of what it means to be Dasein or being-, returns one to a metaphysical 
origin that presents a modality of vision, which is in its final form, and therefore, one that 
is reified from both history and society. And moreover, what form this Heideggerean 
primordiality takes, and how is it related to Levin’s primordial and embodied vision with 
regard to the specificities of its concept and application.  
 
What the conceptualization of a primordial ontological vision opens up is a relation to 
historicity in as much as one is concerned to establish earlier forms of the instantiation of 
vision in relation to its rudimentary beginnings and how this emerges in history and 
society. And secondly in as much one sets up a primordial vision against an average 
everyday day, common sense vision in the socialization and acculturation processes one 
encounters a sociological question by raising the role of society into the foreground. 
Thus, in the former a diachronic dimension is opened, and in relation to the latter a 
synchronic understanding obtains, both of which raises the temporality of vision in as 
much as a relation is opened between the past, present and for that matter a future, in as 
much as one is oriented to an existing crisis, the present, (nihilism) and thus a possible 
alternate state of affairs, a future. This relation to temporality (past, present and future) is 
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concretized by Levin in relation to how he understands the relationships involved in our 
visionary beings as it relates to history, society and the individual and is thus 
paradoxically a relativistic primordiality. The question thus begs and Levin asks to 
reiterate 1988: 10):  
 
If, in our adulthood, vision is ruled over by an ego-logical subject, what could 
vision become when it committed to overcoming this rule? “   
 
To this end, the task at hand to which we now turn is to establish, accordingly, a 
perspective which draws a relation between primordiality, history, biology and society, 
which is mindful of the metaphysical propensity for reification though seeks to anchor 
social being in an existential totality.  
4.4.1.1 Primordiality and vision: mutual determinations of biology, society and 
history  
The perspective which is at issue and tasked with providing a framework for bringing the 
primordiality of vision into a non-metaphysical relationship with biology, society and 
history is Heidegger’s concept of human existence, and its attendant existential logic. It is 
precisely his particular phenomenological understanding of existentiality that enables us 
to make sense of his notion of primordiality and thus to paradoxically open up vision 
such that we are able to see what lies fallow and hidden from view. We begin 
Heidegger’s (1996: 10) analysis in this regard with his concept of the essence of human 
existence for which he has specifically developed the term “Da-sein”.   
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Da-sein itself is distinctly different from other beings. … Da-sein is a being that 
does not simply occur among other beings. Rather it is ontically distinguished by 
the fact that in its being this being is concerned about its very being. Thus it is 
constitutive of the being of Da-sein to have, in its very being, a relation of being 
to this being. And this in turn means that Da-sein understands itself in its being in 
some way and with some explicitness. It is proper with this being that it be 
disclosed to itself with and through its being. Understanding of being is itself a 
determination of being of Da-sein. The ontic distinction of Da-sein lies in the fact 
that it is ontological.  
 
 
At its core, Heidegger’s conception, of what the being of human existence entails, is at 
odds with the metaphysical ontological tradition, which accepts humans as fully formed 
in their essence. In this regard we have already made reference to Plato and Aristotle and 
their primordial understanding of the being of humans as essentially epistemic, however, 
in Heidegger we have the conception that the mode of being of humans is a capacity, or 
potentiality that is decided and determined through the process of existence. In other 
words, the being of human existence presents itself as a potentiality, though one would be 
incorrect in thinking that Heidegger is replicating Locke’s notion of a “tabula rasa”. For 
Heidegger we do not enter the world as a blank slate as such, but rather, as we will 
expand on later, are imbued with the primordial existential structures of ‘being-in-the-
world and ‘being-with-others’.  
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The point is that these existential structures are the primordial elements that prefigure in 
our predispositions and is what he captures in the “da” of “da-sein”. Quite literally “da” 
translates as ‘there’ as in place (here and there) and it is this quality of “thereness” that 
Heidegger understands to be the “throwness” of humans into a pre-existing time and 
space or history and society. There is thus no tabula rasa in play but a potentiality which 
is informed by a predisposition or “moodedness” that is explicit and borne of the 
“facticity” of always being ‘there’ in the world with others. It is this primordial quality of 
“being-in-the-world” and “being-with-others” that we have seized upon as being 
essentially that which predisposes our ontological capacity for sociality: in the case of the 
former, in socially producing and reproducing the worlds we live or ‘dwell’ in, and in the 
latter, in producing and reproducing the social relations, the sociabilities that ensue in our 
interactions and associations with other human beings.  
 
Thus, the lived reality or ontic state of human existence is never decided at the outset as 
in through some bio-programme mapped in our genes, but rather our distinction rests in 
the fact that our being is such that we are always in a state of becoming, it is a life’s 
project the meaning of which is never fully and finally resolved and it is in this sense that 
it is ontological. The actual life being lived is what is referred to as ontical and is the 
immediate domain of existence that either comes into conflict or is in harmony with the 
primordial self in its various vestiges biologically (as endowment), socially (as sociality) 
and historically (as relative primordiality). This existential complex with its attendant 
tensions is evident in Heidegger’s (1996: 10-11) brief analysis. Thus:  
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Da-sein always understands itself in terms of its existence, in terms of its 
possibilities to be itself or not to be itself. Da-sein has either chosen these 
possibilities itself, stumbled upon them, or in each instance already grown up in 
them. Existence is decided only by each Da-sein itself in the manner of seizing 
upon or neglecting such possibilities. We come to terms with the question of 
existence always only through existence itself. We shall call this kind of 
understanding of itself existentiell understanding. The question of existence is an 
ontic “affair” of Da-sein. For this the theoretical transparency of the ontological 
structure of existence is not necessary. The question of structure aims at the 
analysis of what constitutes existence. We shall call the coherence of these 
structures existentiality. Its analysis does not have the character of an existentiell 
understanding but rather an existential one. The task of an existential analysis of 
Da-sein is prescribed with regard to its possibility and necessity in the ontic 
constitution of Da-sein.  
 
There are accordingly two possibilities for self-realization which are somewhat 
precariously balanced in as much as one either connects with one’s primordial sociality (a 
pre-ontological dimension) as an act of deliberation or one accidentally stumbles onto it 
per chance. Alternately one may be consumed by one’s immediate existence (existentiell 
–peculiar to one self and ontical dimension) and as such reproduce the sensibilities of 
‘anyone and everyone’, that is the commonsense view and thus be far removed from that 
primordial being that receives its predispositions from ‘being-in-the-world’ and ‘being-
with-others’ (existential structures). With respect to the former state of ‘harmony’ with 
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the ‘world’ and ‘others’ one would be dealing with a primordial coherence in the 
structure of being and as such it refers to Heidegger’s notion of existentiality.  
 
However, in as much as one is caught within the moment of the socialized, that is, being 
one of ‘them’, ‘anyone’ and ‘everyone’, or the herd as such, then one would be existing 
on the plane of the existentiell. What makes for the distinction between the two is the 
particular relation of distance or contiguity to the primordial existential structures of 
‘being-in-the-world’ and ‘being-with-others’. Within this existential schema the act of 
becoming is not determined or pre-given in the sense that the ontological outcome is in 
anyway guaranteed. Thus this opens up the way for a dynamic relationship with 
primordiality itself as something relative to our ontological being, and society as 
something that is relative to our ontical constitution both of which holds consequences 
for our visionary being (ways of seeing). We have outlined and discussed the different 
modalities of vision and their relation to existential being as ontological vision, to 
socialization as end in itself and as far as it involves the individual and his or her being it 
was alluded to as existential vision and as much as it refers to a common-sense vision or 
quotidian order it was referred to as an ontical vision.  
 
And furthermore, beyond the existential order we have made the argument that the 
movement to a sociological vision, or theoretical seeing directed towards society is 
conditional upon an authentic relation to being, and as such, if not of an existential – 
ontological understanding it leaves a sociological vision with a spurious starting point 
and socially disembedded. And finally, that we need to have one ‘eye’ firmly in-society 
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and only in this way would be socially anchored such that our horizon of intelligibility 
would carry our social be-ing into our theorization of society, sociality and sociabilities.  
 
We now move onto what the constitution of our ontological – existential social being is 
as Dasein and its relation to vision and the technological imperatives as the basis upon 
which we will proceed to anchor ourselves in-society by way of the Archimedean levers 
we have suggested in the visual releasement contained in the perceptual structure and that 
counterpoise contained in our relation to being-amidst-things as equipmentality, in order 
to stem the displacement of our social being in the nihilism of the standing reserve of 
modern technology.     
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Chapter Five 
Existential-Ontological understanding of Being: Dasein 
as horizon of intelligibility of be-ing.and vision 
What kind of vision would we need to develop in order to see through the sociability of 
being, that is our practices, into the sociality of being that is our social be-ing in the 
comportments of  ‘being-in-the world’ and ‘being-amidst-things’? We ask this question 
as a way to into the very ground that makes for the very possibility of our human way of 
being as existence or what Heidegger calls Dasein. To probe this fundamental question of 
our social be-ing in its visile dimension we came up against what we have called a  
sociological vision insofar as it is but a form of theoretical vision and is thus one that 
comes after the facticity of our ‘being-in-the-world’ and ‘being-with-others’ which as 
such does not comport with social being as such and moreover falls within the subject- 
object distanciation and a theoretical re-contextualization taking us our of our existential 
modality of primary social be-ing.   
 
To be clear what is being suggested is not that one may dispense with theoretical vision 
or that it has no value, but rather that it needs to be grounded within the horizon of 
intelligibility of social be-ing and its existential structures. Moreover as we have 
identified in vision as far as its perceptual intentional comportment is concerned it 
potential as counterpoise to the nihilistic danger posed by the essence of modern 
technology we need to bring vision to bear in the grounding of our existential – 
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ontological understanding of social being. Thus we open up and draw a relationship 
between vision and Dasein to be reversed later as our concern moves further into the 
province or field of Dasein to ultimately into the latter itself and its dimensionality as a 
field of disclosure of being, in general and social being, in particular.   
5.1 Modalities of Vision 
In “Being and Time” Heidegger (1996) develops three different conceptions of vision 
that correspond similarly to the three different modalities of being-in-the-world and their 
respective temporalities. These different concepts of vision or seeing will accordingly be 
discussed below  in order to develop later on a nuanced and inflected approach to vision 
that will be used to facilitate our existential – ontological understanding of social being 
and sociality. The three modes of vision or rather seeing of Heidegger’s as taken up by 
Gelven (1989: 63) comprise what he refers to as “circumspection” (Umsicht), 
“considerateness” (Rucksicht) and “transparency” (Durchsichtigkeit). Each of these 
forms of “seeing” Gelven (1989: 63-64) points out entails a particular relation in so far as 
it respectively relates to the way one ‘looks’ at the surrounding world as environment; 
secondly, the world of other Daseins or human beings and; thirdly, how one looks at 
oneself. It is to these modes of vision that we now turn to ground an understanding of 
vision or how we look at the world, each other and ourselves in order to take up how it 
articulates in the context of a technologically informed modality of being.  
 
The structure of the ensuing discussion ‘gathers’ the three elements of Heidegger’s 
existential analytic though in this instance it is specific to the three modes of vision as it 
relates to the world of things and its categorical distinction between that which is “ready-
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to-hand” as a function of utility and that which is “present-at-hand” as function of theory. 
Thus, in the world of things this involves three modalities of vision which are related 
similarly to three concomitant ways of being-in-the-world which Heidegger refers to as 
an engagement which is oriented in general towards what he abstracts as  “for-the-sake-
of” something yet to occur, secondly, “in-the-face-of” something that has occurred and 
finally “in-order-to” allow something to occur (Gelven, 1989: 196) . Each of these states 
of being-in-the-world, particularly in the context of things, in the aforementioned has as 
alluded to a given temporal dimension which to make explicit deals respectively with the 
future, past and present. Our first port of call is with that modality of vision, 
circumspection, which predisposes us in a particular way to the ‘world as environment’, 
or for that matter that we may be estranged from. 
 
5.1.1 Horizon of intelligibility of vision 
What does it mean to say that one sees something or the other, that ones recognizes or 
perceives the existence of an entity before us? If one is merely referring to the physical or 
material form before us in what way do we mean that this thing before us exists as 
something meaningful or intelligible? The point is that we do make such references or 
assertions that such and such a thing lies before us and is rendered present by our visual 
capacity. There are two fundamental issues that Heidegger teases out for our 
introspection, and in so doing challenges some basic taken for granted notions that we 
operate with. Firstly in recognizing or asserting the presence of something before us, we 
are in fact inadvertently disclosing some familiarity or understanding of what it means for 
something to be or exist, in the non-existential sense. Secondly, in being able to 
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recognize and identify something before us presupposes that we have some background 
knowledge of said thing.  
 
Taken together, the vague understanding of being and the identification of said thing refer 
to Heidegger’s distinction between ontology and ontic. However to offer his nuanced 
thinking further the reference to ontological is in fact preontological as the understanding 
of the meaning of Being is tacit rather than explicit and thus precedes an ontological 
understanding proper. The significance of this is that vision as such is predicated not 
upon the senses in its primary relation to being but according to Heidegger it is informed 
by the shared background practices and norms s we are socialized into shortly after 
entering the world. This is not to say that we don’t see with our eyes, but rather that what 
we comprehend with our eyes, are not a function of immaculate perception or an innocent 
eye.  
 
In other words, it is not the eye that makes sense of what it perceives, nor is it the quality 
of the mind as function of internal representation, but rather what Heidegger is arguing is 
that vision is ultimately at the level of its primary relation, a function of existence. By 
existence is meant the self-interpretations that are concomitant in the social practices 
carried by the cultures we are socialized into, not taught as in lessons of an explicit set of 
rules of conduct. The normative pattern as compiled in guidebooks or rule books of 
etiquette and appropriate behaviors are a second order reality, in as much as it is derived 
from the primary form of social practices acquired though socialization, or imitative 
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behavior, and later contemplated, when there is a breakdown in the normal concerned 
coping practices and involvement-in-the-social world.    
5.2 Dasein and the modality of vision 
The said vision we are primarily directed towards understanding is that of an existential 
order and its modalities of being, however, in order to come to terms with its form(s) we 
need to open up a discussion on the different ways we experience our visionary being. 
Not only do we need an explication of our visionary beings as a way to access what effect 
technology has on our modalities of social be-ing, but we also need it to break out of a 
concept of vision that presents this being as detached, decontextualised and deworlded. 
This reification of social being though the particular implicate of vision is not only a 
function of what we find in Virilio’s (1994) “vision machine”, but it is moreover a 
function of a Cartesian philosophical orientation as taken up here particularly in relation 
to Jay (1993) Levin (1988) and Dreyfus (1991).  
 
Thus, what we are exercising discursive vigilance against is an analysis that merely 
serves to confirm that the vision extant of a technological modality of being is some 
version of a Cartesian modality; and thus so remain once removed in theoretical vein; 
when our concern is to probe an understanding that speaks to the first order existential 
modalities of social being, which emerges in the context of an involvement with 
technology as equipment and its sociabilities such as ‘transparent vision’, in what 
Dreyfus (1991) has inferred from his perspicuous reading of Heidegger, as the 
“hermeneutics of everyday averageness”.  
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In short, what is aimed at is an analysis of the modalities of social being from the vantage 
point of a hermeneutic phenomenological view of  technology and vision in so far as it 
leads to an existential – ontological analytic of our human ‘existence’ in the light of 
Heidegger’s notion of “Dasein”.  In order to set up the basic understanding informing our 
approach to vision in the light of Heidegger’s “Being and Time” we shall by and large 
limit scholarly intervention of an exegetical nature to the generally acknowledged 
authoritative account of Dreyfus (1994).  In this way we are better able to probe the dense 
thought of Heidegger in a way that does not make of our approach a polemic, or a 
hagiography, but instead offers an understanding that moves us in the direction of firming 
up an interpretive framework or hermeneutic which is tied to a phenomenological 
account.   
5.2.1 Dasein as sine qua non for the understanding being and vision 
To be clear the fundamental question that Heidegger (1996) is concerned with in “Being 
and Time” is with being and “Dasein’s” relation to it and not with vision. However, in 
explicating this fundamental question of “Being” which Dreyfus (1994) and Gelven 
(1989) translate as “what it means to be” it touches on vision in various ways. Thus, the 
question of being, or what it means to be, interests us in two respects: firstly, as already 
stated, it deals directly with understanding vision and its different modalities; and 
secondly, it deals with “Dasein” that is ways of being human and how this ‘comports’ 
with things, objects, people and the world. Of course in the most directed sense it is 
Heidegger’s analysis of the existential structures of “Dasein” and Dreyfus reading of this 
and our interpretation of both that is to serve an analysis of social being in terms of what 
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it means to be in its dimensionality as sociality and sociability. Though, the ontological 
question of being or what it means to be still begs a starting point and a relation to vision.  
 
With respect to the latter the relation of vision to being comes to the fore as that which is 
intimately connected to being and yet at the same time offers itself as site for the 
obfuscation of the very understanding of being that is sought after. Heidegger (1996: 5) 
probes the question of being thus: 
 
Everything we talk about, mean, and are related to is in being in one way or 
another. What and how we ourselves are is also in being. Being is found in 
thatness and whatness, reality, the objective presence of things [Vorhandenheit], 
subsistence, validity, existence [Dasein], and in the “there is” [es gidt].  
 
What we can infer from the above quote in support of our objective of probing vision is 
that in ‘realist vein’ as far as one refers to the independence of things that lie before us 
being is too apprehended by vision. But to say that being refers to things, or that being is 
a function of vision, or that it is related to some aspect of vision would be patently false, 
and a complete misunderstanding of being, in so far as it refers to what it means to be. In 
fact the conflation of being and vision where the former is subsumed under the latter 
bears testimony to the tendency of vision towards hegemony referred to earlier in 
discussion on the Greek attitude towards vision and its occularcentric bias. It is precisely 
this tendency towards occularcentrism in Western philosophy or traditional ontology that 
Heidegger rails against which is given extensive treatment in Jay (1993) and Levin (1993, 
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1988). For the sake of clarity it should be stated that Heidegger is not anti-vision as such 
in general but against a particular way of seeing which is tied to a particular way of being 
and that is its reduction to a technological modality evidenced in modernity but 
particularly late modernity or post modernity. 
    
The strong point that emerges in relation to vision above is that our relation to things, 
objects, people etc involves much more that just seeing them for in vision what is 
supposed is that we are not only seeing things as they present themselves to our senses, 
but that in apprehending what we see we are also relating to what it means for such and 
such a thing to be, that is, its mode of intelligibility. This is not only something beyond 
vision but more importantly as Heidegger claims it is prior to vision, and it is what is 
connoted in being, that is, what it means to be. And thus to restate Heidegger’s 
fundamental question we refer to Dreyfus’s (1994: 10) account that: 
 
Heidegger’s primary concern is to raise the question of being- to make sense of 
our ability to make sense of things-and to awaken in people a feeling for the 
importance of this very obscure question.  
 
If, being is the basis upon which all intelligibility hinges, and vision as such does not 
have a place as its modal expression, and if, furthermore it is held that being is “no 
ordinary predicate”, and that it is “misleading” to think of being as “entity, or process, or 
event” Dreyfus (1993: 10-11), then, it seems we have traversed the continuum from 
everything to nothing. We seem to have the paradoxical situation of being, which is in 
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everything, but yet it cannot be pinned down to anything, in particular. Consider still as 
Dreyfus points out (1993: 11) that throughout this ‘obscurity’ there is the ‘self-evidence’ 
that according to Heidegger (ibid), “we already live in an understanding of being”. The 
paradox that emerges is that even though as Heidegger claims (cited in, ibid: 11), “we 
always conduct our activities in an understanding of being” (self-evidence) it “is still 
veiled in darkness” (obscurity), thus necessitating “in principle to raise the question [of 
being] again”. Notwithstanding the latter what remains clear for Heidegger (cited in, ibid: 
11), is that “this vague understanding of being is still a fact”, and moreover that this 
understanding of being is derived socially from our immersion in the “background 
practices” of quotidian life. What makes it obscure is that we are immersed in it, and as 
such cannot ‘see’ the ‘woods of being for the ‘trees’ of background practices’, though we 
are clear that we are indeed ‘in’ the ‘woods’   
 
The concern as to the starting point of an analysis of being in the sense of our 
understanding of what it means for anything to be, would then seem to hinge on an 
explication of our “vague understanding of being”, as an emergent property of our  
“background practices” derived from our quotidian or ordinary everyday practices or 
activities. This means that it is in the ways of being human that an understanding of what 
it means to be, or being in general, is to be arrived at. And furthermore, that in exploring 
these ways of being human we concomitantly establish the different related modalities of 
vision and their conditionalities and how these relate to social being and thus to 
technology.  
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Thus, we have arrived at the indispensable role that human existence, or “Dasein” plays 
in coming to terms with an understanding of the intelligibility of all beings and the 
modalities of their visibility. The critical issues to be taken up hereunder are what the role 
of “Dasein” entails, and what the structure of Dasein comprises as a prelude to taking up 
the specificity of its characteristics.  
 
With respect to the claim of the indispensable role that “Dasein” plays in the question of 
what is required to come to an understanding of being or what it means to be Dreyfus 
(1993: 28) isolates three elements making up Heidegger’s basic argument.  
 
…it is Dasein who is trying to make sense of being … and that in order to raise 
the question, Dasein must have in its “average understanding” a premonition of 
the answer. 
 
Heidegger’s ontological logic in starting with Dasein or human existence seems relatively 
basic in as much as he isolates in this being its distinctive capacity for questioning the 
meaning of being. Thus, by extension if there is such a being that is able to raise the 
question of the meaning of being, and that in every question as such there lies embedded 
some anticipation of an answer, albeit vague and incipient, it follows that in Dasein’s 
premonition of a vague understanding, or answer to the question of being there lies in fact 
a jump-start to the fundamental question at hand. Similarly, if one were to ask, as we are 
in fact doing, as to how we make sense of the modalities of being, of what it is we see, in 
terms of the emergent modes of intelligibility that ensue in the intersections of being and 
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vision, then the significance of setting up an interrogative of the latter falls into place 
with respect to its role in probing the visionary dimension of social being. In other words 
the aim is to make sense of the different modalities of vision, such as, in the different 
ways we look at and see that which is associated with Dasein, as in interalia people, 
cultures, publics, institutions, societies and their social distinctions, and by contrast the 
meaning of what we see, when we look at and encounter that which is other than Dasein 
such as technology, equipment, objects, things and the like with their categorial 
distinctions.  
 
The salient point is that being and vision intersect at that point where the modes of 
intelligibility of things and Dasein devolve to that point at which an ‘average 
understanding’ though ‘translucent’ brings itself to bear upon a rudimentary 
understanding of being. Thus, in both instances from the vantage point of being and that 
of vision we are brought to Dasein to make sense thereof, and moreover it is the latter’s 
ability for sense-making that we need to come to terms with and thus Dreyfus (1991: 28) 
points out that   
 
…this average understanding belongs to the essential make-up of Dasein. … that 
is, it is definitive of Dasein to take a stand on its being: Dasein always 
understands itself in terms of its existence. 
 
Here we are made aware of the very basis from which Dasein’s sense making ability 
arises, which is the understanding of being in general (ontological) that derives from 
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‘shared background practices’, but more importantly it is how this average understanding 
is linked to human existence, and what this in turn means in terms of its existential 
dynamics that needs to be uncovered. In this regard we move into the provenance of the 
social (that which is shared) and the sociological (the role of norms) in order to come to 
terms with the fundamental ways of being and becoming human and how this in turn 
serves as a ‘horizon of intelligibility. In as much as there is thus a social basis to 
understanding what it means for Dasein to be, and for being in general, there is 
simultaneously the same basis that underlies our visual sensibilities, and thus for the 
intelligibility of that which enters our purview, as in our physical range of vision. 
Therefore, in short, in uncovering the very essence of existence or Dasein and its 
specificities for understanding being we set the basis for also probing the existential 
complex of vision and its implicate in social being. It is for these reasons that we have 
seized upon social being as the basis for our hermeneutic or horizon of intelligibility and 
thus for our understanding of being, in general. But are we in fact smuggling sociology 
into Heidegger’s thinking through the back door: we certainly may but in reality we are 
seeking the existential – ontological grounding of a concept of social being in Dasein to 
anchor sociology, it is a prior task not  a ‘logic of ontological substitution’ (Thaver, 
2001). In Dasein lays the very ontological conditionality for an understanding of being as 
that which is a priori  as Dreyfus (1991: 28) sum up: 
 
… Dasein’s understanding of being implies an understanding of all modes of 
being. Dasein has therefore a third priority as providing the ontico-ontological 
condition for the possibility of any ontologies. … Thus by carrying out the 
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existential analytic of Dasein we are to arrive at a fundamental ontology. We shall 
understand how every mode of intelligibility-the being of equipment, of objects, 
of institutions, of people, etc.- depends upon a fundamental way of being, namely, 
existence. 
 
Lastly the matter of Dasein’s, or human beings existential complex, is not only cause for 
it to make sense of its own being and other beings in terms of its dimensionality as in an 
anthropocentric understanding, but rather the point being made here is of a generality that 
far exceeds such delimitation. In Dasein’s distinct capacity to make sense of its own 
being and other beings lies its ontic conditioning, that is, its comportment or sociability, 
while the claim that it can ipso facto also make sense of all modes of being lies the more 
general claim of not only understanding beings, but the way of being of beings and thus 
is an ontological conditioning, a hermeneutic in social being. If this understanding of the 
ontology of being lies within the reach of Dasein, that is, the way of being or existence of 
human beings, then the matter of understanding the meaning of being is reduced to an 
existential analytic; of that being in which the sense-making capacity rests, in a word, in 
human beings, Dasein. It then stands to reason that our objective in this chapter of 
coming to terms with what vision means existentially is tied to the existential analytic of 
Dasein, as it serves as the sine qua non for the mode of intelligibility of that which we 
encounter in the ‘world’, and thus of technology, equipment, objects, people, institutions 
and so on. Dasein is thus unequivocally our starting point from which to proceed in order 
to establish, at the primary level, the existential, and secondarily the theoretical 
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conditionality of vision, that is, its subject- object distanciation and its relation to the de-
contextualization of social being.  
5.2.2 What is Dasein? 
Thus far we have considered Heidegger’s argument for the primacy of Dasein in 
understanding the meaning of being and the being of all beings, but have not offered an 
understanding of what Dasein means. In this regard we similarly track into the 
interpretation of Dreyfus (1993) on this most fundamental issue and refer directly to 
Heidegger (1996) to gain insight into the notion of Dasein and its implications for our 
specific purpose of setting up a way to understand vision and visuality. To this end we 
find in Dreyfus (1993: 13-14) both the ontic and ontological dimensions of Dasein:  
 
“Dasein” in colloquial German can mean “everyday human experience,” and so 
Heidegger uses the term to refer to human being. …[But] The best way to 
understand what Heidegger means by Dasein is to think of our term “human 
being,” which can refer to a way of being that is characteristic of all people or to a 
specific person-a human being. Roughly in Division I Heidegger is interested in 
the human way of being, which he calls “being there” or Dasein. 
 
Whilst it is clear that Heidegger uses the term Dasein to designate a human being or 
human beings in general these two terms are not conflatable as such. For it is not human 
beings as subject or object that is at issue for Dasein but rather its way of being. Thus, the 
principle issue around which Dasein revolves is what it is that distinguishes human 
everyday experience or what it is that is encompassed in the idea of a human way of 
 
 
 
 
 208
being. What we can come to terms with at this point is that in order to establish what this 
way of being is that is distinctive of Dasein we have to turn to human beings in their 
generality, that is, their ontology (existential) and their specificity that is their ontical 
condition (existentiell) in order to fix what it means. If, as seems to be the case that 
Heidegger is at great pains to avoid conflating Dasein with a human being singular or 
plural, then what else is at stake in the terminology of Dasein, that is, what else does it 
refer to in the ‘order of things’. It is in addressing this latter question that the discursive 
range of Dasein as well as its content becomes clear. Dreyfus (1993: 14-15) puts this 
matter into perspective: 
 
The whole question of whether Dasein is a general term or the name for a specific entity 
is undercut by Heidegger’s more basic interest in the way of being that human cultures, 
and institutions share. 
 
First to the question of the content of Dasein that is its denotation what Dreyfus makes 
clear is that the term not only refers to human beings, but their cultures and institutions 
on the basis of what they have in common. It is this commonality as will become evident 
that takes us to the heart of what Dasein is, and thus firstly, Dreyfus (1993: 14-15) offers 
us his interpretation and the words of secondly, “Heidegger” (1962:67) to illustrate the 
essence of the meaning of Dasein. 
 
Human beings, it will turn out, are special kinds of being in that their way of 
being embodies an understanding of what it is to be. 
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 These beings in their being comport themselves towards their being (67) [41] 
 
It is thus this understanding of what it means to be that we human beings collectively 
share with culture and society which orients us in a particular way with the specific and 
far reaching consequence that makes us special. This understanding of being is such that 
in Heidegger’s (1962: 36, 32) words cited in Dreyfus (1993: 15) its implications for being 
human is that:  
 
Its ownmost being is such that it has an understanding of that being, and already 
maintains itself in each case in a certain interpretedness of its being. That kind of 
being towards which Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always 
does comport itself somehow, we call ‘existence’.   
 
There are two key elements and their relation to each other in the make-up of Dasein that 
we need to isolate for discussion as this is key to understanding how being relates to the 
general issue of making sense of beings, that is, their mode of intelligibility and thus at 
the level that concerns us directly viz. their visuality.  In this regard it is in interpretation 
and existence and their relation to Dasein that the key rests. With respect to interpretation 
what is especially important is that the understanding of being is not some homologous 
form that is present in all human beings and thus bears upon the interpretation of being in 
some uniform manner. This would suggest that the relationship between interpretation 
and existence is a tight one. But as can be gleaned above it is that Dasein can relate to its 
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understanding of being in one way or another that suggests that there is no singular 
outcome nor is it unproblematic as somehow (since it is vague and we dwell in it) above 
also suggests.  
 
There are in fact three different outcomes that Heidegger designates in this relationship of 
Dasein to its own being which we will outline shortly. The salient point at this juncture is 
that this relationship and its outcome is undecided in as much as it is not a foregone 
conclusion, but arises as a matter of Dasein having to take a stand on how it comports or 
relates to its understanding of being. Now as developed in the above quotation this 
relationship between Dasein and its being undecided as it is at the outset or primordially 
constitutes the basis of the dynamic that is existence in as much as the way this 
relationship unfolds in Dasein is contingent upon the interpretation that ensues in relation 
to its understanding of being. Dreyfus (1993:15) drives this point home by suggesting 
that “Only self-interpreting being exist”.  There is of course the issue of this apriori 
understanding of being that needs to be accounted for and it is not being overlooked as 
such but will be dealt with in due course. What is at issue now, now  that we have 
specified albeit briefly the essential characteristic or content of Dasein namely its self 
interpretation is that we need to consider how this feature of existence relates to culture 
and institutions etc. and what its significant difference is if Dasein is to be restricted to 
human beings and their way of being. In this regard Dreyfus (1993: 15) extends his 
analysis of Dasein to cultures thus:  
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Cultures as well as human beings exist; their practices contain an interpretation of 
what it means to be a culture. Heidegger tells us that institutions such as science 
have existence as their way of being too. 
 
The issue of culture raises an interesting question in relation to being since culture is that 
most general expression of what it means to be. Taken as such may one infer that at its 
broadest that culture might be a way of speaking about being or what it means to be 
ontologically speaking? In this regard we would be inverting the relation of being and 
culture in that culture is that which we humans need in order to be such and such a social 
being. Similarly, if we took society to be Dasein-like which it  is in that it too exists in the 
sense that it contains an interpretation of what it means to be a society, we would be 
engaging in a reduction ad absurdum. For we need society as human beings in order to 
be, and thus being cannot be reduced to society for even though primordially it precedes 
Dasein and is in fact the provenance of becoming a Dasein, or social being of the human 
kind. The point is that Dasein’s relation to social existence is such that the latter offers 
the basis for self-interpretation and as such facilitates an understanding of being which 
sets in motion the dynamic of existence and the openness of social being as contingent 
upon whatever stances society or culture proffers Dasein. And moreover, in an even more 
fundamental way society through its modality of sociality as socialization is the basis 
upon which an implicit ontology comes into being as that vague understanding of being 
that is co-simultaneously linked to the shared agreement of background practices 
acquired in the reproduction of a normative order. So in as much as cultures, science, 
institutions, societies and the like generate practices that embody interpretations of what 
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they must be like to be, they are respectively like Dasein in that they have ‘existence’ as 
their point of equivalence and as their modality or specificity of being. However, 
Heidegger (1996: 11) draws a clear point of differentiation between Dasein and Dasein-
like entities in that: 
 
Sciences and disciplines are ways of being of Da-sein in which Dasein also relates 
to beings that it need not itself be. But being-in-the-world belongs essentially to 
Da-sein. Thus the understanding of being that belongs to Da-sein just as originally 
implies the understanding of something like “world” and the understanding of the 
being of beings accessible within the world.. Ontologies which have their being 
unlike Da-sein as their theme are accordingly founded and motivated in the ontic 
structure of Da-sein itself. This structure included in itself the determination of a 
pre-ontological understanding of being.  
 
We can note that whilst existence is a necessary condition of Dasein it is not a sufficient 
condition and as such can best be described as Dasein-like but not Dasein proper or what 
is above marked as Da-sein. What distinguishes Dasein and its association with a human 
way of being from that which shares existence as its modality of being is what Heidegger 
refers to as the “throwness” or the “thereness” of human beings in the world. In other 
words human beings find themselves thrust in a world neither of their own choosing nor 
of their own making, but of which they have some pre-ontological understanding of their 
social being. This  vaguely familiarity or pre-ontological understanding of being is the 
basis for discerning the intelligibility of beings and stems from the sociality embedded in 
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being-in and being-with, in general and being-in-the-world, in particular. This is not the 
place to take up discussion of this crucial existential structure viz. being-in-the-world 
except to point out that in as much as society and culture share existence with Dasein 
there is this fundamental way in which it is differentiated. Before taking up the latter 
matter of being-in-the-world and worldliness we need to take issue in league with 
Dreyfus (1993) with certain key characteristics of Dasein that have thus far been raised. 
Key amongst them is Dasein’s pre-ontological understanding of being, interpretation and 
the three modes of existence of Dasein.  
 
To close off the discussion on Dasein and existence and its shared relation with 
cultures, institutions and human beings we turn to Dreyfus (1993:15-16) who cites 
Heidegger (1962: 26-27) to mark the theoretical and methodological import for 
understanding being in general and vision in particular which we seize upon in relation 
to the different activities of Dasein.  
 
Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing access to it-all 
these ways of behaving are constitutive for our inquiry, and therefore are modes 
of being for those particular entities which we, the inquirers, are ourselves.     
 
Here we see Heidegger attending in a direct manner to the question of vision and its 
relation to ways of behaving and thus ways of being of Dasein. And in this regard the 
matter of vision invites deep-seated theoretical and methodological issues that were 
inadvertently raised in thinking through the modalities of technological being. At 
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bottom the world in which modern technology is extant and amidst which we find 
ourselves has surfaced fundamental questions about the nature of our social being, 
being in general, the world and the entities within and the relational nexus amongst 
these phenomena. Thus the question then of what the modalities of vision are that are 
entailed in the different modalities of being and social being  that is equipment, objects 
and things and involving human beings that is Dasein presupposes too much to 
approach the inquiry in a superficial and naïve minded manner as has become 
customary with very few exceptions. There are critical issues that remain in 
constituting the problematic, such as, what is Dasein; and how is its constitution 
related to the matter of understanding the modalities of vision, such that we may 
enable the hermeneutic phenomenology of Heidegger to surface and make visible 
those ways of our social being that is implicated in technology and its visionary 
beings. It is to this end that we pursue clarity on Dasein’s capacity for understanding, 
interpretation and its modes of being as grounding for a conception of the different 
ways of being that is anchored in our sociality, our being-in-the-world and our 
sociabilities the specific ways we cope with and relate to our cares and concerns.. 
5.2.2.1 Dasein, pre-ontological understanding and Interpretations 
Following on the conception that human existence entails an understanding of what it 
means to be, taken up above, we now ask how this understanding itself comes into being 
in both senses, as that which is and as that which is present in a Dasein. What emerges 
from Dreyfus’s (1993: 17) reading of Heidegger (1962) translation of Being and Time is 
that 
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…the understanding of being human in an individual’s activity is the result of 
being socialized into practices that contain an interpretation not exhaustively 
contained in the mental states of individuals. 
 
In other words what Dreyfus (1993: 16) is driving at is that Heidegger’s strong point is 
that “our social practices embody an ontology” or what it means to be human. To firm up 
this point Dreyfus refers to the sociology of Pierre Bourdieu in respect of the non-mental 
aspect involved in the socialization process, and its ontological relationship, that is, in 
relation to the understanding of what we have called our social being. What Bourdieu 
(1977: 87) notes, cited in Dreyfus (1993: 17), is that: 
 
A whole group and a whole symbolically structured environment  … exerts an 
anonymous, pervasive pedagogical action … The essential part of the modus 
operandi which defines practical mastery is transmitted in practice, in its practical 
state, without attaining the level of discourse. … in all societies children are 
particularly attentive to the gestures and postures which, in their eyes, express 
everything that goes to make an accomplished adult-a way of talking, a tilt of the 
head, facial expressions, ways of sitting and using implements, always associated 
with a tone of voice, a style of speech, and (how could it be otherwise?) a certain 
subjective experience. 
 
 The point that Bourdieu seems to be making is that the teaching and learning of practical 
skills does not take place in any explicit lesson as in the transmission of knowledge 
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which is internalized and then translated into action. Instead, children acquire an 
understanding of social being through their attentive observation of and listening to 
adults, on the basis of whom they are able to interpret what it, means to be a human 
being, and a thing, object or implement as cases in point. What is thus at issue here is that 
succinctly put “an ontology need not be represented in a mind” Dreyfus (1993: 17). For 
our purposes, though not the explicit intent of Dreyfus or Heidegger, the visionary aspect 
involved in the pre-ontological or pre-theoretical understanding of being is particularly 
strong but also instructive of the circle in which a hermeneutical understanding moves. 
Consider as in Bourdieu above that vision plays an important though not an exhaustive 
role in the process of socialization, and that this socialization embodies an implicit 
ontology, and that this understanding of social being having been imbibed in its turn 
serves as the basis upon which the intelligibility of beings can be established.  
 
In other words the seeing that takes place at the primordial level, that is, at the level of 
children being socialized is by this account an ontological vision in as much as it contains 
the seeds of the interpretation of what it means to be a human being, a Dasein. This 
primordial seeing which is so intimately tied to social being in its initial making would 
seem to be subsumed in the seeing that ensues once that being or Dasein firms up. What 
then becomes of this ontological vision is that it is replaced by the ontical constitution of 
Dasein, that is, in the quotidian order of the everyday and the interpretations of cultural or 
social conformity or convention. It would seem to be the case that in as much as a pre-
ontological understanding of social being seems to underlie and give intelligibility to the 
being of beings that this is similarly the case with the vision that accompanies 
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internalization of social practices and its concomitant ontology. And if this be the case 
would we not be in the same position that our understanding of being like vision would 
also be partial.  
 
The challenge here is clearly that we need to separate being and vision so that we have 
clear blue water between them and consequently can treat them as ontologically and 
epistemologically distinct. However, not to lose ‘sight’ of the point which is that there is 
a close relation between the social practices we imbibe and our understanding of social 
being and thus our modality of vision. It is in this respect that Heidegger speaks of the 
social practices of technology which informs a particular understanding of being as that 
which is ‘enframed’ and thus reconstitutes everything as standing reserve or resources to 
be used and disposed of. To sum up as Dreyfus (1993:18) does; our pre-ontological 
understanding of being is that: 
 
The practices containing an interpretation of what it is to be a person, an object 
and a society fit together. They are all aspects of what Heidegger calls an 
understanding of being. Such an understanding is contained in our knowing-how-
to-cope in various domains rather than in a set of beliefs that such and such is the 
case. Thus we embody an understanding of being that no one has in mind. We 
have an ontology without knowing it.  
 
What then are the implications of holding on to a position that displaces the beliefs and 
mind primordially from what is involved in an understanding of social being and 
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substitutes for it knowing-how-to-cope? Furthermore what must be in place in order for 
the social practices of coping in the world to take the form of an ontology? And yet again 
what is the basis of the intelligibility of the being of beings such that they are discernible 
to begin with? In this regard Dreyfus (1993: 19) is once again of immeasurable value in 
distilling what is at the heart of Heidegger’s thinking. 
 
Heidegger calls the shared agreement in our practices as to what entities can show 
up as a preontological or pretheoretical understanding of being. … Thanks to our 
preontological understanding of being, what shows up for us shows up as 
something. … But when we try to make the preontological understanding we in 
fact posses explicit, we find that it is by means obvious…. The more important 
some aspect of our understanding of being is, the less we can get at it. 
 
The crux of the matter here is that the intelligibility of being is not the preserve of a 
conscious mind guided by beliefs as this would make of it a subjective experience and 
thus individuate what is otherwise a public or collective reality. Secondly, it would 
elevate the role of beliefs and knowledge when the argument has already been made that 
it is social practices and perception thereof and its internalization through socialization 
that an understanding of social being is fundamentally effected. However, what now 
comes to the fore is that it is not the practices in themselves as important as these are in 
themselves, but the shared agreement in such practices that gives us a prior understanding 
of being. In fact it is this agreement of shared practices that renders it possible to make a 
determination of the intelligibility of that which is encountered. In other words we do not 
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make sense of what we see simply because it is within our range of physical vision but 
rather the intelligibility of what we see is derived from the shared agreement in our 
practices, which is our social being.  
 
Thus, to understand our visionary being we need to connect with the shared agreement in 
our social practices, but this is not unproblematic as we are in the ‘trees’ of our social 
practices or sociabilities so much so that we are unable to determine the woods of our 
shared agreement or sociality. What then is within our capacity to determine and what are 
the epistemological limits on what it is that we can know about our preontological 
understanding of being and to what extent does this limitation truncate our understanding 
of our visionary being, if at all.   
 
 
For Dreyfus (1993: 22) Heidegger has a radical reason for supposing that we cannot 
transcend the ‘woods’ of the understanding we have of being and its concomitant 
constraints. 
 
There are no beliefs to get clear about; there are only skills and practices. These 
practices do not arise from beliefs, rules or principles, and so there is nothing to 
make explicit or spell out. We can only give an interpretation of the interpretation 
already in the practices. … since phenomenology deals with our understanding of 
being, it must be hermeneutic. To sum up, an explication of our understanding of 
being can never be complete because we dwell in it-that is, it is so pervasive as to 
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be both nearest to us and  farthest away-and so because there are no beliefs to get 
clear about.  
 
At this primary level of engagement in the world we find that Dreyfus makes us aware 
that Heidegger decenters the ideational aspect of human experience and foregrounds its 
existential being. Thus, in lieu of beliefs and ideas we have skills and practices as the 
latter are implicated in our “knowing how to cope” in our “concernful dealings” with the 
world. In this regard it is skills and practices our sociabilities that inform how we cope in 
the world and not our beliefs as such but rather what orients us in this practical world is 
the shared agreement we have of our practices, our social being. It is thus this pre-
ontological or pre-theoretical understanding of being that we are dimly aware of that is 
the basis of our understanding of the intelligibility of the being of beings or the mode of 
existence of all entities.  
 
And since we dwell in our world of social practices it is to the implicit ontology that we 
need to turn and not abstract ideas or beliefs as such in order to gain an understanding of 
being as first order reality. But whilst we may be in a position to gain an understanding of 
the modality of being with a high degree of clarity the same cannot be said of the 
understanding of social being contained in the background practices in which we dwell. 
And thus the epistemological limits that are inevitable with respect to paradoxically that 
which makes possible the intelligibility of being to begin with. However, while the 
preontological understanding of social being may in fact be vague, and the ontological 
understanding of being, our sociality may be farthest from our reach, the ontical nature of 
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being, our sociabilities is closest and it is here that Dasein’s existence comes into its 
clearest focus. Now in order to spell out what is entailed in this regard we consider what 
Dreyfus defines as Dasein’s capacity for self-interpretation and its relation to its special 
way of being, that is, existence. 
5.2.2.2 Dasein, self-interpretation and misinterpretation 
What we come to terms with here in addressing the relationship of Dasein to 
interpretation deals with the qualified understanding of what constitutes the ‘essence’ of 
human existence. Previously we distinguished the Dasein-like quality to rest in existence 
in terms of its extension to entities such as cultures, institutions and societies on the basis 
that it contained in its practices what it entailed to be a culture or an institution etc. Now 
in league with Dreyfus (1993: 23) we bring Dasein to bear on interpretation by way of 
existence and thereby surface the qualified sense in which one may speak of a human 
essence, sociality of being and its existential scope.   
 
To exist is to take a stand on what is essential about one’s being and to be defined 
by that stand. Thus Dasein is what, in its social activity, it interprets itself to be. 
Human beings do not already have some specific nature. It makes no sense to ask 
whether we are essentially rational animals, creatures of God, organisms with 
built-in needs, sexual beings, or complex computers. Human beings can interpret 
themselves in any of these ways and many more, and they can, in varying 
degrees, become any of these, but to be human is not to be essentially [sic] any of 
them. Human being is essentially simply self-interpreting.  
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The strong point here is that we are ontically relative but ontologically fundamental in as 
much as how we come to interpret ourselves depends upon the society and cultures we 
are socialized or acculturated within.  That is in our particularity as ontic beings and in 
our understanding of our own existences that is existentially this devolves to the self-
interpretations on offer in our culture. However, ontologically in terms of what it means 
to be, in general, as a human social being, that is, existentially, the analytic holds equally 
for all of us. Thus, in the latter existential understanding what it means for all human 
beings to be is a matter of self-interpretation that is tied to our modality of existence 
which means that whatever we become or are as human beings is matter of our existences 
and the stand that we may take on such an existence. In short as social beings as Dasein, 
existence precedes essence  
 
By contrast the content of existence and the particular stand taken by an individual 
Dasein is a relative matter and devolves to the parochial lives of individuals and their 
specific contexts. Caution should however be exercised in this regard as one is not 
constructing the neo-liberal social subject as self contained individual, but rather what is 
at work here is a communitarian subject, a social being, that is one who shares an 
understanding of what it means to be with-others of the same cultural ilk and therefore 
has a public understanding of each others particular stands and the self-interpretations 
that may have been adopted. This latter understanding of social being is that we are all in 
our own milieus relative and arbitrary and thus at one with cultural relativism but 
definitely not essentialist.  So in answer to the question what is the nature or essence of 
Dasein or human beings it is quite baldly that we have none we are open-ended in this 
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respect and come to possess a nature through socialization and as such are social being 
with the capacity for sociality but indeterminate, that is, without a determined content.  
Notwithstanding as stated earlier the point bears reiteration thus Dreyfus (1993: 23) cites 
the words of Heidegger (1962: 67) to echo the claim that:  
 
 The “essence” of Dasein lies in its existence. 
 
If one is tied to this cultural relativism does one then shrug one’s shoulders and yield to 
the notion that well anything goes and settle for a moral and epistemic relativity and 
leave it at that. Well in respect of technology and vision there is arguably a global 
phenomenon at work which cuts across the different social and cultural formations in 
such a way as to enable a transverse effect. Moreover that in technology per se we have 
an ontic orientation that is socially and culturally specific but that does not mean that it is 
somehow immune from the ontological dimension of modern technology at the level of 
its generality as existential analytic that is in its “destining as enframing” and the 
transformation of social being and our sociality into a “standing reserve”.  
 
In other words one may see the same distinction of the ontical (sociability) that is the 
particular and the ontological (social being) the general at work such that the particular 
way in which the standing reserve is made manifest across social formations differs in 
content (kith) but not in form.(kin) in the wake of modern technology. This open-ended 
sensibility with its contingent self-interpretations and cultural specificities is to be seized 
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upon similarly in respect of the complex of vision in as much as it is being argued that 
there is an intersection between modalities of being and related modalities of vision.  
 
In addition to the distinction opened up between the particular and the general evidenced 
in the distinction between the ontical and the ontological self-interpretation also begs 
consideration of the distinction between what is subjective and objective. In other words 
the cultural as subjective and say the biological as objective as regards Dasein’s 
relationship to itself. If existence is characterized by the stand an individual Dasein has to 
take vis-à-vis its open ended possibilities are there objective conditions which limit these 
or around which such self-interpretation revolve or do these possibilities multiply 
themselves out ad infinitum. Dreyfus (1993: 24) thinks through what we have termed the 
relation between subjective and objective vis-à-vis self-interpretation by making use of 
the example of gender and sex. 
 
In Heidegger’s terminology, we can say that homo sapiens can be characterized  
by factuality (e.g. male or female), like any object but that, because human beings 
exist, have Dasein in them, they must be understood in their facticity as a 
gendered way of behaving, e.g., as masculine or feminine.       
 
Given Dasein’s special way of being, that is that its existence is an issue for it means that 
the factuality or objective categories of male and female merely sets the parameters of its 
being which is the same for all human beings. However, how this is interpreted and what 
kind of stand eventuates is a matter of cultural determination and how a particular Dasein 
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interprets the cultural assignation of gender roles and how that in turn articulates with the 
individual’s understanding thereof. Thus whilst the factuality of sex is given objectively 
the cultural determination of how that role is to be understood and taken up by the 
individual Dasein is based on the self-interpretations proffered in that culture and the 
particular stand in relation thereto.  
 
Thus, even though the individual Dasein is involved, the matter of subjective is not be 
understood in the context used above as an individuated and atomistic sense, but rather in 
the sense that it refers to the understanding of subjecthood that it is culturally determined.  
With respect to vision we can objectively recognize that our sensory capacity predisposes 
us to see that which is before us, but how we understand it and the kind of interpretation 
that may be attached to that which is seen, or how it shows up for the individual Dasein is 
similarly a cultural and social construct from the vantage point of an existential 
involvement, or the know-how that comes through coping in-the-world.  
 
What is the position of Dasein, then, if it is ontologically open in as much as its existence 
is such that the issue or meaning of what it means to be, is undecided in and of itself, and 
relative to the stand one takes in one existence and how one lives out that choice. But, on 
the other hand, the stand taken is delimited to the choices that are on offer within a given 
culture. There is no point beyond which Dasein can act that is not already offered as a 
possibility within its socio-cultural setting or social being. In other words Dasein is 
ontically determined that its lived reality is what is closest to its being and from which 
there is no escape. What then can Dasein do if hypothetically he or she is encircled by a 
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culture and social practices that may be unjust as in patriarchy or racism? What does 
Dasein do if there is the realization that the understanding of being of which it is vaguely 
familiar preontologically or pretheoretically contradicts the sociality that is inherent in 
existential being, that is being-with others-in-the-world? Precisely because we are bound 
within a cultural formation Dreyfus (1993: 24):   
 
The most a Dasein can do is “raise its consciousness,” that is, clarify the 
interpretation in the culture. For example, feminists try to become conscious of 
what it means to be feminine in our culture in order to modify our practices.. … 
[but] … Heidegger would, disagree however, with people … who think we should 
get clear about our sex roles and thus get over them and simply be persons.        
 
Since our background practices in which we are socialized and acculturated is the 
grounding upon which our understanding and the intelligibility of being is based, as in 
say the example of gender, it makes it somewhat meaningless to expect then to make 
sense of gender beyond the social practices from which such understanding albeit flawed 
essentially derives. The key issue and its overdetermination seems then not to rest with 
the cultural formation and its articulation with gender per se, but rather with Dasein’s 
way of being and that is the self-interpretation that comes with existence understood 
existentially. In other words we can intervene at the level of self-interpretation in as much 
as it involves taking a stand on how a given culture understands its practices in say what 
it means to be masculine and feminine, and thereby modify our own practices and thus 
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offer in such practices railed as it might be against the conventional understanding 
another interpretation of gendered being.  
 
There is another point to be made in that the socialization process involved in the 
assignation and acceptance of gender roles has been the subject of much discussion and 
theoretical contemplation and its planes of differentiation have been catalogued to the 
point that we have become self-conscious of its practices and thus sensitive about its 
effects and its undesirable outcomes. But when we ask what does it mean to be a man or 
a woman in terms of our gender identities it becomes less obvious in the light of what it 
entails and thus Dreyfus (1993: 21-22) takes up Heidegger’s sensibilities in this regard 
when he points out that our:  
 
most pervasive interpretations” of gender are in “our bodies, our perceptions, our  
language, and in our skills for dealing with the same and opposite sex.  
 
In relation to our visionary being and the matter of its pervasiveness we have increased 
this relationship many times over as the socialization and acculturation into the ways of 
seeing of a given culture is for the most part imperceptible. Our immersion in a culture’s 
way of seeing is such that we do not ask questions as to the nature of the way we see and 
how things show up thus in respect of the example of television the vision involved 
therein is taken for granted. In other words we have generalized this capacity of vision 
such that we have not considered the different ways of seeing and their relation to being 
and vice versa the different modalities of being and the kind of vision that ensue in 
 
 
 
 
 228
relation thereto. Similarly when it comes to technology we are also immersed in it to such 
an extent that we do not question its nature and extent but absorb its sensibility through 
our involvement in the social practices that it generates and the modalities of vision it 
instantiates. We thus see our task as opening up the question of being following 
Heidegger though more attuned to its sociological potential for surfacing the social 
dimension in considering the different modalities of sociality and sociabilities that seem 
to lie fallow therein..  
5.2.2.3 Dasein as Self-misinterpreting 
The fact that we are culturally and socially bound through socialization and inured in 
these practices comes to be as will be agued the site of a spurious understanding of what 
it means to be a human being. This apparently hinges on the contradiction between 
existence and essence. Informed by his reading of Heidegger, Dreyfus (1993: 25) brings 
this into sharp relief: 
 
Being essentially self-interpreting, Dasein has no nature. Yet Dasein always 
understands itself as having some specific essential nature. It grounds its actions 
in its understanding of human nature, and feels at home in belonging to a certain 
nation or a certain race.    
 
What is at work here is that what comes to be, that is, the cultural and social 
understanding of ourselves covers up what we essentially are in our ‘unsettled’ and 
‘open-ended’, still to be decided, selves. There is thus a contradiction in accepting and 
fixing our identities to the socio-cultural understanding proffered as if it were some 
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naturalized and predestined essentialised being. Furthermore, and of profound 
significance for our being with each other is that there is no preserve on such and such a 
people with such and such a cultural formation and their mutual affinities as these are not 
naturally given but socially acquired and as such is equally accessible to any other Dasein 
since it is simply a sociological matter that is a question of socialization and acculturation 
as far as it relates to a particular understanding of what it means to be such and such a 
social being.  
 
However, given the preontological understanding involved in the shared agreement of 
social practices one can gain an insight into how it is that people operating from this 
vague, but primordial understanding come to think of themselves intuitively as innately 
belonging to some nation or ethnicity and even a ‘race’.  This understanding seems to 
take root precisely because our preontological understanding cannot be made explicit in 
its entirety because we dwell in it and its presence is pervasive, suffusing everything we 
encounter and behold.   
 
If, perhaps, one can come to understand that in the vagueness and dimness of a 
preontological understanding a spurious understanding of Dasein comes into play one is 
still left with trying to figure out why there is this seeming trade-off between the open-
endedness of existence (preontological understanding) for the foreclosure of a fixed 
cultural essence (preontological misunderstanding). Dreyfus (1993: 25) understands the 
logic behind what he calls a “preontological misunderstanding” to rest in Heidegger’s 
concept of existence as stated.  
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Understanding itself thus as an object with a fixed essence covers up Dasein’s 
unsettledness and calms the anxiety occasioned by recognizing that Dasein is 
interpretation all the way down. Dasein’s tendency to cover up its own 
preontological understanding accounts for the traditional misinterpretations of 
Dasein as some sort of object with a fixed nature. Heidegger calls this motivated 
understanding “fleeing” and sees the “falling” it produces as an essential structure 
of human being.  
 
What emerges in this preontological understanding of being as far as our understanding is 
concerned is a paradoxical relationship to Dasein. Consider that on the one hand that this 
very preontological understanding of the being of Dasein as unsettled and open serves as 
the basis upon which an understanding or intelligibility of the being of beings is made 
possible. But simultaneously on the other hand that this selfsame preontological 
understanding this openness and unsettledness which lights up our relation to being and 
beings is also unnerving and the site of anxiety. Granted that the openness of Dasein’s 
existence, its unsettledness is viable as the source of anxiety, then surely, should it not 
also be the case that this very anxiety is reproduced in relation to Dasein’s encounter with 
being and beings as such. And if this in indeed the case then we may equally infer that as 
far as the visionary being of Dasein is concerned, there is too the need for a covering up 
or assuaging of anxiety, and this is precisely the motivation behind the relationship 
between social being and vision. In other words what emerges within the purview of 
Dasein, in so far as its visibility is concerned, is rendered intelligible in virtue of the 
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particular social and cultural horizon, as a way of fixing the openness of being as it 
relates to Dasein’s, that is its self-interpreting modality of existence, and accounts for the 
different fields of vision of cultures, people see differently.  
 
Are we then saying that what is ultimately visible and seen as such is that which is fear 
and anxiety inducing and that which does not invoke the latter is somehow invisible? The 
answer would be yes but not as physical presence per se, but rather only in so far as it 
relates to the relationship between being and vision. In other words not all that is seen or 
visually perceived necessarily relates to Dasein’s being as disclosure as such, but all that 
produces anxiety is related to being as revealing of Dasein. There is thus the seeing that 
ensues by way of its sensory dynamics and there is the seeing that is connected to being 
that needs to be distinguished, and will be taken up later. For now we seek to mark vision 
as it relates to our preontological understanding of being. And here the strong point is that 
the preontological understanding of social being, that is, the shared agreement of social 
practices serves not only as a mode of intelligibility of being, but in as much as it relates 
to vision it serves as a field of visibility, it allows things to show up. In this sense our 
vision is tied to the unsettled and openness of being and is suggestive of the primacy of 
existence over essence for unlike other sentient beings vision is not open but structured 
into their genetic programming such that what shows up is what is they are wired to see 
as an extension of their essential make-up.  
 
In closing in as much as there is a ‘fleeing’ from the unsettledness and openness of 
Dasein’s being and a ‘falling’ into the spuriousness of a fixed essence; there is too a 
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‘fleeing’ from the unsettledness of vision and a ‘falling’ into the ocular conventions and 
conformity of the field of vision correlative with the socio-cultural order of the day. The 
question that begs unpacking in this instance from what has been said, thus far, is that at 
the very least Dasein is in a position to take up in its self-interpretation a true relation to 
its preontological understanding and accept its unsettledness or it can fall for a spurious 
fixed essence in its cultural and social milieu. It turns out that there is a third possibility 
as well and thus we now consider Dasein’s three modes of being and explore its 
implication for our visionary beings.  
5.3 Dasein’s three modes of being 
Before taking up the discussion on the three modes of being of Dasein Dreyfus (1993: 
25) makes mention of another characteristic of the self-interpreting way of being (i.e. 
Dasein) or what we prefer to think about as sociability, in order to put the modalities of 
being human into perspective.  What Dreyfus (ibid) is referring to is that according to 
Heidegger (1962) “Dasein always belongs to someone. It is owned.” Thus Heidegger’s 
(1962: 67) cited in Dreyfus (ibid) says that: 
 
We are ourselves the entities to be analyzed. The being of any such entity is in 
each case mine.   
 
There is however an important qualification to be made of sociological import in that 
what is critical in Heidegger’s understanding of the notion that Dasein is “owned” by the 
individual is that it is not an atomistic and isolated modality of being privy only to such a 
discrete entity. Rather as Dreyfus (1993: 26) makes abundantly clear  
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For Heidegger, Dasein’s mineness is the public stand it takes on itself-on what it 
is to be this Dasein-by way of its comportment. 
 
What it is that Dasein comports itself to or what it is that the self-interpreting way of 
being human relates to by way of its stand or choice, or as it happens its lack thereof 
relates to the particular characteristic of human existence. In this regard it refers to the 
matter of the unsettled nature of human existence, and thus that it is open-ended and 
contingent upon how we relate to that which we have been socialized and acculturated 
into, as a matter of our everyday sociality. So what is the choices vis-à-vis the 
commonsense public understanding of what it means to be human, asocial being, that we 
inhabit and own primarily and initially as our distinctive way of being? Is this a fait 
accompli? Clearly not, since we have Dasein in us, which is the self-interpreting way of 
being, and moreover are unsettled, and therefore exist by way of becoming as an 
unresolved way of being.  The possibilities not to further belabor the point and its related 
modalities of being are (Dreyfus, 1993: 26-27):  
 
… Dasein can own up, disown, or fail to take a stand on its unsettling way of 
being. … Heidegger calls choosing itself or owning up Dasein’s authentic 
(eigentlich) way of being, and seeming to choose while disowning, Dasein’s 
inauthentic (uneigentlich) way of being. He calls the third mode, in which Dasein 
exists most of the time, the undifferentiated mode.     
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Each of these possibilities ultimately opens or closes off a relationship to oneself, and 
though they are not negatively described by Heidegger as Dreyfus point out they do bear 
consequences for the individual’s stand. Dreyfus (1993: 26-27) takes up the implications 
of each and how they bear on Dasein in reverse order to that above:  
 
…first …every person… must be socialized into a particular cultural 
understanding of being. … since Dasein has always made some sort of decision as 
to the way in which it is in each case mine (68) [42], its stand is just what it picks 
up from the collective way of not owning up to itself, of not covering up its 
unsettledness . Second … instead of simply accepting passively the social role it 
grew up in, it actively identifies with some social role such as lawyer, father, or 
lover or some socially sanctioned identity such as victim or sacrificing mother, 
which allows it to disown, or cover up, its true self-interpreting structure. The 
owned mode, the third way of relating to one’s own existence … Dasein finally 
achieves individuality by realizing it can never find meaning by identifying with a 
role. Dasein then “chooses” the social responsibilities available to it in such a way 
as to manifest in the style of its activity its understanding of the groundlessness of 
its own existence.   
      
In the first instance it might be inferred that Dasein absconds from making a decision, 
and thus drifts along with the cultural and social flow and as such “fails to take a stand” 
on its groundlessness. This it is argued is tantamount to closing itself from the self, 
settling instead for being an undifferentiated Dasein, that is, being a part of ‘everyone’ 
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and ‘anyone’, “Das Man”. The same holds for the stand described as disowning the 
unsettledness of Dasein and choosing a social role from the cultural inventory on offer, 
though this time as a means to cover up and close off the existing self thus manifesting 
Dasein’s way of being, as inauthentic. Finally, in recognizing the unsettled and open-
ended nature of Dasein and living its life accordingly Dasein opens a path to the self such 
that “it wins itself” and thus takes on the mantle of an authentic way of being. In 
accepting groundlessness as one’s social condition and being and thus one’s modality of 
sociality means that one is not wedded to any particular identity as an uber identity with 
all that it entails in what is sociologically conceptualized as ethnocentric and its 
prejudicial bearing. Thus, one may be passionate about one’s choices and the way one 
lives out that way of being but since it is not regarded as one’s essence as such one can be 
passionate and yet be committed to a way of being that manifests the sociability of a 
practice towards cultural relativism.  
 
The question to which we now turn is how this might relate to vision since we have tied 
the latter to Dasein. In the undifferentiated mode of being where a stand in relation being 
is one by default that is not being explicit one way or the other in respect of Dasein’s 
groundlessness we could accept the concomitant modality of vision as an everyday seeing 
or a an undifferentiated vision that reproduces the commonsense modality of quotidian 
living. The field of vision is analogous to the cultural horizon of what Heidegger (1962: 
69; 1996: 41) )calls “Dasein’s everydayness or its averageness.. Secondly, in as much as 
the latter is also considered an inauthentic way of being it is rather in the act of choosing 
as a cover-up of the groundlessness of human existence that the inauthentic proper is 
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regarded as such. In this respect the concomitant mode of intelligibility of vision would 
be in-authenticity in so far as it relates not to the everyday viewing and a cultural horizon 
of averageness, but rather to a sub-cultural horizon in the specific role that is chosen and 
thus from which its visionary intelligibility would arise.  
 
Thus, in seeing the self, the undifferentiated vision is limited to the quotidian order of 
averageness and in the inauthentic modality of sociality, its vision is role-defined both 
truncated, though in the authentic mode, vision takes the form of a ‘seeing which 
discloses and makes the self apparent to the self. In other words we might refer to the 
seeing of the authentic self as an ‘ontological vision’ ‘clear-sighted’ on an understanding 
of its social being. Whereas the previous two might be more akin to gradations of an 
ontic vision that is undifferentiated from the “one”, the conventional, while the 
inauthentic though differentiated is still hooked into the normative of a specific role and 
its delimited horizon of intelligibility. And thus in this respect these are delimited to a 
sociality and a field of vision which unable to extricate itself from its parochiality and 
thus tied to a fragmented understanding of being and a spurious understanding of its 
social being as somehow essentialised.. 
 
 We have thus far covered some of the essential ground concerning the make-up of 
Dasein and discussed how it is made manifest in the human way of being and articulated 
its commonality with culture, institutions and society in particular. But most importantly 
we differentiated Dasein from Dasein-like entities as stated on the basis that the former 
viz. social beings as Dasein are ‘beings-in-the-world. What we focus on now is to put 
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together by way of Dreyfus (1993), Heidegger’s (1962,1996), English translations of 
Being and Time, concept of ‘being-in-the-world’ and its relation to Dasein’s 
understanding and self-interpretations of being and its import for the modes of 
intelligibility of vision. 
5.4 Being-in-the-world: Dasein and the intelligibility of being and beings 
Previously we have accounted for the understanding of the intelligibility of beings as 
deriving from a preontological understanding of being and that this was acquired through 
the shared agreement contained in the social practices in which we are socialized and 
engage normatively. What is required now is to unpack what is meant by the immersion 
‘in’ social practices and its relation to the world and Dasein; and of course our added 
concern for vision which is both implicit and explicit in Heidegger. However, in order to 
come to terms with Heidegger’s existential analysis of ‘being-in’ it is necessary to follow 
Dreyfus (1993: 40) on his discussion of the key distinction being made. The importance 
of this rests in the conceptual distinctions necessitated in drawing attention to how being-
in-the-world’ relates to Dasein’s being and thus the intelligibility of all beings. What we 
need to do now is to dispel any notion that the preontological understanding of social 
being is located in Dasein, which is a property of human beings, in virtue of its self-
interpretational abilities. Here the issue of note is that as stated previously this 
understanding of being is in the social practices or sociabilities of a given cultural 
formation. What is thus at issue now is what that existential characteristic is that makes it 
possible to relate to social practices in such a way as to emerge with an understanding of 
social being albeit a ‘vague and dim’ take on sociality.   
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Heidegger calls the activity of existing, “being-in-the-world.” … “being-in” in 
Dasein’s “being-in-the-world” is not to be thought of as a characteristic of objects 
spatially with respect to other objects. The way of being of objects, understood as 
isolated, determinate, substances Heidegger calls Vorhandenheit … usually 
translated as “presence-at-hand” … I shall use “occurrentness”.    
 
Let’s recall that existence was described as that state in which an interpretation of what it 
meant to be Dasein or Dasein-like was contained in the social practices that are emergent 
in the acculturation and socialization process. Following on this we note in Heidegger’s 
conflation of existing and being-in-the-world above that it means that there is a point of 
equivalence between the two, and that this rests in the self-contained interpretation of 
what it means to be Dasein and thus a being-in –the-world. There is an understanding of 
being that comes with having Dasein in ourselves and there is an understanding of being 
that comes with the structure of the social world. Before the issue of worldliness is dealt 
with we need to come to grips with a particular understanding of the relationship between 
Dasein and the world. To what end is Dasein a being-in-the-world and that which 
precedes the latter what does it mean to be in-the-world existentially speaking?  Dealing 
with this matter brings us to the point where we can appreciate the conceptual distinction 
Heidegger introduces above between Dasein and objects which are present as things in 
themselves. Dreyfus (1993: 41) puts the case thus: 
 
When someone calls our attention to the fact that “in” also has an existential sense 
which expresses involvement, as in being in love, being in business, or being in 
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the theater, we tend to think of this as a metaphorical derivation from physical 
inclusion. This is just what one would expect if Heidegger is right that Dasein 
always (mis) interprets itself in terms of the objects with which it deals.   
  
 
If objects described above are viewed as isolated and determinate, in a word detached, 
and it is held that Dasein has a tendency to conflate the human way of being with objects, 
then the spatial concept of something being inside something else as an ‘object in a box’ 
is rendered analogous to humans being in the world. This is fundamentally a 
misinterpretation as it overlooks the existential concept of what it means to be involved 
such that one can be in-love without any spatial connotations whatsoever. The mistake 
here is that our reference to being in-love is not involvement, an existential state, but 
rather the physical and spatial sense of being contained. What makes Heidegger radical in 
his existential analysis of being-in is that our conventional understanding of the 
isomorphic relationship of space and our concept of being in is reversed. Instead of ‘in’ 
taking its cue from its physical concept, that is, of containment the opposite is accepted, 
viz., that it is considered primordially or originally, thus Heidegger claims that the 
physical conception of spatially being in derives from existential involvement, which is 
being-in. But moreover that this existential concept of being-in Dreyfus (1993: 43) shows 
stems from Dasein’s make-up: 
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Being-in (with a hyphen) is essentially distinguished from being in because 
Dasein takes a stand on itself by way of being occupied with things. Being-in as 
being involved is definitive of Dasein.  
 
Since what characterizes being human is that one is groundless, unsettled and open in 
one’s nature means that what defines Dasein at any given point in its existence is the self-
interpretations that arise out of  particular practices engaged in. Thus, in the sociabilities 
of being in-business Dasein might be led to interpret its being in relation to such 
involvement, or if it be being in-love then similarly this would be the basis of Dasein’s 
view of itself. So, if, we now consider what being-in-the-world is supposed to mean from 
the point of view of an existential understanding, then it would take the form of a 
meaning that sees Dasein’s relation to the world as one of many involvements and not a 
spatial concept as such. The question that begs here is how one would describe this 
particular type of relationship to the world and what is it that orients such a 
predisposition.  
 
To be sure Dreyfus is not saying that Heidegger rejects the idea of a spatial or physical 
concept of what it means to be in something else that is contained, but rather that it is not 
the primordial or original concept, in other words being in is derived from the existential 
concept of being-in. But that we have bodies and that these bodies have organs in it as 
occurrent, that is isolated and determinate objects is without question. Notwithstanding, 
however, as primordial as this involved state of being-in-the-world is it is still predicated 
on a groundlessness and unsettledness, that is, a social being of homelessness.  
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Paradoxically Dasein or the human way of being is not at home in the world as a given 
state at all, it is ultimately strived for in the socio-cultural practices that Dasein throws 
itself into as a way of covering up what is at bottom an affective state that is never quite 
at-home in the world. Put another way being-in-the-world is Dasein’s way of coming to 
be a social being in relation to whatever ontology (understanding of being) is contained in 
its social activities and practices, and as such is never at home but always working to 
wards it. But since this way of being is a working towards a sense of belonging and being 
at home it is tied to the contingency of self-interpretations and hence Dasein home is of a 
protean nature. How then is this being-in-the-world to be understood and what defines its 
characteristic nature?   
 
In considering the existential understanding of being-in it was noted that Dasein conflates 
its condition with that of objects and thus the question arises as to how one should 
consider being-in-the-world in the presence of other objects and equipment. Be mindful 
that we are not including other Dasein or human beings which Heidegger reserves for the 
existential category being-with or mitsein. To distinguish the latter from being-in-the-
world   with objects and yet capture what that mode of being might be like Dreyfus 
(1993: 45) offers a different translation to the convention of Heidegger’s notion of sein-
bei  
 
… which is very badly translated as “being alongside.”  … Heidegger says 
directly: “There is no such thing as ‘side-by-side-ness’ of an entity called ‘Dasein’ 
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with another entity called world’ (81) [55] … I shall therefore translate sein-bei as 
being-amidst.  
 
What is at issue for Dreyfus is not to attenuate Heidegger’s existential concept of being-
in such that it becomes indistinguishable from the spatial concept entailed in objects and 
their being in as containment. Thus the idea of being alongside just does not cut it as an 
existential understanding of what it means to be involved in the world such that one is 
immersed in one’s activities, and thus there is in such a condition no space between the 
world and its activities. Using ‘being-amidst’ seems to capture that sense that one is 
amongst objects in such a way that one is defined by a relationship to these things. The 
point is that the kind of relationship to things and the world that is at issue here for 
Heidegger is captured by Dreyfus (1993: 45) accordingly:  
 
 
What Heidegger is getting at is a mode of being-in we might call “inhabiting.” 
When we inhabit something, it is no longer an object for us but becomes part of 
us and pervades our relation to other objects in the world. … Heidegger … calls 
this way of being-in “dwelling.”  … Dwelling is Dasein’s basic way of being-in-
the-world. The relation between me and what I inhabit cannot be understood on 
the model of the relation between subject and object.   
 
In ‘dwelling’ and ‘inhabiting’ the world it is no longer opposed to us it becomes that with 
which we share a relationship akin to a marriage which reconstitutes two entities for one 
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(married couple) even though two (husband and wife) are still discernible it is as a 
unitary whole (marital unit) that they now function and that in turn informs a 
reconfigured relation to social being, in general. The analogy of marriage is not made as 
much in relation to the communion between two beings in as much as it suggests a 
physical union, but rather because it is indicative of the modality of being that marriage 
connotes. If one considers a typical Christian marriage and the vows taken in such a 
union then what stands out is that each partner in the marriage pledges to take care of 
each other, and to preserve one another through all the existential crises one expects to 
encounter, as they set out to build a life together. It is in this sense of being-in-a-marriage 
that one may think of dwelling as it is not simply about staying in a marriage, but a way 
of being that involves a set of relations to each other and the union that is characterized 
by care, nurturing and self-sacrifice. With this in mind let’s consider Heidegger’s (1971: 
146-147) concept of dwelling to capture its core and attempt without too much 
elaboration to enter into his discussion of what a thing is and its relation to the gathering 
of the fourfold (earth, sky, divinities and mortals) and its relation in turn to building 
(constructing and cultivating) at this point.     
   
To dwell, to be set at peace, means to remain at peace within the free, the 
preserve, the free sphere that safeguards each thing in its nature. The fundamental 
character of dwelling is this sparing and preserving. It pervades dwelling in its 
whole range. That range reveals itself to us as soon as we reflect that human being 
consists in dwelling and, indeed, dwelling in the sense of the stay of mortals on 
the earth.  
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To dwell as described by Heidegger above is simply to let things be that is to ‘live and let 
live’ and as such means to inhabit the world in such a way that humans are unobtrusive in 
their presence. This way of social being of Dasein as existence, that is, being-in-the-
world exhibits its concern and care for being, and thus is of the character of sparing and 
preserving. However, to be sure this should not be taken to mean that in viewing that 
which shows up, it emerges in a vision of detached and objective contemplation, rather 
like theoretical or scientific vision. By contrast to the latter the former vision is the vision 
of wonder and comes from the sociality which is a modality of dwelling with the 
sociabilities of sparing and preserving. At bottom one is in fact dealing with an 
ontological vision, that is, it has an understanding of what it means to be and to let be 
(gelassenheit) from one whom temporally speaking is passing through and is of an 
ephemeral nature and thus is concerned and cares for its social being. The reference to 
dwelling and its whole range and mortality Heidegger (1971: 147-148) ties to his concept 
of the ‘gathering of the fourfold’ and a particular understanding of world or sociality and 
thus what it means to be for Dasein to be in-the-world.   
 
 
But “on the earth” already means “under the sky.” Both of these also mean 
“remaining before the divinities” and include a “belonging to men’s being with 
one another.” By a primal oneness the four-earth and sky, divinities and mortals-
belong together in one. … The mortals are the human beings. [The] simple 
oneness of the four we call the fourfold. Mortals are in the fourfold by dwelling. 
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But the basic character of dwelling is to spare, to preserve. Mortals dwell in the 
way they preserve the fourfold in its essential being, its presencing. Accordingly, 
the preserving that dwells is fourfold.  
 
We now have some concept of Heidegger’s (1971: 148-149) understanding of Dasein’s 
dwelling that is tied to a concept of world as expressed in the fourfold though how 
dwelling relates to each of the elements of the fourfold still begs. Thus:    
 
Mortals dwell in that they save the earth- … To save really means to set 
something free into its own presencing. … Mortals dwell in that they receive the 
sky as sky. … they do not turn night into day nor day into harassed unrest. … 
Mortals dwell in that they await the divinities as divinities. … In the very depth of 
misfortune they wait for the weal that has been withdrawn. … Mortals dwell in 
that they initiate their own nature- their being capable of death as death-into the 
use and practice of this capacity, so that there may be a good death. 
 
One may be tempted to think of Heidegger’s thinking as a call to the simplicity of the 
social being of a traditional peasant lifestyle to which his recourse to the example of a 
Black forest farmhouse seemingly lends credence, though such a petty-bourgeois 
hankering hardly seems appropriate and plausible in our contemporary age. What seems 
closer to his thinking is that dwelling, that is, sparing, preserving and caring need to be 
the guide to our practices and thinking and not some notion of a nostalgic return, for this 
may just the same miss the crucial point. This crucial point may act as a counterpoise to 
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our technological condition of transforming our world into an objectless standing reserve 
in which everything including human beings themselves are turned into resources and 
rendered available and disposable as modern technologies assault of our planet testifies. 
Notwithstanding within this technological trajectory and its enframing is the possibility 
of maintaining our dwelling as mortals and our connection to being-in-the-world as the 
preserving of the fourfold. To this end Heidegger (1971: 149) asks:  and answers: 
 
But if dwelling preserves the fourfold, where does it keep the fourfold’s nature? 
How do mortals make their dwelling such a preserving?  
 
He (ibid) answers his own questions and in so doing opens a path which may serve as site 
not only to maintain the sensibility of dwelling but possibly recast how one views that 
which is brought forth through technology and its relation to being as dwelling and being-
in-the-world.  
 
Mortals would never be capable of it if dwelling were merely a staying on earth 
under the sky, before the divinities, among mortals. Rather, dwelling itself is 
always a staying with things. Dwelling, as preserving, keeps the fourfold in that 
with which mortals stay: in things. … Dwelling preserves the fourfold by bringing 
the presencing of the fourfold into things. But things themselves secure the 
fourfold only when they themselves as things are let be in their presencing. How 
is this done? In this way, that mortals nurse and nurture the things that grow, and 
specially construct things that do not grow.  
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The fourfold or that sense of the sociality of the world as gathering in things does not 
inhere as preserve of Dasein, but does arise as an existential capacity borne out the fact 
that existence is an issue for Dasein; and hence from whence cometh the structure of care. 
It is this capacity for care and thus its connectedness with staying and preserving that 
Dasein brings to bear in its dealings with nature and techne (producing things) that allows 
the fourfold to presence itself. Thus, Dasein does not create the fourfold but enables it to 
be manifest in the being of things through its modality of being of dwelling that is the 
staying and preserving, or its way of social being that it presences in-the-world.  Clearly 
not everything that is produced, or built qualifies as a thing with the gathering qualities of 
the fourfold, and certainly most technologically produced things are part of an 
equipmental nexus, and as such cannot be left to be in itself and allow for a gathering of 
the fourfold. In fact Heidegger goes as far as to suggest that technology is not capable of 
producing things as stated but only objects. There are alternate suggestions by Borgmann 
(1983) who makes something of an argument for an articulation of technology and focal 
practices which has the power of a fourfold gathering while Feenberg (1986, 1991) 
argues for a secondary level of technological gathering and Dreyfus and Spinosa (1991) 
take the position that technology does have the power to gather, and as such is capable of 
producing things. Dwelling, in the way Heidegger describes it, is an unobtrusive modality 
of being, in fact, it is contrasted with the technological modality in which nature is 
“challenged-forth” and all that comes within its purview is transformed into a standing 
reserve without so much as the status of an object remaining let alone a thing. This is its 
fate under the aegis of enframing and the technological imperative of the standing 
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reserve, which the transformation of things and objects and even Dasein itself into 
resources. 
 
To return to the matter ‘at hand’: in the main our discussion sought clarity on what 
Heidegger meant by dwelling and how this related to the two modalities of being-in-the-
world and being in the world. In closing this section on dwelling we make the inference 
that dwelling is related to being-in-the-world and thus engages being existentially such 
that the mode of vision that is relevant is circumspection as it is tied to staying, 
preserving and caring. What is seen in this modality of vision as a function of dwelling 
would be stand-alone ‘things’ appearing as natural products or as that which have been 
constructed with staying, preserving and caring in mind. Moreover, that dwelling 
instantiates a mode of vision which makes of the fourfold a field of vision in which what 
is rendered visible are ‘things’. The latter speaks to the modality being-in-the-world. By 
contrast a more truncated vision is instantiated in the presencing of that which arises out 
of the modality of being in the world and a visionary being that is detached and without 
context viz. curiosity. And finally furthermore in being in the world but from the context 
of a theoretical or scientific paradigm the vision is certainly richer than the latter though 
in both instances what emerges from the latter line of vision and the field of disciplinary 
vision are objects that is that which stands opposed to being in the duality of subject-
object relations.   
 
.    
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The question of how things relate to each other as discrete objects that are juxtaposed to 
each other does not presuppose a relationship as such; in other words it does not inform 
the way said objects relate to each other as these things do not exist as such, and thus are 
not in a position to take a stand on things or develop some self-interpretation thereto. 
Furthermore, the existential state of being-in-the-world is such that what is seen does not 
arise in relation to the duality of a subject and object, but, rather, is informed by a field of 
involvement. Thus what is encountered is disclosed as a function of dwelling or 
inhabiting the world and brings to the fore a practical involvement that is not predicated 
on intentionality with mental overtones as such. This is the same way one’s relationship 
to the world is de-distantiated by one’s involvement and as such is not opposed to us as in 
a subject-object duality, so too is vision a function of involvement where this is the mode 
of being in which one is relating to the world.  
 
The point here is that this mode of vision about which we will expand later is deemed by 
Heidegger to be the primary modality stemming as it does from our relation to the world 
in terms of what it means for something to be used in one way or another and is translated 
from “Zuhandenheit” as a mode of intelligibility which presents things as “ready-to-
hand” (Heidegger, 1962, 1996). To emphasise this modality of being conventionally 
translated as ready-to-hand for its utilitarian dimension Dreyfus (1993) retranslates 
Heidegger’s “Zuhnadenheit” as “availableness”. We will use both terms interchangeably.  
 
What we need to bear in mind is that there are two modes of being that are at issue in 
terms of how we relate to the world and thus how we encounter objects and thus how we 
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see things. With respect to being-in as the existential relation of involvement and its de-
distanciation Heidegger refers to the kind of vision that takes place in this regard as 
“circumspection” and is what arises in our “concernful dealings with the world” and what 
it entails in its mode as “ready-to-hand” or availableness as tools or equipment. By 
contrast being in as a physical and spatial concept arises as a derived modality of being 
from the latter which as we will discover later emerges when there is a breakdown or 
disturbance in our circumspect involvement and thus what was available becomes 
unavailable. When this occurs, objects take on a discrete and detached mode of being 
from their contexts, that is Dasein no longer relates to the latter as being-in-the-world but 
instead as earlier stated objects assume a mode of intelligibility as “present-at-hand” or as 
Dreyfus translates it as occurrent”, that is, that it just occurs before us. It is in this manner 
that one’s vision loses its involvement in its context and takes the form of a detached 
viewing we associate with a theoretical vision though it does not discount a pre-
ontological understanding only that it is decontextualised and de-worlded as taken out of 
an equipmental whole.  
 
And it is in this mode of things being occurrent or present-at-hand that we encounter the 
world in the modality of a subject-object duality and are thus able to encounter objects in 
the mode of intelligibility of the disinterested and objective observer, the way of being of 
theory and science, and only thus is the derived vision of presence-at-hand made 
manifest. It is only then that we may speak of being in the world as a physical space in 
which there are objects that we are alongside and able to see in a detached and 
decontextualised manner as things in themselves.  
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There is, however, an important distinction that needs to be brought to bear on the 
detached viewing at issue here and that is that Heidegger does not view theoretical vision 
as a context-free seeing, but rather that such viewing is recontextualised in relation to the 
disciplinary parameters of the theory or science that informs such a vision. Unlike the 
latter there is the vision with its own modality of being that comes with a ‘staring’ and 
‘not tarrying’ which Heidegger (1996) associates with “curiosity” and what Dreyfus 
(1993) calls a “pure occurrentness”. What need concern us here as the latter will be taken 
up extensively later is that theoretical vision and the vision associated with curiosity are 
modalities of being and vision that take over from our involvements and circumspect 
vision associated with readiness-to-hand.  
 
With the shift to the modality of being of presence-at-hand vision is extricated from its 
modality as circumspection and becomes one of theoretical reflection. However, in 
dealing with the subject – object juxtaposition and the cognitive centering of 
representation we need to put into Heideggerian perspective what is entailed in 
perception and how this relates to our sociality as being-in-the-word and our related 
sociabilities as intentional comportments, that is, how we relate to that which we 
encounter and how these are rendered intelligible. And finally what does this say about 
our existential – ontological understanding of social being from the vantage point of the 
usability of equipment and its context worldliness and circumspection or readiness-to-
hand and in the breakdown of the latter and its recontextualisation in theory and science 
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and reflective observation and finally in the decontextualisation of curiosity and its 
staring distractedly.   
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Chapter Six 
Hermeneutic Phenomenology of Perception: perceptual 
intentional comportment as counterpoise  
 
 
We have previously taken up ontological and epistemological import of the modality of 
vision in Greek thinking and here again this theme comes up, but this time with the added 
dimension of its role in constituting the very ground of some abiding philosophical 
problems. The central problem that was addressed previously was that associated with the 
subject object distanciation, which set up as a ‘vision condition’ and as such expressed 
together with the ‘technological condition’ something of a detachment from our social 
being and existential involvement in-the-world.  
 
To set the scene for this chapter we ad that it is this very problem that we are engage in, 
in methodology, in Sociology, and that grounds our very understanding of the 
epistemological dualism separating subject and object in research practice. What we 
claim, here, is missing in this epistemological encounter and our understanding thereof, is 
that the prior moment in which such a virtual ‘calculus of observation’ is seen to be 
derived from, is not taken cognizance of, in the very ocular domain that is simultaneously 
its raison d’etre. In other words the dualities of subject and object, perceiver and 
perceived and appearance and essence are not derived from epistemology as such, but 
rather from the stance initiated by an ocular subject under the sway of a particular 
modality of vision. It is in this regard that we can speak of occularcentrism and the 
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hegemony of vision in so far as its presence is concerned in theory per se, and the subject 
– object distanciation and objective detachment from social being.  
 
What is at issue here as far as the latter model of vision is concerned is that the 
primordiality of being-in and its existential dimension of spatial compression is inverted 
and subsumed in the derivative mode of being in, as spatial distanciation of the 
theoretical dimension of being. Thus, an existential vision of the first order comes under 
the adumbration of a theoretical vision of the second order, and worst still under the 
tarrying vision of curiosity (see 7.3.1) of the third order. In making the claim that vision 
and its practices lie at the heart of the epistemological dualities does not detract from the 
fact that the latter is entrenched in our very modalities of thinking, and institutionalized 
as such in our academies.  
 
In this chapter we engage with vision insofar as it constituted in our perceptual structure 
and set up an alternative to the subject – object distanciation of vision, in the intentional 
comportment of perception and as such reorient vision in an existential – ontological 
understanding of being and thus offer it up as corrective and counterpoise to the 
interpolation of social being by modern technology and its way of potentially revealing 
‘everything’, that is, be-ing as standing reserve  Thus,  in taking this Heideggerian line of 
thinking we are moving towards the question of how we redress the nihilistic project 
attached to the way of revealing of the standing reserve as the imperative of modern 
technology and its ‘enframing.  And to this end we turn to the intentional comportment of 
the perceptual structure with vision as our case in point.  
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6.1 Theoretical knowledge, intentionality, perception, comportment and being-in-
the-world  
In the relegation of theoretical knowledge beneath practical knowledge, in Heidegger, 
according primacy to the mode of being of ‘ready-to-hand” (see 7.1.1) over that which is 
“present-at-hand” (see 7.1.2.3 and 7.1.1), does he in fact simultaneously reject the 
epistemological value of theory and science. And if so, is the casualty similarly the 
visionary being thereto attached. This is what we address in this chapter in relation to its 
encounter and concern with being and Dasein. To jumpstart this discussion, the response 
to our introductory question is an unequivocal no in as much as the issue rests in a 
particular understanding of how the two modalities of being of objects are related to each 
other and their import for being-in-the-world, that is, social being. However, there is a 
more fundamental issue at hand for Heidegger which Dreyfus (1993: 45) takes up 
accordingly: 
 
Traditional philosophy has, since the time of Plato, maintained that knowledge is 
gained by means of detached, disinterested inquiry. … The whole array of 
philosophical distinctions between inner subjective experience and the outer 
object of  experience, between perceiving and the perceived, and between 
appearance and reality arise at this point, and “it becomes  the evident point of 
departure for problems of epistemology or the metaphysics of knowledge” (86) 
[59] and outer     
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Given this state of affairs that we have previously taken up in the subject – object 
distanciation, the question that is now of concern is , how does Heidegger propose to 
break us out of what has become an intuitive way of thinking for his counter-intuitive 
understanding? Dreyfus captures (1993: 45) the thrust as  
 
Only by exposing the derivative character of the detached, reflective stance, 
Heidegger holds, can we see the limits of subjective consciousness and the objects 
it knows. … To break out of the epistemological tradition, we must begin with 
everyday involved phenomena and then see where consciousness and its 
intentional content fit in.   
 
This bears out the successive and derivative order of the practical and existential, socially 
contextualized domain and the theoretical and detached, socially de-contextualized, but 
theoretically recontextualised domain,  though its counterintuitive nature is that (ibid): 
 
Heidegger holds that human experience (Erfahrung) discloses the world and 
discovers entities in it-and yet this does not entail the traditional conclusion that 
human beings relate to objects by means of their experiences (Erlebnisse), that is, 
by way of mental states. This view defies common sense and a long philosophical 
tradition. 
 
What we have here is an understanding of the recessive role of vision or perception in the 
encounter of entities in as much as it is deemed a function of experience, that is, what we 
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in fact do rather than what we see. The field of visibility as mode of intelligibility 
emerges through the domain of the practical and not the theoretical as its primary and 
initial encounter. Thus the crux of the problem, for Heidegger as Dreyfus (ibid: 46) points 
out holds equally for Polanyi (1962)  and Kuhn (1970) , is  
 
That the theoretical, disinterested knowledge that is correctly described in 
subject/object terms has been held up as the best example of knowledge for the 
last 2,500 years presupposes practical knowledge and involved “know-how” that 
cannot be accounted for in terms of theoretical knowledge. According to these 
thinkers theoretical knowledge depends on practical skills.   
 
What we have, in the triad of Polanyi, Kuhn and Heidegger, as presented by Dreyfus 
(1993) above, is an inversion of the traditional understanding that theory is the primary 
mode and practical knowledge its derivative. However, the issue at hand, and its 
pertinence for an existential concept of being-in-the-world, and its relation to vision, does 
not revolve around the debate, as to whether mental content or representation in the mind 
precedes the relation with the world, or the primary act of vision, or whether there is no 
mediation between the subject and object of the world or perception. And, if there is no 
mediation between subject and object in the existential sense of being-in-the-world, then 
how does Heidegger understand Dasein’s particular involvement in the world. Put 
differently, what is the nature of Dasein’s dealings with the world such that in its 
primordial modality it is free of mental overtones? This does not hinge as Dreyfus 
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(1993:49-51) makes clear in Heidegger (1962) privileging the practical over the 
theoretical, but rather 
 
… he wants to show … that neither practical activity nor contemplative knowing 
[theory] can be understood as a relation between a self-sufficient mind and an 
independent world.   
 
For, if Heidegger sought merely to reverse the order giving priority to the practical, he 
would still for all intents and purposes be caught within the traditional view, which 
posited a “self-sufficient” mind at work, and thus would be found wanting as regards his 
existential concept of Dasein, as unsettled and groundless. More than this; his notion of 
an involved being-in-the-world would be replaced by a detached contemplative spatially 
located being in the world. And finally, he would be strained to maintain a derivative 
order that prioritizes the practical over the theoretical as self-sufficient mind. To obviate 
these obvious contradictions, Heidegger is required to take a more radical position, and to 
this end Dreyfus (1993: 49-50) gives us the benefit of his insightful analysis by pointing 
out that. 
 
The focal problem is thus not what kind of intelligibility- theoretical or practical- 
is more basic, but how to get beyond the traditional account of intentionality 
altogether.  
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But to get beyond the traditional account of intentionality means having to reckon with 
Husserl and his conception which Dreyfus (1993: 50-51) summarizes for us, thus, 
immeasurably simplifying our task of coming to terms with Heidegger’s particular view. .   
 
Speaking of intentional content is meant to capture the fact that perceptions, 
beliefs, desires, intentions, and so on can all be directed toward the same object 
under the same aspect. … Heidegger sees, however, that such an account already 
introduces the subject/object distinction. It allows the separation of an intentional 
content that is mental from an objective world that may or may not be the way the 
mind takes it to be. Husserl defined phenomenology as the study of the intentional 
content remaining in the mind after the bracketing of the world. Heidegger 
accepts intentional directedness as essential to human activity, but he denies that 
intentionality is mental, that is, as Husserl (following Brentano) claimed, the 
distinguishing characteristic of mental states.  
 
It would seem that Heidegger agrees with the phenomenological understanding of 
intentionality, but only in so far as it captures its essence as that which is “directed 
towards” something. However, in so far as Husserl albeit minimally attributes to 
intentionality a mental content he loses Heidegger who emphatically denies any such 
mental association. This means that in as much as one is dealing with an existential 
concept of Dasein as ‘being-in-the-world, that is, social be-ing, we have an intentionality, 
that is as such, directed toward the world or the social. But what leaves one gasping, 
somewhat, is that this directedness is not held to be in any ‘shape or form’ of mental 
 
 
 
 
 261
origin. And, in so far as it relates to its original or primordial engagement with the world, 
and entities therein it is not of a cognitive centering but of a social bearing. And, because 
Heidegger’s intentionality is neither as said related to any mental shape or form, nor is it 
deemed to be directed towards the world, on the basis of a perceptual or visionary being 
constructed traditionally in the duality of subject and object. The fact that Heidegger 
seeks to and does step beyond the mode of intentionality of the practical, and the 
theoretical requires from him an epistemological leap into a new inventory of concepts. 
To this end the concept that he formulates to take account of his particular concerns,  and 
his critique for and of the mental bias in intentional content, Dreyfus (1993: 51) relates 
his innovation accordingly:  
 
To get the ontology right Heidegger introduces his own term for the way human 
beings relate to things, Verhalten, translated as “comportment.”   
 
 To give an account of what comportment means, Dreyfus (1993: 51) refers us directly to 
Heidegger (1975: 58) who though specific in his conception, is also seen to be somewhat 
guarded: 
 
Comportments have the structure of directing-oneself-toward, of being-directed-
toward. Annexing a term from Scholasticism, phenomenology calls this structure 
intentionality.   … this enigmatic phenomenon of intentionality is far from having 
been adequately comprehended philosophically.  
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The reference, to the matter of adequacy, at the level of the conceptualization of 
intentionality, has been included to add weight to the critique of the traditional view of 
intentionality, as far as its mental overtones are concerned. However, the focus here is of 
a positive order in so far as we seek clarity on Heidegger’s concept of comportment, in 
relation to the primordial relation of being-in-the-world, and our own immediate concern 
for its articulation with perception, or vision more narrowly, to be taken up a little later. . 
What distinguishes Heidegger’s adoption of the concept comportment and its meaning is 
that as Dreyfus contends he: 
 
… uses “comportment” to refer to our directed activity, precisely because the 
term has no mentalistic overtones. He points out that the whole machinery of the 
mental is a construction of the theorist, not the result of phenomenological 
description. He thus takes comportment or intentionality as characteristic not 
merely of acts of consciousness, but of human activity in general. Intentionality is 
attributed not to consciousness but to Dasein.  
 
In other words, comportment, or that directed activity towards something, arises from 
Dasein’s relationship to itself, in so far as it involves a concern and a care for the stand 
that it takes with regard to its own existence and the self-interpretations that arise from 
this concrete existence. That is that Dasein’s relation to itself and its self-concept arises in 
relation to the stand that Dasein takes on its existence, that is, its social being, as concrete 
phenomenon located in the cultural formation, in which Dasein finds itself or is thrown in 
by ‘dint of circumstance’. The directedness of intentional comportment issues in the self-
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interpretations and that understanding of being contained therein and the stances it takes 
vis-à-vis the concerns it takes up in its social be-ing.  
 
We have already gone over the ground, in which it was shown, that Heidegger’s 
fundamental question of being, and the understanding thereof albeit ‘vague and dim’, is 
acquired through the process of socialization. And furthermore, that this latter process is 
not an exercise of the intellect, but one of involvement and immersion, a domain of 
practice. Thus, by relating comportment to Dasein’s existential structure Heidegger is 
able to keep the directed sense of intentionality, but dislodge himself from its mentalistic 
overtones.  In considering vision, or as Heidegger deals with it as perception, we seek 
similarly to establish what the nature and structure is of the intentionality and the 
comportment that accompanies it. And it is primarily for this reason that we enter into 
this discussion on intentionality and comportment and its relation to the existential 
complex or Dasein as such. To arrive at such sought after clarity we need to ‘see’ how 
Heidegger is able to move beyond the issue of practical and theoretical intentionality; for 
as already stated one is dealing with more than a case of substituting the former for the 
latter. The scope of this analytical task that befalls Heidegger, Dreyfus (1993: 52) puts 
into the following perspective. 
 
Heidegger is thus clear that the priority of knowing in Husserl cannot simply be 
supplemented by action. Rather, the whole idea of transcending from the inner to 
the outer must be revised. Heidegger criticizes the traditional account of everyday 
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intentionality, what he calls “ontic transcendence” for overlooking a more basic 
way of being.  
 
 
We have variously discussed the implications of the epistemological duality of subject-
object distanciation and the matter of transcendence implicated, in such a construction, in 
relation to the de-distanciation encompassed in, being-in-the-world as opposed to being 
in, as spatial concept. What is at issue here is to show that being-in-the-world does not 
entail an intentionality that is predicated on “ontic transcendence”, that is, a relation of 
exteriority that resides in a comportment with beings, but rather its apposite.  In other 
words from whence cometh this capacity for relating to what Heidegger calls 
“intraworldly beings”, or put in the language above what enables our capacity to relate to 
objects in our everyday world, for ontic transcendence or comportment with objects. Of 
direct significance our capacity to fall into a technological milieu of gadgets and gizmos 
which in one moment is not around and in the next find it almost impossible to have 
managed life without it such personal computers, cellular phones and the like. The crux 
Dreyfus (1993: 52) points us to is found in Heidegger’s (1984: 134) conceptualization of 
the relation of intentionality and ontic transcendence and what in fact lies beneath this 
relationship:  
 
Intentionality is indeed related to beings themselves and, in this sense, is an ontic 
transcending comportment, but it does not primordially constitute this relating-to 
but is founded in a being-amidst beings. This being-amidst is, in its intrinsic 
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possibility, in turn grounded in existence. In this way the limitations of the earlier 
interpretation and function of the concept of intentionality become clear, as does 
its fundamental significance.   
 
    
Proceeding from the traditional epistemological duality of subject-object relations one is 
bound to an understanding of knowing as residing within the epistemic subject and thus 
the problem of transcendence arises in that one needs to show how we move from the 
inside of the subject’s mind  to the outside to reach objects. This problem of 
transcendence, that is, leaving the provenance of the knowing subject Heidegger takes up 
and we will deal with it momentarily; the issue at hand here is the problem of 
transcendence from the vantage point of  intentionality as comportment,  in as much as it 
relates to the directedness that is located in the beings themselves, that is, ontically.  
 
If, this intentionality which is comportment is not hooked into an epistemic subject and 
neither is it to be located in a pragmatic subject, then how is the transcendence of 
intentional comportment, that is, sans mentalistic overtones to be achieved, but in being-
amidst-things. This being-amidst-beings presupposes a being-in, which in turn is another 
way that Heidegger speaks about existence and which has sociability involves a particular 
kind of sociality. And this existence, or being-in, in turn is another way that Heidegger 
speaks about a human way of being or Dasein which we take as a field of sociality, a 
social be-ing. Thus, this capacity for “relating-to” that is prior to knowing is made 
possible by the ‘Da’ of Dasein, that is, the “throwness” or “thereness” of the human 
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condition, as a being that is always cast or thrust in-the-world, without ‘rhyme or reason’ 
amongst objects and with-people. It is this being outside itself that is being-in-the-world 
and the two modes of transcendence its entails that is now in need of being tied to the 
constitution of Dasein and the structure of being-in. What this comes down to for 
Heidegger as Dreyfus (1993: 52) makes abundantly clear is:  
 
that all relations of mental states to their objects presuppose a more basic form of 
being-with-things which does not involve mental activity  
 
The crux to understanding ontic transcending comportment as a particular modality of 
intentionality such that it is free of mental activity we might find in Heidegger (1975: 
157) where he holds that:  
 
Intentionality belongs to the existence of Dasein. For the Dasein, with its 
existence, there is always a being and an interconnection with a being already 
somehow unveiled, without its being expressly made into an object. To exist then 
means, among other things, to be as comporting with beings… It belongs to the 
nature of the Dasein to exist in such a way that it is always already with other 
beings. 
 
Previously we referred to Heidegger, by way of Dreyfus, in which an account was given 
of the Dasein as emergent only after an initial socialization, that is, that to be human is 
not innate, but acquired in the socialization and acculturation that takes place in our 
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comportment with being-in (things, objects, Dasein or people and the Dasein-like or 
society, culture, institutions).  That precisely because the human condition is unsettled 
and groundless its existence is an issue for it and thus is of concern and care and involves 
taking a stand on that which is socially and culturally proffered and as such involves a 
self-interpretation which defines said Dasein or individual human. It is in this entire 
complex that is implicated in existence, in being-in-the-world, and which involves a 
directedness towards an understanding of being and beings that is emergent in said 
comportment that intentionality is given, and hence it’s ontic transcendence the ability to 
be amidst-things or to relate to things. In other words intentionality in as much as it 
involves the individual Dasein is directed towards a specific and concrete socio-cultural 
formation and thus is ontic, however in as much as it is transcendent it refers to the extent 
to which it cuts across and holds for other Dasein equally, within the same formation and 
lies externally in beings. But to address the matter of its transcendence is to 
simultaneously identify as Heidegger has done an aporia in traditional thinking on 
intentionality. More than this in accounting for the ground of ontic transcendence 
Heidegger (1984: 135) gets to the most basic way of being: 
 
Underneath the entire problem of the “relation” of “subject” to “object” is the 
undisclosed problem of transcendence…The problem of transcendence as such is 
not at all identical with the problem of intentionality. As ontic transcendence, the 
latter is itself only possible on the basis of originary transcendence, on the basis of 
being-in-the-world. This primal transcendence makes possible every intentional 
relation to beings. … The relation is based on a preliminary understanding of the 
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being of beings. This understanding-of-being first secures the possibility of beings 
manifesting themselves as beings.   
 
The question of how we relate to beings in our everyday quotidian order of being and 
make sense of that which we encounter is what is at the heart of ontic transcendence. 
Though not in the sense that it is contained in this order of intentionality but rather that it 
is held in its very condition of possibility is what Heidegger seems to be saying 
immediately above. Simply put we cannot make sense of beings if we do not have a sense 
of what it means to be. What is at issue here is, then, that which constitutes the sine qua 
non of an understanding of being, and that which in turn renders beings intelligible such 
that they are as such made manifest, seen and encountered, as such. The fact that 
Heidegger holds this primal relationship to be constitutive of the very intelligibility of 
being and beings he refers to it as an originary transcendence. Thus as primal, being-in-
the-world, and the understanding of being that it instantiates, is ipso facto prior to “every 
intentional relation to beings’. It is the basis through which we make sense of that which 
we encounter and deal with and thus it lies at the very basis of how we can come to be 
seized in a technological modality of being and a concomitant mode of intelligibility and 
perceptual order including vision.  
 
What this gives credence to is that Heidegger’s counter-intuitive claim that a theoretical 
way of knowing is not our most basic relation to being, neither does it account for the 
basic modality of being-in-the-world and thus our social being, its sociality and the 
sociabilities thereto attached as one of existential involvement only as detached objective 
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phenomena. In this regard the existential concept of being-in as an involved state in 
which no separation from the world is presupposed and which in turn presupposes all 
forms of knowing makes apparent that the model of perception and vision in particular 
which is constitutive of the epistemological duality is not the primary modality of being 
but a secondary one. We will show through Heidegger and Dreyfus in which ways the 
modality of theoretical, detached being is derived from the practical modality of 
involvement as it relates to our equipmental nexus (see chapter seven). And moreover, 
that it is not only a deficient mode (cannot account for existential involvement, which is, 
being-in), but also that it is not a normal state of knowing or being, that is, it arises out of 
a disturbance or breakdown in our practical and everyday coping-in-the-world.  
 
Now that we have shown how ontic transcendence relating to things, or intentional 
comportment is derived from originary transcendence or being-in-the-world, and that the 
latter presupposes an understanding of being and renders beings intelligible; we now 
move onto showing how this relationship of intentionality and comportment relates to 
perception and vision.  
6.2. Perception/Vision, intentionality and comportment 
The isomorphic relation between intentionality and transcendence is such that it is held 
by Heidegger (1975) that the former is derived from the latter. In other words 
intentionality is a function of Dasein’s originary transcendence, that is, social being and 
thus only possible because Dasein is predicated on existence as being-in-the-world and is 
comported to the world as such. For this reason Dasein’s being-in-the-world cannot be 
explained in terms of an intentional content, but rather, because being-in-the-world 
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involves a comportment, as such, it serves as basis for intentionality and not vice versa. 
However, if there is no intentional content by way of mental overtones in the 
comportment of originary transcendence does it mean that the same would hold for 
perception? Can one assume likewise that there is no self-referentiality in the primary 
visual relationship that occurs in the modalities of existential vision, that is the everyday 
quotidian order of ‘socialised vision’ and what has been called ‘ontical vision’ and 
‘ontological vision’ in which Dasein exists? In other words in the quotidian order of 
social being and everyday living as such what might the modalities of vision be,  that is at 
work here. In order to put ourselves in a position to answer this question we need to 
contextualize vision and perception in the light of the ontic and originary transcendence 
just laid bare.  
 
 
Firstly the issue arises as to how perception relates to the intentional comportment of 
ontic transcendence in so far as it too is considered to be free of mental states in the 
quotidian order of being. In this regard Dreyfus (1993: 58) draws a parallel between 
Heidegger’s concept of everyday action and perception and its critique of traditional 
views such that: 
 
Heidegger holds that the commonsense concept of action and consciousness 
misses the structure of our most basic mode of comportment. In opposition to the 
tradition, Heidegger wants to show that we are not normally thematically 
conscious of our ongoing everyday activity, and that where thematic self-
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referential consciousness does arise, it presupposes a non-thematic, non-self-
referential mode of awareness.  
 
We will consider the derivative relation between these two modes of being, when we 
engage, for explanatory purposes the difference between what Heidegger calls 
Zuhandenheit (ready-to-hand or availableness-see 7.1.1) and Vorhandenheit (present-at-
hand or occurrentness-see 7.1.3 ) and how this relates to vision. What is relevant here in 
terms of the development of a Heideggerian understanding of everyday vision is that this 
‘mindless’ ontic transcendence or intentional comportment relates similarly to perception. 
Dreyfus (1993: 58) opens up the discussion by laying out Heidegger’s terms of 
engagement which we will take up in greater detail as it lies at the hub of our visionary 
concerns:     
 
Heidegger suggests … that perception too is not self-referential … but is based on 
a non-self-referential openness to the world. Just as action absorbed in the world 
does not involve an experience of acting, a mental state self-referentially causing 
a bodily movement so, perception does not involve a visual experience: I am 
simply fascinated by and drawn into the spectacle of the world. …  [He] seeks to 
show how... everyday activity can disclose the world and discover things in it 
without containing any explicit or implicit experience of the separation from the 
world of bodies and things.  
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Here it is made explicit that Heidegger’s existential concept of being-in-the-world, as the 
originary modality, of Dasein does not require recourse to the epistemological duality, 
albeit paradoxically modeled on precisely the visionary stance, of subject-object 
distanciation for rendering things visibly intelligible. One need only make reference to 
one’s experience of deep involvement and immersion in some or other activity that 
absorbs our attention to such an extent that one becomes oblivious of everything else; 
even that which we are proximally involved with, to come to terms with what Heidegger 
is referring to by everyday activity and its lack of self-referentiality. In short one becomes 
oblivious of everything including the self and thus in this respect there is no cognitive 
centre directing us towards things in our involvement therewith, but rather it is the thing 
and its related activities to which we are comported.  
 
Though, it should be added that it does strain the bounds of incredulity to accept that 
what one sees in one’s involvement in-the-world is not the function of a visionary 
experience as such, but the field of visibility associated with one’s utilitarian relation to 
an existential world. In other words what one sees is a function of our understanding or 
relation to our understanding of the mode of being-in-the-world as existential 
involvement and serves as the horizon of intelligibility of what we encounter or perceive. 
We will explore this relation between our understandings of being (disclosure) and its 
bearing on the perceived (discovery). In particular how this perceptual complex as 
structure of vision is organized in relation to our intentional comportment that is our ontic 
transcendence and how this turn relates to our originary transcendence or being-in-the-
world and its social being, is what we seek in Heidegger’s thinking to ground our 
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understanding of vision per se and thus set up the ontological basis as Archimedean lever 
to dislodge us from the technological modality of revealing, the standing reserve.  
6.3 Perceiving, perceived and the perceivedness of the perceived 
We will now track into Heidegger’s (1982) analysis of the triadic perceptual complex and 
seek to distill the crux of his understanding, whilst scrupulously steering clear of his 
engagement with Kant, even though admittedly it is this encounter that informs the 
formers thinking. Dealing with Heidegger’s thinking is exacting enough that to add Kant 
to the fray would tend to complicate matters further and act to obscure rather than clarify 
what this concept of perception is about for the former and which is central in this chapter 
on vision. So at the risk of such philosophical decontextualisation and its attendant issues 
we proceed to the hub of Heidegger’s concept of perception. At bottom Heidegger (1975: 
57) takes the ‘view’ that:  
 
What we concisely call perception is, more explicitly formulated, the perceptual 
directing of oneself toward what is perceived, in such a way indeed that the 
perceived is itself always understood as perceived in its perceivedness. … In 
speaking of perceptual directedness-toward or of directing-oneself-toward we are 
saying that the belonging together of the three moments of perception is in each 
case a character of this directedness- toward. This directedness-toward 
constitutes, as it were, the framework of the whole phenomenon “perception”.  
 
The question that begs is why Heidegger (ibid) does, by his own admission, indulge in 
what is clearly quite tautological in its formulation such that we have “the perceived is … 
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understood as perceived in its perceivedness.” To arrive at a clear perspective on this 
‘tautology’ we need to recall that Heidegger’s critique of the metaphysical tradition and 
western philosophy rests on a reversal of the theoretical and practical comportments to 
being. Thus, whereas the tradition has held that the theoretical is the primary basis upon 
which knowledge of being is generated Heidegger by contrast hold that it is our practical 
and existential involvement that is primary. And, moreover that the theoretical in fact 
derives from the practical. In short, Heidegger seeks to challenge the view that we are 
first and foremost cognitively centered in the world and as such makes sense of being and 
beings.  
 
By contrast, Heidegger claims that we relate to the world primarily through our 
involvement with thing,s and each other in such a way that we are existentially centered 
and cognitively decentered. In fact our minds come to the fore only when there is a 
rupture or interruption in our quotidian everyday involvement in-the-world, which is 
‘mindless, so to speak. If, this is Heidegger’s take on our primary engagement in-the-
world, then what is at stake in his conception of perception is precisely to disengage the 
mind and the senses, as that which directs our awareness to things. It is after all our 
common understanding of perception that it is the “action by which the mind refers its 
senses to external objects as its cause” (Concise Oxford Dictionary). Heidegger in a move 
which counters the latter purges both the mind and sensations as fundamental to 
perception from the vantage point of his existential understanding of primary everyday 
day coping and dealing with the world circumspectively.  
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The tautology in Heidegger’s formulation evident in the relation between “perceiving, the 
perceived and the perceivedness of the perceived” now appears as a necessary discursive 
strategy to combat the cognitive centering and the epistemological privileging embedded 
in conventional philosophical and even scientific accounts of perception. In effect, then, 
Heidegger can be seen to be shifting the intentionality ostensibly behind perception from 
the mind to the structure of perception itself. The question, then, is what is to take the 
place of the mind as the active or intentional dimension of perception, or what is it that is 
responsible for the “directedness towards”, which Heidegger claims is evidenced in the 
perceptual complex and in the orientation of the self.  
 
.In this regard we need to refer back to the originary transcendence of our human way of 
being, namely, Dasein as being-in-the–world, so to speak, outside of ourselves as the 
basis of our intentional comportment or ontic transcendence , that is, our relation to 
things. It is ‘here’ or ‘there’ as beings-in-the-world that our capacity for, or intentionality 
as “directedness towards”, what is perceived arises, and thus being-amidst-things 
emerges as a specific comportment. Hence, in relation to the latter, Heidegger (1975) 
refers to the “pleonasm of intentional comportment”. The significance of this ontic 
transcendence, that is, how we relate to things, or our “intentional comportment and its 
concomitant redundancy, is what we are attempting to draw into the structure of 
perception, in so far as it involves how it is that we come to perceive things.  
 
Put differently what is the conditionality for the perceivedness of the perceived. In order 
to allow for greater clarity we will refer to Heidegger’s (1975: 48) treatment of the 
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equivalence of “perceivedness” as “uncoveredness”, and try to unhook the tautology of 
the ‘perceivedness of the perceived’. In this way we can reformulate, and hone in on, 
what Heidegger is probing for, by asking what is it that the uncoveredness of the 
perceived is attributed to, if we are not involving the intentionality of a conscious mind as 
that which is responsible, firstly for steering  the “perceptual directedness towards”  
whatever is to be perceived. And secondly, that this conscious mind is not where the 
uncovering of that which is rendered perceivable is taking place for this would contradict 
Heidegger’s claim that it is in the existential order of everyday quotidian involvement 
that our primary engagement with the world and what we come to know occurs. And lest 
we forget we need to note that in the uncoveredness of the perceived, is presupposed a 
certain coveredness which perception is able to lift so that, that which is encountered may 
become intelligible.  
 
The key, then, to the perceivedness (uncoverability) of the perceived and that which is 
perceived (uncovered), lies at the heart of a conception of vision and the visible that we 
are seeking to develop in this chapter, which is one that is able to account for the 
everyday quotidian order of an ‘involved seeing’ (circumspection) and its derivative a 
‘detached seeing’ (theoretical projection or curiosity). The move towards what we might 
describe as ‘ontological and ontic vision’, or the vision that enables a ‘seeing’ of what it 
means to be and a vision, and enables that which has thus been freed to be encountered in 
its visibility as thing, or equipment or object, hinges on linking the logic of comportment 
to the essence of the phenomenon of perception, through the kind of intentionality vested 
in both. This means showing what it is that they have in common, and secondly how the 
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latter is informed by the former in terms of its relation to the “subject” of perception 
namely, Dasein.  
 
Firstly, as regards their point of equivalence: Heidegger makes the case thus 
 
Comportments have the structure of directing-oneself-toward, of being directed- 
toward. … Every comportment is a comporting-toward; Perception is a 
perceiving-of. We call this comporting-toward … the intentio. Every comporting-
toward and every being-directed-toward has its specific whereto of the 
comporting and the toward-which of the directedness. This whereto of the 
comporting and toward-which of directedness belonging to the intentio we call 
the intentum. Intentionality comprises both moments, the intentio and the 
intentum, within its unity, thus far still obscure.       
    
In both comportment and perception what is common is that the self is being directed- 
toward something. What is noteworthy in Heidegger’s precise formulation is that it is not 
the self that is doing the directing, but rather like an actor in a play he or she is directed 
and as such falls into line with the ‘direction of the directing’. However, unlike the play 
where the directing is done by a director, in the form of a person, the comporting or 
perception is not directed by some social agent, but, and here we encounter the 
tautological structure again, by comportment and perceiving. This raises an interesting 
addition to sociological conceptions of agency in as much as social action and the rational 
minded actor is fully mindful of his comportments and as such in Weberian fashion as 
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“motivational explanation” (Keat and Urry, 1975: 146 and Freund, 1966: 96) is able to 
interpret his actions and define his motivations accordingly. Paradigmatically Ritzer 
(1983) describes Weber’s sociology the social definition kind as distinct from the social 
facts and social behaviorism.   
 
Thus, we have the basis albeit somewhat oversimplified for a “Sociology of Action” or 
an “Interpretive Sociology”. Though what has Heideggerian overtones for us is that it is 
through the socio-cultural framework, “verstehen” (Ibid) that the action makes sense for 
the actor and indeed for anyone who seeks to understand the motivation behind the act 
but because it carries mental overtones, is cognitively centered, it falls outside the ambit 
of a non-thematic circumspective absorption. By contrast in a behaviorist understanding 
of  “action” we have what amount to a reaction in as much as it is precipitated by some 
stimulus or set of stimuli external to the individual, and as such bereft of rational 
mindedness. The second is a form of socially programmed behavior. Here we have in 
various forms what may be associated with a Positivist Sociology, Empiricist Sociology 
or even a “Behaviorist Sociology”. However, the fact that the latter does not involve 
consciousness as such does not mean that it is in any way like that associated with a 
Heideggerian comportment. Considered in relation to action, which is putatively rational, 
the comportment we have in mind differs in as much as it does not operate with a 
centered consciousness as its primary relation to the world. Similarly, considered in 
relation to behavior the absence of consciousness is a superficial likeness in as much as 
the latter is completely mindless, a sort of tabula rasa, whereas comportment in 
Heidegger’s conception involves an understanding of being albeit ‘dim and ‘vague’ and 
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with it is thus an interpretive dimension, a social hermeneutic without which nothing 
meaningful is intelligible.  
 
And in this regard his hermeneutic phenomenology as chosen method is arrived at. 
Phenomenology is invoked by Heidegger though significantly altered to allow for an 
understanding of the being of beings to emerge in its fullness and thus encounter things in 
themselves. And the interpretive aspect attests to hermeneutics as that which is made 
possible through that prior understanding of being that is present though rudimentary in 
Dasein and which allows for the intelligibility of that which is perceived; conjointly they 
serve to disclose the existential structure of Dasein or the way of being human and thus 
the way of being of beings in general. Similarly as such hermeneutic phenomenology 
discloses the way of revealing that is a challenging-forth and uncovers its essence as the 
enframing of the standing reserve. 
 
Given the preceding we are pressed to ask. Do we have the condition of possibility of a 
“Hermeneutic Phenomenological Sociology” or a Heideggerian Existential - Ontological 
Sociology with the former its methodology? At this point, contradictions, not 
withstanding, we are merely signaling the direction we intend heading towards vis-à-vis 
the sociological ramifications that emerge as distinct possibility for attending to how we 
are shaping up to view the contemporaneous relationship between technology, vision and 
social being. In short we are asking in this thesis what type of sociology might be 
appropriate for us human beings who are existentially engaged in ‘being-in-a-
technological-world. These questions are anticipating the outcome of this theoretical 
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endeavor and is consistent with Heidegger’s claim that as ‘beings-in-the-world that is 
thrust beyond ourselves we have the tendency to get-ahead of ourselves. In having thus 
raised said questions of a disciplinary nature, and satisfied the tendency to get ahead of 
oneself, we can now return to the matter at hand, namely, how intentionality relates to 
perception and our constitution as Dasein..   
 
What we are hedging towards in Heideggerian vein is that intentionality, or the purpose 
and directedness of comportment which in our case is limited to perception, is of such a 
nature that it is not held to be the preserve of a conscious mind as its primary reality; but 
rather that its provenance is in the very structure of comportment. By extension it is also 
not in the object towards which it is directed that intentionality, or the purpose of 
perceiving is to be found; since as stated above it belongs to the structure of 
intentionality, which in turn is intrinsic to perception, or comportment in general. Having 
said this we are still not sufficiently in the know as to the nature of the intentionality 
Heidegger has in mind, in order to pinpoint its locus except to say that it is neither in the 
consciousness of the subject of perception, nor is it in the object as such, as this 
reproduces the subject-object duality, which is the target of his critique and contradicts 
his existential model of involvement. Even though we have been minimally able to state 
that intentionality is of the order of perception or generally of comportment we do so as a 
matter of deductive logic in that as far as it involves directedness, it shares this quality 
with perception and comportment. So what begs now though not necessarily in the order 
of appearance is how this comportment, perception in particular, and the intentionality 
contained therein are related to transcendence. Secondly, what the structure of 
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intentionality is and how is it related to the being of humans i.e. Dasein. And third what 
does intentionality mean for the structure of perception and how does this feature in an 
understanding of vision and its modalities of being, and what does it hold for modern 
technology and its modality of being and finally what does this all hold for our social 
being and our humanity.  
 
Heidegger’s (1975) strategy for dealing with these matters is to first displace by way of 
critique the misinterpretations that run interference in coming to terms with a clear and 
true understanding of perception. Thus he dispenses with two misinterpretations of 
intentionality bifurcated on the bases of objectification and subjectification respectively 
as it relates firstly to the “naïve, natural vision of things” (Heidegger, 1982: 59-60) and 
secondly to the “subjective in sensations, representations …” (ibid: 62).  We begin our 
discussion with former. 
We shall first attempt to characterize one misinterpretation of intentionality that is 
based exactly in the naive, natural vision of things. Here we shall orient ourselves 
again in connection with the intentional character of perception. “Perception has 
an intentional character” means first of all that perceiving, its intentio, relates to 
the perceived, intentum. I perceive the window over there. … The relation of the 
perception of the window manifestly expresses the relation in which the window, 
extant over there, stands to me as the human being, the subject, extant here. … 
The intentional relation can, it appears, be extant as a relation only if both the 
relational members are extant, and the relation subsists only so long as these 
relational members are themselves extant. … The intentional relation belongs to 
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the subject by virtue of the object’s being extant and conversely. All of this seems 
obvious.   
 
The basic argument is clear enough in as much as what obtains is that perception 
understood as “naïve natural vision of things” is a relationship that is based on a bilateral 
contingency. In other words perception comes into play only when a subject encounters 
an object, or an object is encountered by a subject and is as such made manifest in the 
relation so established between the latter and former. What renders this perceptual 
relation as intentional is that the perceiving subject is directed towards the object to be 
perceived. Simply put the ‘seeing’ subject intends the object e.g. the window to which it 
is directed to be ‘seen’. Taken to its logical conclusion the perceptual relation between 
subject (perceiving) and object (perceived) is in fact the intentional relation. Without 
either subject or object the perceptual relation does not obtain and thus no perceptual 
intentionality. We see here the subject – object distanciation discussed in the previous 
chapter and thus an expression of the vision condition as detaching us from social being 
and our existential involvement in society, our social being. This is in sum what the 
“naïve natural vision of things” amounts to and is in Heidegger’s estimation (1982) a 
misinterpretation of intentionality because:  
 
… in this characterization of intentionality as an extant relation between two 
things extant, a psychical subject and a physical object, the nature as well as the 
mode of intentionality is missed. 
 
 
 
 
 
 283
This is evident since, as presented above, intentionality is that relation which takes place 
between a subject and object and as such is once removed from the act of perceiving 
itself. Thus, if, as has been maintained that Heidegger locates intentionality in 
comportment, and perception is but one example of the latter, then intentionality is surely 
being overlooked in the perceptual structure. This happens to the case since as it is now 
been objectified in the transcendent relation that ensues between subject and object, that 
is, it is nether in the subject, nor in the object, but ‘between and betwixt’ the two in the 
relation of distanciation, as implied in the commonsense view of ‘natural vision’. In this 
objectified understanding of intentionality the subject is oriented by the object and thus 
directs the former accordingly. However, as Heidegger’s recourse to hallucinations taken 
up below to different effect has shown it is not in the object that intentionality resides for 
it is not extant. The matter of perception is then patently not as simple as accepting that 
what comes into the purview of vision is something natural, a consequence of an 
‘immaculate perception’. Taken at face value such a naïve conception of vision is 
mistaken, carrying with it a grave implication that has consequences for how we 
understand the visual experience existentially. In fact vision understood as natural, 
forecloses on an existential understanding of vision, and with it the possibility of 
understanding how it may relate to a technological modality of being  and thus elide an 
understanding of how social being is engaged in-the-technological-world . To obviate this 
discursive foreclosure we take up Heidegger’s (1975: 60) phenomenological thinking on 
perception which opens up his ‘existential – ontological ’ ‘perspective’ for us: 
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The mistake lies in the fact that this interpretation takes the intentional relation to 
be something that at each time accrues to the subject due to the extantness of an 
object. Implied in this is the notion that in itself, as an isolated psychical subject, 
this subject is without intentionality. 
 
What seems to emerge as at issue for a true understanding of intentionality as far as the 
structure of perception is concerned is to turn inwards, that is, towards the subject, though 
how we proceed in this regard is the critical matter at hand. To recall we have already 
established that Heidegger does not support the notion of a self-referential subject that is 
cognitively or theoretically centered in its primary and usual relationship in-the-world; 
thus we have to proceed cautiously on this issue. In order to elucidate his particular 
understanding of the nature and mode of intentionality Heidegger (1975: 60-62) uses the 
example of someone hallucinating that a room is full of elephants.  
 
We have here a directedness towards objects without their being extant. … -
because perceiving is intrinsically a comporting-toward, a relationship to the 
object, whether the object is extant actually or only in imagination. Only because 
the hallucinative perceiving has within itself qua perception the character of 
being-directed-toward can the hallucinator intend something in an imaginary way. 
I can apprehend something imaginarily only if, as apprehender, I intend in 
general. Only then can intending assume the modification of imaginariness. The 
intentional relation does not arise first through the actual extantness of objects but 
lies in the perceiving itself, whether illusionless or illusory. Perceiving must be 
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perception-of something in order for me to be able to be deceived about 
something.    
 
What this example of said hallucination illustrates is that the implication above that the 
“subject is without intentionality” does not hold as what is shown is that an object does 
not have to be extant, in the real sense in order for a perceptual relation to be instantiated. 
This means that it is not the object that precipitates the intentional relation as it is a 
hallucination. And if it is not the object then surely the subject has something to do with 
the intentionality that ensues in the perceptual relation in so far as it is ‘directedness-
towards-something’. It is after all the subject that is the one doing the perceiving and 
comporting, thus intentionality must at some level putatively rest in this subject. In any 
event there has to be at the very least an affinity if not symmetry between the constitution 
of the subject and perception or comportment, in general. This requires that we 
reconsider what is to be meant by the notion of a “subject” that is not of the self-
referential type and yet capable of intentionality in the way he or she is able to comport 
with things and accordingly perceive.  
 
In this regard Heidegger makes the general leap towards an existential claim in holding 
that we as human beings “intend in general”. The claim itself is consistent with the basic 
existential constitution of human beings and which is held to be of the nature of 
‘originary transcendence’ namely that we are a being-in-the-world and as such a social 
being. For this is the link between the subject and perceiving in as much as it held that the 
latter with its “character of being-directed-toward” is self-intentioned, then we have in 
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perception a transcendence, which is unhooked from the subject as self-referential and 
cognitively centered. In other words it is perception which reaches out towards the 
external and connects with objects not as a quality of an individual, self-contained 
cognitive subject, but on the basis that it arises from the comportment that comes from 
being-in-the-world, itself transcendent and originary, in that it makes for the possibility of 
all intentional relations. This ‘subject’ that emerges in Heidegger’s (1975:61) conception 
of perception is then not self-referential nor self-contained, but “self-comporting”. 
Moreover, in relation to comportment, Heidegger (1975: 61) spells out the nature and 
mode of intentionality thus: 
 
This relation, which we signify by intentionality, is the a priori comportmental 
character of what we call self-comporting. As structure of comportments, 
intentionality is itself a structure of the self-comporting subject. It is intrinsic to 
the manner of being of the self-comporting subject as the comportmental 
character of this comportmental relationship. It belongs to the essential nature of 
comportments, so that to speak of intentional comportment is already a pleonasm 
and is somewhat equivalent to me speaking of a spatial triangle.  
 
Here we are left without doubt as to the nature and modality of intentionality as that 
which reaches deep into our very constitution as human beings, into Dasein. What makes 
for the a priori character of intentionality in the self-comporting subject is, that as Dasein 
we are directed to the self in as much as we are required to take a stand on our existence, 
which as such is undecided, unsettled, and thus we are directed to take care and show 
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concern for what we do. Secondly, though, not in this order, we are directed towards the 
world in as much as we find ourselves with-others and amidst-things. In these senses 
intentionality as directedness-towards is indeed a priori. In as much as we are directed 
towards ourselves, in terms of our existence, we are self-comporting, and thus have 
intentionality which expresses itself in the choices we make, in so far as it is in turn 
directed towards social being as “authentic”, “inauthentic” or “undifferentiated”. Thus, 
intentionality is at the heart of our self-comportment. And finally, in as much as 
comportment is a directedness towards the world, self, others and things it is 
simultaneously an intentionality, and as such to speak of intentional comportment is 
tantamount to a redundancy. As to be human is already to be intentioned in one way or 
another to the self et al and as such is to be within the structure of comportment itself.  
 
In clarifying that intentionality is not an objective relation, but rather constituted in the 
self-comporting subject closes off one misinterpretation, but as Heidegger (1975) claims 
opens another, and that is the error associated with subjectifying intentionality. We will 
allow ourselves a brief explication as the analysis by Heidegger is conducted along the 
same lines as that which deals with the misinterpretation associated with the 
objectification of intentionality just taken up above. To move the discussion towards the 
real objective which is to establish the provenance of intentionality and thus arrive at the 
mode of being of perception, we will focus on Heidegger’s (1982: 63-64) discussion 
where he shows the intersection of intentionality with the way of being human, that is,  
Dasein while simultaneously dispensing with the second misinterpretation.  
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That toward which perception is directed in conformity with its sense is the 
perceived itself. It is this that is intended. What is implied… I do not first need to 
ask how the immanent intentional experience acquires transcendent validity; 
rather, what has to be seen is that it is precisely intentionality and nothing else in 
which transcendence consists. … This misinterpretation lies in an erroneous 
subjectivizing of intentionality. An ego or subject is supposed, to whose so-called 
sphere intentional experiences are then supposed to belong. … we shall in the 
future no longer speak of a subject, a subjective sphere, but shall understand the 
being to whom intentional comportment belong as Dasein, …, properly 
understood, … one of Dasein’s basic constitutions.  
 
What Heidegger debunks here is that intentionality operates at the behest of an ego 
centered subject who in turn directs the comportment of perception towards what is being 
perceived. In relocating the site of intentionality away from the subject he leap-frogs the 
problem of transcendence, that is, in how intentionality is able to leave the province of 
the subjective sphere and reach out and connect with the object. This is achieved in 
locating intentionality as he does in the comportment of perception itself, but this by all 
means is not sufficient as perceiving, as we well know, is carried by a being, in this case 
of the human kind. Now if this being is not of the ego centered kind, as this instantiates, 
as Heidegger contends, the Cartesian subject-object duality, and with it all manner of 
such like dualities, and thus misinterprets the provenance of intentionality, then we are 
left somewhat paradoxically with what one might call a ‘de-subjectified’ subject. And it 
is precisely this paradoxical construct that Heidegger has in mind when he attributes 
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intentional comportment to Dasein. It is not so much that we have, so to speak, a de-
subjectified subject, but rather that it is in existence that we become a human subject, that 
we become Dasein. This means that our starting point as such is not a subject as such but 
the field of possibilities for becoming an existential subject.  
 
It is in our constitution as Dasein, that is, beings for whom existence is a care and 
concern that our intentional comportment arises from, and not an internalized subjective 
experiential sphere. To clarify this fundamental nature Heidegger (1975: 64) specifies the 
logic of Dasein’s intentional comportment and in so doing offers an ontological 
distinction between Dasein and things in relation to their mode of social being:    
 
The statement that the comportment s of the Dasein are intentional means that the 
mode of being of our own self , the Dasein,  is essentially such that this being, so 
far that it is, is always dwelling with the extant. When … we give the concise 
name “existence” to the Dasein’s mode of being, this is to say that the Dasein 
exists and is not extant like a thing.  
 
We have previously given an account of dwelling (see 5.4), thus will not reiterate it here 
suffice to say that in relation to things as extant Dasein’s comportment to the latter is one 
of inhabiting the same space, and as such it is much like being-amidst unlike the subject-
object distanciation implied in the Cartesian concept of perception it by contrast entails 
the de-distanciation, de-severing or de-territorialisation implicated in involvement. 
Furthermore, at the level of originary transcendence, that is, being-in-the-world Dasein is 
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always with things and others, that is, already in a transcendent state of being, or in that 
ready state of intentional comportment, as directed-towards. The fact that Dasein is a 
being among beings does not mean that it is as such indistinguishable in its modality of 
being from other beings. As already discussed Dasein and Dasein-like beings differ from 
non-Dasein-like entities in the manner of the presence or absence of a hermeneutic, that 
is, an interpretation of what it means to be. Now at the level of intentionality we are also 
witness to a distinction that Heidegger (ibid) points out between Dasein and things, and 
speaks to the social being as a general comportment including how we relate to things. 
 
A distinguishing feature between the existent and extant is found precisely in 
intentionality. “The Dasein exists” means among other things, that the Dasein is 
in such a way that in being it comports towards what is extant but not toward it as 
toward something subjective. A window, a chair, in general anything extant in the 
broadest sense, does not exist, because it cannot comport toward extant entities in 
the manner of intentional self-directedness toward them. An extant being is 
simply one among others also extant.     
 
The distinguishing feature of Dasein is thus that it relates to extant things in the manner 
of an intentional comportment, that is, that it is always directed towards things, as things 
in themselves. This means that Dasein does not relate to things as sensations, or 
representational images that are mediated, but instead that things are encountered 
directly. However this relationship to extant things based upon self-directedness is of an 
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all encompassing nature, such that Heidegger (1982:66) finds in this intentional 
comportment or ontic transcendence that: 
 
The Dasein has this natural tendency to start by taking every being whether 
something extant in the sense of a natural thing or something with the mode of 
being of the subject- as an extant entity and to understand it in the sense of being 
extant. This is the basic tendency of ancient ontology and one that has not yet 
been overcome down to the present day because it belongs with Dasein’s 
understanding of being and its mode of understanding being.  
 
What we have here is not only an ontological distinction but an ontological 
misinterpretation as well. If it is not only a mistaken view of ancient ontology to mistake 
other Dasein that is existent subjects for extant objects, one remediable methodologically 
through Heidegger’s “destructuring” or Derrida’s “deconstruction”, but also in Dasein’s 
natural tendency and in its understanding of being, then how is it corrected. One can 
accept that with respect to the perception of extant things this generalization of the latter 
understanding of being poses no direct problem as such, but it certainly does not bode 
well for how we understand fellow beings and other Dasein-like beings. This brings us 
too close to collapsing the distinction between Dasein and things such that the issue of 
how we comport is absorbed into a modality reminiscent of the standing reserve’s way of 
revealing of modern technology.  
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Thus for clarity, that is, to obviate erroneous conflations what we turn to now is to the 
heart of the perceptual complex, which we see is neither objective nor subjective. In other 
words it not extant as stated in the relation between subject and object, nor is it inherent 
in the subjective sphere in the ego, but is inherent in the Dasein, that is, the existential 
structure of our human way of being-in-the-world as social being with its concomitant 
transcendence which is originary (basis for understanding being, in general). The issue at 
stake now for the matter of perception is how being-in the-world and its originary 
transcendence (social being) and being-amidst-things and its ontic transcendence 
(sociality) relates to the encounter of things in themselves, as that which is respectively 
rendered intelligible, and thus perceivable. Or, to put it in Heidegger’s tautological 
modality, what is it that enables the perceivedness of the perceived.  
6.3.1 Perception as unveiling and uncovering of being and beings  
We have unraveled the relation of perception to things extant in so far as we have 
established through Heidegger that intentionality is related to comportment in an much as 
the latter is premised in a directedness towards something. Thus, in perception it was 
shown that as modality of comportment it likewise held intentionality in its very 
structure. In this way it could be said that perception is always directed towards or 
intends the perceived with no reference to the conscious mind or the object or the relation 
between the subject and object. However, in having said that and shown that the nature of 
intentionality understood as such is tied to a subject and is not of a subjective type, but of 
the kind of Dasein, and that its constitution as existent is ultimately of a self-directed 
comportment; it remains to be shown what makes this encounter between the self-
directed intentional comportment possible, given its structural make-up, and that which is 
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perceived. What is it about Dasein and its existential complex that makes it possible for 
us to encounter things in themselves? What is it that reveals things to us in and of 
themselves, in such a, way that we see them for what they are, is to be our central 
concern.       
 
 
In coming to terms with what Heidegger understands by the intentionality of perception 
we are confronted with the claim that things as they are, or in their extant form are 
covered, that is, that they are not immediately apparent in and of themselves, apparent as 
such to the naked eye. There is thus no “bare perception” Heidegger (1987), no 
“immaculate perception” (Jenks, 1995) and no “innocent eye” (Mitchell, 1986). Instead 
in raising the matter of the ‘perceivedness of the perceived’, or perhaps with more clarity, 
the ‘uncoveredness of the perceived’ we are expected to conceptualize perception as 
involving an uncovering of that which exists, before it can, so to speak, be seen or enter 
the purview of vision, that is, become intelligible. What this then suggests is that how we 
relate to things, that is, our comportment to things involves an intentionality, which is 
directed to how something enters our perception.  In other words embedded in the act of 
perceiving there has of necessity to be some understanding of the thing and its extantness 
in order for there to be any perception of it as such at all.  
 
Put negatively, if we have absolutely no idea of what lies before us, then we cannot 
perceive it as something for which we have some awareness,, that is that it is this or that 
thing. In fact, Heidegger claims more than this, if we have no understanding of what a 
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thing is, then, we are not in a position to even perceive what lies before us as a thing. We 
are, in the latter, in such a situation, that we are confronted with a physical extension in 
space that is quite meaningless. If, we for the moment consider that certain species are 
programmed to pick out certain shapes that take on the form of food, or that present 
themselves as a threat to their being and do not register anything else, then we can 
understand what it is that their perception is directed toward and thus what is outside their 
field of visibility.  
 
Human beings by contrast as Dasein are of such a type that we can perceive all manner of 
forms that come into our purview or field of vision, and thus represent something like a 
field of disclosure emanating from our understanding of social being, that is, that 
ontological facility of understanding what it means to be, since this existential aspect is 
one that is unsettled that is not fixed as in most if not all other species beings. The point is 
that it is our comprehension of being, at the level of its generality, that opens up our 
perception to what is extant and what is existent. How do these two aspects sit in the 
structure of perception; and how does intentionality in perception sit when it is given the 
specificity of being directed towards uncovering that which is perceived; and what is it 
that is directed towards this uncovering are our concerns here. Put differently, what is the 
intentionality in perception, which lies prior to the uncovering of the perceived, and that, 
in other words, intends the perceivedness or uncoveredness and presupposes the latter.  
 
This takes us to the mode of being of perception. What lies at the heart of perception, or 
what is referred to as the ‘perceivedness of the perceived’ is the intentionality that is 
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contained in the directedness towards “uncovering” that which is to be perceived, and 
“unveiling” that which is simultaneously disclosed. We first take up the matter of 
uncovering as intentional modality in perception, as Heidegger (1975) does, even though 
it in a manner of speaking ‘succeeds’ the latter. If, there is an uncovering, of that which is 
perceived, in what way does Heidegger mean that things are covered, and, should this be 
so, how does it inform the structure of perception? Firstly, in relation to the mode of 
intentionality of uncovering it is necessitated Heidegger (1982: 68) claims because 
 
We can cover over the instrumental characteristics that in the first instance 
confront us in our natural commerce with such a thing as a window, constituting 
its utilitarian character, and consider the window merely as a natural thing.    
 
We will suspend for the moment that in covering over something, whether it be the 
matter of its instrumental character or whatever else, that it presupposes that there is in 
fact in place already an understanding of the mode of being of what is being perceived, as 
we are concerned presently with the matter of the nature of covering, and hence its 
uncovering. The primary level of covering over things that emerges above is that it 
occurs in our primary engagement or involvement in the world in terms of its use value or 
utilitarian character. Through this primary coping or dealing with things, our sociabilities, 
they are uncovered as a function of their usability. This suggests that in its primary 
modality things take on a utilitarian character, but that subsequent to this primordial or 
original comportment to things uncovered as such, these thing can in turn be covered up 
by different understandings of their modality of being. For instance, the window as 
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utilitarian thing, covered or understood as such in terms of its functionality, can also be 
considered as a natural thing and thus be covered or understood as such, and thus entails 
a different set of properties to those aspects yielded in use.  
 
The intentional comportment of perception thus understood in the aforementioned reveals 
an intentionality that is directed towards the uncovering of that which is perceived in 
terms of a particular mode of understanding of its being, about which more a little later. 
Therefore, from Heidegger’s understanding of the intentionality of perception as 
involving an uncovering of that which is perceived, one is able to debunk the idea of an 
innocent eye or immaculate perception. The implications of this understanding that 
perception is not some natural vision empty of understanding, but that from the vantage 
point of Dasein involves at its very centre an understanding of what it means to be, that 
is, in a word, of being.  
 
6.3.2 Perceivedness as counterpoise 
 
With this notion of perceivedness as an uncovering we now turn to Heidegger’s (1982: 
69-70) on how this relates to the structure of perception, and whether it is possible at all 
to encounter or deal with things, as they are in themselves. What appears to one as 
something of a seeming phenomenological contradiction is that, if perception is always 
mediated, then under what conditions is it held that its intentional comportment is one of 
uncovering or uncoveredness, where such a condition is always situated in an 
understanding of being. Heidegger (ibid) states emphatically that  
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Perceivedness belongs to perceptual intentional comportment. This makes it 
possible that the extant should be encountered in its own self. Perceiving uncovers 
the extant and lets it be encountered in the manner of a specific uncovering. 
Perception takes from the extant coveredness and releases it so that it can show 
itself in its own self. That is the sense of every natural self-circumspection and 
every natural self-orientation about something, and indeed because this mode of 
uncovering is implicit in perceiving, corresponding to its own intentional sense.    
 
What emerges is that, If it is in fact held that the mode of intentionality of perception is 
uncoveredness, then it is precisely this capacity which frees up that which is perceived 
from its covering, such that it is able to be in and of itself sans what happens to be 
covering its essence, that is what it is in its usability. In other words perception and its 
intentional comportment directed as it is towards uncoveredness is able, as such, to draw 
a distinction between what something is, namely it, essence (in use) from its modality of 
being, as presence, or that it is simply extant.. And rather than Dasein’s understanding of 
being facilitating another covering over of the being of something its task is in the order 
of demystification or a deconstruction, such that the cover recognized as such is lifted 
and in so doing the things being is able to emerge in its phenomenological essence as 
something in itself. Phenomenologically, then, one is involved in enabling something to 
be, or returning to the phenomena themselves, so to speak, by uncovering it so that it can 
be released for perception, and hermeneutically speaking one is disclosing the thing in 
terms of one’s understanding of being, the ‘horizon of intelligibility’, as in what makes a 
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thing a thing, an object an object, equipment, equipment. Unveiled as such we can turn to 
its aspects in use, or its theoretical properties when merely present before us. With 
respect to the window, as instrument, it is precisely this instrumentality which is lifted; or 
with it as natural thing, it is this modality of being, its ‘thingness’, which is uncovered, 
and thus in respect of both modalities of being, these are so to speak deconstructed such 
that the window, as example, emerges in its own self.  However, this release is not an end 
in itself as something owing to the integrity of the perceived, rather the intentionality of 
perception relates more fundamentally to perception is so far as it bears on its very 
condition of possibility. Thus Heidegger (1982: 70) states that 
 
Perceiving is a release of extant things which lets them be encountered. 
Transcending is an uncovering. The Dasein exists as uncovering. The 
uncoveredness of the extant is what makes possible its release as something 
encountered. Perceivedness, that is, the specific release of a being in perceiving, 
is a mode of uncoveredness in general. Uncoveredness is also the determination 
of the release of something in production or in judgment about ….     
 
What is important for us is to gain a perspective on vision such that we are clear about its 
constitutive nature. In other words it is not that things or objects are given as such, but 
that it is through the structure of perception and what it is that is brought to bear on that 
which is perceived, that we are able to encounter things in a meaningful way, even at the 
simplest determination of a natural thing. It is clear as already stated that we need to 
establish what lies so to speak prior to the possibility of something being uncovered so 
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that it may be encountered as such. What we are concerned with now is uncovering and 
uncoveredness as a mode of intentionality intrinsic to the perceptual structure as such. It 
is this facility in perception for ‘release’ that we seize upon as a means to engage the 
modern technological modality of revealing of enframing as ‘standing reserve’.  
 
Thus, in the logic of the uncoveredness which is contained in the intentional 
comportment of the perceptual structure, we have a vantage point, an Archimedean lever, 
so to speak, that can potentially dislodge and release ‘things’ to be encountered and dealt 
with in themselves, rather than as standing reserve. We can in a manner of speaking 
restore to things their dignity and integrity by retrieving them from the ‘thinglessness’ 
and objectlessness of the standing reserve, but only insofar as the field of disclosure 
which is Dasein, that is, our way of being human does not lose its sociality and sociability 
as social be-ing.  
 
The technological condition, and its danger, as understood from within the logic of the 
perceptual structure, is that should we surrender to its modality of being, and thus 
substitute thereby our Dasein, as social being,  its hermeneutic as horizon of intelligibility 
and therewith its understanding of being, we will have cut off any recourse to the 
sociality and sociabilities of our social being and consequently left bereft of the way of 
revealing that comes with the perceivedness and its disclosure that is steeped in being-in-
the-world and Dasein. In other words should our social being be replaced with a 
technological modality of being our horizon of intelligibility and with it our 
understanding of being will be nothing more than the way of revealing which is an 
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enframing and which as such would show everything up as standing reserve. Our 
socialization and normative order would be ensconced in the modality of a technological-
being-in-the-technological-world, the outcome somewhat eschatological, would be the 
end of social be-ing and the advent of ‘homo technologicus’. This seem a tad too 
fatalistic and alarmist, however, notwithstanding, the latter discursive excesses, we are 
confronted with a social being that is being eroded in a contemporary age that seems to 
be losing its footing in-the-world and being-with-others’ such that our care and concern 
for being is somewhat precariously balanced and directed-towards an insatiable 
consumptive drive. We seem to be covering our being with gadgets and gizmos in a 
perpetual loop of disposability and replacement which makes one wonder how we are 
presently comported to the world, and when in our increasing distanciation from our 
social being we will finally reach a critical mass. What we have in mind is the dialectic of 
the transformation of quantity into quality: a critical mass where technological plenitude 
yield to a qualitative change in social being for technological being. One manifestation of 
this which bear relevance for perception as visuality is Debord’s  () conceptualization of 
the contemporary age which is variously present as “society of the spectacle” in which he 
holds that the latter is characterized by  “separation [which] is the alpha and omega of 
spectacle” and it is as far as we are concerned most manifest and most disturbing in the 
distanciation from our selves, each other and the world, in short from our social be-ing 
that this thesis is first and foremost pre-occupied with that matters most. It is in this 
regard that we are drawing attention to the need to center our social being in our concerns 
for the well being of society and the fate of our humanity and thus we are steeped in an 
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existential ontological understanding of social being as a means of returning us 
analytically back towards-sociality and in-society.  
 
Returning to the matter at hand, we address the claim, that transcendence is in fact an 
uncovering is clear, when we consider the compounds that Heidegger formulates of the 
existential structure of our way of being human, that is, Dasein. With respect to originary 
transcendence, that is, being-in-the-world and social be-ing, what is uncovered is our 
“throwness” or “thereness” in the world, the ‘da’, so to speak. That as ‘thrown’ beings, 
who are thrust or cast into a world in a particular society and culture without choice and 
without meaning, what is uncovered is that human beings are groundless, unsettled and 
homeless. And it is only in being-in-the-world, our social be-ing that we carve out a 
home, though always contingent, and as such impute meaning into once life derived as 
such from the socialization and acculturation on offer in the society and culture we 
happen to find ourselves in and thus become human. Furthermore, in our ontic 
transcendence, that is, being-amidst-things our intentional comportment what is 
uncovered are extant things and what is derived from our comportment to said things is 
the meaning of the being of beings. And finally in being-with-others, that is other Dasein 
we uncover what it means to be an authentic, inauthentic or undifferentiated being and 
thus what it means to be one’s “ownmost” self, a being-towards-self.  
 
And since, all uncovering is made possible through the intentional comportment of the 
Dasein, it follows that we human beings because of our open ended structure of 
existence, which is unsettled and groundless, but is transcendent in that we are outside 
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ourselves, as existent in-the-world deriving our very natures from the social and cultural 
world’s we happen to find ourselves in, means that we are in fact, as the Dasein, a field of 
uncovering. It is, then, in the region of the way of being human, that Heidegger, what we 
have referred to as, ‘de-subjectifies’ as the Dasein, that the very condition of possibility 
of uncovering or perceivedness emanates from and is thus located as part of its 
constitution. But it is not a structure, as in some endowment of the Dasein, a part of the 
human constitution as such, but rather it is in the intentional comportment, that is, in the 
transcendence that comes with being-in, being-amidst and being-with. And as such this 
transcendence shares with the perceptual structure its mode of intentionality, directed as 
it is towards the perceived, but made possible by the self-circumspection and self-
orientation of our existential structure, that is, in our concern and care for our existence, 
and the self-interpretations that accompanies the stances we take in relation thereto.  
 
Heidegger clearly is not falling for an anthropocentric rendition of uncoveredness as 
somehow the property of a human condition albeit in the mode of the Dasein as he makes 
it clear that it is also a function of production and judgment though not understood in 
subjective terms. For instance with respect to the latter and central to our thesis he 
attributes uncoveredness to the modality of technology (see chapter two) and as such 
decenters it; and similarly with respect to judgment this can be seen to be the function of 
theory, and as such is of disciplinary and paradigmatic dimension rather than human 
subjectivity as such.  
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We can now turn to second task as indicated which is to tie the mode of intentionality of 
perception, namely, the directedness towards uncovering into the perceptual structure, 
that is, with respect to its intentio (perceiving of -directedness) and the intentum 
(perceived-towards which) and thereby complete the analysis by leading into the deferred 
matter of how this ‘uncovering’ is itself rendered possible. In fact what we arrive at in 
Heidegger’s (1982: 70-71) phenomenological conception of perception and conclude 
with is its very condition of possibility. Thus 
 
In the intentio of the perceiving something like an understanding of extantness 
must already be antecedently present. … In accord with its directional sense, 
perceiving intends the extant in its extantness. The extant in its extantness belongs 
to the directional sense-that is to say, the intentio is directed towards uncovering 
the extant in its extantness. The intentio itself includes an understanding of 
extantness, even if it is only pre-conceptual. In this understanding, what 
extantness means is unveiled, laid open, or, as we say disclosed. We speak of the 
disclosedness given in the understanding of extantness.  
 
In order to unpack the above we will make reference to Heidegger’s example of the 
window, as it concretizes the analysis of perception and anchors one’s, understanding in a 
palpable manner. Firstly, in considering extantness we need to be aware that this refers to 
the mode of being of the window, as case in point, or how it presences itself. In this 
regard the window’s mode of being can be either as natural thing, or its presence can be 
utilitarian in character. Unlike the conception of a positivistic perception where the 
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presence of something is given in its appearance Heidegger questions this naïve view of 
the natural presence of things. In what strikes one as counter-intuitive he offers a 
complex view of the mode of being of things, and problematises what lies before us as 
present, in a way that ‘views’ that which is present as not visible in its appearance or 
occurrence, what we may consider as positivist vision, but rather, as what we think of, as 
translucent, that is, as covered and veiled.  
 
What the latter opens as possibility, nay necessity, if it is to be perceived as such, is 
perhaps a concept of phenomenological vision that which enables the window to be seen 
after it has been unveiled and thus uncovered as something in and of itself. Towards this 
end what Heidegger’s phenomenological vision lays bare, is to return to a previous that 
is, that in order for something to be uncovered in its extantness, or to refer to our 
example, for the window to be encountered as natural thing, there must already be in 
place a concept of what it means for something or anything to be a thing. If, we do not 
have a sense of what it means for something to be a thing, then surely the window cannot 
for all intents and purposes assume the modality of a natural thing. To be sure, the eye 
and the optic centre of the brain registers some physicality in its purview, but what it is, 
that is, the mode of its intelligibility, which if not being present, renders what is optically 
present, without definition and thus meaningless.  
 
However, there is another element in the perceptual structure that needs to be overcome 
or uncovered if the window is to be disclosed as natural thing, as uncovered in perception 
as such. This refers to the primary and initial comportment of the Dasein, that is, that we 
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human beings engage the world in our quotidian everyday order by being involved in our 
coping and dealing with things and objects, in terms of their functionality, as part of an 
equipmental nexus and thus something like a world appears. This means that in order for 
us to be able to encounter objects as natural things, we need, first and foremost, to unveil 
their extantness as instrumentality, and having uncovered the window as such we are then 
able to move onto other modalities of being of the window.  
 
In other words, the window has to be released from its extantness, as instrumentality or 
functionality, in order to be released to be perceived as natural thing. When we take up 
the matter of the perception of that which is “present-at-hand”, a little later, we will see 
that it is when there is a breakdown or disruption in the utilitarian modality of being that 
the modality of a natural vision, or theoretical vision is then derived. In the case of our 
window it is when our involvement with usability is disrupted or breaks down that our 
perception is directed towards other modalities of being, and thus it is released to uncover 
different properties such as everyday and theoretical and scientific observation and their 
concomitant modalities of vision (thinking and seeing).  
 
The issue of where one locates this moment of sense-making is critical for Heidegger as 
he discounts that a conscious mind or self-referential subject is at the heart of the 
perceptual process. Instead, he holds accordingly that it is in the intentional comportment 
and the self-directedness in the perceiving of the window, as case in point, that the 
specific meaning of extantness, that is, whether the window is extant as utilitarian thing 
or as natural thing. In other words, the intentio, as the directional sense of the perceiving 
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of the window, is directed to its mode of presencing as utilitarian thing in our natural 
commerce with the window (as in opening it to ventilate a stuffy room), or that when 
disrupted (as a broken pane letting in the rain) then it is directed to the window as natural 
thing say the fragility of a glass pane. The point is that the understanding of the modality 
of being of the thing is a function of the perceptual structure in particular the intentio, that 
is, the intentionality involved in the directedness towards the unveiling or disclosure of 
the understanding of extantness as conditional for the uncovering or release of the 
intentum, that which is perceived. Critically what is at stake here is that our horizon of 
intelligibility, that is our understanding of being arising as it does from our involvement-
in-society (socialization and the normative order) and its sociality and sociabilities are 
what defines our social being. And is thus in the latter region that critical site sits where 
we need to be mindful of our dealings with technology and the extent to which we should 
admit it to, or surrender to it, the modality of our way of being human, that is, Dasein as 
the field of disclosure or intelligibility.    
 
If, as presented the unveiling, or disclosure of extantness, what we might call our 
‘hermeneutic vision’ occurs, before the uncovering or discovery, what we have called our 
‘phenomenological vision’, so to speak, does it mean, therefore, that this is performed 
before perception can, in a manner of speaking, uncover that which is to be perceived. 
Heidegger seems very well aware that in introducing a temporal order to the perceptual 
structure, in the order of succession of an unveiling, which is followed by an uncovering, 
he would inadvertently bring into play sense-making as conscious activity, and thus 
center the cognitive or the theoretical in the perceptual process. Thus, to maintain the idea 
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of a conscious-free comportment, in the sense-making dimension involved in the 
perceptual process, Heidegger (1982: 71) refers to this as a field of disclosure, which is 
constitutive of the Dasein and its existential structure: 
 
The antecedent understanding of extantness is not prior in the order of measured 
clocktime. … it is implicit in the basic constitution of the Dasein itself that, in 
existing, the Dasein also already understands the mode of being of the extant, to 
which it comports existingly, regardless of how far this extant entity is uncovered 
and whether it is or is not adequately  and suitably uncovered. Not only do 
intentio and intentum belong to the intentionality of perception but so also does 
the understanding of the mode of being of what is intended in the intentum.    
 
Given that the understanding of being is present in Dasein (product of socialization and 
normative acculturation) means that the perceptual process understood as an unveiling 
and uncovering should be seen as co-simultaneous, rather than in the temporal order 
suggested in ‘clocktime’. But, what is striking for its import in dissuading an appeal to 
the conscious subject is that, whereas the latter would suggest, that some resolution in the 
understanding of being is likely to occur once the perceptual uncovering kicks in, even if 
it is incorrect, for Heidegger, however, such an eventuality is not conditional at all, in the 
perceptual structure, for something to be apprehended as intelligible. He suggests that this 
understanding of being is tied to the existential structure of the Dasein, and as such is 
proximate in the way of being human. Thus, whether, or not, something is not adequately 
or suitably uncovered does not reflect in any way on the extent of understanding of being 
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that such a Dasein has, as part of its constitution. Moreover that this understanding of 
being constitutive of Dasein, as part of its existential structure, and thus part of the 
intentional comportment of the human way of being, that is, the ontic transcendence, that 
is, our relation to things or being-amidst-things, is also as such part of the intentionality 
of perception. Let me attempt to illustrate this understanding of the complex of 
perception as follows.   
 
In order to probe this complex structure of perception of Heidegger we take as our 
example a cooking utensil of unusual bearing. Lets say that we encounter this thing 
which lies before us and that it is unfamiliar and of complex design. To be clear lets spell 
out what is happening. This thing before us comes across as unfamiliar and as such its 
intelligibility eludes us for the moment. What is thus at stake here is how we perceive this 
thing or that we can even begin to be clear about what we perceive as such. In seeking to 
apprehend what is being registered before us we are in fact attempting to uncover the 
entity or that which is to be perceived, the intentum as such. It is to the structure, its form 
and its particular function towards which we are being directed to uncover what it might 
be or in fact is used for, that is, its essence. And because we are struggling to make sense 
of it that is to identify it as such we are brought face to face with the intentionality of the 
perceptual structure. This entity is not available to us in a way which makes it intelligible 
and thus we are directed towards how we in fact go about perceiving that which is 
perceived in the quotidian order of our everyday lives.  
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When we begin to conjecture as to what this thing might be we begin to draw on our 
understanding of the different modes of being of things. We may ask whether it is a 
medical instrument, work of art, weapon of war, cooking instrument, mechanical part of 
some machine and so on and so forth.  This perceiving of the thing as this or that 
possibility or the direction that the lines of enquiry are heading in is what is referred to as 
the intentio, the directional sense of the perceptual structure, and what we have called our 
‘hermeneutic vision’ (understanding and interpreting being, making sense of). It is on the 
basis of this understanding that we can be intentionally comported to the thing in one way 
or another. That is how we relate to what is before us as thing, object, equipment or as 
entitities.  
 
The matter of whether we are to uncover said thing et al as weapon, medical instrument, 
cooking utensil etc is based on the understanding which we come to not because we have 
made some mental leap into the thing but because we have unveiled the modality of its 
being (i.e. thing, object, etc.) through our hermeneutic vision, so to speak. . But most 
importantly it is because our existential experiences as being-in-the-world-with-others-
amidst-things encompasses various involvements, dealings and copings in our everyday 
lives through which as a function of our socialization and acculturation that we acquire an 
ontological understanding, that is, of what it means to be (the being of beings) that the 
thing was unveiled as thing and that its mystery can be uncovered, as for example, a 
cooking utensil.  
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Let us for the sake of convenience say that something in the make-up of the thing ‘gives 
the game away’ so to speak and we determine on the basis of this feature that it is an 
elaborate design for boiling eggs. Having thus uncovered said example in the perceiving 
of the thing as a utensil used in the cooking of eggs, we can say that it has been laid open 
in its uncoveredness, and thus its perceivedness is determinable or specifiable. In being 
directed to the thing as cooking utensil that is perceiving it as such we then say that it has 
been unveiled because it derives from our understanding of what it means for something 
to be a utensil not because we have a theory of utensils, which we might have, but rather 
because we have been socialized into the milieu of cooking and all it entails, and it is as 
such that we are directed in our vision of said object to its being as cooking utensil. In 
other words whether we do or do not arrive conclusively at whether said object is in fact 
a cooking utensil, or that it may be one in a doubtful way does not detract from an 
understanding of the modality of being of a cooking utensil.  Nor does it detract from the 
visionary being entailed in the perceiving of something as cooking utensil in other words 
that it ‘looks’ like a cooking utensil of some kind supposes that it is in the directional 
sense of perception, that is, the intentio that the understanding of the being of the thing is 
located.  
However in saying that something looks’ like a cooking utensil one is not only coming 
from the directional sense of the intentio in the perception of said object, but one is 
simultaneously coming from the object as such, that is, what is being perceived, the 
intentum. In other words it is the look of the thing, its form that is also suggestive and 
thus the synthesis of the intentio, that one is directed towards the entity by understanding 
its being or perceiving of it as for example a cooking utensil, and the intentum the object 
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itself and its perceivedness or uncoveredness as cooking utensil for boiling eggs, an 
electrical egg-boiler that conjointly make up the intentional perceptual structure. Simply 
put the “intentionality of perception” or the directedness of the perceptual complex comes 
down to this structure; that which is unveiled is in the perceiving of, the intentio and that 
which is uncovered is in the perceived, the intentum and that which makes perception 
intelligible lies in the understanding of being all of which is contained in its complexity.  
 
In what has been said thus far about the intentionality of perception and its very 
possibility what is clear is that it all hinges on the disclosedness entailed in the 
understanding of being. And that if we are to arrive at an understanding of how we 
comport to things and their extantness we need to come to terms with what is entailed in 
an understanding of extantness itself before we can move onto the matter of the specifics 
of beings as such. In effect we are tracking into Heidegger’s (1982: 71) concern for 
establishing in his ‘fundamental ontology’ the condition of possibility of the perception 
of things and thus the relationship between disclosure, uncovering and Dasein’s 
constitution.  
 
… in general that uncovering comportment toward the extant maintains itself in 
an understanding of extantness and that the disclosure of extantness belongs to 
this comportment, to the Dasein’s existence. This is the condition of the 
possibility of the uncoverability of extant things. Uncoverability, the perceptibility 
of extant things, presupposes disclosedness of extantness. With respect to its 
possibility, perceivedness is grounded in the understanding of extantness.        
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Since the Dasein is what exists rather than what is extant it means that the way of being 
human is to comport to things. We establish a relationship to things which is our 
intentional comportment and in doing so we uncover being in general and two types of 
being in particular (readiness-to-hand and presence-at-hand). Because we have to take 
care of our own existences in the way we live out our lives in terms of what we do and 
how we interpret these practices for ourselves we acquire a foundational understanding of 
being and thus of two modalities of  beings . On the one hand we uncover aspects of our 
own being or Dasein to ourselves in the things we comport to, take care of and show 
concern for and we similarly uncover things in our dealings with them. Both of which are 
made possible by the “disclosure” of being which belongs to the Dasein and as such its 
comportment is one of a field of disclosure. Dasein in virtue of its understanding of being 
is an opening or clearing in which the being of beings is rendered intelligible and thus as 
such Dasein as existent being is a function of a field of disclosure.  
 
Dasein as field of disclosure enjoys an intentional comportment towards all beings that as 
field is a clearing of being in which all beings can emerge in and of themselves. In other 
words the intentional perceptual structure of Dasein that is directed towards uncovering 
beings stems from the very comportment in which as a field of disclosure, its intentional 
comportment is one of uncovering. And it is for this reason that Heidegger speaks in 
phenomenological vein of perceivedness or uncovering being grounded in the 
understanding or hermeneutic of extantness, meaning the being of things. Thus, things 
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emerge on the ground of disclosure as uncovered figures; they take their meaning from 
within the horizon of intelligibility of being. Put succinctly, the hermeneutic dimension 
establishes the ground of disclosure in the unveiling of the modality of be-ing while the 
perceivedness of things is the phenomenological uncovering or discovery of the figures. 
or things themselves as they emerge on the ground of intelligibility, which we hold is 
social be-ing. This sociality enables the comportment not only to being-with-others but 
with being-towards-self and it is not confined to Dasein but includes our relation to things 
as being-amidst-things all carrying the indelible stamp of the range of our sociabilities.    
 
The distinction and connectedness of the intentional structure of perception in relation to 
what is involved in ‘uncoveredness’ and ‘disclosedness’ of beings and being respectively 
is what remains to be put in place, to close off this critical discussion on the nature of 
perception before moving onto being-amidst-things and their modalities of being and our 
relation to them as Dasein. Heidegger (1982: 72) approaches the distinction between 
uncoveredness and disclosedness to indicate that it is more than a matter of mere 
semantics: 
 
We therefore distinguish not only terminologically but also for reasons of intrinsic 
content between the uncoveredness of a being and the disclosedness of its being. 
A being can be uncovered, whether by way of perception or some other mode of 
access, only if the being of this being is already disclosed– only if I already 
understand it. Only then can I ask whether it is actual or not and embark on some 
procedure to establish the actuality of the being.  
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The connection between uncoveredness and disclosedness devolves to the mode of 
intelligibility that necessitates that things first be understood in terms of its modality of 
being before it can as such be seen for what it truly is, rather than merely be groped or 
guessed at. Put differently, if one does not understand the nature of the being of 
something one is not in a position to see it for what it is, that is, it cannot be uncovered in 
perception and thus be apprehended as thing in itself. In showing, then, that there is an 
intimate connection or unity between ‘uncoveredness’ and ‘disclosedness’ Heidegger 
(Ibid) simultaneously draws our attention to the distinction between the being that is 
being uncovered and the being of the being that is being disclosed or unveiled. Thus   
 
This involves at the same time the possibility of formulating the distinction 
between the being [Seienden] (sic)  that is uncovered in the uncoveredness and 
the being [Sein] (sic) which is disclosed in the disclosedness, thus fixing the 
differentiation between being and beings, the ontological difference.  
 
Whereas being is considered the ontological dimension, as it involves what it means for 
something to be, in other words, that it is, namely, its existence; beings by contrast in 
their specificity as this or that thing, refers us as such to its ontical constitution, in other 
words, what it is, namely, its essence. What Heidegger (1982: 74) alludes to then is that  
 
In our phenomenological consideration …-to each being there belongs a what and 
a way-of –being. 
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The above refers to a fundamental distinction between being and beings which we 
counter posed as that and what,  but moreover what it is that enables us human beings to 
not only make such a distinction, but more importantly to make of this distinction a unity 
Heidegger (1982: 75) has this to say. 
 
For it is only on the basis of the exposition of the basic ontological constitution of 
the Dasein that we put ourselves in a position to understand adequately the 
phenomenon correlated with the idea of being, the understanding of being which 
lies at the basis of all comportment to beings and guides it. Only if we understand 
the basic ontological constitution of the Dasein can we make clear to ourselves 
how an understanding of being is possible in the Dasein.  
 
Thus we close in the unity of the perceptual structure in as much as it encompasses 
disclosure and discovery, that is, a hermeneutical and phenomenological vision 
respectively, and that it coalesces in Dasein, that is the field of social being as made 
manifest in the way of existence that is distinctively human.  And since our existence 
predisposes us to a comportment with things such that being-amidst things means that we 
in fact develop a relationship not only with fellow human beings but with things as well 
opens us up to taking on a technological modality of being in as much as we are amidst-
technological objects. To be sure it is not the object as such since Heidegger has made it 
clear that the essence of technology is not in anything technological but rather in the 
comportment and horizon of intelligibility that emanates from the sociabilities and 
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sociality concomitant with being socialized in a technological world. In other words the 
emergent generations and those who have been socialized in a technological milieu show 
an amazing awareness and adroitness at being-amidst-technological-things. And each 
generation marvels at the new generation and their sociability or functionality in such 
worlds.  
 
The point is that it is no mystery that they have the ‘hermeneutic vision’ to make sense of 
their worlds, but rather what is clear is that they have been socialized and acculturated 
into the technological normative order of their time and space. Thus, they are able to 
disclose the different modalities of technological being, and as such phenomenologically 
uncover the technological artifacts that they live amidst, and the technological world they 
dwell in and inhabit, with much ease and aplomb by and large. What we are heading 
towards is the rallying cry of many parents who find themselves in such technological 
milieus and have to confront the technological miens of their progeny in that they more 
inclined to spend most of their time with technological things such personal computers 
surfing the World Wide Web, playing video games, electronic networking, gaming, and 
so on. By contrast the current generation has been socialized into a social modality that is 
ensconced in a social being that carries the socialization and normative order of sociality 
borne of a being-in-the-world, and being-with-others, being-amidst-things and being-
towards-self all of which through our sociabilities (practices, functionality, and 
association) have inured us existentially in-society. We engage with technology but 
through the horizon of intelligibility of our social being and we are able to function in a 
world that is increasingly becoming technological without surrendering our being, our 
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Dasein as that field of disclosure as connective to our way of existing as humans 
concerned and caring for that which defines our humanity, that is the sociabilities or 
practices we instantiate. Through our intentional comportment as it articulates in the 
perceptual structure we are able to release technological things to be encountered as such 
but always within a social hermeneutic and thus maintain our social being and yet be 
amidst-technological things.  
 
What happens when the next generation or the one following in some foreseeable future 
loses its footing in a social hermeneutic such that their horizon of intelligibility takes on 
the socialization and normative order of modern technology and its way of revealing as 
standing reserve. There would be no recourse to the perceptual structure as the very 
intentional comportment of disclosure in the directional sense towards technological 
things would be sated in a technological sensibility and thus what was previously 
released for a phenomenological vision surrenders to the spectacle of the standing 
reserve. We are not suggesting a technological dystopia as some inevitability and 
technological determinist scenario, but raising the sociological implications of a 
socialization and a normative pattern that when technologised to the point that it becomes 
an uncontested hermeneutic, then what other recourse do we have that can maintain our 
foot in-society and thus our social be-ing. It is to this possible saving grace that we now 
turn to bring our Heideggerian excursus to a close and raise the possibility of 
equipmentality and its ontology that is it way of revealing and disclosing being as a way 
out of the technological quagmire.  
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Chapter Seven 
Being-amidst-things: equipmentality as counterpoise  
 
We will now move on from the perceptual structure, and its modality of releasing things, 
to be encountered in themselves, though close with the point, that as an Archimedean 
lever, where such a perceptual comportment secures its social grounding, it is dependent 
on generational continuities for its reproduction of a social hermeneutic. Particularly, as 
far as the latter in its relation to the advent of Dasein early in the socialization process 
and its import for a social hermeneutic is concerned, though with each succeeding 
generation one may argue that such a link becomes increasingly tenuous. The likelihood 
is that unless it is made explicit and recognized as such, our social being arguably would 
increasingly give way to a technological modality of being.  
 
Thus, if we are going to find an Archimedean lever or counterpoise to the 
technologisation of social being we would paradoxically have in dialectical vein to look 
to technology itself for our saving grace. And thus, it is precisely with such a 
development in mind that we turn to being-amidst-things, in as much as it involves an 
equipmental nexus and gestalt that we close in on, and open up the possibility of reining 
in the imperative of modern technology.    
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Now that we have followed through on Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology of 
technology and the intentional structure of perception similarly as an uncovering and an 
unveiling we can move onto what is entailed in an existential ontological understanding 
of social being. In this regard, firstly, we take up the specificities that reach into our 
involvement and encounter with equipment and things, that is, as ‘being-amidst-things, 
and how this relates to ourselves and what it means for the former to be, that is, their 
different modalities of being, in general and their concomitant modes of vision. And 
finally we consider how equipmentality from an ontological vantage point offers or does 
not offer itself as counterpoise to modern technology and its way of revealing nature as 
raw materials, being and all that is brought-forth or challenged-forth as standing reserve. 
We have taken our cue from Verbeek (2005) who differs from Dreyfus (1992) on the 
intermediary role of Heidegger’s conception of equipmenetality who holds that it finds a 
place between techne and modern technology. Dreyfus (1992: 175) offers a sociological 
analysis which locates handcraft production in the Greek modality of techne and 
cybernetic control in modern technology and equipment in industrial production. In doing 
so he elides the primary importance of equipmentality and furthermore effaces it from 
our contemporary modality of being when in our technological profligacy it seems to be 
embedded in such plenitude, if one looks beyond the gizmos and gadgets that obscure it. 
In this one respect our reading is closer to Verbeek (2005: 82) who holds that Dreyfus is 
wrong on this account because he overlooks the “innovative aspect in Heidegger’s 
analysis of tools and equipment”, which is to show its “constitutive role in the relation 
between human beings and world. Whereas Verbeek (2205) is concerned with developing 
a post-phenomenology of things, we find in Heidegger’s analysis of equipment the 
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existential - ontological grounding of social being and its dimensionality in sociality and 
sociabilities. And moreover, we find in said equipmentality a counterpoise to modern 
technology and its Nihilism. 
7.1 Being-amidst-things: modalities of encountering things 
The matter at hand is to arrive at an understanding of how the relationship to equipment 
things or being-amidst-things and dwelling with them reveals to us our being as Dasein, 
that is, it the modalities our being. In this regard Dreyfus (1991: 61) cites Heidegger 
(1982: 159, 157) to illustrate the point that: 
 
In everyday terms, we understand ourselves and our existence by way of the 
activities we pursue and the things we take care of (159). To exist then means, 
among other things, relating to oneself  by being with beings (157).    
 
It is thus in this way what we have referred to as our sociabilities that we seek through an 
analysis of our relation to social being and technology what it means “to be as 
comportment with things …” Heidegger (1982: 157). Dreyfus translates Heidegger’s 
comportment with things as  “relating to oneself by being with beings…” so as to arrive 
at  an understanding of our being in relation to the technological modality that is 
prescient and how it relates to social being and sociality. Towards this end we track into 
Dreyfus (1991) and his exegesis of Heidegger’s phenomenological account of Dasein in 
terms of our relation to things and its comportment as it pertains to perception or vision to 
set the conceptual basis of our thinking in this regard on equipmentality as the site of the 
disclosure of social being and  sociality. We are particularly interested in Dreyfus’s 
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(1991) account of Heidegger’s (1962) notions of  the two modes of being of  things 
referred to as “Zuhanden” and “Vorhanden”, which have been respectively translated as 
“ready-to-hand” and “present-at-hand” in the (1962) edition cited. Our concern is to take 
up the former as counterpoise to the essence of modern technology and the latter to show 
that the subject object duality of theory and science are not primary but derivative. We 
also seek in the latter the modality of the quotidian order and its modality as curiosity and 
how this sits with our existential constitution.  
 
With regard to the two modalities of being of equipment Dreyfus (1991: 60) prefers 
instead to refer to these directly as “availableness” and “occurrentness” and their 
concomitant modes of comportment that reveal them as “dealing with” and cognition”. 
And finally to bring these introductory comments to a close the accompanying modalities 
of vision that in turn respectively correspond are ‘circumspection’ and ‘theoretical 
vision’. These are the issues that will be taken up immediately below to situate the 
relation between the primary modalities of being of equipment, things and vision and 
their derivation in the secondary and cursory modalities that arise in relation thereto such 
as “occurrentness” and “pure occurrence”. We will follow Dreyfus (1991: 124-125) in his 
summary of the different modes of being of entities which he lists as “availableness”, 
“unavailableness”, “occurrentness” and “pure occurrentness” and their respective 
modalities of comportment and perception though will also engage directly with 
Heidegger (1962). 
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7.1.1 Zuhandenheit: equipment as ready-at-hand or availableness 
With very slight modification to the translation of Heidegger’s “Being and Time”  (1962: 
95) Dreyfus (1991: 62) opens his discussion on the nature of our primary encounter with 
the “being of those beings” as distinct from the former reference to the “Being of those 
entities”. In both cases the reference is to that which is non-human or non-Dasein-like. 
Though as stated the critical issue is that in our comportment to said entities we reveal 
our being in the way we thus act towards these things or beings. What emerges is that the 
salient point is that one’s investigation into the latter encounter with the being of beings 
or entities  
 
.. can be “phenomenologically exhibited if we take as our clue our everyday 
being-in-the-world, which we call our “dealings” with the world and with 
intraworldly beings.    
 
What Heidegger (1962: 95) reveals is that our quotidian order of being is such that what 
is closest to us in our everyday coping is not to be located, as noted by Dreyfus (1991: 
62), in a :    
 
… bare perceptual cognition, but rather that kind of concern which manipulates 
things and puts them to use    
 
The point being made with respect to the negation of perception as such is not that we are 
somehow not able to see what lies before us, but, rather as previously taken up, with 
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respect to the intentional structure of perception, that in order for something to be 
uncovered in perception its being needs to be disclosed or unveiled, and in that moment is 
it, the entity, simultaneously released as uncovered in perception. Thus, the point is that 
our closest encounter with entitities in our quotidian order of being, as far as perception is 
concerned, is that it is not immaculately perceived, but informed by an understanding of 
their mode of being. The issue of note for us here in this instance is what this 
understanding of being is that directs one’s perception such that the modality of the being 
of the entity in use takes on a definitive appearance, though not as discrete and isolated. 
The latter modality of the disclosedness of the structure of intentionality emergent in its 
directional sense (intentio) we established in Heidegger (1975). What is pertinent here is 
Dreyfus’s (1981: 62) analysis of our primary everyday being, and how it relates to 
Heidegger’s (1962) conception of the modality of being of those entities that emerge in 
the “concern, which manipulates things and puts then to use”, that is equipment.   
 
Dreyfus (1991: 62) puts it succinctly thus:  
 
Heidegger first notes that we do not usually encounter (use, talk about, deal with) 
“mere things,” but rather we use the things at hand to get something done. These 
things he calls “equipment” (Zeug), in a broad enough sense to include whatever 
is useful: tools, materials, toys, clothing, dwellings, etc. 
 
Heidegger (1962: 97) is very specific about how he defines what he understands by 
equipment and its relation to Dasein’s utilitarian complex by saying that: 
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 We shall call those entities which we encounter in concern “equipment”.   
 
Thus in our human way of being there are many things that we need to take care of and 
that we show great concern for as in the basic satisfactions of food, clothes and shelter 
and the socialization entailed in ludic behavior all of which are accompanied by 
equipment of all sorts. In this we can understand how equipment comes to bear on Dasein 
though we do not as yet have any insight into what characterizes it. Dreyfus (1991: 62-
63) gives us an outline of its main characteristics: 
 
The basic characteristic of equipment is that it is used for something. “Equipment 
is essentially something ‘in-order-to’” (97) [68]. It is important to note that 
Heidegger is not defining equipment merely in terms of its in-order-to. A chimp 
uses a stick in order to reach a banana is not using equipment. Equipment always 
refers to other equipment. “In the ‘in-order-to’ as a structure there lies an 
assignment or reference of something to something” (97) [68]. An “item” of 
equipment is what it is only insofar as it refers to other equipment and so in a 
certain way fits into an “equipmental whole.”    
 
Why it is that no ‘bare perception’ occurs, insofar as one is able to apprehend a ‘mere 
thing’ in our closest encounter with it as used in our dealings in everyday life, becomes 
apparent above in terms of the aspect of its being. Put directly what obtains above, firstly, 
is that the directional sense of perception is oriented towards the entity by a pre-
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conceptual understanding of being, and thus disclosed or unveiled as equipment. 
However, what needs to be noted in addition is that this understanding of the modality of 
the being of the entity as equipment is necessary, but not sufficient for this entity towards 
which the intentionality of perception is directed, to be uncovered and so released in 
perception. In order for this entity or piece of equipment to be apprehended as such there 
is the also the related matter of an equipmental gestalt which needs to be in place.  
 
In other words, as Heidegger (1975: 292), cited in Dreyfus (1991: 63) points out, that 
“what determines a piece of equipment as individuated is the “equipmental whole” and 
‘equipmental nexus.”  In this way we are referring to in so far as this whole resonates 
with Dasein a field of sociality. Thus, in view of the intentional structure of perception it 
is only under the aspect of the disclosedness of the ‘equipmental nexus’ (intentio) that 
perception is directed towards an individual piece of equipment (intentum), and it is thus 
able to co-simultaneously emerge as uncovered and is as such amenable to being 
perceived in itself. Therefore, in addition to the social hermeneutic which is tied to 
socialization and the normative order, we have a horizon of intelligibility that is tied to 
the equipmental nexus and its referential structure as an overlapping hermeneutic. 
Furthermore, the socialization that takes place in the equipmental whole of say a 
workshop or garage articulates with the socialization in which the horizon of 
intelligibility of being is involved.  What we have here and why we have risked the 
tautology is to drive home the point that in equipmentality the counterpoise is this very 
sociality and the sociabilities that have become apparent.    
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The phenomenological point being made is that, what a specific piece of equipment may 
be, is not primarily a function of space and time and thus not open to bare perception as 
such, but is rather a function of an equipmental hermeneutic and gestalt first and 
foremost.  What this comes down to is that for an individual piece of equipment to be, 
means that it has to be part of an equipmental whole and as such speaks to an ontological 
relation rather than a specific characteristic of its being or ontical constitution. Thus, in as 
much as one is dealing with the “way of being of entities which are defined by their use 
in the whole’, Dreyfus (1991:63) makes us aware that we are dealing with what he calls 
“availableness.”   
 
It turns out that Dreyfus translates Heidegger’s original terminology of “Zuhandenheit”, 
employed in Being and Time, as “availableness”, which in turn differs from Macquarrie 
and Robinson who prefer  “ready-to-hand”, in their translation in Heidegger (1962), and 
in turn differs from Stambaugh’s  “handiness” in Heidegger (1996). What they all refer 
to, is that which is closest, handy  and ‘available’ in our everyday day dealing with the 
concerns we have as Dasein, in terms of the equipment we need and use and thus have at 
our disposal in order to cope with our quotidian order of being. But already here what is 
emergent is that a rich milieu is available in which our social being is inured.  
 
What we encounter in our involved dealings in-the-world and the field of visibility 
subsequently opened is the unveiling or disclosure of the modality of being of 
‘availableness’ or “readiness-to-hand” and its uncoveredness, such that equipment, both 
in its presence as individual pieces can be apprehended as such’, as well as those which 
 
 
 
 
 328
in their absence are signaled in their relational nexus and equipmental whole. This is the 
ontological thesis referring to the general condition of what it means for something to be, 
and the way of revealing in what is present as  “available’, ‘ready-to-hand’ or ‘handy’ as 
equipment. However,  what we now turn to is the specific conditions under which we 
encounter that which has, so to speak, been released or uncovered for the comportment of 
perception with respect to that which is used and as such  ‘available’. Our own preference 
would be to use the translations of ‘Zuhandenheit’ interchangeably especially where it is 
serves for ease of understanding and in so doing treat these terms similarly, that is as 
‘available’, ‘handy’ or ready-to-hand’..   
7.1.1.1 Dasein’s way of encountering equipment 
What is noteworthy about Dasein’s way of encountering and understanding the mode of 
being of equipment variously referred to as “availableness”, “ready-to-hand” or 
“handiness” is that it can only be apprehended in a primordial or original way through its 
functioning or its use. In the terms we have established by way of our concern for social 
being it is as sociability though not as potential practice but as actual practice that we 
disclose what a given equipment is, in its being as handy.  
 
Secondly, in its use or functioning what is furthermore of note is that both the equipment 
in use, and the person or Dasein using the equipment “disappear” so to speak in the ‘heat’ 
of involvement, or in being absorbed in the function, that is the ‘in-order-to and the end 
point, the ‘towards which , as such. Dreyfus (1991: 64-66) understands these 
“disappearances” that ensue in the comportment of dealing-with, and what it reveals, that 
is,  the being  of ‘availableness”, as the transparency both of  equipment and Dasein as 
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these are absorbed in the associated activity of use and function. In other words one is 
oblivious of the equipment and self when one is absorbed in the function and directed 
towards the goal of one’s activity and thus one’s encounter with the equipment and 
oneself assumes virtual transparency.  
 
Quite clearly we are not dealing with actual disappearance and as such it may be better to 
speak of transparence as in looking through the equipment to what is being done and 
through self to what the end-point is of said activity. However, in being momentarily 
oblivious of self and equipment does not mean that one is clueless as to what is involved 
and entailed in the modality of being of practical involvement in equipment and its 
handiness. So in reflecting on the subject – object epistemological dualism of a 
theoretical or scientific modality of being we find that it is absorbed into the equipmental 
nexus and adumbrated by readiness-to-hand. It recedes into the sociabilities at hand and 
the sociality of its directedness in so far as it resonates with Dasein’s way of social being. 
This absorption of equipment and Dasein into equipmental nexus also differs from the 
absorption evident in modern technology’s way of revealing as standing reserve. Where 
being, in general and beings, in particular, in modern technology don’t become 
transparent while still being substantial, but rather disappear in a way that manifests a 
loss of their substantial nature, their sociality, in as much as Dasein is unable to comport, 
that is have a relationship with objects, things and equipment as the latter is not extant as 
such, and Dasein is not existent as such, either.     
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 With respect to the matter of understanding the ‘handiness’ of equipment Heidegger 
(1962: 98) is clear that there are definite limits as to how we reach such knowledge:  
 
Equipment can genuinely show itself only in dealings cut to its own (hammering 
with a hammer for example); but in such dealings an entity of this kind is not 
grasped thematically as an occurring Thing, nor is the equipment-structure known 
as such even in the using. The hammering does not simply have knowledge about 
[um] the hammer’s character as equipment, but it has appropriated this equipment 
in a way which could not possibly be more suitable. 
 
Firstly, it is clearly in the intended use connoted in “cut to its own” that the being of 
equipment is encountered in a ‘primordial’ or ‘original’ understanding. In other words if 
the hammer is used for anything other than hammering, that is, as paper-weight for 
example, its “handiness” or “availableness” as a hammer would not be accessed. Apart 
from this non-intended use the hammer can neither be understood nor cognitively grasped 
at the theoretical level in so far as its handiness is concerned. This level of cognition will 
be shown to be a derivative of the latter modality of being. But similarly the act of 
hammering is not an epistemological threshold for moving from the practical to the 
domain of knowledge of the equipmental nexus as such either. In its intended function as 
such, something of an essence emerges for Heidegger (1962: 98), though of a qualified 
nature as the following obtains  
The hammering itself uncovers the specific ‘manipulability’ [“Handlichkeit”] of 
the hammer. The kind of being which equipment possesses-in which it manifests 
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itself in its own right-we call “readiness-to-hand” [Zuhandenheit]. Only because 
equipment has this ‘Being-in-itself’ and does not merely occur, is it manipulable 
in the broadest sense and at our disposal. No matter how sharply we just look at 
the ‘outward appearance’ of Things in whatever form this takes, we cannot 
discover anything ready-to-hand. 
 
In the formulation of equipment as ‘Being-in-itself’ we must guard against assuming that 
Heidegger means that there is an essence inherent in equipment that one can discover 
simply thorough a phenomenological description. Far from it; rather, it is in the use or 
primary function of a piece of equipment and its relation to an equipmental whole that the 
former reveals a nature ‘in itself’ and it is furthermore in the act of use that the very 
possibility of its manipulability emerges and thus multiple usage. Accordingly, it is not in 
this sense that the piece of equipment by simply being present before us as such reveals 
its handiness and manipulability and can thus be accessed by ‘bare’ perception. Its 
‘essence’, if one were to speak of it as such, is a function of its primary use, that is, its 
being as “ready-to-hand”, and not its being as something merely occurring, that is, as 
“present-at-hand”. It is with regard to the latter that one sees the merit in Dreyfus’s 
(1991) direct translation of “Vorhanden” as “occurrent” and thus the point that ‘essence’ 
is not to be found in ‘outward appearance’ but in a “non-thematic” and “non-self 
referential” use. It, then, becomes evident that Heidegger not only combines a 
hermeneutic to his phenomenology, but in relation to equipment we also have praxis 
involved in uncovering the ‘essence’, or function of given equipment. If it were left to 
consciousness as such it would simply devolve to a cognitively centered transcendental 
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subject and thus for our own slant towards social being it would undermine our claims 
that the horizon of intelligibility lays at the heart of our particular sociality as imbibed in 
our social be-ing.           
 
If, in the absorbed coping of “readiness-to-hand”, there is as such a virtual transparency 
involved insofar as the equipment and the Dasein is concerned, then are we to think that 
we are dealing with a mindless and sightless phenomenon. What is particularly 
interesting is that the concerns raised as to the mental and visual content of our absorbed 
and “transparent” dealings with equipment, issues forth the matter of theory, in this 
modality of “readiness-to-hand”, which in turn ‘so happens’, to be a conjoining of sight 
and mind. Our commonsense English understanding of theory is that it, in the main, 
refers to a ‘system of ideas for explaining something’ and thus its mental content. 
However, what is also true of an understanding of theory (see Heidegger, 1962; Jenks, 
1995; Mitchell, 10986 and many others) is that its root lies in the Greek ‘theoria’ 
meaning to look at, to see and thus its visual overtones. We have lost the latter root and 
with it the role of vision as it is embedded in thought, even though at another level we 
have sublimated this visionary aspect, in a visual condition described as occularcentrism 
and its subject – object distanciation. The point, however, is that in relation to equipment, 
and the mind and sight, which accompany its use and functionality, we have a distinct 
modality of vision and hence of mind that is at work. In teasing out this understanding 
Heidegger (1962: 98-99) simultaneously distinguishes it from theoretical understanding. 
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If we look at Things just ‘theoretically’, we can get along without understanding 
readiness-to-hand. But when we deal with them by using them and manipulating 
them, this activity is not a blind one; it has its own kind of sight, by which our 
manipulation is guided and from which it acquires its specific Thingly character. 
Dealings with equipment subordinate themselves to the manifold assignments of 
the ‘in-order-to. And the sight with which they thus accommodate themselves is 
circumspection.  
 
We will defer discussion on a ‘theoretical vision’ to the appropriate section dealing with 
‘presence-at-hand shortly, but will focus here on the sight associated with circumspection 
deemed significant for our involvement with equipment and it ‘availableness’. Though, 
before engaging with circumspection an important point needs to be made with respect to 
the unity of vision and cognition. Whereas the point was made earlier as to the separation 
of vision from theory what is evident here with respect to sight is that it incorporates the 
element of thinking into its ‘horizon of intelligibility’, such that we have inter alia 
foresight, insight and hindsight as opposed to a kind of seeing as ‘bare’ perception. 
However, in as much as, this unitary view of sight and mind in ‘non-self-referential’ 
behavior, is being made explicit one finds this in Heidegger’s quote above, in that 
‘seeing’ is imputed in the activity of using and manipulating, and ‘thinking’ in what is 
connoted in our ‘action’ being guided, as well as in our understanding of the essence of 
equipmentality (‘Thingly’ character). But, what kind of seeing is involved in 
circumspection and what state of mind or rather being, as the latter is not explicit, is 
proximate are our concerns below. In a footnote, in Heidegger (1962: 98-99) we are 
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given a definition by the translators of circumspection by way of the matter of its 
translation from the German term “Umsicht”: 
 
The word ‘Umsicht’, which we translate by ‘circumspection’, is here presented as 
standing for a special kind of ‘Sicht’ (sight). … Heidegger is taking advantage of 
the fact that the prefix ‘um’ may mean either ‘around’ or ‘in order to’. Umsicht’ 
may accordingly be thought of as meaning ‘looking around’ or ‘looking around 
for something’ or ‘looking around for a way to get something done’. … ‘Umsicht’ 
seems to have much the same connotation as our ‘circumspection’-a kind of 
awareness in which one looks around before one decides just what one ought to 
do next. But Heidegger seems to be generalizing this notion as well as calling 
attention to the extent to which circumspection in the narrower sense occurs in 
our everyday seeing.  
 
The semantic analysis of the German word ‘Umsicht” given above and circumspect as in 
circum- meaning round or about and spect from specere (Oxford Concise Dictionary) 
meaning look seem to coalesce in meaning. However probing these meanings for their 
significance suggests a deeper relation to the originary transcendence of ‘being-in-the-
world and how that sits with the existential state of Dasein. In looking around is 
presupposed that one is situated in something of a world which surrounds us, and in 
which one seeks to find one’s bearings, so to speak, and moreover that these so-called 
bearings are found through the specific kind of looking understood of circumspection. 
Furthermore, that in looking around in order to find something or do something opens 
 
 
 
 
 335
itself to that which is available or ready-to-hand, that is, generally understood as being at 
hand. In this regard what is being singled out is that it is circumspection that enables one 
to find one’s bearings in relation to what we need to do, or find when we are in the act of 
manipulating and using equipment, and thus in the mode of being of ‘readiness-to-hand’.  
 
Moreover, the awareness that accompanies circumspection as it relates to that which is 
‘ready-to-hand’ and what one uses or is looking for momentarily is directly related to the 
‘equipment whole’, and the ‘referential nexus’ or what we have dubbed an equipmental 
gestalt. In other words, and most importantly, what the equipmental gestalt is fore 
grounding is that circumspection does not involve a self awareness in its modality of 
comportment. And in this respect we come to understand Dreyfus’s (1991) reference to 
the “transparence of Dasein” even though it carries the risk of being conflated with what 
Heidegger (1962: 186) refers to as existential vision or transparency as existential 
awareness that involves the ‘seeing of self’ though not as subjective sight, hence its 
existential qualification.   Dreyfus (1991: 66) concern is to make clear that for Heidegger 
circumspection “does not involve deliberate thematic awareness”, and thus:  
 
The view in which the equipmental nexus stands at first, completely unobtrusive 
and unthought, is the view and sight of practical circumspection, of our practical 
everyday orientation. “Unthought” means that it is not thematically apprehended 
for deliberate thinking about things; instead, in circumspection, we find our 
bearings in relation to them.   
 
 
 
 
 
 336
Dasein and for that matter the equipmental specificities ‘disappear’ so to speak or 
becomes transparent in relation to an equipmental nexus insofar for example as when one 
enters a library, as case in point, one does not go about looking at each book, 
bookshelves, cataloging numbers and letters in order to establish that one is in fact in a 
library. Even less does one recount one’s ‘theory’ of what a library is and then tick off 
what one takes note of in a deliberate way so as to ascertain that what one has entered 
does conform to one’s theoretical construct thereof. Instead one encounters these 
specificities that make up a library in a non-obvious way, that is, unobtrusively because 
one has an understanding of what it means to be a library in terms of it as an equipmental 
nexus and it is with this circumspective gestalt, that is looking round and about that one 
orients oneself to such a thing called a library or whatever. Thus, in paradoxical vein, 
circumspective thought, as a gestalt, a visionary whole of the modality of availableness, 
is an unthought, and the seeing that ensues with respect to what one might associate with 
a detailed and fine-grained vision is in fact an unsighted or ‘sightless’.  
 
We have previously referred to a socialized vision which given it quotidian order and 
hermeneutic structure seems in place. Indeed, the intentional structure of vision as in 
circumspection is directed to the aspect of a practical everyday orientation as regards its 
being as ‘ready-to-hand’ or ‘availableness’. Though the matter of the “transparency” of 
Dasein or rather its absorption into the equipmental nexus raises a more fundamental 
existential matter of how this bears upon the relationship of Dasein and the world. In 
particular our concern is for how this modality of self relates to Dasein’s ‘being-in-the-
world’ The stark implication, then,  of  this ‘non-self-referential awareness’ in dealing 
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with equipment in its modality of ‘availableness’ is that, as Heidegger (1975: 297) puts it, 
cited in Dreyfus (1991; 67) :  
 
Self and world belong together in the single entity, Dasein. Self and world are not 
two entitities, like subject and object, or like I and thou, but self and world are the 
basic determination of Dasein itself in the unity of the structure of being-in-the-
world.   
 
In other words it is in ‘being-there” if we regard the inversion of Da-sein (there-being) as 
it does not alter what is connoted insofar as what is being alluded to is that self is 
contained in being and ‘Sein’ and world is imputed in there and ‘Da’. To be human is 
always to be there in the world and it is in being in a particular socio-cultural world that 
we have the wherewithal to define what it means to be human in the stances and self-
interpretations we take, and make in relation to what it means to be concerned with and to 
care for our existence per se. In other words our social being and the world we are in are 
inseparable from each other; they are a de-territorialized, de-spatialised and de-severed 
mutuality. It is precisely this ontological dimension to equipment that we seize upon to 
suggest it as counterpoise to the displacement of social being in modern technology for 
surely to speak of technological equipment carries with it concomitant sociabilities and as 
such keeps us rooted in social being. Or would we need to reconceptualise equipment and 
treat of it as already in the way of revealing of the standing reserve in which case we 
would need Heidegger’s recourse to art as a way out of the malady. This seems hardly 
viable a position since my very relation to the personal computer that I am using to write 
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this thesis has a transparency about it and my own being in relation to it is absorbed in its 
functionality and what this work is directed towards. Thus it would seem that one would 
need a conception of equipment that is able to differentiate that which opens it to social 
being and that which closes itself off from it rather than disregard equipmentality and its 
sociality and sociabilities.     
 
 
Returning to the point at hand Heidegger (1962: 216) in his discussion on what it means 
to perceive in relation to curiosity as a particular modality of social being and ‘seeing’ 
concretizes the relation of circumspection and being-in-the-world. Even though this 
discussion is more appropriate to those modalities of being associated with 
“occurrentness” and “pure occurrence” (to follow shortly), it is relevant, as Heidegger 
brings it to bear on readiness-to- hand, as case in point. Thus Heidegger (1962: 216) 
draws circumspection into it’s implicate in being-in-the-world:  
 
What is to be said about this tendency just to perceive? Which existential state of 
Dasein will become intelligible in the phenomenon of curiosity? Being-in-the-
world is proximally absorbed in the world of concern. This concern is guided by 
circumspection, which discovers the ready-to-hand and preserves it as thus 
discovered. Whenever we have something to contribute or perform, 
circumspection gives us the route for proceeding with it, the means for carrying it 
out, the right opportunity, the appropriate moment. … In the world of work, 
circumspective discovering has de-severing as the character of its Being. When 
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circumspection has been set free, there is no longer anything ready-to-hand which 
we must concern ourselves with bringing close.    
 
What is particularly profound in this understanding of Heidegger above where he 
conflates the notion of world with an equipmental nexus and thus world-view with an 
equipmental gestalt is that this speaks to the modality of being of readiness-to-hand as a 
primordial and original access to knowledge of the world. Furthermore, it is in the non-
self-referential awareness and in the non-thematic awareness of circumspection and its 
intentional comportment that we access the world in our primary and usual way. Thus 
contradicting the dominant view and classical philosophical understanding that our 
knowledge of the world is derived primarily and originally thorough the theoretical vision 
of a detached self-referential observer. The mutuality of our being that is human beings 
and world and its unity is brought together in our absorption into that equipmental nexus 
which we disappear into such that we become that which is connoted and denoted in 
Heidegger’s discovery of that originary realization in the existential structure of being-in-
the-world.  
 
It is not theoretical vision which maps our being-in-the-world but circumspection which 
maps our being-in-availableness and thus it through being-amidst-things that is our 
equipmental gestalt that we arrive at a fundamental understanding of our way of being 
human, that is, that what it means to be human is to take a stand on existence and its 
contingent conditionalities, in other words its groundlessness, unsettledness, 
‘foundationless-ness’. Thus, in closing being with things in the modality of availableness 
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or readiness-to-hand and our perception thereof in its mode of circumspection is no mere 
incidental matter as has been ‘disclosed’ but is revelatory of being and worldliness as a 
function of equipmentality. It is thus no simplistic thing that human comport to things, 
equipment, objects in a deeply meaningful way such that one cannot merely pass it off as 
crass materialism, which it sometimes truly is. Rather what Heidegger shows us is that 
our relationship to things is tied to our make-up as Dasein, that is, that it discloses and 
uncovers in our relation to our existence what it means for us to be. Simply put 
equipment connects us to our being by de-severing our relationship to the world such that 
we are absorbed into our being-in-world and thus social being, through our concern with 
producing and reproducing our basic satisfactions and more. Through our dealings with 
and involvement in an equipmental whole, our imbrications in an equipmental nexus and 
disclosure in an equipmental gestalt we are the mutuality of self and world; in a word we 
are ‘being-in-the-world’ and inured in our sociality through the concomitant sociabilities 
that are tied to the practices involved in using equipment..  
 
Lest it not be misunderstood Heidegger is not taking the position of being anti-theory, 
though he is taking a radical and literal point of epistemological departure, for what he 
has called “fundamental ontology”. In this context theory does not become transparent to 
disappear as such from view, rather it no longer assumes the prominence that it did and 
does in Western philosophy, as our primary and primordial access to knowledge of the 
world. What emerges and has been assumed in the aforementioned discussion on 
equipmentality and circumspection as our mode of access to its being as availableness 
and readiness-to-hand, is that this modality emerges in our smooth and uninterrupted 
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‘commerce’ or dealings and involvement with equipment, as we manipulate it and use it 
in order to satisfy that toward which such use is directed at or intended. The question that 
begs then is what happens when such manipulation or functionality associated with 
readiness-to-hand is temporarily interrupted at best or permanently interrupted at worst. 
These are the conditionalities that Heidegger takes up to show that the comportment of 
theoretical vision and cognition as such is derived from our dealing with and involvement 
that comes with the use, manipulation and functionality of equipment at work. We 
consider both Heidegger’s (1962) views directly and Dreyfus’s (1991) analysis and 
extension of the formers views.   
 
The point we want to leave this with is that it is in our involvement with equipment, the 
practical domain of activity that we are inured in our social being and sociality through 
the sociabilities we exercise. Thus in the modality of equipment we are presented with a 
counterpoise to the displacement of our social being, however we must add a cautionary 
qualification, and that is that this holds for as long as the nature of technological 
equipment is of such a nature that our sociabilities are substantially exercised. But where 
our practices and involvement in equipment is absorbed by technology not in the sense of 
transparency, but in the sense that our efforts are no longer required and substituted as 
such by technology, and then the extent of our inuring in social being is proportionally 
diminished by such ontological substitution. In other words the way of revealing is not in 
the way of being of equipment as ready-to-hand and Dasein’s being as such is not 
disclosed in such comportment, but instead technology as way of revealing manifest the 
standing reserve. When this occurs then equipment no longer offers itself up as 
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Archimedean lever, but is itself a modality of an enframing, which reveals itself, to be 
stripped of its equipmental status, its status as thing and as object and merely a resource 
which is at hand to fulfill a technological functionality. Then we face the Heideggerian 
fatalism of humanity without social substance, a nihilistic fate. The question that thus 
confronts us is that with talk of the breakdown in circumspective absorption in the 
equipmental nexus as far as our involvement is concerned and the emergence of other 
modalities of being in unavailableness and presence-at-hand do these offer recourse as 
way of revealing, that is potentially serve as counterpoise to the way of revealing as 
standing reserve. We consider these possibilities in what follows.  
 
7.1.2 Unavailableness: temporary and permanent interruption in availableness/ 
readiness-to- hand 
In the previous section dealing with equipment and its ‘availableness’ we noted along 
with Dreyfus that Heidegger reversed the order of theory over practice favored by 
classical Western Philosophy in the matter of our primary mode for accessing knowledge 
of the world. We were at pains to show that Heidegger was not negating the role of 
theory but rather delimiting its relation to our primordial and original engagement with 
the world and its epistemic priority. This question of the role of theory in relation to the 
cognitive intentionality of the subject and the self-referential nature of the object is now 
put into perspective in Heidegger’s understanding of their emergence, as contingent upon 
the breakdown in the comportment of ‘absorbed coping’ and ‘transparent equipment’. In 
our terms the modality of theory is revealed as embedded in the sociability of 
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circumspective absorption and emerges when this mode is disrupted which as such comes 
to the way of revealing of presence-at-hand and its functionality or sociability.  
 
What must be noted however is that theory as derivative still has a ‘foot’ in the 
background understanding of being but it is recessive and assumes an analogous 
relationship as that between presence-at-hand and readiness-to-hand (the former in the 
latter) though inversely so. What happens in an interruption to the previous ‘transparent’ 
and circumspective functioning of equipment is that the virtual transparency of 
equipment and Dasein are no longer absorbed and as a result both, so to speak, reappear 
and emerge as subject and object. This subject – object relationship thrusts itself to the 
foreground and severs the existential involvement of readiness-to-hand, thus altering the 
modality of social being and its sociality. This opens up for us the potential in engaging 
the technological modality of being of the standing reserve theoretically, thus delimiting 
its region of influence and its relation to Dasein, that is our existential – ontological 
constitution of being.  
 
How far can we take this theoretical modality of being, given that it renders recessive 
social being for theoretical being and thus our sociabilities are socially decontextualised 
but paradigmatically recontextualised? However, in being able to shift contexts does it 
offer the possibility of at least theoretically being able to move outside of the orbit of the 
essence of ‘enframing’? Or conversely does it mean that if one is within the sway of 
modern technology our modality of thinking serves already as ‘ordering, measuring and 
calculating’, hence confirming the Heisenberg moment, which as such, is that the act of 
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measurement constitutes the reality of what is being measured. And that brings us 
squarely to the ‘standing reserve’ once again. We will keep the ‘horns’ of this 
epistemological dilemma in mind as we move into the remaining modalities of the being 
of equipment. In another sense, we are asking if the sociabilities attached to the way of 
revealing of presence-at-hand will be able to resist the imperative of modern technology 
when those associated with readiness-to-hand are absorbed into the standing reserve or 
similarly and in a prior sense are the sociabilities of readiness-to-hand absorbed into the 
subject – object modality of presence-at-hand, that is a theoretical paradigm and thus 
bringing a different tension to bear on social being?   
 
The point of note that we will develop accordingly is that the use and manipulation of 
equipment during breakdown assumes a conscious dimension with a cognitive centering 
that is no longer an ‘absorbed coping’ and a visual centering that now informs 
circumspection. This switch in comportment Dreyfus (1991: 70-71) or sociability is one 
from “absorbed coping” and “transparent equipment” to “thematic consciousness” and 
“its objects”. Dreyfus (1991: 70-71) makes the point that Heidegger (1962: 107) was not 
explicit in his account of “how thematic consciousness and its objects emerge”, though he 
does state that the latter offers a hint to this end and cites the following. We have 
remained faithful in this instance to the translation of Dreyfus (1991) and have inserted 
Heidegger’s (1962) version in square brackets to distinguish between the two 
interpretations.       
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Being-in-the-world, according to our interpretation hitherto, amounts to a non-
thematic circumspective absorption (sic) in references or assignments constitutive 
for the availableness [readiness-to-hand] of an equipmental whole [of a totality of 
equipment]. Any concern is already as it is, because of some familiarity with the 
world. In this familiarity Dasein can lose itself in what it encounters within the 
world [and be fascinated with it]… The occurrentness of beings [presence-at-hand 
of entities] is thrust to the fore by possible breaks in that referential whole 
[totality] in which circumspection ‘operates’ … 
 
We need only add that circumspection as non-thematic absorption emerges as possible 
modality of sight because Dasein as being-in-the-world, as social being, already has an 
understanding (hermeneutic) of what it means to be, thus is accordingly concerned and in 
so doing somewhat familiar with its existence and being in general . This much has been 
covered previously, the point of note is that entities as pieces of equipment recede into 
the totality of the referential nexus and are thus discernable as individual items only 
within this whole.  
 
However, what Heidegger is now saying is that when this totality is ruptured and 
equipment in circumspective absorption becomes unavailable then this equipment is so to 
speak objectified and thus emerges (momentarily) as present-at-hand or occurrent. What 
was ready-to-hand and ‘available now assumes the mode of being of the ‘occurrentness’, 
and circumspection which was non-thematic now becomes deliberate and potentially 
thematic in an objective sense. Exactly how this shift manifests itself and how it relates to 
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vision depends on the extent of the disruption to the non-thematic circumspective 
absorption as related to the mode of being of ‘availableness’ or ‘readiness-to-hand’ of 
equipment. Heidegger (1962: 104) cited in Dreyfus (1991: 71) identifies three modes of 
disruption of circumspective absorption in ‘availableness’ or ‘readiness-to-hand’ which 
allow for the emergence of the Dasein as cognitively or theoretically centered subject, 
and for the modality of the being of entitities as ‘present-at-hand’ or ‘occurrent’ that is as 
isolated and determinate, and thus as distinct ontological structure.    
 
The modes of conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and obstinacy all have the function 
of bringing to the fore the characteristic of occurrentness [presence-at-hand] in 
what is available [ready-to-hand]. 
 
Since Heidegger’s (1962) account of the three modes of concern are brief and by Dreyfus 
account (1991) quite sketchy we will move between the former and the latter to develop 
an understanding that surfaces the modalities of vision that are implicated in how we 
encounter things as equipment with our ‘epistemological dilemma’ in mind.   
7.1.2.1 The mode of concern of conspicuousness: temporary disruption and 
unavailableness 
What we have established thus far is that we encounter equipment and Dasein, that is our 
existential - ontological constitution of social being, in the mode of being of 
‘availableness’ and in the comportment, that is the sociability, of ‘non-thematic 
circumspective absorption’, as ontologically transparent in its sociality. Both our ‘mental’ 
content and ‘visual’ content, so to speak, ‘disappear’ into said circumspective absorption 
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and the task at hand. Notwithstanding, there are times when in our involvement in the 
mode of being of availableness’ or ‘readiness-to-hand’ of equipment, we encounter some 
or other problem when the tool we are using incurs some damage as a result of which we 
are no longer able to use it for the designated purpose. In these instances Heidegger 
(1962: 71) notes that: 
 
We discover its unusability, however, not by looking at it and establishing its 
properties, but rather by the circumspection of the dealings in which we use it. 
When its unusability is thus discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous. This 
conspicuousness presents the ready-to-hand equipment as in a certain un-
readiness-to-hand. … Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equipment, 
but only to withdraw to the readiness-to-hand of something with which one 
concerns oneself - that is to say, of the sort of thing we find when we put it back 
into repair 
 
What emerges is that how we encounter the temporary disruption countenanced in the 
‘unusability’ of equipment is not through our capacity for vision, but rather in the rupture 
of the transparency with which we encounter the equipment we are using and ourselves 
as existing in relation thereto, that is as Dasein. In this rupture we are ‘untimely ripped’ 
from our involvement and immersion and thrust into the foreground of our activity where 
we encounter the ‘conspicuousness’ of that which we have been manipulating. What 
takes on the character of conspicuousness is not the visual dimensions of equipment that 
is thrust before us, which now momentarily reconstitutes us in a subject-object relation, 
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but rather our circumspective absorption that is now redirected towards what Dreyfus 
(1991) more appropriately refers to as the mode of being of the ‘unavailableness’ of 
equipment. However, because the break is temporary we are not in a state of 
‘unavailableness’ as extended condition of the being of equipment and are readily 
returned to its being as available or ready-to-hand once repaired. In this regard Dreyfus 
(1991) takes the position that one is not dealing so much with a change in the modality of 
the being of equipment, as such, in as much as it suggests a move from “availableness” to 
“unavailableness”, but he sees it as a temporary “malfunction” which allows a glimpse 
into the being of not only the latter, but of presence-at-hand too or as he prefers 
‘occurrentness’. There is support in the quote above as ‘conspicuousness’ or 
‘malfunction’ merely suggests ‘unavailableness’ in that it is only so in a certain way and 
presence-at-hand withdraws to allow for availableness to return taking its rightful place 
once the equipment has been restored to its working order. We accept this line of 
interpretation only insofar as it relates to the transience of disrepair and where in fact 
such repair or damage is redeemable but would argue for a stronger ontological claim 
contra both Dreyfus and Heidegger in the light of the tendential nature of modern 
technology to wards disposability of pieces of equipment.   
 
Before taking this up we take up our dilemma and concern for how what has been 
described as ‘conspicuousness’ through equipmental malfunction offers a symptomatic 
for considering the relation of modern technology to our existential – ontological 
constitution and thus our social being. In the temporary rupture both being and equipment 
become conspicuous and thus in that moment we have in our existential involvement-
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equipment and its modality of revealing as technology an ontological disclosure of the 
structure of being. One is faced with one’s sociability in the ontic transcendence involved 
in our break in non-thematic circumspective absorption and one is faced with a break in 
the equipmental nexus and thus its sociality. Taken together, we are confronted with the 
nature of our social being and in as much as the technological modality of being involves 
equipment and profligately so, we are regularly confronted with temporary and extended 
breakdowns in our technological milieu and thus with interpolations to our social being.  
 
In this scenario we are pushed to draw on sociabilities where the nature of equipment is 
such that it keeps the deep connective with social being ‘alive and well’. In this regard we 
take a contrary view to Heidegger’s techno-pessimism by suggesting that intrinsic to 
modern technology is also the imperative of replacement and limited shelf life as part of 
its mechanism of social reproduction. And it is precisely in this technological culture of 
disposability and obsolescence that disruptions in the technological milieu are seen as its 
standard feature, rather than its exception. Thus, sociologically speaking it could be seen 
to vary by social class, or in the wealth- poverty continuum, in as much as equipment of 
high quality and high cost end up with a high reliability, and equipment of lower quality 
and lower cost with shorter reliability. Be that as it may, the point is that technology’s 
sweep is not ‘even and combined’ and as such offers social sites in which, the way of 
revealing as standing reserve is assuaged and kept from enveloping all in its wake.  
 
There might inadvertently, as ‘quirk of fate’, be some existential – ontological virtue in 
not being able to afford the highest quality equipment, for in its unreliability rests an 
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access to social being and a diagnostic that can potentially serve as counterpoise. Of 
course in the logic of homo economicus of ceterus paribus,  where everything is equal 
and the market putatively eventuates in consistent reliability the ontological sites for 
disclosure become much more limited, and we would thus need more than a temporary 
breakdown to secure ourselves a counterpoise to the displacement of our sociality and 
social being. Having said this we want to steer clear of the implication that we may be 
proposing technological anarchy as counterpoise and its precedent in Luddism, though 
one may be able to appreciate it role in disclosing the absorption of social being into the 
standing reserve and resisting its imperative. Though, one may also concede that perhaps 
in the end it may come to that as one social manifestation of resistance to the 
technologisation of being. This may very well be portentous of the movement into such a 
Heideggerian technological condition.  
 
After having given some mind to our dilemma we now turn to whether one is in fact 
witness to a shift in the ontological structure of equipment in the mode of the concern of 
‘conspicuousness’ or “malfunction”. In this regard we find ourselves somewhat at odds 
both with Heidegger (1962) and Dreyfus (1991) on this matter. Dreyfus (1991: 71) plays 
down the mode of encountering equipment in the temporary state of unusability and the 
conspicuousness that emerges or what he calls “malfunction” making the point instead 
that it “provides a preview” of the other two modes. We accept that in the guarded and 
qualified use by Heidegger (1962) of a “certain un-readiness-to-hand” he has grounds; 
however in as much as it accounts for something as commonplace as damage to 
equipment and the frequency of its occurrence means for us that it needs to be taken 
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account of as a modality of being in and of itself for a different reason. It does after all 
impact on what Dreyfus (1001) calls the ‘transparency’ of equipment and Dasein and 
does in fact introduce a qualitative break in the sociability of ‘absorbed coping”.  
However, Dreyfus’s (1991) argument hinges on, and is applicable in those instances 
where there is, a return to an original state of availableness but it does not by that fact 
render obsolete, nor incidental what has been disclosed about the modality of being of 
unavailableness or un-readiness-to-hand in its modality of revealing of conspicuousness, 
albeit somewhat ephemeral.  
 
The point of departure here is that it need not necessarily be temporary and in fact in the 
modality of equipment of modern technology it is instead a permanent state of disrepair, 
in other words the piece of equipment has to be replaced. To be sure this replacement 
does return us to an original state of availableness, but the part being disposed of, in 
itself, constitutes a permanent feature of the technological condition of obsolescence and 
waste, and thus its predisposition for disposability. As such its conspicuousness is not 
diminished by its ready replacement it is enhanced in the increasing accumulation of the 
mountains of failed equipment littering workshops, factories, plants and eventually 
ending up in garbage dumps and landfills.  
 
Thus we would extend Dreyfus (1991) claim as far as the mode of conspicuousness or 
malfunction is concerned and argue that it in as much as much of modern of 
technological equipment is not readily repairable and thus remains conspicuous in those 
many instances it is not returned to state of repair and constitutes waste it does take on 
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the modality of being of ‘unreadiness-to-hand or ‘unavailableness’. And contra 
Heidegger who holds that conspicuousness is only unreadiness-to-hand in a “certain” 
way we make the stronger claim that it is so in a definite way in those instances where 
damage is not repairable, as it mostly is with much equipment contemporaneously, and 
furthermore since its conspicuousness accumulates as waste. But more than this of 
existential- ontological import conspicuousness or malfunction signals this pervasive 
tendency of obsolescence, disposability and waste as the way of revealing of the standing 
reserve, and how our constitution as social being is increasingly taking this form as our 
sociabilities are being absorbed by technologies and displaced as formerly productive 
labour which increasingly swells the ranks of the ‘standing labour reserve’. We might in 
certain respect be closer than we think to being revealed as nothing but resources for 
tourism, servicing, medical industry and such like.          
 
However with respect to ‘unavailableness or unreadiness-to-hand crossing an ontological 
threshold into another modality of being entirely as in pure presence-at-hand Heidegger 
(1962: 103) seems unequivocal on this as what is encountered he points out still takes 
place within the horizon of intelligibility of readiness-to-hand.  
 
This presence-at-hand of something that cannot be used is still not devoid of all 
readiness-to-hand whatsoever; equipment which is present-at-hand in this way is 
still not just a Thing which occurs somewhere. The damage to the equipment is 
still not a mere alteration of a Thing - not a change of properties which just occurs 
in something-present-at-hand.  . 
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In light of the above Dreyfus (1991) to be sure is certainly making a strong ontological 
claim in holding that un-readiness-to-hand or unavailableness constitutes a new modality 
of being of equipment and that it is not simply a deficient state of readiness-to-hand or 
availableness. We would tend towards Dreyfus interpretation though considered in a 
different ‘light’ of the technological modality of being of equipment in the context of the 
result of  malfunction, disrepair and thus its conspicuousness as deplorable waste and rate 
of obsolescence making literally for ‘mountains’ of ‘garbage heaps’. The point being 
made is not one borne of an ecological sensitivity which it certainly nevertheless is, but 
that the mode of being of the unavailableness of this equipmental waste is reconstituted 
as recycled material and as such re-enters the technological cycle or whole as part of the 
standing reserve. As such what was formerly conspicuous in its waste becomes 
inconspicuous as causa materialis and thus part of the equipmental nexus. Thus un-
readiness-to-hand or unavailableness we would argue does indeed merit being treated as 
an ontological structure as disclosed in its mode of conspicuousness as case in point as it 
does enter the equipmental whole with the ontical distinction of ‘recycled material’ 
though tied to its modality of being of conspicuousness, thus ontological. We now move 
onto the next mode of being of equipment. 
7.1.2.2 The mode of concern of obstinacy and Unavailableness 
In accordance with Dreyfus’s (1991) reorganization of Heidegger’s (1962) discussion on 
the three modes of being of equipment of  conspicuousness, obstinacy and obtrusiveness 
we take up the matter of obstinacy before obtrusiveness as the latter expresses the 
emergence of the subject and object relation in ‘unavailableness of equipment in a more 
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definitive way than the latter. The particular ontological status of obstinacy does not 
warrant reconsideration as distinct ontological category. Though, obstinacy does surface 
fundamental issues such as to how it bears on the subject-object relation and what kind of 
visionary being is being invoked, in relation to how it in turn bears upon circumspection. 
Thus it does raise issues that bear on social being and sociabilities and how these in turn 
fare in relation to technological interpolation and to equipment as its counterpoise.    
First let us consider what Heidegger (1962: 103-104) means by this mode of concern 
called obstinacy: 
 
In our dealings with the world of our concern, the un-ready-to-hand can be 
encountered … as something … which ‘stands in the way of our concern. That to 
which our concern refuses to turn, that for which it has ‘no time’, is something 
un-ready-to-hand in the manner of what does not belong here, of what has not as 
yet been attended to. Anything which is un-ready-to-hand in this way is disturbing 
to us, and enables us to see the obstinacy of that which we must concern ourselves 
in the first instance before we do anything else. With this obstinacy, the presence-
at-hand of the ready-to-hand makes itself known in a new way as the Being of 
that which lies before us and calls for our attending to it.    
 
Here we note, again as before, that what is present-at-hand or occurrent is disclosed when 
that which is ready-to-hand or available is disturbed in such a way as to render, albeit it 
momentarily, the equipment as un-ready-to-hand or unavailable. Previously we noted this 
in the mode of concern of conspicuousness when equipment in their unavailability was 
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rendered briefly present-at-hand before it was returned to repair and availableness. Now 
we see Heidegger making us aware of instances when equipment in addition to being 
unusable becomes unavailable when it ‘stands in our way’, and blocks what it is we are 
engaged in such that we have to clear the path in order to continue that which we are 
concerned with completing. What emerges in this instance is that what we are distracted 
by and occupied with doing what is particularly stubborn in as much as it does not brook 
being sidestepped in any way whatsoever, such that without being attended to it will 
continue to obstruct the consummation of that to which the work is being directed 
towards or intended.  
 
And insofar as that which obstinately blocks the manipulation and use of equipment, so 
that whatever task is being performed is hindered, the result of which is such that one 
encounters the mode of being of such equipment, as present-at-hand that is merely 
occurrent. If so, are we then finding in the mode of concern of obstinacy an ontological 
threshold marking a point in the modality of being of equipment separating readiness-to-
hand from presence-at-hand, or availableness from occurrentness? And, can we extend 
our argument that we have seized upon with respect to ‘conspicuousness’ that 
unavailableness presents itself in a sufficiently defined way in this latter mode, such that 
it inures itself sufficiently to be considered an ontological structure, sui generis, in the 
mode of obstinacy?. To both questions Heidegger’s (1962: 104) understanding of 
obstinacy as presented below does not seem to make for such allowances.        
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But the ready-to-hand is not thereby just observed and stared at as something 
present-at-hand; the presence-at-hand which makes itself known is still bound up 
in the readiness-to-hand of equipment. Such equipment still does not veil itself in 
the guise of mere Things. It becomes ‘equipment’ in the sense of something 
which one would like to shove out of the way. But in such a Tendency to shove 
things aside, the ready-to-hand the ready-to-hand shows itself as still ready-to-
hand in its unswerving presence-at-hand.   
 
With respect to the matter of obstinacy suggesting the move from readiness-to-hand to 
presence-at-hand, we do not see in this a critical threshold in which a shift is registered 
where equipment is transformed into a thing as such. Since, as Heidegger holds above, 
obstinacy still comes under the adumbration of the horizon of availableness or readiness-
to-hand. And secondly that which is shoved aside is presented as an obstacle coming in 
the way of circumspectively directed activity, and is not as in the mode of 
conspicuousness, damaged equipment, or that which is in a state of permanent disrepair. 
There is thus no relation as such to permanent unavailableness, nor is there any recourse 
to its reconstitution as recycled material and as such representing a transformation from 
the state of unreadiness-to-hand or unavailableness to that of readiness-to-hand or 
availableness.  
 
Thus, in both cases as ontological threshold to either presence-at-hand or to unreadiness-
to-hand obstinacy offers neither necessary condition nor sufficient condition. But it does 
offer itself as site for the emergence of temporary unavailableness in which presence-at-
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hand or ‘occurrentness’ becomes manifest briefly, and as such does invoke a different 
modality of circumspection or sociability that is addressed to dealing with that which 
obstructs circumspective absorption. However, in dealing with what is obstinate and in 
the path of equipment so as to return to readiness-to-hand what is disclosed are the 
assignments and references that is the ‘in-order-to’ and the ‘towards’ which the 
equipment is directed to, or in other words the kind of sociality instantiated in the 
equipmental nexus.  
 
Before taking up obstinacy in its modal specificity we want to consider the 
aforementioned for its relevance as counterpoise to the imperative of modern technology. 
What is at stake as we have taken up variously is our social be-ing and its potential 
absorption into the standing reserve, that our sociality is rendered insubstantial as 
resource and no more, and how equipmentality may offer itself as a different way of 
revealing and as diagnostic of the technological condition. With respect to its ontological 
dimension, that is as disclosure of being it is a way of revealing our being and Dasein’s 
existential involvement in equipment, in its sociability as non-thematic circumspective 
absorption and its transparencies.  
 
And secondly in so far as it discloses the sociality of being it is a way of revealing the 
social be-ing binding together the sociabilities entailed in equipmental functions and 
purposes to constitute an equipmental whole and gestalt as hermeneutic for making sense 
and understanding the social world instantiated in the equipmental nexus as a function of 
this social be-ing.  With regard to equipment in its mode of temporary unavailableness in 
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its mode of obstinacy and it as counterpoise we find in the plenitude of technological 
equipment much that has to be pushed aside in order to busy ourselves with sociabilities 
necessary for securing our social well being. The car that needs petrol so that one may go 
to work or get some important part to restore some equipment so that one may continue 
some or other function will not budge unless one has refueled. Though in having to deal 
with the obstinacy of equipment as in having to fuel a car so that one may proceed, one is 
brought to a disclosure of how one is socially connected to whatever is momentarily 
blocked, thus the sociality of our world and our existential involvement in what we do 
with equipment is made manifest as the latter’s way of revealing being.  
 
This equipmentality is a ubiquitous feature of modern life and as such the mode of being 
of unavailableness in its temporary mode as obstinacy is an omniscient characteristic, 
which in its technological modality of being would be a constant interpellation of social 
being, thus undercutting the way of revealing of the standing reserve. Equipment here too 
offers it self as an ontological site to counter pose the modality of technological being by 
anchoring us in, and hailing us, our existential – ontological constitution of social being 
and Dasein as our way of being and existing as human. This seems to us to be a more 
unequivocal modality for counteracting the enframing of modern technology, though as 
diagnostic it suggests itself in the silence, which may come in the place of the hailing of 
the social imperatives, and the lack of exigency that come with the temporal structure of 
care and concern for our existence. It is when we no longer care one way or the other that 
our insubstantiality as resource may find ground for its expression, though we are 
sanguine about the prospects of this modality of being of obstinacy of equipment and it 
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recalcitrant haling of the imperatives of our social be-ing. Whether we choose to see this 
or not will depend on the sensitivity of our vision and it hermeneutic.  
 
 
 
Thus we take up the matter of circumspection in as much as it involves a particular 
modality of vision or envisioning as it is directly relevant for our purposes and take up 
Dreyfus’s (1991: 72) interpretation of this aspect of the mode of obstinacy. We are 
particularly interested in the way Dreyfus inflects Heidegger’s analysis of the disruption 
to readiness-to-hand in the ‘circuitry’ he establishes with respect to its different levels of 
intensity that emerge in relation to obstinacy. Accordingly, Dreyfus considers what 
happens in temporary breakdown, in order to show how this relates to the emergence of a 
subject and object, its modalities of circumspection and the specific conditionalities of 
each moment. Thus in the mode of obstinacy our involvement with equipment sees 
different sociabilities in circumspective involvement when faced with different intensities 
of temporary breakdown such that respectively we move from “deliberate coping to 
deliberation”.  
 
During circumspective ‘deliberate coping’ the absorption of equipment into the 
equipmental nexus is disturbed and thus what was previously described by Dreyfus as 
‘transparent equipment’ now becomes manifest, in other words emerges into the being of 
‘presence-at-hand’ though still within the horizon of equipmentality and not things. What 
is different from the mode of conspicuousness is that the temporary breakdown or 
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obstinacy and the ensuing unavailableness not only make present equipment as now 
manifest but also the equipmental nexus that is its references and assignments which are 
already there. These references and assignments which face temporary breakdown refer 
to as Dreyfus (1991: 72) points out drawing on Heidegger (1962) 
 
“the constitutive assignment of the in-order-to [this hammer is something one 
uses to pound nails] to a ‘towards-this’ [pounding the nails into the wall to hold 
these brackets] has been disturbed.  
 
However, when the breakdown assumes serious proportions then circumspective 
deliberate coping is itself disturbed for a more intensive engagement with the equipment 
and equipmental nexus. Here we encounter yet another mode of circumspective coping in 
the form of “deliberation”. To be clear the mode of circumspective deliberate coping is 
an involvement with equipment, which is still trained on the function and ‘constitutive 
assignment’ and what we might call the ‘consummative’ assignment except in this 
instance we become aware of what we are doing, and thus transparency as such 
withdraws. It would seem that what Dreyfus has in mind here is a way to nuance 
Heidegger’s understanding of this mode by pointing to the practical awareness one has in 
the process of performing a function towards its consummation, in a careful and 
deliberate manner especially when one encounters slight obstacles that need to be 
attended so that a near breakdown may be averted. This however kicks into another level 
of circumspection when the disturbance becomes serious and breaks down, then 
deliberate, careful functioning no longer suffices and progress towards the consummation 
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of the task at hand is blocked. In this event “deliberation” emerges as mode of 
circumspection which entails more than being deliberate in the use and manipulation of 
equipment, as now the activity has broken down and calls for “reflective planning … in a 
context of involved activity” (Dreyfus, 1991: 72). Before characterizing this mode of 
deliberation and its modality of vision we turn to Heidegger’s (1962: 410) interpretation 
and note that he anchors in the circumspection involved in “practical concern” and its 
modality of “seeing” the “existential genesis of science”.   
 
Circumspection operates in the involvement-relationships of the context of 
equipment which is ready-to-hand. Moreover, it is subordinate to the guidance of 
a more or less explicit survey of the equipmental totality of the current 
equipmental-world and of the public environment which belongs to it. … In one’s 
current using and manipulating, the concernful circumspection which does this 
‘surveying’, brings the ready to hand closer to Dasein, and does so by interpreting 
it circumspectively, we call deliberating.  
 
Here we find once again an understanding of circumspection that receives its 
intelligibility not from a cognitively centered subject, but instead from that concernful 
looking about and around as a function of an equipmental gestalt. However, Heidegger 
does more than merely reassert this point on the prior understanding of an equipmental 
whole and nexus, but now offers in addition the subsumption of the public environment 
to that which is constituted in the equipmental totality of the ready-to-hand. Consistent 
with his non-thematic circumspective awareness the public environment emerges as a 
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function of the intelligibility contained in one’s circumspective absorption in dealing with 
the context in which readiness-to-hand is made manifest , as in say a workshop. The 
disclosure that is made of the social be-ing of the equipmental nexus and its sociabilities 
that comes with ‘deliberating’ is such that it not of the type that is tied to the social 
subjectivities of an individual who organizes his or her workshop idiosyncratically, but 
rather one finds in Heidegger the claim that such social organization of space into an 
equipmental whole or world carries with it the sociality of a public sensibility and as such 
is objective. This obviously dos not detract from certain esoteric proclivities or variations 
to the theme but are speaking to a general sensibility which we have called a social 
hermeneutic and thus devolves to social being.  
 
Thus the organization of a workshop is social not technological such that anyone who 
shares a familiarity with equipmentality is able to engage in the readiness-to-hand that is 
integral to its organization. One sees clearly from the vantage point of an existential – 
ontological understanding of social being that the intelligibility contained in the 
circumspective organization of the workshop, in relation to one’s involvement in the 
context of equipment’s readiness-to-hand manifests, at bottom, a sociality, that is in fact 
borne of an originary transcendence, namely that existential structure of ‘being-in-the-
world, our Dasein. Social worlds and society writ large is thus an emergent property of 
the use and manipulation of equipment in the context of readiness-to-hand as it relates to 
how the assignment and references coalesce in an equipmental nexus and firms up in an 
equipmental whole with a gestalt or hermeneutic as its horizon of intelligibility.  Such 
that, an existential ontological understanding of social being is deemed to be in place in 
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which anyone and everyone with a sense of equipmentality is equally able to derive 
meaning from its social or public context. Succinctly, this is the Archimedean lever that 
we find in equipmentality which even in the most technologically sated modality of being 
still offers itself an existential - ontological understanding of social being. Even when our 
sociabilities might be truncated as more and more of our functionalities and practices are 
absorbed into prescient technologies, the sociality of equipment disturbs the way of 
insubstantiality of the standing reserve for it is in our circumspective existential 
involvement- in-an-equipmental-world that our social being and its sociality receives its 
intelligibility.  
 
It would appear then that as counterpoise the way of revealing of equipment restores the 
ontological dimension to technology. And that its imperative for enframing and the 
standing reserve is but one manifestation and not the manifestation as ‘grand 
confinement’. Heidegger (1977) as Feenberg (2004) and Verbeek (2005) argue is making 
too abstract and monolithic an argument for the relationship between modern 
technology’s essence and its taking up of society in its sweep and thus as we have held 
for overreaching into the ambit of social being with token resistance.. 
 
The second point of note is that circumspection is considered to bring readiness-at-hand 
closer to the Dasein that is the human way of showing concern and care for its existence.   
In the mode of concern of conspicuousness we saw the emergence of the modality of 
seeing of inspection as way to bring readiness-to-hand closer, such that damage to 
equipment could be dealt with, and thus circumspective absorption could be sustained. 
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We have seen in relation to obstinacy thus far how readiness-to-hand is brought closer, 
though the circumspective mode of being deliberate, in our practical awareness thus 
ceases to be transparent in our being and in our relation to equipmentality. And in 
‘second degree’ obstinacy we encounter the modality of deliberation, which takes what 
has been brought closer in the mode of being deliberate, and subject it to a deliberation 
that foregrounds the cognitive dimension, which though responsive to the present-at-hand 
is still guided by readiness-to-hand. Thus, even though we see below the basis for the 
‘existential genesis of science’, it is by definition not one that as yet takes the form of a 
detachment, or decontextualisation from readiness-to-hand and its transparent sociality, 
sociabilities and social being, or sees a recontextualisation in a scientific or theoretical 
paradigm, that is de-worlded or de-socialized. Furthermore in Heidegger (1962: 410) 
partially cited in Dreyfus (1991: 72-73) we have an analysis of the circumspective 
modality of deliberation and what it holds for its contemplative aspects.  
 
The scheme peculiar to this is the ‘if - then’; if this or that, for instance, is to be 
produced, put to use, or averted, then some ways and means, circumstances, or 
opportunities will be needed. Circumspective deliberation illumines Dasein’s 
factical situation in the environment with which it concerns itself. Accordingly, 
such deliberation never merely ‘affirms’ that some entity is present-at-hand or has 
such and such properties. Moreover, deliberation can be performed even when 
that which is brought close in it circumspectively is not palpably ready-to-hand 
and does not have presence within the closest range. Bringing the environment 
closer in circumspective deliberation has the existential meaning of a making 
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present; for envisaging is only a mode of this. In envisaging, one’s deliberation 
catches sight directly of that which is needed but which is un-ready-to-hand. 
Circumspection which envisages does not relate itself to ‘mere representations’.    
 
 
In as much as one is ‘dealing with’ the genesis of an ‘existential science’ in relation to 
circumspection we take this to be that which is contained in the propositional structure of 
the if – then structure as it is tied to the context of  absorption in ‘readiness-to-hand’. 
Dreyfus (1991:72) refers to this structure as that which is considered and formalized as 
“practical syllogism”. In this regard it has something of the shape of a ‘deductive 
nomological’ structure and as such leans towards science, though is not of a universalistic 
bent steeped as it is in a local social context of equipmentality. What, however, prompts 
the movement towards science arises in the disruption that occurs when readiness-to-
hand’ yields to ‘presence-at-hand’ by way of ‘un-readiness-to-hand’. To be sure science 
emerges proper when the break down is total and it is wrenched from the existential 
context of readiness-to-hand and its sociality and recontextualised, about which more a 
little later.  
 
Our concern here is for the modality of circumspection that emerges in the context of the 
‘second degree’ level of obstinacy referred to as deliberation. In this regard Heidegger 
makes the general point that the intentional structure of circumspective deliberation, or 
what it is directed towards, is in making present that which arises in what has been 
disturbed. This mode of what we may call ‘reflexivity’ for the equipmental nexus, its 
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functionality and point of consummation falls within the purview of deliberation in as 
much as it reaches to that which is not apparent and present as such, but must be 
envisaged that is, made present. Thus, whereas in the mode of obstinacy, being deliberate 
deals with what is at hand, deliberation by contrast, in its contemplative and reflexivity, is 
concerned with what is un-ready-to-hand or unavailable, but necessary to remove that 
which stands in the way of availableness. Where, this mode of circumspection of 
deliberation, in its specificity, as envisaging differs, from the modality of vision 
associated with science, is that it is not directed towards the present-at-hand as much as it 
is directed towards the un-ready-to-hand.  
 
In other words s what Dreyfus (1991:73) make clear is that Heidegger is not dealing with 
representations in the latter modality of envisaging as cognitively centered, and thus is 
strictly speaking not reflexive, as he is “shifting attention from a being – a hammer, for 
example – to Dasein’s ways of understanding of, i.e., way of coping with being – un-
readiness-to-hand, for example. Or, in short, we move from an ontical concern to an 
ontological concern. Briefly, one is not dealing with objects that stand alone, as self-
referential in their presence-at-hand; neither is one, dealing with subjects that stand alone 
in their cognitively centered mental selves. With respect to the ontological structure and 
its being in itself, that is, sui generis credence is attributed to Dreyfus (1991: 77) who 
makes the case that  
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… a way of being of equipment is revealed which is more determinate than 
transparent functioning and yet whose way of being is not that of an isolated, 
determinate, occurrent thing with occurrent properties.      
 
We saw this in the mode of circumspection of inspecting, in the mode of concern of 
conspicuousness or malfunction, and we saw this in the modes of circumspection of 
being deliberate, deliberation and envisaging in the mode of concern of obstinacy or 
temporary breakdown. In addition in the latter circumspective deliberation we saw the 
emergence of the genesis of existential science in the propositional structure or practical 
syllogisms as articulated in the mode of existential involvement in readiness-to-hand.  In 
these modes we also saw the flow and ebb of presence-at-hand in the disturbances and 
blockages to readiness-at-hand and in un-readiness-to-hand respectively.  
 
We now move into the province of obtrusiveness or permanent breakdown to consider 
the emergence of presence-at-hand as it relates to readiness-at-hand but more especially 
as it relates to presence-at-hand and its modalities of circumspection and perception, in its 
mode of being of equipment as obtrusiveness. Once again we are concerned with its 
bearing on our existential – ontological understanding of social being, sociality and 
sociabilities, and how it offers up itself as a counterpoise to modern technology’s 
standing reserve, or whether it surfaces a different order of problematic in its subject – 
object distanciation and detached observation or what we have called a ‘calculus of 
vision’. .   
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7.1.2.3 The mode of concern of obtrusiveness and presence-at-hand or 
occurrentness 
We take up this mode of concern, as the final modality, unlike Heidegger who deals with 
it after conspicuousness, but before obtrusiveness, though like Dreyfus we have opted to 
treat it as the final stage in the being of equipment as it marks the threshold to a new 
ontological structure, that is, presence-at-hand. Though, unlike Dreyfus we are concerned 
with the matter of perception and vision, in particular, and in this regard we encounter 
Heidegger’s thinking by way of his engagement with theoretical vision and curiosity and 
the distinctions he proffers. We are not concerned with the latter in  themselves but rather 
for their significance in their relation to social being, and its interpolation by modern 
technology, and the conditions of possibility for its counterpoise.   
 
However, before the discussion on modalities of vision and its relation to technological 
being and social being we need to come to terms with the modality of concern with 
equipment that is neither unusable (conspicuousness), nor ‘standing in our way’ 
(obstinacy) but that is missing, that is, obtrusive. One notes that in Heidegger 
sandwiching obtrusiveness between the modes of being of equipment of conspicuousness 
and obstinacy, he may be alluding to the possibility that in each of the modes denoting a 
temporary breakdown there is always the chance that the damage might be irreparable 
and that a blockage or obstacle might prove implacable in which case one would have to 
deal with their unavailableness and thus their presence-at-hand albeit on the background 
of readiness-to-hand. Be that as it may, we are considering that the latter modes of 
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concern are indeed temporary and therefore do not fall within the purview of 
obtrusiveness. In the latter regard Heidegger (1962: 103) notes that: 
 
…we also find things which are missing – which not only are not handy … but 
are not ‘to hand’ … at all. Again, to miss something in this way amounts to 
coming across something un-ready-to-hand. When we notice what is un-ready-to-
hand, that which is ready-to-hand enters the mode of obtrusiveness. The more 
urgently … we need what is missing, and the more authentically it is encountered 
in its un-readiness-to-hand, all the more obtrusive … does that which is ready-to-
hand become – so much so, indeed, that it seems to lose its character of readiness-
to-hand. It reveals itself as something just present-at-hand and no more, which 
cannot be budged without the thing that is missing. The helpless way in which we 
stand before it is a deficient mode of concern, and as such it uncovers the Being-
just-present-at-hand-and-no-more of something ready-to-hand.    
 
What we would need to add is that not only is the mode of being of readiness-to-hand lost 
but so too is unavailableness or un-readiness-to-hand. In other words in no longer being 
able to continue in the use and manipulation of equipment in the immediate refers to a 
loss of readiness-to-hand, but in no longer being able to restore the situation at all means 
that even un-readiness-to-hand would no longer be the current mode of being, as that 
which is transient or an interregnum (between end of readiness-to-hand and beginning of 
presence-at-hand). However, in as much as we have argued that unavailableness or –
readiness-to-hand where it involves extensive damage and irreparability and as such 
 
 
 
 
 370
becomes conspicuous as waste constitutes a distinct modality as being in itself, which is 
not only transient, but in addition to and not only as waste but as that which is inflected 
as recycled material, and even as recycled equipment. In this way that which reenters as 
recycled equipment carries an ontological distinction and thus is marked as a condition of 
possibility of unavailableness outside the immediate equipmental whole but reconstituted 
as such within a broader equipmental gestalt. This might be making too fine a point of 
conspicuousness as obtrusiveness. Nevertheless to return to the matter ‘at hand’ when the 
latter situation arises, then we are effectively confronting equipment as ripped from their 
equipmental nexus and their sociality as well as Dasein in existential involvement and its 
sociability of circumspective absorption or transparency, and thus covered over or veiled 
by a different modality of being or appearance as present-at-hand and thus as things or 
objects in themselves before one.  
 
It is in this sense that equipment is made present as that which lies before us without their 
being-in-themselves (their functionality or usability) any longer available, as this is tied 
to their relational nature as equipment in an equipmental whole and nexus, that is their 
context of social be-ing and its sociality and sociabilities. Extruded of these 
aforementioned relations and functions and social be-ing  we are left with equipment and 
their assignment and references as no longer transparent that is tied to our involvement in 
our circumspective coping and thus somewhat ‘invisible’, but now entering a 
‘conspicuous’ field of visibility as we helplessly stare at what now lies before us in 
disuse.. Whereas we became variously aware of the visibilities involved in equipment in 
the other modes of concern in terms of their functions and purposes and our selves these 
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were only fleeting since in conspicuousness and obstinacy we are only brought to such 
awareness temporarily.  
 
The ramifications of this regime of transparency and ‘invisibility or visibility that is 
absorbed into the circumspection that is concomitant to our existential involvement in-
equipment is that the horizon of intelligibility that is a function of what we have called in 
its various guises a ‘socialized vision, hermeneutic vision, existential vision, ontological 
vision, is so speak disembedded from social be-ing since these are no anchored in the 
sociality and sociabilities of  the mode of equipmentality and its gestalt. In as much as 
there is such a decontextualisation and no existential – ontological anchoring of social 
being we would argue that as such we are indeed at great risk to be consumed by the way 
of revealing that is the standing reserve.  
 
However before we leap into this eventuality we need to state quite categorically that this 
might hold were it not for another modality of contextualization and thus our being is not 
free or unmoored such that it can be taken up by a technological modality. We will deal 
with this state of affairs when we deal with curiosity but in term of presence-at-hand and 
its relation to theoretical vision we are concerned with a specific form of 
recontextualisation. The issue then is how this stands up as counterpoise?  But we are 
making the general point that with our modality of existential involvement in 
equipmentality no longer at work we are freed to be taken up by a technological modality 
of being or are we? Let us consider this in the light of the mode of equipment’s 
obtrusiveness.  
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In obtrusiveness, which is when things go missing, and one would expect when 
temporary breakdown reaches the state of permanence, we cross the threshold into a 
different ontological structure, and thus engage not equipment as equipment but 
equipment as things. In this latter uncovered state where we helplessly stare at equipment 
disclosed as things we are properly in the state of being ‘just-present-at-hand-and-no-
more’ and thus find ourselves entering a new modality of being with a different kind of 
visual and social sensibility. To ascertain what is at stake we turn to Dreyfus’s (1991: 79) 
analysis of this shift and its implications for the emergence of theoretical reflection and 
contemplation which entails a focus on their concomitant modalities of vision, sociality 
and sociabilities to assess its potential as counterpoise.   
7.1.3 from modes of concern to the mode of being of presence-at-hand 
(Vorhandenheit or occurrentness)   
To be sure what Heidegger has said is that we only enter into presence-at-hand or 
occurrence once our circumspective absorbed dealings have been permanently 
interrupted. In nevertheless entering into the mode of being of presence-at-hand what is at 
stake as far as Heidegger is concerned and what Dreyfus (1991) make abundantly clear is 
our very theoretical being and scientific modality of generating knowledge. The tone of 
Heidegger’s (1962) account of presence-at-hand or occurrence carries with it a certain 
ambivalence which Dreyfus (1991: 78-80) not only points to below but resolves and in so 
doing opens up a pathway into what is of primary concern to us and deals with different 
modalities of vision.    
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Once our work is permanently interrupted, we can either stare helplessly at the 
remaining objects or take a new detached theoretical stance towards things and try 
to explain their underlying causal properties. … Heidegger, however, sometimes 
seems to say that the theoretical stance is merely what is left over after the 
cessation of practical activity. In this extreme view, the only stance that is left 
when we withhold our present concern and relinquish our immediate project is 
just staring at things.  
 
 
The critical issue of note that we intend focusing upon are the modalities of vision that 
arise in what Dreyfus (1991: 79) calls the “transition from involved deliberation and its 
concerns to theoretical reflection and its objects.” To this end Dreyfus draws attention to 
two different modalities of vision. There is vision which is ‘just staring’ and there is that 
which is theoretically oriented. However, what is more pressing is that as presented by 
Dreyfus there is a seeming correlation that Heidegger (1962: 88) makes between 
theoretical knowledge and staring. That is, that staring leads in itself leads   to theoretical 
knowledge. What concerns us is that in equating theoretical reflection with staring the 
two modalities of vision are conflated. This however turns out to be unwarranted as 
Dreyfus (1991: 80) alerts us to what Heidegger truly understands of the modality of 
vision that informs theoretical knowledge:   
 
Heidegger retracts this implication in a marginal note: “Looking away from is not 
looking at. The latter has its own origin and has as a necessary result this looking 
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away from. Observation has its own primordiality” [83]. That is, observing is not 
just staring. Once there is a break in our ongoing activity we can just stare at 
objects, but we can also engage in a new activity, theoretical reflection, which 
operates by “depriving the world of its worldliness in a definite way” (94) [65].  
 
What is noteworthy for us as far one is able to distinguish between just staring and 
observing is that it offers a basis to engage with Heidegger’s existential conception of 
science. And moreover, what the latter provides us is a basis to approach the kinds of 
vision that emerge concomitantly in the crossover to the ontological structure of 
presence-at-hand. Dreyfus (1991: 80) summarizes Heidegger thus: 
 
As we shall see, there are, according to Heidegger, two distinct modes of “just 
looking”: gazing with curiosity for the sake of distraction, and observing with the 
wonder that leads to theory. The isolation of properties required by theory 
(looking away from their context) is independently motivated and requires its own 
kind of skill. For Heidegger, scientific theory is an autonomous stance. It is not 
mere curiosity, nor is it based on an interest in control. Science is not instrumental 
reason. 
 
We are now brought to an understanding of what the distinction between ‘looking away 
from’ and ‘looking at’ entail and how these dovetails with the two modalities of vision 
that accompany occurrentness. It now appears that looking away involves not seeing the 
equipment, as case in point, as ready-to-hand or available, any longer, which in turn 
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means ‘depriving the world of its worldliness’. In other words in looking away from the 
availableness of equipment one is no longer cognizant of the equipmental whole, the 
equipmental nexus and thus not seeing what is of circumspective concern within an 
equipmental gestalt. It is after all the assignments and references of the equipmental 
whole that constitutes worldliness through its sociality and sociabilities in a ‘definite 
way’. Looking away from the worldiness entailed in the equipmental whole means also 
switching to different modalities of vision: from the circumspective vision and its 
modalities of transparent seeing, inspecting and envisaging we move with the shift to 
presence at hand to the possibilities of ‘gazing with distraction’ (curiosity) and ‘observing 
with wonder’ (theory/science). We will deal with the former separately as this is 
particularly pertinent for the existential – ontological understanding of social being in its 
quotidian order and what it holds in relation to the way of revealing as standing reserve. 
However, it is the latter that we will focus on now as a means to clearly demarcate the 
two modalities of vision of the mode of being of the presence-at-hand of objects and what 
must be clearly noted is that we are not in the orbit of equipment but objects. What 
distinguishes observing with wonder, Heidegger (1962: 356-357), cited in Dreyfus, raises 
the more deep-seated question of: 
 
When in the course of existential ontological analysis we ask how theoretical 
discovery “arises” out of our circumspective concern, .. we are asking which of 
these conditions implied in Dasein’s being make-up are existentially necessary for 
the possibility of Dasein’s existing in the way of scientific research. This 
formulation of the question is aimed at an existential conception of science.       
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In raising the matter of what Dreyfus (Ibid) calls the “character of the theoretical attitude” 
of an ‘existential conception of science’ what is at issue here for us is that the 
‘observation with wonder’ is not simply borne of a specific set of techniques and methods 
that are external to our way of being human and merely applied by us as is conventionally 
understood in relation to a positivistic conception of science.  
 
What we are dealing with here is that an existential conception of science ties the very 
condition of possibility of science to our constitution as Dasein and our particular 
modality of existence as what we claim to be a field of social be-ing. And once again 
Heidegger offers us a holistic way of approaching our social being and our relation to the 
world within which we dwell and inhabit, and how we come to know it through our 
primary circumspective involvements and deliberations therewith, and secondarily, in our 
detached theoretical reflections. Having opened up Heidegger’s theoretical attitude to his 
existential conception of science Dreyfus (1991: 80-81) now takes us into the specifics of 
what is involved in the modality of theory insofar as it involves “decontextualising 
characteristics from the context of everyday practices” citing an example from Heidegger 
(1962:360-361) to illustrate and at the same time to signal the shift from readiness-to-
hand or availableness to presence-at-hand or occurrentness:  
 
… the hammer is heavy .. this proposition can mean that the entity before us, 
which we already know circumspectively as a hammer, has a weight –that is to 
say, it has the “property” of heaviness: it exerts a pressure on what lies beneath it, 
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and it falls if it this removed. When this kind talk is so understood, it is no longer 
spoken within the horizon of … an equipmental whole and its involvement-
relationships. … In the “physical assertion that the “the hammer is heavy” we 
overlook … the tool character of the entity we encounter… ,    
 
What is being referred to here and distinguished as such is that in the circumspective use 
of the hammer that is when it is used in say hammering nails we encounter its being as 
ready-to-hand or handy. In this context we may speak of the hammer’s heaviness insofar 
as it relates to its bearing on the use of the hammer in the act of hammering. One, so to 
speak, notes this aspect of the hammer in relation to whether it makes for difficulty or 
ease of manipulation, or use in the task at hand.. However, when we focus on the 
property of heaviness as such that is outside of the context of its assignments, that it is 
employed in-order-to do something, and towards which, that is a particular purpose, then 
we are not considering it within the horizon of its equipmentality and as such outside its 
social scope as far as its sociality, sociabilities and social being is concerned..  
 
The point is that we are now focused on the physical properties of the hammer and not its 
handiness for the task at hand. What we now have is the makings of an ontological 
threshold signaling the shift to a new modality of being of equipment, as things or 
objects. In this shift the meaning of the hammer as equipment is now lost and the thing 
stands before us as meaningless because it has been decontextualised that is ripped from 
its social be-ing, its worldliness.  And as Dreyfus (1991: 81) points out we now have a 
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“new attitude that reveals a new way of being”, he calls “occurrentness” and cites 
Heidegger’s (1962: 412) take on this ontological shift:  
 
Why is it that what we are talking about - the heavy hammer – shows itself 
differently when our way of talking is thus modified? Not because we are keeping 
our distance from manipulation, nor because we are just looking away from the 
equipmental character of this entity, but rather because we are looking at the 
available thing which we encounter, and looking at it “in a new way” as 
something occurrent [present-at-hand]. The understanding of being by which our 
concernful dealings with intraworldly entities have been guided has changed 
over.      
 
In considering Heidegger’s understanding of the shift to occurrence or presence-at-hand 
we note that whilst the necessary conditions for said shift entails a withdrawal from 
manipulation and use of what is available, and a decontextualisation from the 
equipmental whole these in themselves are not sufficient to constitute a new ontological 
structure. What is additionally required is a modality for disclosing the new mode of 
being, that is, for unveiling what lies before as thing or object for theoretical reflection, 
which is what is referred to as a ‘new way’ of ‘looking at’ what is available, as opposed 
to ‘looking through’ equipment to its usability and its nexus or looking away.  
 
This new way of ‘looking at’ is the new way of understanding what was previously 
understood as availableness within a meaningful context, but is now a modality of being 
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which is “just-present –at-hand-and –no-more both context free and meaningless, and as 
such a looking away from the equipmental whole.. In as much as that which we are 
looking at has been freed from a meaningful context of involvement in availableness, that 
is entails a looking away,  what this holds is the very possibility of being taken up in a 
horizon of scientific intelligibility. Dreyfus (1991: 81) sums up this field of possibility for 
science thus: 
 
Once characteristics are no longer related to one another in a concrete, everyday, 
meaningful way, as aspects of a thing in a particular context, the isolated 
properties that remain can be quantified and related by scientific covering laws 
and thus taken as evidence for theoretical entities. … Laws and formal models 
provide a new, essentially meaningless, context for occurrent properties.    
 
Overall what Heidegger wants to stress according to Dreyfus (Ibid) in his analysis of 
‘existential science’ in relation to presence-at-hand or occurrentness and what we have 
entered into to demarcate it from the modality of vision which is a gazing with distraction 
is that: 
  
(1) It is necessary to get beyond our practical concerns in order to be able to 
encounter mere objects. (2) The “bare facts” related by scientific laws are isolated 
by a special activity of selective seeing rather than being simply found. (3) 
Scientifically relevant “facts” are not merely removed from their contexts by 
selective seeing; they are theory-laden, i.e., recontextualised in a new projection.   
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The relation between practical concerns and theory for Heidegger is clearly that the latter 
is derived from the former and in this regard he reverses the traditional ontological 
account and the epistemological privileging of western philosophy. Furthermore, 
Heidegger is not equating theory with merely staring or gazing at the object before us as 
to suggest that in this act of ‘bare perception’ scientific knowledge of the properties of 
said object leaps out, so to speak. The basis for generating scientific knowledge does not 
stop at a ‘looking at’ and a ‘looking away’ as reification of the object from its scientific 
context, but we would continue in perceptual vein to say that what is involved is crucially 
a ‘looking towards’ in particular a theoretical paradigm. Thus, in as much as there are no 
‘bare facts’ which we entirely concur with we are dealing with a ‘selective seeing’, and 
what it is that informs the selections as such seems to be something of the order of a 
‘theoretical vision’. The critical difference between a staring and ‘gazing with distraction’ 
from a ‘gazing with wonder’ is that the latter involves a theoretical vision which 
recontextualises the object in such a way that it is able to uncover an objects scientific 
property. From the vantage point of the scientist Dreyfus (1991: 83) the 
recontextualisation takes this form:  
 
Although he is detached from the everyday practical context, the scientist is 
interested in his work and dwells in the “disciplinary matrix” that forms the basis 
of his skillful observing and theorizing.   
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By contrast Dreyfus (Ibid) juxtaposes and compares the vantage point of the 
“hermeneutic ontologist:  
 
… the hermeneutic ontologist makes his theme precisely the shared background 
understanding in which he dwells and from which he cannot detach himself. … 
from the detached, objectifying thematization characteristic of any discipline from 
physics to factual history.   
 
With respect to the scientist the modality of seeing which attaches itself to that which has 
been objectified, is premised in a ‘theoretical vision’, whereas the hermeneutic 
ontologist’s seeing is attached to involvement, and may be described as an ‘existential 
vision’. What this holds for us in the light of its potential as counterpoise is that in as 
much as the theoretical paradigm recontextualises equipment as objects and as things in 
themselves, with the integrity and dignity worthy of being considered object of 
knowledge, this is representative of what we have in mind as Archimedean lever.  
 
To be sure the horizon of intelligibility of social being and its hermeneutic vision is 
absorbed into theoretical vision, and the subject – object distanciation of detached 
observation of vision severs our existential involvement, and thus distances us from our 
social being, though it does this within the modality of a different de-severance and this is 
in relation to bringing objects and things closer as theoretical and scientific objects. As 
counterpoise it serves as a site in the resistance to modern technology’s way of revealing 
as standing reserve where objects and things lose their substantiality in being able to 
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gather nature and social being, and thus their ontological capacity for disclosure or 
revealing. The essence of modern technology as an enframing is such that what remains 
once it way of revealing is made manifest is nothing but what is constituted as resources 
to be at hand and taken up and disposed of and no more. Thus in theory and science for as 
long as it is hermeneutically anchored and existentially informed it potentially stands in 
opposition to modern technology; but in so far as it leaves its existential provenance and 
abstracts itself from its horizon of social intelligibility, that is, loses sight of social be-ing 
and Dasein it becomes but the science of the standing reserve and something akin to 
‘positivistic science’. The main contention here is that theoretically objects have as 
Dreyfus (1991: 125) points out isolable, determinate properties  and scientifically what is 
encountered is disclosed in terms of “law governed sets of elements’. Sociologically, 
society is abstracted and with it what have called social be-ing. By extension social action 
or what we have preferred to call sociabilities are explained in terms of strict rules.  
 
Our main bone’ of contention is that sociologically speaking in terms of our theoretical 
orientation we are anchored or rather disembedded in a positivistically dominated 
conception of science when we should be hermeneutically, existentially and ontologically 
engaged. It is in the spirit of the latter that we have spent long hours and much 
deliberation over Heidegger’s ‘fundamental ontology’ and its relation to Dasein or our 
existential structure and trust that something useful has come of our existentially 
anchored theoretical labour.   
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However, in so far as this theoretical vision involves perceivedness or uncovering as its 
intentional comportment and its sociabilities which in this case involves theoretical vision 
we are dealing with a phenomenology in as much as what obtains is that object are 
released to encountered in their own self (see 6.3.1). It is this capacity in vision as 
hermeneutic that in the perceiving that is theoretical, objects and things are released to be 
perceived in their uncovering in scientific laws and their unveiling as theoretical objects. 
Thus, in the perceptual intentional comportment lies a counterpoise to the essence of 
modern technology, in its being as theory in the mode of hermeneutic phenomenology 
and existential science and hermeneutic ontology. And that social being enters here as the 
background intelligibility of the social hermeneutic with our social be-ing thus anchored 
in our theoretical and scientific modalities of being. 
 
We now turn to the modality of vision described as a staring or gazing with distraction 
that is neither recontextualised within a ‘disciplinary matrix’ nor contextualized in the 
quotidian order of everyday absorbed coping. This in short is referred to as “curiosity” a 
mere staring which we take up similarly to consider its bearing on our concerns for 
mitigating and assuaging our relation to modern technology and its way of revealing.  
7.1.3.1 Curiosity as modality of being and seeing:  
We have spent much time discussing perception though from the vantage point of its 
intentional structure and its relation to our comportment to being-in-the-world and being-
amidst-things. Moreover, we have alluded to and made specific references to different 
modalities of vision. However, most conspicuously we have not offered Heidegger’s 
understanding of sight and seeing and how this relates to the different modalities of 
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being. The motivation behind this has simply been to avoid subjecting the conception of 
vision to its foreclosure in a definition thus rendering it both trivial and superficial. But, 
we can no longer defer such discussion (and expect that it may be considered to be fairly 
late in coming), as the question now begs in relation to the point that we have reached 
with respect to the matter of curiosity, as a particular type of seeing in the modality of 
being of presence-at-hand. To this end we draw attention to Heidegger’s (1962: 186) 
conception of the different modalities of seeing as it relates to the different modalities of 
being-in of Dasein merely to indicate the scope of his analysis and to delimit our concern.     
 
In its projective character understanding goes to make up existentially what we 
call Dasein’s “sight”. With the disclosedness of the there this sight is 
existentially; and Dasein is this sight equiprimordially in each of those basic ways 
of its Being which we have noted: as the circumspection [Umsicht] of concern, as 
the considerateness [Ruchsicht] of solicitude, and as that sight which is directed 
upon Being as such … Dasein … we call “transparency” [Durchsichtigkeit] … 
knowledge of the Self …    
 
What is important to note here is that in as much as Heidegger refers to the 
“disclosedness of the there” he is pointing to the existential structure of being-in-the-
world and its hermeneutic in social being we would add.. And thus the equiprimordiality 
of sight devolves to the modalities of the being of Dasein as ‘being-amidst-things’ 
(circumspection), ‘being-with-others’ (considerateness) and the way of being human, that 
is Dasein, being-as-existence (transparency). We will, not be taking up, the latter two for 
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discussion, but only allude to it here. Though, we have taken it up throughout the thesis 
as it reflected upon our primary concern, which was our involvement and coping with 
being-amidst-things. This was done and motivated as a way to probe technology and 
vision as to how we stand in our relation to enframing and its interpolation of our social 
being. We have however thought through issues concerning circumspection and its 
modalities of seeing (looking about, inspecting, envisaging) but without couching it in 
Heidegger’s (1962:187) conception thereof which we now take up by noting that he 
frames ‘sight’ in parentheses thus implying that one ought to be cautious in how one 
understands it and thus:     
 
We must, to be sure, guard against a misunderstanding of the expression ‘sight’. It 
corresponds to the “clearedness” which we took as characterizing the 
disclosedness of the “there”. Seeing’ does not mean just perceiving with the 
bodily eyes, but neither does it mean pure non-sensory awareness of something 
present-at-hand in its presence-at-hand. In giving an existential signification to 
‘sight’, we have merely drawn upon the peculiar feature of seeing, that it lets 
entities which are accessible to it be encountered unconcealedly in themselves.  
 
What is uppermost in seeking to arrive at Heidegger’s understanding of ‘seeing’ and 
‘sight’ is that at the core of his existential – ontological understanding there rests the 
hermeneutic terms which under gird his concept of vision. At the primary level of 
originary transcendence that is being-in-the-world and its dimensionality of social being 
is the hermeneutic dimension in which we have a pre-ontological understanding of being 
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and thus we are able to interpret being by way of its disclosedness. Secondly, we have 
established that disclosure is tied phenomenologically to discovery, in as much as what is 
unveiled is uncovered; both terms as such refer to the visual dimension of opening to 
view and to reveal and thus to release what is encountered to the terms of perceiving such 
that what is seen is noted in itself.  However, Heidegger is not using these terms to make 
a visual point, but rather to make an existential point in terms of how it relates to the 
structure of our way of existence as humans, which is Dasein. And it is in this second 
sense that one is dealing with what Heidegger called “fundamental ontology” in the 
phenomenology of being, that is, the disclosure and discovery of the latter’s structure as it 
is made possible in the constitutive nature of Dasein that ‘sight’ is to be understood. 
However, in having said this one is still left in the ‘dark’ as to how to take up the 
unfamiliar terms Heidegger employs such as “clearedness” and “the there” in relation to 
sight. There is the direct import of sight into the terms “clearing” and “there”, in as much 
as they refer to what is commonly understood as visually apprehended phenomena. In 
both terms there is firstly the spatial figure, as in a clearing in the forest and that 
something is over there, a point in space and time. In this latter both terms clearing and 
there serve as the ground upon which something is rendered visible, as in picking out an 
object made visible by the ‘light’ of  the clearing and that such and such a thing is over 
there, as in the space within which something is revealed..  
 
In this second sense one is not directed visually to the clearing or the there as such, but 
rather to what it is that appears and thus the visual dimension recedes in relation to the 
ground upon which such objects appear, and we lose ‘sight’ of it as one becomes fixated 
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by the figures that appear as for example an aeroplane in mid air passing through clouds 
and appearing there in a ‘clearing’, and ‘therein’. The point, which Heidegger alerts us to, 
is that in fixating on the visual phenomenon as we are wont to do at the neglect of the 
ground is akin to the fixation we have for things and self without a sense of the ground 
that makes it possible. In the subject – object distanciation associated with say theoretical 
vision the social contextual ground is absorbed so to speak as background intelligibility 
of the theoretical ground that replaces it and upon which theoretical and scientific objects 
and phenomena emerge. Positivism loses it ontological grounding entirely but that is 
another matter. In sociologising or theorizing social be-ing, the ground that we lose is 
precisely the sociality of being as existential – ontological constitution and thus what 
emerges are ‘social facts’ as isolable and determinable properties; but the ground upon 
which these sociological figures emerge, the real hermeneutic or horizon of intelligibility 
disappears into the paradigmatic dimension of theory and there remains mute. What our 
discussion of vision and our problematisation has sought to achieve is to show the ways 
in which we can through our theoretical practices anchored as such in an existential – 
ontological grounding, theorize and yet remain connected to our social being. We need 
not be ‘untimely ripped from the womb’ of our sociality.  
 
It is this originary ground as ‘clearing’ and as that which is ‘cleared’ in our practices, and 
our position ‘in’ it as transcendent, that we are to be found ‘there’, in the act of clearing’, 
and thus completed, that we are then ‘there’ in that very clearing, that is our sociabilities 
or practices, that Heidegger restores to our ‘visionary being’. The concept Heidegger 
develops to capture and bring attention to this primary ground of the ‘cleared, clearing, 
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clearedness’ and the ‘there’ and ‘thereness’ is ‘being-in-the-world, that which defines us 
as human beings in our social be-ing. In other words what grounds our sight is this 
originary transcendence our being-in-the-world and the understanding of being-there in 
the clearing that accompanies it. What we seek now is how Heidegger (1962: 214, 216) 
takes up sight in his consideration of its articulation in curiosity and Dasein and then 
consider its merit as counterpoise if at all it may have any:     
 
The basic state of sight shows itself in a peculiar tendency-of-Being which 
belongs to everydayness – the tendency towards ‘seeing’. We designate this 
tendency by the term “curiosity”, which characteristically is not confined to 
seeing, but expresses the tendency towards a peculiar way of letting the world be 
encountered by us in perception. … What is to be said about this tendency just to 
perceive? Which existential state of Dasein will become intelligible in the 
phenomenon of curiosity? 
 
We note that Heidegger is not yielding to the usual connotations ascribed to curiosity, 
which is mainly given to its mental overtones, as in an eagerness to learn or something 
strange, odd and unusual. Even though the visual element seems implicit there are also 
references to scopophilia showing its relation to vision. Be this as it may, Heidegger is 
more concerned to make an “existential-ontological” point and thus he accords curiosity a 
particular modality of being. As a modality of being it offers a field of disclosure or 
clearing in which things or objects can be illuminated or unveiled, and thus uncovered in 
perception. What is particularly striking for us in Heidegger offering up curiosity, as a 
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modality of being is that he refers it to our quotidian order of being, that is, our 
everydayness. It is this ordinariness that we are interested in as it serves as the basis for 
our interpretive framework, about which much more later. More to the point what we are 
concerned with here is to move onto Heidegger’s question above as to how curiosity 
relates to our being as Dasein. In order to take up this line of thought of curiosity as 
modality of being Heidegger (1962: 216) takes us back to readiness-to-hand and the 
modality of being of circumspection as segue way:   
 
Being-in-the-world is proximally absorbed in the world of concern. This concern 
is guided by circumspection, which discovers the ready-to-hand and preserves it 
as thus discovered. … Concern may come to a rest in the sense of one’s 
interrupting the performance and taking a rest, or it can do so by getting it 
finished. In rest, concern does not disappear; circumspection, however, becomes 
free and is no longer bound to the world of work. When we take a rest, care 
subsides into circumspection which has been set free.  
 
 
We have covered what is involved in the ‘looking about’ that is concerned with the mode 
of being of equipment as readiness-to-hand or availableness and its absorption in the 
equipmental nexus and whole. What Heidegger takes up here is that in presence-at-hand 
or occurrentness we no longer look around with concern for the work at hand as this has 
ceased, but still find ourselves ‘looking around’ and about, but without this 
circumspection being tied to being-in-the-world, and the concerns or dealings that arise 
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as a result thereof. In other words we have been dislodged from our sociality and its 
sociabilities as disclosed in equipmentality, and thus from our existential involvement in-
the-world. However, since we continue to be, that is, to exist we have as matter of course 
that which concerns this existence, and what we consequently have to take care of. The 
point is that the structure of care or concernful dealings is an existential structure and thus 
proximate in our being.  
 
What is different in the shift from readiness-to-hand to presence-at-hand is that 
circumspection loses it immediate concern for the manipulation and use of equipment and 
turns its attention to that which assumes the being of entities. The use of entities is 
mindful that the kind of staring without attachments without social grounding is not that 
associated with wonder, and thus theoretical reflection and recontextualisation and its 
objectification, a terminus a quo, which is a starting point in which theoretical objects are 
set on their path to discursive realization. But rather, in curiosity one is dealing with 
‘presence-at-hand-and-no-more’, a terminus ad quem. Before we touch on the 
specificities of curiosity as just looking the important matter of the existential structure of 
care, and its relation to Dasein was briefly pointed out, as it related to circumspection 
which has now come to a rest. Similarly we note as Heidegger (Ibid) discloses another 
such existential structure which is tied to the mode of being of equipment of readiness-at-
hand and its articulation with the world of work, and how it in turn becomes available to 
curiosity:   
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In the world of work, circumspective discovering has de-severing as the character 
of its Being. When circumspection has been set free, there is no longer anything 
ready-to-hand which we must concern ourselves with bringing close. But, as 
essentially de-severant, this circumspection provides itself with new possibilities 
of de-severing. This means that it tends away from what is most closely ready-to-
hand, and into a far and alien world. Care becomes concern with the possibilities 
of seeing the ‘world’ merely as it looks while one tarries and takes a rest. Dasein 
seeks what is far away simply in order to bring it close to itself in the way it 
looks. Dasein lets itself be carried along solely by the looks of the world; in this 
kind of Being, it concerns itself with becoming rid of itself as Being-in-the-world 
and rid of its Being-alongside that which, in the closest everyday manner, is 
ready-to-hand.   
 
The absorption entailed in readiness-to-hand insofar as Dasein disappears into its world 
of concern that is in the equipmental references and assignments and its nexus and whole 
is the primary and original condition in which social being and world are brought 
together. In this coming closer of social being and world such that being is in-the-world is 
an act of de-severing; what we might consider in the spatial terms to be the collapsing of 
gap between being and the world. However, in as much as Dasein is concerned, it is in 
existence, that is, in taking care of and dealing with the concerns that arise out of the 
unsettled and foundationless human condition, and in so doing gives rise to the 
emergence of a world (e.g. of work) and inversely to Dasein that one understands being-
in-the-world as a de-territorialized structure or notes its de-severance. As such this de-
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severing as a function of readiness-to-hand and a manifestation of being-in-the-world is 
constitutive of the being of Dasein, it is an existential structure. In short readiness-to-
hand or availableness brings closer or de-severs social being, equipment and world. But 
in the mode of presence-at-hand de-severance plays a different role in as much as it is 
hooked into that which occurs simply in the way it looks or appears.  
 
This being of occurrence, being present-at-hand and no more is then not only a 
manifestation of that which lies before us, but equally so Heidegger seems to suggest that 
we too are rendered occurrent or present-at-hand. And thus we are ripped from the de-
severed modality of readiness-to-hand and existential involvement in caring about our 
social being, sociality and our sociabilities. In short we are existentially no longer a 
being-in-the-world (social being) and neither a being-amidst-things (sociability), but 
simply present-at-hand-and-no-more, more akin to a social object or more accurately a 
social entitity. What we are primarily concerned with and show is that caring as such 
does not disappear in this modality of being of curiosity, but as existential structure and 
as intrinsic to Dasein it is merely redirected to that which lies before us as present and 
occurrent, that is, as visual spectacle, visiogenic. And in this state we enter the modality 
of being distinct not only from readiness-to-hand and un-readiness-to-hand with their 
modalities of concern, but also in its manner of just looking as Heidegger (1962: 216-
217) states: 
 
When curiosity has become free, however, it concerns itself with seeing, not in 
order to understand what is seen (that is, to come into a Being towards it) but just 
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in order to see. It seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another 
novelty. In this kind of seeing, that which is an issue for care does not lie in 
grasping something and being knowingly in the truth; it lies rather in its 
possibilities of abandoning itself to the world. Therefore curiosity is characterized 
by a specific way of not tarrying alongside what is closest. Consequently it does 
not seek the leisure of tarrying observantly, but rather seeks restlessness and the 
excitement of continual novelty and changing encounters.  
 
 
The shift to the ontological structure of presence-at-hand expresses for us in the light of a 
phenomenological and existential conception of vision the basis of a visual threshold. 
Whereas the visibility of equipment and their visile nature was absorbed into the concern 
for the work and all it entailed and as such was rendered ‘transparent’, presence-at-hand 
by contrast, allows of equipment to be made present in their visibility as objects. This 
objectification however opens up to two modalities of being of Dasein as has already 
been indicated: firstly, there is the mode of theoretical being, which Heidegger 
differentiates consistently as can be gleaned above in his reference to the separation of 
seeing from understanding. This seeing without seeking to understand which belongs to 
the modality of curiosity differs from theoretical reflection from the vantage point of 
vision in this respect that it does not have a visile dimension to it. In as much as one 
relates to an object’s visile dimension means not only that it pertains to what is seen but 
that one is also able to learn through such visual images. In this sense curiosity as a 
modality of seeing is reduced to its simplest determination as apprehension of the visual 
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insofar as it pertains only to its appearance, that is, what it looks like. Secondly, in as 
much as curiosity is fixated on the visual appearance of entities as spectacle its aesthetic 
is one of a visiogenic and as such may be predisposed to the modality of television, as an 
example of ‘not tarrying’. At bottom whereas the mode of concern of theoretical 
reflection is to acquire knowledge of the objects before one as present-at-hand, which one 
knows requires a paradigmatic frame, dedicated time and concentration, by contrast the 
modes of concern of curiosity is distinguished by being ephemeral and capricious. This is 
its modality of being. 
 
The mode of concern of curiosity Heidegger notes above is one of ‘not tarrying’ and is 
clear enough in his references to the concerns and care evident in this modality of being.  
As stated curiosity cares for novelty, but it does not remain or ‘tarry’ with it long enough 
to get to grasp the ‘essence’ of this being of novelty as I perhaps its equipmentality, but 
rather flirts from one novelty to another without ever getting close enough to that which 
lies before. Instead of the de-severing that belongs to availableness which is the ‘bringing 
closer’ of social being, equipment and world, curiosity brings closer only that which 
intrigues its visual sensitivities and then only for as long or rather as short-lived as it 
takes to satisfy its curiosity or voyeurism. In this perpetual flitting from one novelty to 
another and the restlessness that underlies this modality of being two additional modes of 
concern of curiosity are revealed by Heidegger (Ibid): 
 
In not tarrying, curiosity is concerned with the constant possibility of distraction. 
Curiosity has nothing to do with observing entitities and marveling at them. To be 
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amazed to the point of not understanding is something in which it has no interest. 
Rather it concerns itself with a kind of knowing, but just in order to have known. 
But this not tarrying in the environment with which one concerns oneself, and this 
distraction by new possibilities, are constitutive items for curiosity; and upon 
these is founded the third essential characteristic of this phenomenon which we 
call the character of “never dwelling anywhere”. Curiosity is everywhere and 
nowhere. The mode of Being-in-the-world reveals a new kind of Being of 
everyday Dasein - a kind in which Dasein is constantly uprooting itself.  
 
 
What is noteworthy is that in abandoning itself (perhaps social entity is appropriate) to 
the world, Dasein or social being and our social stance (sociality) loses whatever anchor 
it has managed to secure in the de-severance or de-territorialisation of being-in-the-world, 
in the context of an equipmental whole and its sociality. And, as second order reality to 
similar effect Dasein is also bereft of the anchor that comes with the centering of the 
cognitive subject in a theoretical recontextualisation. Now at the level of the modality of 
vision we would make the claim that with respect to readiness-to-hand the visile 
dimension is what we have encountered and learnt about in the handiness of equipment 
through its usability though admittedly with its visuality implicit in its equipmental 
functionality or sociability. However, in this modality of readiness-to-hand we were in 
rapt concentration and embedded in the sociality or world of work, that is, its referential 
nexus and manifold relationships.   
 
 
 
 
 
 396
Secondly, at the level of presence-at-hand, in its modality of theoretical ‘reflection’, its 
visuality was more explicit in that in the process of objectification entailed in theory what 
was encountered and rendered visible were objects and their scientific properties. In this 
regard the visile dimension in terms of its aspect of learning this was overt in its 
association with the context of a theoretical vision. In this regard we again have dedicated 
and enraptured focus and an embedded context, though not of the everyday modality of 
readiness-to-hand, but in the theoretical recontextualisation of presence-at-hand. Though, 
in the latter, we have made the argument that we should be foregrounding social being in 
terms of its social hermeneutic, or concept of be-ing. However, in the modes of concern 
of “not tarrying”, being “distracted” and being “everywhere but nowhere”, we have, what 
has been referred to as, a “deficient mode of being”. We find this with respect to an 
epistemic relation in which knowledge is trivialized; we find this also in respect of our 
ontic transcendence, that is, an intentional comportment, a sociability  which is not 
alongside things; and we find this in relation to our originary transcendence, that is, our 
being-in-the-world, which is ‘everywhere but nowhere”, as we are not embedded in any 
social context whatsoever, but disembedded, rootless,   in a certain sense we are in the 
world but not of the world.   
 
Despite this dis-embeddedness from being-in-the-world-of-work and from being-in-the-
world-of-theory Dasein in the mode of curiosity is in-the-world of the everyday quotidian 
order of being. But, being different from the everyday circumspective absorption of 
readiness-to-hand Heidegger (Ibid) situates what we might understand as the 
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‘banalisation’ of being, as derived from the three modalities of concern of curiosity in the 
mudanities of a manner  of “idle talk” and ‘seeing’:  
 
Idle talk controls even the ways in which one may be curious. It says what one 
“must” have read and seen. In being everywhere and nowhere, curiosity is 
delivered over to idle talk. These two everyday modes of Being for discourse and 
sight are not just present-at-hand side by side in their tendency to uproot, but 
either of these ways-to-be drags the other one with it. Curiosity, for which 
nothing is closed off, and idle talk, for which there is nothing that is not 
understood, provide themselves … with the guarantee of a ‘life’ which, 
supposedly, is genuinely ‘lively’. … it soon becomes impossible to decide what is 
disclosed in a genuine understanding and what is not. This ambiguity extends not 
only to the world, but just as much to Being-with-another as such, and even 
Dasein’s Being towards itself.       
 
      
The modes of concern of being ‘distracted’ and ‘not tarrying’ in the face of what is before 
one leads us to leap from one thing to another, and thus one finds oneself wherever the 
distractedness directs one, which is both context-free and disembedded, that is,  
everywhere and nowhere. However, when one relates this to the everyday comportment 
or sociability of talking and seeing, one is similarly in a mode of being everywhere and 
nowhere, which is ‘precisely’ where  ‘idle talk’ and an ‘unfocused vision’ tend to be. The 
paradoxes in this mode of being is that idle talk professes to know without tarrying 
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observantly, and professes to have seen without a focused looking. Yet, in this everyday 
modality of curiosity there is a sense of excitement that comes with the terminus ad quo 
of idle talk in “have you heard” without having listened in amazement, or  “did you 
know” without having reflected”. And in the case of an ‘unfocused seeing’ the refrain is 
usually ‘have you noticed’ with the merest of glances or ‘have you seen’ with the most 
fleeting of glimpses or even in not having seen at all but merely heard by way of idle talk.   
 
In both cases involving discourse and sight these serve to jumpstart either one or the 
other modality of curiosity and so reinforce the banalisation of being. However, in the 
mode of modern technology one notes existentially how audio-visual equipment derive 
their almost intoxicating power over everydayness, which goes to the heart of our thesis. 
Here again we seek only to point to this being, rather than to grasp it in its totality. 
Notwithstanding, to close off this modality of being in relation to the mode of being of 
Dasein we note that it alludes to an authenticity, when in fact it may either be of the 
sociality of an inauthentic or an undifferentiated being. In this sense it refers itself to an 
ambiguity which is manifest in the modality of being of presence-at-hand manifest as 
curiosity, insofar as idle talk and its equivalence in vision is concerned as regards its 
claims to authenticity to round off our efforts at an existential-ontological-understanding 
of social being.  
 
Concluding comments 
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What we confronted in this milieu was the danger to our sociality in which the existential 
– ontological vision of circumspection-considerateness-and-transparency was being 
displaced with the modality of sociability and vision devolving to curiosity, a staring as 
an end in itself, a scopophilia. Thus our originary transcendence in being-in-the-world 
and its ontic transcendence of circumspective absorption in our equipmental nexus were 
steadily being eroded. In our technological worlds our being-in and the sociabilities 
instantiated in electronic social networks sees an increasing intensity in the modalities of 
concern of a social being mired in curiosity, and thus it manifests distractedness in the 
pursuit of novelty, a staring without tarrying, an idle talk without real knowing, a way of 
being present without being embedded, that is, everywhere and nowhere. In short what 
we have is an ambiguous relation to the world, its sociality and our social being and 
sociabilities caught between the excitement generated by  idle talk and idle vision and its 
insubstantial nature as pseudo- and virtual, its unreality as simulacrum.  
 
We see this, by way of an illustration, in electronic social networking sites on the 
Internet, such as ‘Facebook’, ‘You Tube’, for example, and in cellular phone modalities 
such as ‘Twitter’ and ‘M’xit’ where the concerns or sociabilities of curiosity such as ‘not 
tarrying, distraction, being everywhere and nowhere in idle talk and idle vision are taken 
to an extreme. Though, there is something of an involvement in-the-technological-world 
it is not of the order of  what Borgmann  (see 2.2.6 and 2.2.6.1) refers to as a focal 
concern or practice, and as Heidegger holds is not so much being-in-the-world as an 
abandoning-to-the-world. It is not so much a being-with-others as it is being-amidst-
others, and thus it approximates to a relation in which social beings are treated as social 
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resources at worst and paradoxically as social objects at best. It comes with its visionary 
equivalents as visual objects of the paparazzi, in particular, or in general make up the 
fleeting images caught on a cellular phone camera or a video camera and circulated to be 
gawked at momentarily before the next set of images replaces it in a nano second ad 
infinitum.  
 
The modality of vision of considerateness that is borne of a sociality connected to our 
being-with-others and the care and concern that comes with it is absent , and the 
transparent vision that comes with a non-ego self that is involved-in and coping with 
being-towards-self as an existential – ontological expression of social being comes under 
the adumbration of a ‘conspicuous’ vision, where to be seen is not to be noted with 
respect and admiration, but merely to be seen and stared at voyeuristically, that is, a gaze 
that reproduces the ‘cult of the self’. It is these modalities of being that we set out to 
juxtapose as a way to bring it closer for our circumspective reflection, and to note without 
ambiguity that we do have within our grasp the possibilities to think, understand and to 
interpret our being-in-the-technological world that does not doom us to the destining of 
the essence of modern technology as standing reserve, resources and inventory.  
 
Neither, are we compelled to the imperatives of a technological eye and a machinic 
vision that sees neither social beings nor our humanity, but merely its veneer and an 
electronic, digital visiogenic. Our modality of being human or Dasein is fundamentally a 
field of social being which we acquire in becoming human beings, and which offers up 
the very condition of possibility of an understanding and interpretation of our humanity 
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in the sociabilities we learn and apply as existential beings, in the totality of our lives in-
the-world, with-others, toward-our-selves, borne of the care and concern that comes with 
our finitude and mutuality.  
 
We need not surrender to the imperatives of technology and its concomitant modalities of 
vision, but certainly need to return to an existential – ontological understanding of our 
humanity, and the sociality and sociabilities it encompasses as a way to reconnect with 
our social being and its possibilities in the contemporary age, of what we might call the 
horizon of intelligibility of techno-vision, and its modalities of unveiling or disclosure, 
and uncovering or discovery of being. In short by way of a Heideggerian hermeneutic 
phenomenology of technology and vision as the ground for disclosing social being, in our 
contemporary age we arrived at an existential – ontological understanding of social being 
anchored as such in the counterpoise of our involvement-in-equipment and the perceptual 
intentional comportment of releasing entities to be encountered in themselves. 
 
And to bring this chapter to a close we have offered up an existential – ontological 
understanding of social being as it articulates in equipment and the intentional 
comportment of perception and vision, as the means and social sites in which we can 
engage modern technology without abandoning it or surrendering to it, but in using it 
such that our social beings are affirmed. Moreover, that modern technology’s enframing 
as a way of revealing as standing reserve can be contained and delimited to the margins, 
where resources have their place, but not allow it the untrammeled space to be the only 
way in which be-ing.may be revealed.   
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Chapter Eight 
 
Conclusion 
 
The sociological condition of the current age is such that the modalities of the being of 
modern technology and vision have converged to reconstitute our social being such that 
what it means to be human has the makings of a technological mien and a technological 
milieu each with their modalities of vision. It is argued in this thesis that in modern 
technology we are confronted with an estrangement and blocking off of our humanity as 
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we have been transformed by the imperative of modern technology for “enframing” all 
things in its wake. This modality of “enframing” has even transformed us human beings 
into resources which as such are at hand to be used and disposed as needed and no more. 
While vision, on the other hand, similarly, presents us with an epistemological 
privileging and a foregrounding of our theoretical modality of being, but at the expense 
and oversight of our primary relation to the world, each other and our selves. This 
primary relationship is achieved Heidegger holds through our use and manipulation of 
equipment in coping and dealing with our everyday quotidian order in-the-world.  
 
However, in order to have ‘unveiled’ or ‘disclosed’ the technological condition and 
visionary condition in themselves, so to speak, and return to the primordial and primary 
domain of social being as involvement-in-society, it has been necessary to turn to 
Heidegger’s methodology of hermeneutic phenomenology; simply because social being 
has variously been reconstituted theoretically and paradigmatically and thus its reality has 
been remade, though what it is in itself as such disappears from view and into some or 
other disciplinary paradigm. In taking up the hermeneutic phenomenological 
interrogative, we have ‘disclosed’ and ‘discovered’ that fundamentally in our 
technological and visionary beings our sociality has been veiled and covered by various 
socialities, modes of social being, and sociabilities, that is, modalities of practices, 
functions and associations, which our primary socialization has bequeathed us as we 
internalize the role models and possibilities that society proffers.  
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What Heidegger offers up and what we have reconstituted as social being are the 
modalities of Dasein (being human) that arise in relation to the stances we take, or do not 
take, and the self-interpretation we make thereof as a way of defining our selves. In 
making a choice as to what society proffers from the vantage point of an existential – 
ontological understanding of social being, as unsettled, foundationless and homeless, 
which is, as open ended and undecided, and open to possibility, is a modality of sociality 
which is regarded by Heidegger as that of authentic being. In making the choice by 
contrast to take on society’s offerings as somehow essentialised, and to accept this as 
one’s modality of sociality is to flee from the truth of our existential – ontological 
understanding of social being and to fall into society’s normative order and thus manifest 
the self as inauthentic.  
 
And finally to make neither choice but to merely allow oneself to drift into whatever one 
happens to end up with by way of a sociability as social role and functionality is to 
manifest one’s sociality as undifferentiated and as such is equally a fleeing from our 
existential – ontological understanding of being as unsettled and thus to fall into society 
by default. The issue is not that society as such is problematic for whether we accept a 
modality of sociality as authentic or inauthentic or differentiated they all have their 
source in society but rather what is at issue is how we understand social being.  
 
The strong point of this thesis is, if we are to end up with an authentic modality of 
sociality, then our understanding of social being has to find its way back from its 
recontextualisation in the science of society, that is, sociology to our involvement in-
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society and hence its understanding as existential and ontological. To be sure we are 
making a fundamental point about social being and not a methodological point about how 
the social is manifest in our sociological theories. The latter is indeed important but 
comes after we have already detached ourselves from society as a function of our 
theoretical vantage point outside of an existential – ontological stance. We cannot say 
that we have been able to extricate ourselves from the subject – object distanciation and 
epistemological dualism thereto attached, only that we have concentrated our efforts in 
decentering the epistemic being, and centering the existential being as a way to consider 
the totality of social being, and not only its modality of expression in theory or science, 
and to show how the latter flows from our being-in-the-world and not it inverse. This was 
our theoretical and disciplinary claim.   
 
This thesis has as its terminus ad quo, that is, its point of departure the problematique 
expressed as a technological condition and a visual condition and as its terminus ad quem 
the human and social condition in the contemporary age and brings to our awareness the 
alternative modality that lies fallow in our social being and the sociality it potentiates in 
relation to being in general. . It did not take ‘human nature’ and ‘social being’ for granted 
as is the case in the main in sociology and sociological theory, but has taken its cue from 
Heidegger and uncovered an existential and ontological structure through a hermeneutic 
phenomenology such that two distinct and related modalities of social being were 
surfaced in our capacity for sociality and the faculty of sociability.  
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It is against these social modalities contextualized within the concept of social being as 
stated that we have come to disclose and discover, and thus through our hermeneutic 
phenomenological interrogatives take a position against an understanding of the 
technological modality of being and modalities of vision that continue to estrange us 
from our humanity. We have endeavored to provide an interpretation of this humanity as 
anchored in our deep-seated existential – ontological understanding of social being; 
firstly, in the light of our sociality as involvement in-society that is being-in-the-world 
and our sociabilities in our comportment with equipment and its equipmental nexus as 
being-amidst-things.  
 
And we have provided an understanding of this latter sociality in the sociabilities tied to 
the practices and functions associated with our comportments as it related to our 
technological modality of being and our modalities of perception in vision. We did this 
through following very closely Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology and as such 
was able to unpack the horizon of intelligibility embedded in our social being as 
hermeneutic and have disclosed and discovered this in the light of a hermeneutic 
phenomenological interrogative of technology and vision in themselves and their relation 
to our being-in-the-world and being-amidst-things.  
 
In having uncovered these relations to being we have arrived in league with Heidegger at 
the originary structure of our way of being human or Dasein as being-in-the-world and 
that as such it is not amenable to a sociologisation as theorization but that it is emergent 
as far we can tell only in an existential – ontological understanding of being. And thus we 
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have come to accept this in the way that ontology of technology and vision and its ways 
of revealing simultaneously established that our primary comportment with the world 
through equipment and its usability in things is not first and foremost a cognitively 
centered experience as is generally and conventionally accepted. But, that it is a through 
the ‘transparent’ and circumspective absorption in-the-world, that is as existential 
involvement that we come to understand social being. And that it is only when this 
modality of being of readiness-to-hand is disrupted and a subject – object relation ensues 
in presence-at-hand that we enter into the modality of theory and science, and thus 
sociology. In this regard we are by way of this existential ontological understanding of 
social being also making the argument that we are in a need of a corrective that is 
realizable in an ‘existential science’.  This being a another theoretical and disciplinary 
claim.  
 
And finally in opening up Heidegger’s concept of Being to its respecification as social 
being we have brought to bear on sociology an existential-ontology which anchors the 
social in its modalities of sociality (authentic, inauthentic and undifferentiated being) and 
concomitant  sociabilities  such that what was previously outside the purview of 
sociology can now enter into our central concerns. These are the interpolation of being by 
the essence modern technology and the detachment and objectification of  vision,  the 
primacy of socialization and the normative order in constituting our pre-ontological 
understanding of being and thus its hermeneutic bearing, the phenomenology of 
technology and perception and a return to these phenomena and their essence and how 
they reveal social being as an embedded mode of intelligibility, the existential structure 
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of our relation to being-amidst-things as equipmentality and its modalities of sociality, 
sociability and vision. And finally an understanding that our primary and original mode 
of concern (the first order reality) is one of involvement in-the-world (practice) and that 
the modality of theory and science is rather a secondary mode of concern (second order 
reality) derived from a disruption in the first order, and that we may speak of a tertiary 
mode of concern (the third order reality) of the modality of curiosity.  
 
In sum then we have given a grounded, complex and nuanced account of the concept 
social being and its concomitant modalities of revealing in technology and seeing and 
how these carry within them the horizon of an intelligibility or hermeneutic which offers 
up an alternative to what we have described as the technological and visual condition of 
estrangement and distanciation from our selves, each other and the world in which we 
dwell and inhabit..    
 
The thesis we have developed took as its point of departure that we have come to a point 
in the contemporary period where we have a convergence of a technological and a related 
visionary condition which we might collectively call a techno-visionary condition. What 
we have argued is, on the one hand, we have the technological aspect which spoke to an 
estrangement and blocking of our sociality, which is our humanity by the technological 
mien instantiated in our socialization and normative order which was acquired in the 
technological milieu of our technologised worlds. To the latter we offered as 
counterpoise the ontology of technology as a way of revealing which is how we are 
connected to the truth of our social being and being, in general, and that if we remain 
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mindful of that we do not have to yield to the existential-ontological wasteland of the 
standing reserve.  
 
On the other hand, we argued that in vision we have had an epistemological privileging 
manifest in its visuality as occularcentrism and socially reified in objective detachment 
and recontextualisation paradigmatically in theory and science. These amounted to a 
decontextualisation and ‘de-worlding’ which transformed our being-in-the-world into a 
being-in-the-technological-world where our circumspective absorption in an equipmental 
nexus continued to be reduced in scope. This occurred as we became more reliant on 
technologies which replaced our active involvement rendering us as spectators and thus 
increasing the potential for a sociability rooted in curiosity.  
 
However, in the phenomenology of perception and its ontology of vision we found in it a 
counterpoise in the intentional comportment or sociability, that a releasement of entities 
was obtained, and thus they could be encountered in and of themselves, thus releasing us 
not only from the objectification of vision, but also from the objectless-ness of the 
standing reserve. This we have taken from Heidegger’s claim that art offers an alternative 
way of revealing, though he does not take this into the province of perception, it occurred 
to us that as a modality of seeing, in the broadest sense in its existential and ontological 
grounding, there is surely to be found in the intentional structure of perception, as we 
take it up in setting perception and vision as Archimedean lever, a basis for dislodging us 
from the techno-visual condition as stated. This was the substantive claim of our thesis.  
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And on a sanguine note we end by noting that we need not surrender to the imperatives of 
technology and its concomitant modalities of vision, but certainly need to return to an 
existential – ontological understanding of our humanity, and the sociality and sociabilities 
it encompasses. We suggest this as a way to reconnect with our social being and its 
possibilities in the contemporary age of what we might call the horizon of intelligibility 
of techno-vision, and its modalities of foreclosing on the ontological dimension of techne 
for unveiling or disclosing and uncovering or discovery of the truth of social being. In 
short by way of a Heideggerian hermeneutic phenomenology we have arrived at this 
ontology of technology and vision as the ground for disclosing being and thus an 
existential – ontological understanding of social being in our contemporary age. 
Furthermore, in probing social being, sociality and sociability in the mode of being of 
equipment in particular and perceptual intentional comportment, we have been able to see 
in a hermeneutic phenomenology of technology and vision , the very conditions of 
possibility of keeping in check and counteracting the nihilism of modern technology and 
its way of revealing , as standing reserve. And, in the final instance, we have through our 
existential – ontological understanding of social being, and its dimensions (sociality and 
sociability) putatively offered up to sociology, a way to think our way back into-society 
from our recontextualisation in theory and science.  
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